The_Capt

That is not what I see. I see the growing suspicion I have had for some time now that air superiority might be a dead concept, which has enormous implications. Especially if you are trying to invade/occupy another country.

So I did a piece a long way back on the thread on how Russia's Relationship as a component of its power is collapsing, this is what that looks like. They managed to get Finland, Sweden and Switzerland to vote in favor...Jeopardy answer "how you know you are totally f#cked in a land war in Europe?"

I am starting to think we may have over estimated the Russian cyber capability. If they have got dark farms of hackers ready to collapse the western economic system, why can't they even turn off Twitter in the Ukraine? Right now the social media feeds and internal communication networks in Ukraine are doing as much damage to Russia as those Javelins. If anything the cyber war looks like it is going the other way.

So I think a lot of people (including some experts) are wrestling with this concept of what a Ukrainian victory might look like. The simplest answer is "existence". If, after all this Ukraine is still a functioning independent nation (even with redrawn borders) able to decide and chart its own fate, and recognized within the global community as such...they "win". Further, as in most wars the Ukrainians win if Russian "lose" and the definition of that is widening by the min; however, the Russians also have the added spin of the reality that they can "win" in Ukraine and still "lose", this is an added complication that invading militaries all face. Russia could pound a half a dozen Ukrainian cities into dust, massive civilian casualties and eventually the Ukrainian government resolve may fracture, it is highly likely that the resolve of the Ukrainian people, at least in some circles will outlast the resolve of the government, that is a the seed of an insurgency. Technically, if the Ukrainian government falls and an insurgency doesn't happen, it is still a Russian "loss". The reason, that level of blunt use of force, human suffering and likely war crimes will ensure that the sanctions we are seeing will stick for a very long time, to the point that Russia will not be "Russia" in a few years. Further domestic support in Russia is very likely going to crack and internal security issues are almost guaranteed. Looking at the strategic options space, Ukraine has many roads to victory left to it right now. They can lose Kyiv and major cities in the east but can create governments in exile and deny western Ukraine, at least, with resistance for a generation. There are options and off-ramps for them all along the way from here to there. The Russian strategic options space is compressing quickly and painfully. Right now, the only Russian "win" is to keep the pressure up and win at the negotiation table. If they do it early and reasonably the west may lose interest in sanctions in a year or two. They may get the Crimea (but man it cost them) and some concessions but these are very big maybes right now. Russian credibility has been burned for a generation on the world stage, it is done, they do not get that back. All other options available to Russia are worse that that option. They double down and do the medieval game, and they are a third world nation or satellite of China in less than a decade. Or the Russian population votes with violence, we are looking at destabilization of Russia in the short term and possibility of a Russian Civil war in the longer. I think it much more likely that Putin is retired well before this happens. In short, doubling down on kinetic sieges is akin to finding your arm stuck in a hornets nest and deciding to start smashing it with your face. Sure you will break the hive and if given enough time you will kill a lot of hornets, but you sure as hell won't be going out dancing anytime soon. And to make matters worse, you are guaranteed to have that on YouTube with a billion hits.

Ok, hey maybe they have got some people on staff but a few tours in the sand makes them experts at shooting people and maybe not so much on the invasion of an entire country. Now if they were on the Corp staff back in 03 or SAMS grads with some NATO time, ok. Based on their resumes this is akin to getting municipal planning advice from two fire fighters. Sure they are on the payroll but way out of their lane. Live and let live but I would be cautious and weigh their opinions accordingly.

I didn’t get a real “professional analyst” vibe off them. Of course it is the Internet so pick your own truth.

So who are these two and why should I listen to them?

Worse, how can they not have information superiority?!

Hmm, you mean free our northern brothers from the yoke of wealth and prosperity. I like this plan but Alaska has a hidden WMD; they have some nasty breeds of moose up there. I am talking big bastards that you do not want to mess with, like kick-the-side-of-a-LAV-in bulls.

All good points it is very hard to determine what is actually happening on the ground at a tactical or operational level. What is odd is what we are seeing, if not totally fabricated, and more importantly what we are not seeing. These are snippets but also remember that a military machine is a big system. I do not need to see the inner workings of my entire car engine to know that the weird knocking sound or strange smell is not a good sign. Even as one-offs things like: - destroyed high level low density assets such as AD, engineering and logistics. - obvious logistical issues such as vehicles out of gas. - C2 and morale issues, such as abandoned vehicles and odd PW stories. - Ukrainian alleged airstrikes/drone strikes 48 hours into this thing when air superiority is kinda invasion 101. - The beginnings of insurgency actions - The fact that we are going into day 6 and there is nowhere near enough red on those maps unless one is looking for a very long drawn out slog. - We are not seeing large Ukrainian PW captures that indicate whole units or formations are surrendering - We are not seeing Ukrainian cities declare themselves as "open" or regions of the country effectively surrendering. - We are not seeing a communications or internet blackout over the Ukraine. - We are not seeing Ukrainian units splitting off or switching sides. - We are not seeing an outpouring of support for Putin back in Russia None of those "not seen" make much sense for Russia to hold back on at this point. I am not sure how the academics in your lecture think a military intelligence picture is built up but it is pretty much by stringing together a lot of information like this (a lot more) into a coherent picture. Now any one of these insolation is likely a weird tactical event or unlucky day. When one sees these things repeatedly, patterns start to emerge that give a sense of how things are proceeding. And by every professional assessment I have heard the answer is "not well" for Russia at day 6, not well at all. Further, strategically the Russians could be in real trouble as their options spaces are compressing at an increasing rate, which is not supposed to happen if one has the initiative. [re-post from the Beta Forum below] It is pretty obvious the Russian offensive has stalled but is likely regrouping and retooling. The problem for them now is 1) Ukrainians have had time to re-group, get more outside support and dig in, 2) the loss of the narrative has accelerated outside impacts such as sanctions, support for Ukraine etc, when a quick war was supposed to mitigate that, 3) the political objective of a quick install of a friendly regime is damned near impossible if you have to level half the country to win, and 4) they are running out of time in the backfield of domestic support. So what? Well if they have not completely lost their minds, you look as dangerous as you can and try to get concessions at a negotiated end-state and call it a “win”. Or you double down and go for a bunch of Sarajevos and pray domestic support doesn’t turn to revolution in the 6-12 months it will take you to create a veneer of control (good luck in the Carpathians), then you Balkanize the part you think won’t kill you in your sleep and get the hell out…Peace with Honour. Or you go WMD and hope for a Nagasaki moment that forces the Ukrainians to surrender quickly, assuming you don’t start WW3. Then brace for a long burning low level insurgency and likely terrorist actions inside Russia while preparing to become either a third world nation or a satellite of the Chinese after the resolve on economic sanctions sets up to last for a generation. It is not the tactical incompetence that is baffling, it is the total strategic train wreck. I mean this was a thousand points of failure plan at best but the box they built for themselves is already likely one of the greatest strategic military failures of the 21st century, and to be totally honest that was already a fairly high bar - see Kabul last Aug. So this will really come down to how long and how hard the Ukrainians really want to resist, they definitely have the means and support, another Russian strategic blunder. They are gaining the know-how very quickly. All that remains is the motivation and that is up to the Ukrainians to decide but having watched old women and men stand in front of tanks, only the dimmest Russian commander would be unworried by this point.

Could be? I don't think Putin can buy more time from the west, that ship has sailed, he needs to buy more time from his own people. I am not sure the "big guns", short of WMDs, are going to do much but make this a worse IO nightmare to be honest. Remember those guns need supplies which will likely have to traverse 100 odd kms of increasingly hostile heavily armed back country, the flank security on that corridor alone would be brutal. I am with you, this ain't over yet but my sense is that the worst case scenario for the west, a 3 day war with Ukraine's total surrender before it can even organize resistance, has left the building. We are quickly approaching "forced to negotiate a quick out or bleed for months" which is not really a good strategic position by any metric.

Well first hurdle is whether Putin has completely lost the bubble. I mean a really bad plan and botching an invasion is not a sign of complete insanity. If the guy has gone totally "the Russian people do not deserve to exist either if they cannot support me" then the short answer is "yes", we are going to rely on his underlings to take him out and introduce him to his god. But here one has to really look at his hold on power, it is pretty strong but not to the point 170 million people are willing to die for him alone. North Korea is another story, and so would a cult state where a really powerful ideology was in play, so think if ISIL won and formed a state with nukes, then we are all in trouble. The next big strategic question is "how far will Putin go?". If he moves to chemical, or god help us tactical nuclear weapons to try and save this thing, and his military actually back him, well all bets are off at that point. But I am not sure if we are there yet, or even will get there to be honest. A lot of very rich Russians have a lot to lose here, and are losing based on the economic hurt which is just starting. If one adds WMDs onto civilian areas on top of that I think we will see a Russian coup, maybe a civil war...which is whole other set of bad.

I posted a really long assessment post about three pages back now (we really need a billboard on this thing). Russia is definitely not out of strategic or operational gas yet but that needle is dropping. Accepting peace talks 4-5 days after you invade another country is never a good sign unless 1) that was your plan all along and 2) you can dictate the terms completely. Russia has not met either condition. It is the options space that is indicating Russia is in trouble here: sue for some sort of gamed win "Russian Minor Victory" actually at this point pyrrhic might be a better term or engage in a brutal long slog for which I am not sure the Russian people have the appetite.

Oh I guarantee the military planners have been driven nuts trying to figure that one out. How much is just enough without driving public opinion into Putins arms? It probably helped that Putin went all "hey I got nukes" because more force appears defensive now and not offensive. That said, no way Putin isn't watch the other borders, he is ex-KGB and one paranoid SOB, no way he lived this long without being one.

I can understand the concern, all the DEFCON stuff is also troubling. When one elevates that equation - nuclear war - Clausewitz no longer applies, one cannot pursue a policy of self-destruction rationally. So the real question is one of "is Russia a suicide state?" And despite the obvious issues, I have to go with a firm "no" on this one. I do not think they are ideologically there, nor is this existential to the Russian people. It is likely existential for Putin and his government but I am not sure even his hold on power is cultish enough to go down this road. Now if we start seeing BMD batteries outside major US urban centers, I will start to get worried, but I expect this is Putins way to try and get the world to back off and somehow contain this mess.

Now in another reality, this would be where NATO builds up forces in the Baltics to pin down any Russian re-deploying options...oh wait they did that with the VJTF: https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-combat-ready-force-eastern-states-russia/31723732.html

Most sources say around 12.5k but they really cannot send them all to Ukraine.

Ouch. That is some hard truth right there. This and the west is likely going to rally around NATO hard.

And one last thought that has been bugging me, UA's likely greatest asset right now is the ISR being provided by the west. To the point that I am becoming convinced that the UA might have information superiority right now, especially if the US machine has thrown its full weight behind this. If the US is sharing all the "INTs" along with hi resolution satellite, UA commanders probably have a better idea of the battlespace than Russian ones. Let alone if there is a cyber war happening in the background. This is probably one of the biggest advantages the Ukrainians could have in this fight.

So if we wanna talk insurgencies...heh, well 20 years has built a whole bunch of experts with a ton of experience here in the west on that one. From an insurgency point of view, that is exactly what you want. A military force that is heavy handed because it feels isolated and threatened from all sides is creating more insurgents with every action. This is a race to the bottom that formed militaries cannot win without a genocidal level of effort (and history if full of them that tried). Then insurgents will evolve to IEDs, and the Ukrainians have access to western SOF who won't mess around with jugs of homemade crap, no we are talking EFPs that are going to make any movement a living hell. Oh, the dark and dirty road of insurgency is just starting, worse it will likely widen the fight as terrorist actions inside Russia are also likely.

So don't know what people think about Gen P, but this is pretty good and matches pretty much what we have seen on this thread.

S'ok, insurgency provides a steep learning curve but people get really good at it really fast. Largely because them that figure it out don't die, Darwin is one helluva drill Sgt.

Absolutely, if it matches what is in the UA inventory then it is a total win because they already have the logistics in place. I am sure things like T72s and maybe even T80s they can keep going much longer. Some of the more exotic stuff will be much harder. Re: Air, missile strategy, ya that is what we in the business call "half-assed". Likely built on a lot of really shaky assumptions, built on top of other shaky assumptions. If you wanna minimize civilian infrastructure damage, then you go PGM, non-kinetic (isn't Russia supposed to be this cyber god?) or really work hard on your target lists and ROEs. What you do not do is go "s'ok, they will fold like a three legged goat by Sat morning anyway so let's not overdo it." Now they are likely to have to do a lot more damage to civilian infrastructure to pull this our of the fire then they would have in the first place.

In the short term, pretty practical if you can get trained crews onto them (even hastily trained). Long term harder as UA probably does not have spare parts or even ammo for some equipment. But the information-win of a video of a captured piece of Russian hardware hitting Russian forces is pure gold. That "early bombardment" is another odd thing about this one because it was so short. If you recall '91 and '03 and even EOF, we spent weeks pounding from the air in order to achieve full air supremacy and attrit key targets both strategic and operational. Russian look like they spent about 6 hours last Thurs on the job and went "meh, good enough". That is why internet, electricity and UA air assets are still in the game as far as I can tell.

Oh that is so the right answer..