The_Capt

So it is about 11 pm in Kyiv so let's summarize day 3 of this nasty bit of business. If I miss anything feel free to jump in. [aside: people will recall when Iran shot down that Ukrainian airliner (just weird) how a bunch of internet nerds figured out where the shooter were before western intel did, well this little thread is doing one bang up job of intel analysis so I wanna try and capture that]. Caveat - this assessment is based on unclassified open source intelligence, much of it unverified or unverifiable at this time. Strategic Level: While the strategic causes of this military action by Russia remain vague and unconfirmed (i.e. I still have not seen a reason "why now" beyond "why not"), the overall most likely strategic objective is the total defeat of Ukraine as a nation, followed by installation of a puppet regime as a demonstration to NATO and western powers of Russian power in the region. The overall Russian strategy in this action was to overwhelm the Ukrainian forces quickly with a knockout blow aimed at Kyiv designed to break the will of Ukrainian resistance. It appears that this objective was in a 48-72 hour window, other strategic objectives are largely unknow at this time (?). One of the biggest strategic unknowns at this time is the overall will of the Russian people to continue to prosecute this war, current Russian leadership likely remain fully committed and short of a regime change will not likely voluntarily pull out. Over the last 72 hours Europe and the West appear to have solidified their stance on this war with respect to increasing sanctions and military support to the Ukraine. China and India remain two global powers who have not engaged in punitive measures against Russia, nor have they provided direct support to Ukraine. Another unknown at this time is whether Turkey will close the Black Sea to additional Russian maritime forces. It is clear that outside Russia, at least, Russia has not managed to control the strategic narrative for this war nor have dis/mis information campaigns been effective widening divisions in Western responses. In fact the opposite appear to be true as this action has created unity in NATO and the European community, at least in the short term. Operational Level: - As of 72 hours into the war there is evidence that Russia has not achieved air superiority, information/cyber superiority, decision superiority or effectively eroded the Ukrainian infrastructure (military or civilian) or power centers of gravity at the operational or tactical level. Russian advances on a multi-pronged assault have made modest gains however it appears that some lines of advance may have stalled. - Russian casualties are likely high (again very hard to get specifics) or at least higher than expected. - There are indications that Russian logistical systems have failed in some locations, whether this is an indicator of isolated issues or a broader issue remains unknown. Evidence of fuel shortages has been presented suggesting disruption in operational LOCs - Russian forces are currently of questionable quality along some axis of advance at least based on captured POWs. Further based on largely anecdotal evidence, it appears that Russia has not employed a form of Mission Command, nor really provided any detailed SA to some Russian tactical units (again based on POW interviews). - Latest reports are that heavy concentrations of artillery are forming one the outskirts of Kyiv, which could signal a shift in strategy from a "knock out maneuver" toward a more "shock and awe" approach, or the Russians have essentially opted for an attritional approach to Kyiv at least. - Ukrainian forces have demonstrated a level of lethality and coordination beyond expectations of open source analysts and likely Russian planners. How much of this is do to outside support and how much is due to Russian setback remains unclear. Tactical: - Ukrainian forces have broadcast examples of both ambush and deep strike, the role of specific military capability remains vague. The effectiveness next gen ATGM systems and MANPADs remains unknown but reported high armored vehicle casualties indicate they have been effective. Overall Summary: As of the first 72 hours of the war, it appears that the Russian military has overestimated its own capabilities and/or the capabilities of Ukrainian resistance and has not likely met the timelines it had set during pre-war planning. The assessment is that the next 24-48 hours will be critical in the outcome of this war and if Russian forces are not about to take Kyiv and inflict some serious damage to the Ukrainian people's will, their own strategic center of gravity will become more vulnerable. Did I miss anything? Seriously, jump in.

Hey I get tactical context but that weapon system is normally in a DAG - probably pushed down to a lower level in this one no doubt. One does not simply drop ones MLRS, by my count 3 systems with 120 tubes can do a good job of suppressing a grid square, this would be a equivalent of a BTG dropping its rifle. Sure conditions exist where you would but none of them are very good. You are either out of gas, out of ammo or the enemy have overrun your rear area to name a few. More precisely - What would drive a commander to drop those weapon systems?

Oh, I am not so sure, the generals have all the guns. The "spirited resistance of Kyiv" is making mainstream news now [I am noticing that mainstream news is about 6-12 hours behind the live feeds]. We will know this is really over when the NATO has to get assurances that Ukraine will not counter-attack into Russia. Of course a completely upside down Russia is not great either.

That is a good point, incompetency does not a principle make. I am wondering about those Ukrainian UAVs. We could not keep air superiority below 2000 feet in Iraq and I am wondering what it looks like over there now.

Hell I am talking about Twitter! Come on, invasion 101 guys, cut the power, cut off communications and bring lots of gas, then be ready to stay for awhile.

Which will be really fun when they get to Western Ukraine and a 150 x 250 km belt of Carpathian mountains along borders of NATO nations. Seriously, who thought this was a good idea? Did they workshop this at all?

I guess it was next to "gas" on the note on the fridge. In Crimea, Russia had hacked the cell phone system to a frankly stunning degree, I guess they figured "meh" on this one?

Unless increased lethality is pushing that ratio outward. I am also starting to wonder about the metrics of air superiority.

Add to this the fact that we really are not talking really long LOCs yet. Based on the open source maps I can only see about 100km of penetration. In order to take central Ukraine you are talking 3-4 times that distance in what seems to be pretty hostile territory. I am honestly starting to think that the whole Russian plan was a 48-72 push to Kyiv, take capital and the Ukrainians surrender. Tactical formations all carry about 3-4 DOS after that operational level needs to be clicking and at least in these isolated cases it appear to not be. Now the Russians may be doubling down on success letting the "weak and failed" go without but that is high risk, if for the only reason the whole world is watching Russian units caught with their pants down. Speaking of which, how/why does Ukraine still have internet and phone?

I suspect you are right on this one. If so this is hubris and just bad military planning. 1st wave is find and fix, 2nd is finish, 3rd is exploit...that was Soviet doctrine. I am starting to wonder if our standard force ratio calcs are in need of a re-look. I think the character of this war will be decided by Mon morning. The Russian blitzkrieg is definitely starting to look less likely but day ain't over yet. So we could be talking slow grinding grudge match, if so that is not in Russian favour at all.

Wow, well that seems to hint at the whole "will they resist for the long haul" pretty well.

You assume it will be over in 48 hours? CM has taught us all that any combat scenario is going to be ten times harder than we assume.

I am all about verify, verify and verify especially in the middle of a war, but this is really weird if true. In western doctrine finding and killing these things was near the top of the target list. To have an HVT like this "run out of gas and be abandoned" points to an unraveling of Russian logistics (and morale) at least on this road.

So this is interesting and in the spirit of the thread I am not going to make this personal. Instead I think we have a fundamental failure to understand different perspectives. I have no doubt at all we in the west do not fully understand the Russian/Putin perspective, hence why I think we are having such a reaction to all this, but this appears to cut both ways. So, why this is very unreasonable: - First, any western politician who accepts these terms will have a Neville Chamberlain meme tattooed to their forehead right until the next election cycle, so there is that. - Next, the "rules" say that the only international body that can make dictates to a nation or group of nations is the UN itself via the UNSC...and it just got shot in the head (again) by a veto carrying nation. - Further, the "rules" then state that the only nations that can or cannot "allow the US" or anyone else for that matter to exercise anywhere are the recognized sovereign nations that control those territories. A third party nation, like Russia cannot dictate it for them, that is a violation of a state. Same goes for "allowing" 15 nations to still support Ukraine - except the US and three "others" - again the only nation that can legally determine that is the Ukraine itself. To even suggest this as a starting point is in effect negotiating how much sovereignty Russia can violate, which is "none" under the current international system. This is akin to breaking into someone's house and negotiating what you can steal as "reasonable negotiation", - But but, the US in Iraq. I know this will come up and it definitely has some baggage; however, Iraq was a known and sanctioned rogue state that even though the global order did not like the US move, could live with it because the angels were not really on Saddam's side. Russian cannot apply the same calculus here as neither the Ukraine or Baltic states are doing anything except exercising their own sovereignty in a manner that Russia does not agree with. - Again on the US. In '03 Canada said "nope, not in big guy" on the whole Iraq thing. If you want a parallel between Russian and Ukraine, US and Canada is not a bad one (we even had a war way back). Canada is in a lot of ways a satellite state to the US, so when we said "no", well there were a lot of hurt feelings and nasty rhetoric but we did not see ("or else") threats of military force if we did not support. So what? Russian actions before, during and no doubt after this whole thing are nowhere near accepted norms baseline and from that position this was always going to be a non-starter

Most of the open source analysts seem to agree that the capital would fall this weekend and the whole conventional thing would end shortly after that. I am not sure, and could not say even if I did what the J2 guys are seeing. I am still wondering if Russian has a card (that does not involve WMDs) left to play but sluggish and messy is what I put on what I have seen so far. If the Russians are still slugging it out on the outskirts of Kyiv by say Mon then I do not think this has gone to plan.

You wanna make sanctions stick for a generation (see Iraq and Syria) keep going down this road. Further if the Russian public were unsteady before, gassing civilians really does not do much to reassure.

We gotta be careful with info sources but 1) this poster sounds like he knows what he is talking about, I would guess professional military background and 2) a lot of this resonates. This whole thing is starting to feel sluggish on the Russian side and the steady stream of really expensive equipment losses are adding up (even if half of them are errors).

So this does not sound like Russian air superiority or at least not total. Even if this was an artillery strike it likely had airborne ISR to be this accurate. Tanks and infantry stuff is supposed to get “got”. Even arty, but engineers and logistics are not.

I don’t want to lose this one. Ok, so this is important. Beyond the fact that there are some violations of laws of armed conflict here with uniform switching and use of non-military but this whole thing is violation of laws of armed conflict so there’s that. This is hybrid warfare. I do recall reading that the Soviets had planned to use this approach as a deep battle tactic but not on the frontline. This is tactical level hybrid subversive/infiltration on a significant scale.

Ah, so we want to talk “rational”, which is kinda strange given the whole lead up to this mess but, ok I will bite. There are two types of rationality at work here, objective or high level, and subjective or relative. High level, the rational is that at least as far as anyone can tell the Russian public are not entirely onside with this whole dance. So if one were to bleed Russian forces enough they might buckle, much similar to how Afghanistan in the 80s went but accelerated. The cost will be high but if Russia will collapses (or somebody with real power in the back room “retires” Putin) then the pay off is Ukraine remains free, gets all sorts of reconstruction aid from the west and makes the world record for admission into NATO, while Russians burn their own cities. At a low level, Russians just blew up my home and killed my friends and family, I am not “rational”, I am furious and willing to take as many Russian soldiers with me cause they are likely to kill me anyway [aside: are we really applauding the Russian military for not committing war crimes? Man, that is a low bar]. In the end it is a Ukrainian decision and all we can do is support them as much as possible -in case there was any doubt the west has picked a side here-, and more than we did in the run up to this mess.

So this And this is, victim blaming. An angle oppressors and abusers have used forever: “this is your fault for struggling”. It is the little old lady’s fault for getting shot. I am not sure what the Ukrainian’s should do they are a free people (for now) who are fighting and dying for that freedom. I think Russia should stop because the loss of life is entirely on them right now. I think Russia should pay for the damage it has caused and toss out its current government while it is at it and rejoin the international community. But we are being all realistic and pragmatic. Ok, same answer. Realistically this will devolve into a long running insurgency backed by western powers that will make Iraq and Afghanistan look like a grade school dance - so awkward but adorable. This will likely create destabilizing pressure on Putins regime and instability in Russia itself. So from a Russian point of view Ukraine rolling over and quitting is the only good option at this point. And I for one sincerely hope they find a way to remain a free and democratic nation able to chart their own destiny.

Well if that is true, someone had better tell the US cause they clearly do not see it that way. I am no economics expert but when a nation is moving to become the global currency reserve (just google it) it is going to have that pen, history backs that up. Anyway, we probably should stray too far into the China debate or the den mother is going to come in and take our candles away.

Ya, I am not buying the “eastern sage/western squirrel” argument. I mean there is some truth to the election cycle pendulum but for having “no long term strategic thinking” the west has become the richest and most powerful version of human civilization by any metric (except possibly spiritual). If Putin is looking into that bowl of water, across the sands of time, he will note that the west is pretty messed up coming out of this pandemic and later might have been better. Hell, we had pretty much written off Crimea and he needed only a few member states to reject or derail the entry process into NATO. In short for a “long term strategist” he had a bunch of options he didn’t just leave on the table, he lit them on fire and flushed them down the toilet. He also completely missed the one thing that really matters to the West, the Deal. We all got very rich off the Deal and he just pissed all over it.

Ok, let’s do China for a minute. China’s not in the same league as Russia, I am not sure they are even playing the same sport. China’s trajectory and activities mirror US early days as a rising power in the 19th century, they are in this to win. Win what Capt? Win the pen that gets to write the new set of rules. So What about Ukraine? Well if you are trying for top dog, it does not mean you just have weight to throw around, you must also lead. China has done this in its sphere but globally it has been standing back and waiting. This whole thing is not helping China in my opinion. They are playing a long game and a kinda-partner lit half the board on fire. This is damned awkward for them as they are not ready to take over global leadership, they lack the clout or street cred and the US, while a little bruised up, is no where near ready to toss in the towel. So now Russia starts a ruckus and they are trying desperately to not take a side while looking weak in the process; this does not promote a global leadership image and they cannot break with Russia the next biggest power in the “out club”. And then there is India..like what the hell guys?!

In political and strategic timeframes this is a whiplashing policy shift even for an autocrat. This time last year no one as seriously thinking that beyond the usual sabre rattling and posturing that this was an eventuality, or at least mainstream analysis. They obviously set this in motion a few months ago and again , why? If the calculus was “well been getting away with rear area ass grabbery, now let’s try cruise missiles”, it is a miscalculation of historic proportions. That or, he knows something we don’t and all resolve collapses in a few weeks, at which point we are really in trouble.