The_Capt

Not really what I am talking about. More about the global order and how it is failing while we are to busy either arguing with each other or chasing some nonsensical visions of the future. Humanity is a harsh place and if you want to stay on top you have to earn it. We in the west forgot that somewhere along the way.

So much bigger than equipment. For too long we have sold Canadians on "better kit = better military" we are past that. We need to look at military reforms that cut across the entire institution, hell our mobilization model is based on WW2. 2% GDP is no good if it means we just "buy more wrong".

I think mistakes were made, to say the least. In reality this is going to likely go down as a massive Russian strategic failure, possibly nation breaking but we would be remiss not to look in that mirror and recognize that it is also a western failure writ large. We collectively run the planet (casting nervous glance at China) and as such this mess that took 20+ years to happen has to come home to roost on our decision making. As to the NATO argument, I guess what sticks is that every former eastern bloc nation who has joined NATO did so of their own free will and for very good reasons. What happened is akin to watching a man with three wives he abused for years beating the one who stayed behind and blaming the other two who left. Yes, technically he might have just spread the abuse more equitably but how on earth does that equation get right?! The US was using the same strategy that won the Cold War, enticement and Russian response with a strategy of bombing or threats of bombing, followed by more bombing cannot compete, and that is not on us. I think we in the West do need to take a long hard look at how we basically went past "letting it happen" to "enabling because we like cheap gas and were to busy with our own crap". I am Canadian and frankly the lines we fed ourselves for over 30 years of a utopian liberal humanistic new world order, and kept smoking right up until Feb 24th meant we lost sight of just how nasty the world was really getting and failed to do anything about it. I hope that some lines are re-drawn as a result of this and we try and realize that things like freedom and democracy come at costs that every generation must pay, not just the ones in the movies.

Ok, so there has been a lot of finger pointing at the US on what it, should have done, should do or not do etc. I think it is time to point that finger back at Europe on this point. Who thought it was a good idea to become energy dependent on a nation that has been causing ruckus since 2008, did a soft invasion of another European nation in 2014, has been pulling stunts in the backfield ever since then and now has demonstrated just how unstable it is? This is worse than US dependence on Arab oil, which they have worked very hard to get rid of, as Arabs can be jerks and support terrorism but they are not likely to invade with 100k plus troops. Can someone explain this one to me? Because the Euros that paid for that gas found their way to funding this fiasco and no one seems to be saying to much about it.

I think the major difference between discussions here and what I have seen from a lot of the "experts" is that they seem to focusing on quantitative assessment, while we are largely focus on qualitative. We can count up the losses and numbers as well as any right now but when linking that back to qualitative deductions one comes up with different conclusions. I mean one can see that about 10% of the Russian invasion force of tanks has been attrited. From a quantitative view that is not great but losses are to be expected in front line capability and it likely matches some other similar military actions. Then if one takes the remaining 90% versus big red spaces on the map, I can see how people are coming to the conclusions that they are. What is missing is all the weird stuff, like most of those tanks have been abandoned either out of gas or crews just left. That is a qualitative observation on how or why those tanks were lost beyond what was lost. I am not surprised that a forum of avid wargamers and students of history are taking a broader qualitative system view, and frankly the real experts/analysist who work for government/military are doing the exact same thing (with better data). In the end events will confirm or deny which viewpoint has been correct and the truth is probably somewhere in between. What has been interesting is that we here have been about 24-48 hours ahead of mainstream in a lot of ways. In the first couple of days we noted some odd signals and had pretty much decided that the "quick war" was a loss by the end of the first weekend. Then experts caught up and complimented "Ukrainian resistance", when it was in fact a pretty convincing military defence, and were stating that Ukraine may hold out for a couple weeks but the end was going to be the same. As things unfolded it became more apparent here that the Russian war machine had stalled hard - while mainstream media was pointing to the looming 64km convoy North of Kyiv - which turned out to be a parking lot and by now is likely turning into a graveyard. We began to wonder if the Russians might even get to the siege phase. Now most experts are still seeing a brutal siege phase and a long term guerilla war. Here in our little bubble it is looking more likely that the Russians will have to be halting broad offensive action soon and we could see this turn into a stalemate scenario...all largely based on qualitative assessment of 1) Russian inability to establish what should have ben pre-conditions such as information and air superiority, 2) very poor Russian logistical performance, 3) Signs of eroding Russian morale, 4) Baffling Russian C2, and 5) The increasing/acceleration of Ukrainian will and capability to fight. This is beyond the changes in strategic narrative from Russia, who went from "unconditional surrender" to "conditional surrender" in about 10 days. As well as the growing impact of what has become the economic equivalent to a nuclear war against Russia. We will see how close everyone is as this thing unfolds, we could be wrong or too optimistic based on a steady stream of what may be fairly isolated events but when strung together on social media look like a trend. The major shift I am looking for right now is signs of Russian defensive operations like minefields, major digging in and the like. At the strategic level we might start seeing less of Putin and the identification of a new "spokesperson", this may be a sign of a shifting power dynamic at the top. I recall back in 2014 the Russian Foreign Minister saying "if Russia wanted to, we could be in Kyiv in two weeks" or words to that effect, well that is Thurs and so far they can't even seem to be able to cordon Kyiv, let alone control it; there are strange rattling and scraping sounds coming out of the Russian War Machine. All the while Ukraine is waging an information war that is now the Gold Standard and a employing a hybrid operational approach that will be actively studied for a century at least. In another reality, if I were on the Russian Military Staff and had a golden Willie Wonka ticket to say whatever I wanted without repercussions, it would be "Get out, now. They are not surrounded, we are."

Heh, I have an already pretty active day job. Think of this as bonus customer service - check out the gift shop while you are here!

Taiwan is a completely different situation but as it relates to Ukraine I suspect the Chinese are watching things unfold carefully and taking notes. The only thing I can hope is that they are drawing the same conclusions we are, invading a well defended nation is very hard. I hope that this entire affair has the opposite effect that a lot of people fear and that is to avoid a military escalation in Taiwan because China will want to learn from the Russian mistakes at all levels in this war.

Well no idea where it will end, too many really dynamic variables at this point. I am more at the “what should we be looking for?” stage, which is only slightly ahead of the “what are we looking at?”. I am not sure the Russians can take all of Eastern Ukraine, that is a lot of ground and all of it filled with well armed resistance. If this is going to turn into a defensive infantry war then the manpower bill goes up because now one has limited ability to maneuver. I think the Russians will dig in at some point (re: something to watch for), at which point the Ukrainians should conduct offensive operations carefully. They would probably be best to stick to the hybrid model that is working for them and hit Russian logistics and supply lines as opposed to try to re-take ground. Russians could try the same game but the Ukrainians actually do control their ground including popular support of civilians all armed with cellphones. I am not convinced we will see a big siege of Kyiv at this rate but that is also not definite. The Russians ability to supply such a siege is the main question, next to whether they can actually surround and close off the city. But if they do it will likely last for weeks if not months as no cordon is 100 percent and west and south of Kyiv the siege-ers will also become besieged themselves as behind them is all Ukrainian held territory. After this is all over I think many observer militaries will spend a lot of time unpacking this one. Have we seen a shift to dominant defensive warfare? Is armor in trouble? Did social media just go from observer to combatant? How much was incompetence and how much real? One thing is clear though, well motivated, well armed, well trained light infantry connected to each other and an ISR network are stalling a heavy mech force and may be crushing them. This totally screws with doctrine and why so many experts are kinda saying “Well Ukraine is doing well but Russia is still going to crush them”, because I suspect they are using old metrics of so many tanks and firepower. But what they are missing, in my opinion, is the level of dislocation that is occurring as a result of Ukrainian hybrid approach. In simpler terms all those tanks, hardware and troops are not useful if they cannot bring that combat power to bear. And right now a combination of ATGM lethality and deep strikes by the Ukrainian forces seem to be fragmenting the Russian mass. However the Russians may be dislocating themselves as well. This is like watching someone try and win a fight by sawing off their limbs and throwing them at an opponent. This thing could end tomorrow and it will still go down as a master class in how not to invade another nation.

First off this technically won't really be an "insurgency" it will be a "resistance", the primary difference is that the resistance will be recognized as legitimate by the west and weapons and training will continue throughout. Every insurgency we have fought in the west has been home grown but not supported by an outside power [aside: ok, technically things got weird with Pakistan but that is not even close to what we are talking about here]. So now we have an "insurgency" with MiG 29s. I think it far more likely we see as NVA/VC relationship as I am doubtful that Russia can take all of Ukraine, if the people continue to have the will to fight. The Russians have damn near broke themselves trying to take the Eastern Ukraine and are nowhere near having it under control. So we will more likely see a legitimate and recognized Free Ukraine while resistance continues is Russian controlled territory. This is all assuming that Russia can actually keep going at all, serious cracks are starting to show, and we don't bog down into a Balkan scenario looking more like WW1 with everyone dug in where they are and trying to get best deal at the negotiation table.

Very hard to tell at this point but I agree with Steve that the Russians are running out of gas. Barring some "miracle on the XXX" moment the Russians are bogging down and bleeding heavily right now. I am beginning to doubt a second Afghanistan because I don't think the Russian have the horsepower to even try to control the entire country. They might try it east of the Dnieper but even that looks out of reach. We are 11 days in and they don't even control the Donbas. If this drags on, and it will likely do so until there is a negotiation [aside: there is a small chance the Russian collapse completely and simply walk out but that would signal the collapse of Russia...a whole other problem]. My guess (and it is a guess) is that we could be looking at something that looked like the Former Yugoslavia, which looked more like WW1, at least until a negotiated end-state happens.

John, you got some citations on the Russian DFing capability in this war because frankly it is sucking. I have seen nothing on "warnings" on widespread shutting down of cellphones. The fact that we are seeing a mountain of open source int and freakin Zoom calls from UKR politicians, I see zero evidenced that Russians have even come close to posing a threat in this area. There were some reports of Russian SF doing jamming west of Kyiv but not sure what that accomplished. We have enough drone footage to string together a documentary coming out of Ukraine right now so whatever "ELINT sweep" the Russians did it failed gloriously. There is no metric of superiority one can apply to the Russians in the information space right now in any spectrum, nor have they demonstrated the coordination to do precision strike on a single drone operator. This is a "hot war" in a nation with massive communications architecture, that makes doing what that article is warning about much harder, not easier.

Ah, well that isn't much better, as security forces are also supposed to be in the rear. Might be piggybacking on the CLIP as well, hence the fuel trucks (honestly couldn't make out much but a mess).

I think you meant to say "small to miniscule chance" based on Russian performance to date. Commercial drones run at the same frequency range as wifi and even cellphones (I have seen videos on line of people using cell receivers to greatly increase range). So what? Well because the Russians completely failed to achieve information/communications superiority the Ukraine is one massive EM Christmas tree right now (see: Twitter feeds), so all that really sexy Russian kit is going to be overwhelmed. With enough time, they may be able to figure out if that signal is a drone but right now there is likely way too much noise. That, and the very large assumption that those Russian Drone hunter vehicles have gas and aren't being pulled away by the UKR tractor brigade.

Based on which BTG version one subscribes to, they only have 2-3 POL trucks per group so this might be the B echelon of a BTG, which means that BTG is out of the fight.

His primary argument that the “south matters” due to seaports is only valid once this war is over. Russian does have air and sea control, or at least denial that area, so no aid or commerce is going to be coming in and out of those southern ports while the war is on (unless Russian completely drops the ball, which is a distinct possibility). I suspect the Ukrainians will fight for every inch in the south because it is their home but the Ukrainian centres of gravity right now are Kyiv, the will to fight, and keeping LOCs open from the west. If all those port cities fall, it will most definitely complicate negotiations and hit global morale but the Ukrainian war machine is not really effected because the Russians have cut off the souther approaches already.

Not sure what is going to happen but here are some things we should keep an eye out for: - Partisan actions and open protests in Kherson. How secure is one of the few cities Russia claims to control? - Mass movements of Russian troops North from Kyiv, on foot. If that convoy has run out of gas, it is a matter of time until the food and water runs out and then troops will vote with their feet. - More broadly Russian's moving to consolidate or move to the defensive. This would include digging in and trying to hold onto ground they have in order to shape the negotiation table. This may include moving to the defensive along some axis in order to double down on offense in others. - Logistics. Russian logistics have been a gawd awful mess so far, there will be signs if that shifts. Either ammo will run out and we will see more crumbing in the Russian rear ech, or they will somehow get a grip on it and their tempo will pick up. Based on the losses we have seen, they are running out of trucks so civilian patterns or other weird logistical method are something to watch out for. - ISR and comms, frequency of UKR reports on open source start to drop off. This would be a sign that the Russians finally got around to what they should have done on day 1 - gain information superiority. - Some sort of indications that Russia has managed to get its air force in the game beyond dropping bomb on civilians and getting shot out of the sky. - at the strategic level, movement at the negotiation table and/or indications Putin is on the way out. Cracks in the power holders or any strange signals in the political space. I am sure there are more but based on what we have seen so far, these are on my list.

I think he meant to say "farm folk". Edit: [damn got dislocated and forgot to quote - meant for two posts back]

Careful with what "operational" means, it could simply mean "ready" in some sort of managed readiness system that most western countries use. This does not mean the tanks "not operational" are sitting on the shop floor in pieces, it means the crews are in some stage of training. Of course a 120 tanks lost, isn't that like 10 BTGs worth?

That and the fakes might also be "fake", what a wonderful age we live in.

Sure they are but more like the ones that beat us. And I am not talking ideology or character but will to fight. The Taliban fought an insurgency for 20 years against NATO and never thought of tapping out. Given what I have seen so far the Ukrainians might be even more hardcore, which is even more bad news for the Russians.

Well rail makes more sense than air but there are some serious issues. Rail has traditionally been a key Strategic LOC, so think back in Russia, to get the massive amount of tonnage needed into assembly areas so they can be pushed forward. This seems to suggest that the idea would be to use rail as an operational LOC based on the alignment with axis and existing rail (alternatively, they could just be built next to major roads so this is not a plan, more of a coincidence). In the old days they just used different gauge of rail to prevent this but assuming that is not an issue here there is a lot of risk to this but at least it is bette plan than log jams on roads and everyone running out of gas. The biggest problem with using rail as operational LOCs is security. A train cannot hide, nor can it maneuver. It is forced to come down a rail line. So securing that entire line against attack is a challenge to say the least. Second rail is fragile. Two guys with a truck and crowbar can make it impassible. I would be surprised if the Ukrainians have not already cut rail in very big slices and they sure can do it after without much trouble. Trains are also fragile so hitting them especially from the air is a bad thing. But if one can establish full security on a rail line and keep it open, you could establish operational depots along it. But it is going to be hit continuously, one would have to expect that, especially if you cannot establish air superiority. Normally operational and tactical LOCs are like a blood system, a lot of redundancy and alternate routes, parallel arteries A lot of depots and “iron mountains” of supply. The reason is that you know some are going to get cut but you build the web so that supplies always get through. Running down a single rail line is kinda counter to that. Finally all those cities along the rail lines are not a good thing. They are not “logistics hubs” they are filled with pissed off and well armed Ukrainians and trying to control them is going to be hard enough without running key LOCs right thru them. That is just asking for sabotage and nastiness.

Well, lost a multiple of two in there somewhere then, I think it was kgs per litre. So make that 64 flights per day for that 8 BTG axis, which is over half the entire fleet, optimally. Point still stands, air only logistics = hard.

So option four "Go for Nagasaki": Russians get more and more desperate and employ chemical first and then maybe (and it is a very big maybe) tactical nuclear weapons. The shock of their use somehow crumbles Ukrainian resolve, quick surrender and back to Option 1 - Puppet Government in new province of mighty mother Russia, while West cowers in fear at their own inadequacy. Hm, ok. Well more than a few problems with this. Not the least of which the military operation so far has the hallmarks of amateur political interference. We all remember this in WW2 when ol AH used to get right down there on the map and start micro-managing. So in this little shin-dig we all pretty much know who is pulling the strings on the Russian side [aside: there is some military genius going on the Ukrainian side, I hope they are taking notes] and I am pretty sure this fustercluck is all due to either military professionals lacking the courage to speak truth-to-power or are being ignored. Putin has demonstrated that he knows his stuff in the Grey, dirty espionage and subversive type operations, makes sense given he is an ex KGB type, but he literally knows nothing about military operations at this level, or any level. So what? Well dollars to doughnuts he is actually thinking WMDs are an option, hell he thought 3 days of supply was an option apparently. First let's stick with chemical weapons, tac nukes last. Chemicals: The question is, "will the Russian military finally step up and push back?". Why won't they? Books will be written on that. Why Should They? - #1 War crimes - Russia signed onto the CWC so there use is violation of that convention and will probably wind up with everyone involved in there use at The Hague (note: we are not even sure if Russia has chemical weapons anymore as they declared them free of stockpiles in 2017, but we will see how that goes) - #2 Tricky Ops. Given the clown car ride this operation has been so far I would be nervous about hitting my own troops with chemical and slowing down an already glacial operation as one tries to advance through now contaminated terrain. - #3 Trickier Logistics. If the Russian are having logistical issues now, just wait until they have to throw decontamination into the mix of everything (vehicles, equipment, people). Given they cannot provide fuel at this point, even if Russian troops do have protective gear, they will be living in it for a month at a time, which is just a recipe for disaster. -#4 Ukrainian response. Oh my. Well a chemical release may shock the Ukrainians, but it also may create massive further resistance. Any hope of breaking resolve could sail away as a backlash. And forget installing a puppet government, it will not last a week. So Russian forces will be in Ukraine forever supporting a propped up government, and taking hits the whole time. - #5 Western Response. Sanctions until the end of time. In order to survive Russia will have to become a satellite of the Chinese if they will even have them after chemical attacks. - #6 Russian response. Russian public are already soft on this use of chemical weapons could cause revolts in the population and munities in the military All bad built on a weak theory; however, this whole crazy plan was pretty much that from the start. Tac Nukes - This might just pull the West in and the Russian power structure and military know it. Western direct involvement is a sliding scale but none of it is good. Tactical nukes might just be enough for the West to figure that Russia has become too unstable and it is time for a reckoning. Putin knows the US has been working BMD hard in the backfield and if we are going with harsh calculus of nuclear war, he may very well be at a significant disadvantage: yes, he might actually lose a nuclear war. So will he or won't he is still in the wind but my bet is that he will be removed from power if it comes to that, or at least I would hope so.

Welcome. Standard wisdom right now is to take Ukrainian official numbers and divide by two, or add a zero to Russian casualty reports. Ukrainian errors are much more likely fog of war, Russian reports are dis-information based on how the information war is going.

They could try but passenger airliners are not really tooled up to move gas. They could move troops and other classes of supplies. However, civilian airliners are not setup to fly in warzones, they don't have defensive systems or an ability maneuver like military aircraft can (e.g. approaches tend to be much longer and the MANPAD bubble has to expand to meet it). To use civilian aircraft they would need to look at a SEAD corridor but you a now taking 100km long security/control operations type stuff. Honestly, it would be easier to start a pipeline than use an air corridor in my opinion.