The_Capt

So who are these two and why should I listen to them?

Worse, how can they not have information superiority?!

Hmm, you mean free our northern brothers from the yoke of wealth and prosperity. I like this plan but Alaska has a hidden WMD; they have some nasty breeds of moose up there. I am talking big bastards that you do not want to mess with, like kick-the-side-of-a-LAV-in bulls.

All good points it is very hard to determine what is actually happening on the ground at a tactical or operational level. What is odd is what we are seeing, if not totally fabricated, and more importantly what we are not seeing. These are snippets but also remember that a military machine is a big system. I do not need to see the inner workings of my entire car engine to know that the weird knocking sound or strange smell is not a good sign. Even as one-offs things like: - destroyed high level low density assets such as AD, engineering and logistics. - obvious logistical issues such as vehicles out of gas. - C2 and morale issues, such as abandoned vehicles and odd PW stories. - Ukrainian alleged airstrikes/drone strikes 48 hours into this thing when air superiority is kinda invasion 101. - The beginnings of insurgency actions - The fact that we are going into day 6 and there is nowhere near enough red on those maps unless one is looking for a very long drawn out slog. - We are not seeing large Ukrainian PW captures that indicate whole units or formations are surrendering - We are not seeing Ukrainian cities declare themselves as "open" or regions of the country effectively surrendering. - We are not seeing a communications or internet blackout over the Ukraine. - We are not seeing Ukrainian units splitting off or switching sides. - We are not seeing an outpouring of support for Putin back in Russia None of those "not seen" make much sense for Russia to hold back on at this point. I am not sure how the academics in your lecture think a military intelligence picture is built up but it is pretty much by stringing together a lot of information like this (a lot more) into a coherent picture. Now any one of these insolation is likely a weird tactical event or unlucky day. When one sees these things repeatedly, patterns start to emerge that give a sense of how things are proceeding. And by every professional assessment I have heard the answer is "not well" for Russia at day 6, not well at all. Further, strategically the Russians could be in real trouble as their options spaces are compressing at an increasing rate, which is not supposed to happen if one has the initiative. [re-post from the Beta Forum below] It is pretty obvious the Russian offensive has stalled but is likely regrouping and retooling. The problem for them now is 1) Ukrainians have had time to re-group, get more outside support and dig in, 2) the loss of the narrative has accelerated outside impacts such as sanctions, support for Ukraine etc, when a quick war was supposed to mitigate that, 3) the political objective of a quick install of a friendly regime is damned near impossible if you have to level half the country to win, and 4) they are running out of time in the backfield of domestic support. So what? Well if they have not completely lost their minds, you look as dangerous as you can and try to get concessions at a negotiated end-state and call it a “win”. Or you double down and go for a bunch of Sarajevos and pray domestic support doesn’t turn to revolution in the 6-12 months it will take you to create a veneer of control (good luck in the Carpathians), then you Balkanize the part you think won’t kill you in your sleep and get the hell out…Peace with Honour. Or you go WMD and hope for a Nagasaki moment that forces the Ukrainians to surrender quickly, assuming you don’t start WW3. Then brace for a long burning low level insurgency and likely terrorist actions inside Russia while preparing to become either a third world nation or a satellite of the Chinese after the resolve on economic sanctions sets up to last for a generation. It is not the tactical incompetence that is baffling, it is the total strategic train wreck. I mean this was a thousand points of failure plan at best but the box they built for themselves is already likely one of the greatest strategic military failures of the 21st century, and to be totally honest that was already a fairly high bar - see Kabul last Aug. So this will really come down to how long and how hard the Ukrainians really want to resist, they definitely have the means and support, another Russian strategic blunder. They are gaining the know-how very quickly. All that remains is the motivation and that is up to the Ukrainians to decide but having watched old women and men stand in front of tanks, only the dimmest Russian commander would be unworried by this point.

Could be? I don't think Putin can buy more time from the west, that ship has sailed, he needs to buy more time from his own people. I am not sure the "big guns", short of WMDs, are going to do much but make this a worse IO nightmare to be honest. Remember those guns need supplies which will likely have to traverse 100 odd kms of increasingly hostile heavily armed back country, the flank security on that corridor alone would be brutal. I am with you, this ain't over yet but my sense is that the worst case scenario for the west, a 3 day war with Ukraine's total surrender before it can even organize resistance, has left the building. We are quickly approaching "forced to negotiate a quick out or bleed for months" which is not really a good strategic position by any metric.

Well first hurdle is whether Putin has completely lost the bubble. I mean a really bad plan and botching an invasion is not a sign of complete insanity. If the guy has gone totally "the Russian people do not deserve to exist either if they cannot support me" then the short answer is "yes", we are going to rely on his underlings to take him out and introduce him to his god. But here one has to really look at his hold on power, it is pretty strong but not to the point 170 million people are willing to die for him alone. North Korea is another story, and so would a cult state where a really powerful ideology was in play, so think if ISIL won and formed a state with nukes, then we are all in trouble. The next big strategic question is "how far will Putin go?". If he moves to chemical, or god help us tactical nuclear weapons to try and save this thing, and his military actually back him, well all bets are off at that point. But I am not sure if we are there yet, or even will get there to be honest. A lot of very rich Russians have a lot to lose here, and are losing based on the economic hurt which is just starting. If one adds WMDs onto civilian areas on top of that I think we will see a Russian coup, maybe a civil war...which is whole other set of bad.

I posted a really long assessment post about three pages back now (we really need a billboard on this thing). Russia is definitely not out of strategic or operational gas yet but that needle is dropping. Accepting peace talks 4-5 days after you invade another country is never a good sign unless 1) that was your plan all along and 2) you can dictate the terms completely. Russia has not met either condition. It is the options space that is indicating Russia is in trouble here: sue for some sort of gamed win "Russian Minor Victory" actually at this point pyrrhic might be a better term or engage in a brutal long slog for which I am not sure the Russian people have the appetite.

Oh I guarantee the military planners have been driven nuts trying to figure that one out. How much is just enough without driving public opinion into Putins arms? It probably helped that Putin went all "hey I got nukes" because more force appears defensive now and not offensive. That said, no way Putin isn't watch the other borders, he is ex-KGB and one paranoid SOB, no way he lived this long without being one.

I can understand the concern, all the DEFCON stuff is also troubling. When one elevates that equation - nuclear war - Clausewitz no longer applies, one cannot pursue a policy of self-destruction rationally. So the real question is one of "is Russia a suicide state?" And despite the obvious issues, I have to go with a firm "no" on this one. I do not think they are ideologically there, nor is this existential to the Russian people. It is likely existential for Putin and his government but I am not sure even his hold on power is cultish enough to go down this road. Now if we start seeing BMD batteries outside major US urban centers, I will start to get worried, but I expect this is Putins way to try and get the world to back off and somehow contain this mess.

Now in another reality, this would be where NATO builds up forces in the Baltics to pin down any Russian re-deploying options...oh wait they did that with the VJTF: https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-combat-ready-force-eastern-states-russia/31723732.html

Most sources say around 12.5k but they really cannot send them all to Ukraine.

Ouch. That is some hard truth right there. This and the west is likely going to rally around NATO hard.

And one last thought that has been bugging me, UA's likely greatest asset right now is the ISR being provided by the west. To the point that I am becoming convinced that the UA might have information superiority right now, especially if the US machine has thrown its full weight behind this. If the US is sharing all the "INTs" along with hi resolution satellite, UA commanders probably have a better idea of the battlespace than Russian ones. Let alone if there is a cyber war happening in the background. This is probably one of the biggest advantages the Ukrainians could have in this fight.

So if we wanna talk insurgencies...heh, well 20 years has built a whole bunch of experts with a ton of experience here in the west on that one. From an insurgency point of view, that is exactly what you want. A military force that is heavy handed because it feels isolated and threatened from all sides is creating more insurgents with every action. This is a race to the bottom that formed militaries cannot win without a genocidal level of effort (and history if full of them that tried). Then insurgents will evolve to IEDs, and the Ukrainians have access to western SOF who won't mess around with jugs of homemade crap, no we are talking EFPs that are going to make any movement a living hell. Oh, the dark and dirty road of insurgency is just starting, worse it will likely widen the fight as terrorist actions inside Russia are also likely.

So don't know what people think about Gen P, but this is pretty good and matches pretty much what we have seen on this thread.

S'ok, insurgency provides a steep learning curve but people get really good at it really fast. Largely because them that figure it out don't die, Darwin is one helluva drill Sgt.

Absolutely, if it matches what is in the UA inventory then it is a total win because they already have the logistics in place. I am sure things like T72s and maybe even T80s they can keep going much longer. Some of the more exotic stuff will be much harder. Re: Air, missile strategy, ya that is what we in the business call "half-assed". Likely built on a lot of really shaky assumptions, built on top of other shaky assumptions. If you wanna minimize civilian infrastructure damage, then you go PGM, non-kinetic (isn't Russia supposed to be this cyber god?) or really work hard on your target lists and ROEs. What you do not do is go "s'ok, they will fold like a three legged goat by Sat morning anyway so let's not overdo it." Now they are likely to have to do a lot more damage to civilian infrastructure to pull this our of the fire then they would have in the first place.

In the short term, pretty practical if you can get trained crews onto them (even hastily trained). Long term harder as UA probably does not have spare parts or even ammo for some equipment. But the information-win of a video of a captured piece of Russian hardware hitting Russian forces is pure gold. That "early bombardment" is another odd thing about this one because it was so short. If you recall '91 and '03 and even EOF, we spent weeks pounding from the air in order to achieve full air supremacy and attrit key targets both strategic and operational. Russian look like they spent about 6 hours last Thurs on the job and went "meh, good enough". That is why internet, electricity and UA air assets are still in the game as far as I can tell.

Oh that is so the right answer..

Wow, what a crazy weekend! So I figure I might be able to add to the discussion on the whole state of things, people normally have to pay for this but I like you guys so much you can have it gratis. We are currently in a human social singularity and have been since the beginning of the pandemic. Historians may very well point out that 1991 to 2022 was one big singularity. By that I mean the coin is literally in the air and there is no real way to tell how it will land. So here we are all spinning in a massive uncertainty and trying to cling onto certainty, very human. The best we can honestly do right now is enhance our strategic agility and collective resilience because no one really knows how this thing will unfold (trust me). Predictive assessment and projections are about as accurate as throwing dice in these situations so I really encourage everyone to avoid getting to attached to any one version of reality. So that all said, here is what we can say: War, all war, is a human social activity that is defined by a collision of certainties. It is a theory with primary components of: a version of reality, communication, negotiation and sacrifice, all laid overtop a foundation of culture/identity and power. Right now this is a three way war (at least): Russia, Ukraine and the West (for want of a better word). I include the West not only for the material and volunteer fighters but the incredible amount of information warfare being waged all pretty much in the direction of Russia. Further the West also has a vision of reality and certainty stake in all this. So what? Well the versions of reality by all parties is pretty clear by now, Russia's is a still a little vague but it is hard not to see an overall aim here. Communication is literally happening live on YouTube and Twitter in all its forms. Negotiation is ongoing in so many dimensions it would be impossible to see them all. Sacrifice, which is more than the obvious tragedy of loss of life it is what each side is willing to lose in order to win, is largely unknown outside of some really big rocks (e.g. The west is not willing to sacrifice New York for Kyiv). This war is definitely existential for Ukraine, maybe for Russian and very impactful for the western based view of the world order. In summary this system is still in collision and it is almost impossible to tell where it will land; if you want to know how a war ends, you have to fight it first. So what can we tell so far? Well for that I take a look at the deeper power frameworks: If we take Power as Will, Strength, Relationships and Opportunity (there are other models but this one works): - Opportunity. The options spaces for a short sharp war, which probably served Russian ends, is pretty much closed. And here I mean for all sides. Ukraine has dug in and I am not sure they would listen at a local level if the Ukrainian government begged them to put down arms. Russian military operations have not gone according to plan. There is too much evidence of stalls, logistical screw ups and frankly disturbing losses (mins/dis information caveats accepted - some of this equipment being towed by Ukrainian tractors are Div level assets). The Russian quick definitive war options spaces have likely collapsed unless they are willing to escalate to the WMD level. The West has swung the other way, dramatically. Soft support and kinda weak signals have been galvanized in a manner I find shocking to be honest. This, and the fourth party in this fight, the people of the global community, is also something I am not sure anyone was ready for. So what? Opportunity-wise Russia is facing one of two spheres of options: negotiate a "just enough win" or dig in for a long hard grind. Ukraine is looking to "just lose enough" or pretty much "hey Russia go f#ck yourself" and wage a hybrid war for the history books (we are talking Iberian Peninsula "war to the knife" type stuff). There have been zero signs of regional Ukrainian splits beyond the Donbas (and even there), so while Balkanization is likely on the table there is a lot of space between initial bargaining positions. - Relationships. This could not have gone better for Ukraine if they actually sat down and workshopped it as a movie script. Russia is isolated and villainized to a point I am not sure even the most optimistic western planner could hope for. China and India are basically staying out of this as far as I can see, while Russia's allies are Belarus and...? I mean if its true, the freakin Chechens (modern day Cossacks) said "no thank you". Only the most delusional Russophile could describe this as anything but a total relationship disaster for Russia and enormous victory for Ukraine, at least so far. - Strength. Well this is a deep rabbit hole but I am pretty sure most experts will (and are) saying that Russia still has an enormous military advantage (even subtracting the nuclear equation). Their economy is crashing a lot faster than many thought so unless those "military contractors" on the Russian side are being paid in USD, it is going to hurt eventually. But Russia is a big machine that will take a long time to choke out economically - at least that is the theory, I am beginning to wonder. So if this turns into a long grinding war we will likely see urban sieges (wow that takes me back) and a brutal insurgency that is really not good for anyone. Russians will bleed, heavily and Ukraine will take decades to recover. In the end, neither side is showing an inability to muster and project military power, at least for now. - Will, the church of warfare, and it definitely applies here. Whose will break first? Not the West, our stakes are much lower and we are pretty much all in for the little guy, plus we are not hurting. Putin really has only one option space wrt to western Will and that is nuclear war; however, he will likely suffer a 9mm headache if he tries to go that far. Ukrainian Will, well one can only go on online video and open source here but it seems pretty clear that Ukrainian will to fight has escalated in the last 5 days, not diminished. Compare the Ukraine to the Afghan National Army vs Taliban last Aug if one wants a stark contrast of the concept of Will. Russia, hoo buddy, lets sit down and have a conversation. So things have definitely not gone according to any sane plan. The Ukrainians are really pissed off and are digging in hard, they own the ground and are being supplied by the best the west can give them and that cheque is pretty close to blank. So, how bad do you really want the Ukraine? I mean really want it? This is making that little misadventure to Afghanistan back in 79 look pretty benign. You can probably "win" this militarily but it may very well break your nation trying to do it. Russian Will is right now the center of gravity for this whole thing and time is not on its side. I am not sure the Russian people have the stomach for a months long siege of Kyiv (In 16-17, it took 115k Iraqis with western support and all the airspace 9 months to take Mosul from about 12k ISIL fighters), so what does next Christmas look like for Russians, cause I suspect Ukrainians are already planning for it. Anyway, just keep watching but I do recommend that we take mental health breaks too because this is still got room to be one crazy ride. Oh and remember while you are at it that there are those, even on this forum, who cannot take mental health breaks, this is not theoretical for them so try and keep that in mind too.

I am not saying @Haiduk is an impartial source (and seriously who could blame him) but he called this a couple hours ago.

My guess too, someone may try and spin as a tac nuke but there was a primary and then big secondary.

That is literally the craziest thing I have seen yet.

Oh man Steve, you are not a young man anymore and we kinda want to keep this gaming thing going for at least awhile yet.

I think the term we are searching for is "progressive unreality" and it happened to the US in '03 as well. It is where the logic gets somewhat narrowed by a set of more and more unrealistic assumptions that look realistic from inside the chamber. Clearly Vlad and the gang were looking for shock and awe that would paralyze the Ukrainian will to fight. They likely built a house of cards assumptions/logic along the way that made very tenuous connections between A, B and C but once you are "inside the bubble" they become perfectly logical. The problem is that there is no robustness to the system and if things do not go exactly as planned...well...bad. I also smell hubris here, likely a belief that the Ukrainians would not or could not actually resist because they are "less than us". This all becomes a "good idea to show the world we still got game" built on some really shaky echo chamber logic. It is still early days but if you do not want the locals to really get a head of steam you need to convince them quickly that resistance is totally useless or will not be needed, Russia has accomplished neither. The fact that we can even see Ukrainian strikes, empty Russian vehicles and Russian POWs is a very bad sign that this whole thing has gone sideways from a Russian point of view. More to the point, Russia is not controlling the narrative here, Ukraine is. In simpler terms, Russian option space is shrinking (as demonstrated by nuclear sabre rattling), while Ukrainian option space still wide open and when you are invading another country that is about as bad as it gets. This ain't over yet but the Russians need a big win and to put it out loud and proud or at best this is going to be a very long slog for them. The bigger picture is that the world order likely shifted in the last week and we are likely into some sort of weird Second Cold War that has in reality been building for years.