The_Capt

This is pretty good thanks, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17 I don’t think this changes the main assessments going on here but there is some good analysis here.

So I gotta start by asking: are you honestly engaging in a discussion here and want to explore ideas? Because you are coming across as a guy whose mind is made up and no amount of rational discussion is going to matter. I am honestly going to try here, you get exactly one shot based on your tone so far: 1 - Absolutely true, plans definitely do not survive contact, as old as warfare. However, what is important is how fast one can re-plan and pivot. In this the Russians have not demonstrated an ability to come up with a "new plan" and re-org to it. They have had a pregnant pause which has allowed their opponent to organize/mobilize, arm up, dig in, dominate the narrative, and access billions in military support. And then there is the quality of that initial plan. Failing to establish some key operational pre-conditions (e.g. why does the internet still work for Ukraine?) is also not a very good sign. So let's see the quality of the second (or third) plan and then we might now better what is going on. 2 - You said "The Russians have taken losses, but they remain free to operate combat aircraft and helicopters over most of the country." That is not true, in fact it is very not true below about 10k feet. The fact that Russian forces did not set the basic pre-condition of gaining air superiority is a demonstration of their problem, not Ukraine's. Plenty of evidence of Ukrainian UAV strikes online to demonstrate that we really are in more of an airpower stalemate and that is bad for an invading force. 3 - The Russian Navy is definitely still a factor. They have sea control and are hitting with missiles but 1) like everything else the Russians are doing, there appears little integration between naval, air and land power at this point and 2) the Russian amphibious capability is in serious question. If for the sole question, "why have they not used it yet? that said sea control will likely not be decisive, nor has it been decisive so far. 4- Evidence of defeat (https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html), so that is coming up on 24 BTGs of tanks, look at the logistics vehicle, coming up on 485...that is bad. But even if you refuse to believe this, then one has to ask "what losing looks like". Over to you as you asked the question. However, it is a layered issue. Political defeat, military defeat, economic defeat - if we are talking military defeat, well then an inability to influence or shape negotiations in the direction of national interest is near the top for me. And as we watch the bubble slide on the Russian side of the table, it is not looking good, but I will give you that the jury is still out. 5- Well backwards, as on a map, is kind of a one dimensional view to be honest. The primary way Russia has "gone backwards" is in the will of the Ukrainian people. This is not about terrain, it is about their willingness to fight. I think if Russian had one a quick and fairly clean fight that will might have stayed relatively dormant; however, that "plan did not survive" and now the entire nation is galvanized in an existential fight...that is definitely "backwards" from a Russian perspective. Economically, narrative and just about any other non-military metric you want to apply Russia has gone backwards severely and let's not even start on the diplomatic front as it has been a complete disaster. But if you only want to measure ground, then I guess we have to see. So we have discussed a lot on forces and comparisons. Right now, conservative estimate is that UA and Russian manpower is pretty near parity in theatre. Russia does have equipment advantage but it has failed to be able to really leverage that. Why? Well that is a million dollar question. What we have seen is that Russian mass is not working, if it was that map would look a lot different. I suspect it is either because the Russian war machine simply is not setup for this complexity and has fallen under its own weight, and the Ukrainians help them along with that. You are correct on one point, this is coming down to Will. The Russians can keep pouring men into this fight, even if they are dismounted and have no ammo or food but if they have the Will that is an option. What you seem to be sidestepping is the other issue, the Ukrainian Will to fight. They see this as existential and are acting as such, so that is a problem right there for the Russians, unless they want a decades old resistance blowing up in their face but frankly I can't even seeing them getting that far as that would mean the Russians actually have to control the entire country and not about 15% of it. Until then arms and support will flow in from the west and Russians will bleed...but we will see who blinks first. Lemme just close with a very important point - this is not an internet argument that anyone can "win". I know the reflex is there to play forum games and try to "out argue each other" but that is not what is happening here. For the most part no one really has a full picture of that is going on so we are sharing information and trying to build the best picture we can. So the usual internet argument games do not apply here. If you have a different assessment based on information you have, present it and we can all get a better picture. This is a real war and people are dying in droves, so I frankly do not care who is "right or wrong" on a given Thurs because the situation is too dynamic. But if you honestly want to contribute then do so, but this is not a contest...it is a really violent and scary puzzle. Finally, there are people posting here who are actually in range of all those guns so let's also try and keep that in mind.

You wanna back that up with some expertise or are we just gonna sling stuff here? This has been one helluva "temporary". Those maps have not moved in coming up on two weeks. Why don't you go back a few pages and read my post on what an operational pause actually is (or is not) and then come back. As demonstrated by the dozens of abandoned vehicles, you know easy to replace stuff. True, at least not entirely; however, the Russian's can't either. This has led to an air parity situation. Russians can and have been using air power but it is limited and has not been effective in interdicting western support or internal Ukrainina logistics. I would love to see the Russians try an amphibious operation. So far easy stuff like heliborne and basic mechanized has eluded them completely, so why not go for an amphibious landing to round out the experience. Based on what I have seen they will die on the beach, if they can even make it that far. They already have. The US just announced $800 million of lethal aid, is that just window dressing? You can google the aid coming in from Europe Ah, now I get it. You are that guy, one in every bar.

"The proof of that is the litter of corpses in Russian uniform after any major battle." That is a new one for me.

Why would they not ensure air superiority? Why would they ensure information/comms superiority? Why does Ukraine still have a functioning C2 structure? Why would they not ensure logistical superiority? Why would they not cut off Western Ukraine from western support as a priority? This and a whole lotta other operational pre-conditions....?

Why do people keep saying "Russia has the bigger Army"? Of the committed regular land forces the sides are at rough parity. If one takes into account Ukrainian mobilization they have the advantage. Russian has equipment and material advantage (well they did). Regardless. I am wondering if this is a symptom of the UA moving over to more offensive operations? They are going to see more casualties as the attacker, IF, the Russians have been able to dig in and create an effective defence.

Not sure I agree with this: - First, the average citizen is not seeing what we are, a total shambles of a Russian military operation that will ring out across the ages. They see that Russia attacked it neighbor, blew up a lot of buildings that look like where they live and killed a lot of people that look like them. The public have short attention spans but once something gets stuck in the collective brain-pan it is very hard to get out. We are already seeing shifts in public opinion and that drives politicians. - Second, it is not in any NATO nations military interest. We need a bad guy, a boogie man in order to create political will to arm us. We are going to play up the Russians as dangerous and a proven threat that we need to really worry about. Assessments will get slowly ratcheted up from the obvious sh*tshow we see today, towards "the Russians have learned and teamed up with the Chinese!" It is no secret that larger deployments to Eastern Europe a la Cold War are on the table. - Third, no matter how badly the Russians did here...and it is bad...collective non-military deterrence failed. We threatened sanctions, mean looks and strong language, Russia said "screw it" and went anyway. That means hard power is back on the table one way or the other. We have entered into a season of Mars (something most of the MENA already knew) and that is going to change the calculus (already has). We are already getting sweaty questions on the Arctic and NORAD. - Fourth, crazy bastards still got the bomb. No matter how ridiculous Russian performance has been, they are sitting on enough nuclear boom-boom to re-set civilization, so we are likely going to see BMD and its like go nuts. The only thing that makes this all go away is a total regime change in Russia that puts a moderate centrist in power, all the while embracing open liberal democracy...like by Saturday. I think the Russian have a better chance of a Ukrainian surrender than that happening, so here we are in crazy town.

Seriously, which part of "do not go into urban areas unsupported" got missed in all those training exercises they ran last year?

Well I guess we are coming to the "what happens next" discussions - which is a very good sign, as it likely means this thing is coming to a close; however, like every step of this thing...accept that we will probably be wrong, until we either are or are not. Ukraine So let's assume this thing ends tomorrow. What it gains or loses is not as important in the short term. In the short term Ukraine will need to deal with a pretty significant risk of humanitarian crisis. The good news is that this happened in the Spring and not the Fall, but you have millions of IDPs and refugees and highly damaged internal infrastructure. Ensuring basic food, health and habitation security, is going to be a challenge. Western aid will no doubt pour in but the Ukrainian government will have about 8 months to get basis services up and running enough that people can come home and re-start their lives. This will be the challenge of the next year through next winter. In the mid-to-long term, Ukraine will have to undertake a pretty significant reconstruction effort to 1) recover/clean up all the remnants of war that are littered around their country right now, from landmines to UXOs. 2) re-build damaged infrastructure/economy back to pre-war levels, and then 3) move past that toward something more resilient in the event they are attacked again. All this will all take time and a lot of money. As a minimum the Ukrainian government will need to get the economy back on track looking at long term sustainment of whatever strategy they chose. On military power in the long term, Ukraine does not need NATO to become secure - it is not an essential pre-condition. Beyond various bi-lateral arrangements, the Ukrainians could go the way of Switzerland or Israel, who can manage on their own quite well. They do not even need massive numbers, they played to qualitative strengths and will likely double down on that. They will need a lot of support and funding but I think that will be a tap that is turned on for awhile yet. They only need to keep the doubt of "A Second Ukrainian Disaster" in the minds of the Russian government, which should not be too hard for the next decade. They will have to fend off numerous subversive and political warfare attacks, Puntin will likely try to go back to his A game so we can expect Cold War levels of this backfield stuff, along with all sorts of proxy actions, of which Ukraine will get caught up in. I can see Ukraine being pulled into the EU or other Euro-centric mechanisms but it will always have to do so carefully. As to re-normalization with Russia, not this generation, likely two or three before that happens, if ever. Ukraine is likely to be westward facing for years to come. Russia Big unknown. The Russian people have repeatedly demonstrated that it takes a lot to get them moving, revolution-wise. I think if Russia can get out "clean" the current power structure will hold in the short term. Players behind the throne are likely already planning for Putin's exit, when or how that will happen is anyone's guess. What the next version of a Russian regime look like is also anyone's guess; however, we do know it will likely be a kleptocracy, xenophobic particularly to the west, and autocratic (with a veneer of democracy). I do not see full renormalization with Russia and the West for a long time, although we will likely keep buying their gas. Russia broke the deal and as such will remain in isolation from a western perspective. Further, any grey zone, political, subversive actions against the west are not going to met with the "hey they just tampered with our democratic processes...whacha goign to do?" shoulder shrugging. Russia has shown itself to be a clear and present danger to global stability so we are very likely to see that isolation continue. In the longer term this will likely push Russia deeper into China's power sphere, as the world become more and more bi-polar. Much like the relationship between the UK and the US, Russia will still cling onto the pomp and ceremony of an empire but China will own them. This sets us all up for the real power struggle this century as the world decides who hold the pen in writing the global order...as the planet continues to heat up. Some are calling it Cold War 2.0, others a gunfight in a phone booth, no idea but we need to be ready for both. The West NATO just got the boost it needed for the next 30 years. Some will point out "Russia sucks" but the seal is already broken and collective defence will be on the menu as western public will likely demand it. Whether or not the internal divisions that have plagued the western world are impacted by this remains to be seen. Oddly it would have been "better" for western unity if Russia had succeeded. Now with this, whatever-this-is, we might see some of the old divides resurface...which is dumb...because China. The West (and here I mean largely western Europe and its scions in NA) has been ruling the planet really since the 19th century (giver or take) and the question of "is time up?" is forefront in almost every national strategic calculus. This thing in Ukraine is a western power bloc failure, it never should have happened, but it did. We are going to be hand-wringing over this for years. To say this has been a disruption, particularly coming on the heels of the largest pandemic in a century is an understatement. I am not sure what that disruption means but there are a lot of potential outcomes and not a few of them are scary - "you better start believing in human singularities Mrs Robinson, cause you are in one".

That is because we have largely been focusing on the military picture. Nationally, Ukraine has had serious hurt put upon it. Its national and economic infrastructure has been severely damaged, it now has to try and get those refugees back or it faces a human capital problem. It has thousands of civilians still at serious risk and Russia could simply do more and more damage. It is very likely that a tidal wave of aid will flow in from the West, further pulling UKR away from Russia but any good politicians calculus has to be how to get out of this and still be able to rebuild. I am not sure what people thought winning looks like in this situation but it was always going to be "the best bad".

You guys remember that Navy guy video who went on about "forward airfields as logistical hubs?" Ya, here is the problem, you have to make them absolutely ironclad and airtight or stuff like this happens. This is not Afghanistan or Iraq, those rules do not apply.

Help me Jebus! Does this look like a refueling point to anyone? Could explain the clustering...damn...ouch. I mean the Russians earned every hit they are taking but this one is just cringe worthy.

This could also be a signal. The narrative is shifting slightly and heading towards "Mission Accomplished". He needs something at the negotiation table - Ukraine not in NATO and Crimea neutral state, may be enough. He can then declare "victory" and pull back "peace with honor" style, claiming a need to stop the suffering being perpetrated on Ukrainians by their own government, or some weird narrative. Putin is too cagey not to start seeing writing on the wall. When/If this happens, we can start thinking about what happens next.

I would bet money that any aircraft left on the tarmac in that second picture are damaged to the point of being a loss. It looks like the 3 serviceable ones pulled out but the line of choppers outside those red squares are also knocked out. That much metal flying around...

So reference my long post on pauses and initiative…a lot of chatter of Ukr going on the offensive. It will interesting to see what happens at negotiating table.

Ya me too. If it is a mine it is an off route one. Or a tilt rod that penetrates the hull. More likely was an anti-tank weapon of some sort. Either way, catastrophic.

I am only really talking about military options. Politically there are more and let's hope they exercise them.

Heard this multiple times here and elsewhere so I think it is time for us to have a Pause talk. We pretty much know the Russians have pretty much halted operational level offensives and are stalled, that is all over the place and even mainstream media has picked it up. So the theories on what is happening to the Russian forces now are roughly assembling around 3 possibilities: - Stopped, cannot start so digging in for a long haul, which will see broad operational defensive operations with limited tactical offensive actions designed to terrorize the population. - Stopped, will never re-start and are heading towards total collapse. - Stopped, conducting an operational pause to consolidate/re-org before re-starting the massive offensive to surround major cities and begin the Russian Grind strategy. I am going to leave off the first two and focus on that third one. A military war machine is a really big system built in layers, we do this for both C2/span of control and sustainment reasons. Normally a modern military will lay itself out in echelons of some shape or size in depth, the Soviets had a really organized system for this, the Wests was a bit more fluid but we all are set up to fight in what are essentially structures waves since the Roman legions (somebody google the opening of the HBO Rome series and you can see it in action). For arguments sake let's go with the rule of three and say the Russians are setup in three tactical layers (the West kind of does it as well with "2 up, 1 back and the last one as "Reserve", bit more of a pyramid scheme). The first tactical layer will be given main objectives and then some stretch ones, unless they are using mission-command then it gets a bit more opportunistic, but the concept is the same; whistle blows first wave into the breach. That echelon/wave is expected to be able to fight for a certain period of time based on a lot of factors like attrition, distance, logistical consumption; however, the old rule is that in human based systems you can get about 72-96 hours of action (i.e. little to no sleep) before people start to break down ("beware the 5th day" by Moltke (I think)). So that first wave can theoretically do up to 4 days of intense action before it needs to be relieved by the second wave. This can change based on conditions but it is important to understand that it can get shorter but not longer because we are still fighting with human beings as the basis of the system. So no matter how tough the guys might think they are, or how many chin ups they can do, after 4 days without sleep their brains start to shut down (trust me, been there and done it). Then the second wave is supposed to conduct some sort of passage of lines and process continues for another 72-96, and then the third wave (if you have one). While the second and third are doing their thing the first wave is supposed to be going through a tactical consolidation which include resupply/reinforcements/replacements and reorganization. This is also when things like vehicle and weapons systems maintenance happens because vehicles will break down like people. Now that whole system, which for arguments sake we can call the "operational system" is designed to be able to keep this up for weeks to months. However after a certain amount of time all the losses and wear & tear start to add up and you need...wait for it...an operational pause. [Aside: eventually, all these operational pauses add up and you see a strategic pause but that can take much longer]. This pause is basically an entire system overhaul to do all sorts of things that look like refitting a ship. Replacements, rotations and re-organization of tactical units. Planning and boring stuff like orders. A lot of logistical and ISR scene setting for the next phase, and lastly...don't let your opponent know you are doing an operational pause until it is over. So you will still see tactical action such as feints, tactical offensives but with short small gains - more jabs than actual punches - are often employed to try and make it hard for an opponent to figure out that you are in fact pausing...why? We will come back to that. Ok, so how does that apply to the current situation. Let's accept that this is an operational pause for a moment and the big nasty Russian Bear is just cleaning the blood out of its fur before going back to ravaging Ukrainian bunnies. Well first off it was not a planned pause, it happened too quickly. Based on the big maps and overall tempo, it appears like the Russians were really advancing hard for the first 3-4 days. We did see a likely echelon flip on the next 3-4 days as they pushed depth forward but by about day 10 of this thing everyone was starting to notice that the big red blotches on the map had stopped moving. So let's give the Russian the benefit of the doubt and say they actually managed to use all three echelons effectively, well what likely did not happen was that 1st wave reloaded while waves 2 and 3 continued. Remember formations are designed to be able to do this for weeks and out to months if the situation allows. So having the whole operational system come to a stop in 10 days is a very good indication that this was not in the plan. 10 days into this war was 5 March, a week and half ago. Even the most uninformed journalist (and here I cast a baleful eye at our own CBC because it is harder to find a more uninformed bunch when it comes to warfare) is getting the drift that the Russians are not moving. Now remember when I said "don't let your opponent know you are pausing"? The reason for this is that you do not what them to try and grab the operational initiative, it is bad if they do because you are now on the defensive pretty much by definition. Now if you plan for this, you can do all sorts of clever things like pull you opponent into over reaching etc, not sure I see a masterful design on the Russian side here. But the UA has shown more offensive actions and c-attacks. We have all been talking about a big UA operational strike, not sure if it will happen but the Russians are leaving the door open to one because of this pregnant operational pause. So to summarize, the Russian operational pause: 1) came much earlier than it should have, why?, 2) has lasted the length of an Old Testament reading in modern warfare timelines, and 3) is handing initiative over to their opponent. So what? Well if this is a Russian operational pause (at this rate, and with rumors of those other 40 BTGs it could be strategic) it is not a good one. The conditions that led to that are very likely really poor pre-planning, ample evidence of that, and systemic failures that happened very quickly. This speaks to a brittle operational system that they are having to almost re-tool from the ground up. I have serious doubts that the Russians, who have lost some of their best troops, can come out of this as a new "super-force" able to mass joint effects and cut through the UA in days. The types of planning and quality organization/preparations, from logistics to C4ISR, that a military force needs to do in order to pull off what the Russians are attempting takes years to prepare and build. So if this is an operational pause, it is probably a master class in "how not to do this" and I doubt it will solve much for the Russian forces who are now coming up on two weeks of time they have given their opponent to prepare, supply and continue to hit them as they are pausing.

Well that is the end to foreign aviation investment in Russia. Of course how long they can keep them in the air with zero maintenance support from western manufacturers is a question. Dig up Vlad, dig up!

Not sure where that is coming from. We had people joining the US, UK and Australian militaries and went on all sorts of “military action” in countries we are not at war with. Ukraine is a partner force we had a military mission with so joining their military is pretty much the same thing. Sounds like a either a myth or some weird law on the books that no one actually enforces. ISIS foreign fighters can be charged for “support to a terrorist organization”, which is different.

Ukraine is not legally identified as a terrorist organization like ISIS was, so no. They are essentially volunteering to fight under the authority of another state whose defence is recognized by the UN and the laws of armed conflict. No different from those who went south to join the US military after 9/11.

I would hazard about double those percentages by now, so 12-14% of the attacking force. Lowball estimates by the US are say 3000 KIA, so add another 9000 WIA, MIA or whatever (1:3 is not crazy), so the Ukrainian estimate of 12k total out of battle is not too far out to lunch to be honest. If the Russians invaded with 110k, that takes them over 10% losses overall. Major equipment such as tanks seem to echo this. If they brought in 120 BTG that is, on paper, 1200 MBTs but let’s say they had double that with armor heavy formations and reserves, so 2400 - about 25% of the total fleet. Well oryx.com is showing about 213 MBTs as seen on OS media, which is coming up on 9%, numbers are likely higher as not every tank gets a twitter shot. IFVs and APCs also run in at around 388 out of 3600, so are doing worse than tanks (11% ish) Logistical vehicles, could be in even worse shape as they are showing almost 411 lost which over the holdings of a CAA and these likely get less airtime. Engineer stuff and arty also is taking a pounding. So if I were to guess I would say losses in frontline units are somewhere between 10-20% right now, which is on the border of ineffective (normally viewed as 70% as one cannot tactically maneuver without risk and any reserves are spent) and are needing re-org, which might be actually happening, hence the pregnant pause. Or the Russians are coming up on spent entirely and are looking for an exit door.

I think the major problem is trying to find objective observations. The Ukrainians are going to be skewed but I also give the steady stream of "broken Russians" on social as more valid because it is in their best interest to push out real untainted data right now. Any mis/dis information coming from Ukraine is counter-productive and erodes the high ground they hold in the information war. That, and to try and invent or doctor that many videos and photos, and not get caught out is a massive undertaking. In short, the Ukrainians don't want to lie, nor does it look like they have to at this point. Russia on the other had has been lying continuously both to its own people and the world, so trying to find valid data from that end is very hard. Russia's best play is also the one they cannot exercise because of the box they have built - the truth. If Russia came out and said, "yep Oryx is correct we have been taking it in the teeth but here is our honest Ukrainian data, undistorted evidence of large Ukrainian losses" then one could start to balance the picture. However, Russia is not going to do that because it has already been lying to its own people. In the middle we have some open source sites that are trying to report on only what they see. I can only go on what we know for sure: - Russian lines have not really moved in almost 2 weeks, a few thin advances are not success. - Open source evidence of Russian losses and the nature of those losses signal 1) the Russians are in the hurt and 2) the Ukrainians are putting on that hurt. - Russian negotiation position has started to slide. It went from "Steel Russian Bear will eat you and poop you out into better Ukraine/mini-Russia" to "Hey guys, let us keep Crimea and Donbas and stay out of NATO we will call it even". By next week it will be "Ok, how about we just keep pre-conflict lines/status quo and you stay out of NATO, maybe "in a few more weeks it will be "Ok, just let us walk out without killing us all". - As predicted, Russia calling out to China for help. I mean seriously, we all saw it coming but this is crazy based on their history. Beyond that, I guess all we can do is be aware of our own biases and be ready to be wrong.

I went down to DC during this crisis and even the US took months to pivot onto this one tactical threat capability (e.g. Armored HUMVEEs, C-IED etc)...and this was one issue. The stuff we are seeing in the Russian system are hitting military reform-levels to address and those take years, if not decades.

So this is important, why are the Russians leaving high value assets in fields? A few possibilities: - Breakdown in logistical system - most likely cause given the wide spread reporting of fuel/supply shortages, It would stand to reason that recovery assets are also no where to be found if the Russian logistical system is in trouble. - The Russians think the CoGs are something else and logistics/mobility are not on their priority lists. Or they are moving to another plan that does not include them. I am at a loss for what that would look like beyond a total abandoning of offensive, or all operations for that matter. - They are being forced to as a result of UKR rear-area actions. This means the backfield is not secure for the Russian LOCs, at least in these areas. - Completely broken C2. Perhaps those assets just got lost or were left out of contact with higher. Worse Russian C2 might not even know they have lost these assets in this case. Morale plays a factor here as well. Regardless, we have seen a few people ask "how do you know it is going bad for Russia?" "are we in an anti-Russian echo chamber". Well maybe but none of those possibilities above are very good for the Russians at all, and all signs of things that should not be happening as widely as they are. I would even be less concerned if we saw AVLBs blown up, that is bad but this is a dangerous business. Simply abandoning them, in many cases without destroying them first, is a sign of a much deeper breakdown in the Russian system...and we are seeing it almost everywhere. And with every day, I am growing less and less convinced the Russians can recover to the point that they can wage effective offensive operations against an opponent who has had more and more time to prepare.