The_Capt

Get back in your cave, J2 troll!! The Comd and "his chosen" determine the enemy CoG; the J2, while scuttling around chasing their 20 sided dice, provide advice...most of which is promptly ignored. Remember your station!! Seriously, my assessment of the Russian CoG is it ability to move and sustain mass at what they think the UKR Strategic CoG is, Kyiv, which is odd as I disagree with that assessment, the UKR Strategic CoG is likely support from the West, along with sustaining the will to fight, neither really depend on Kyiv remaining in UKR hands. That "mass" includes fires but also manpower if they are dumb enough to try and take Kyiv the old fashion way. Regardless, that elevates operational logistics and mobility (particularly bridging - as there seem to be belts of irrigation canals NW of Kyiv) to the top of the joint targeting list to my mind (I will leave it to you "qualified targeteers" to work out on what Kafka-esque list-system it goes on). Artillery is going to be right up there as well but I would focus on the trucks and bridges needed to keep pushing "boom-boom" to those tubes, then hit the tubes. I too would put CPs and command infra a bit further down the list, mainly because killing the current -and I will be kind- "Russian system" might lead to better Russian C2 and they appear to be on the side of the Ukrainians right now. Lets not create Darwinian pressure to promote more talented junior people (I am only half joking here, CPs are going to die if they are found). I would also prioritize Russian ISR though, particularly tactical unmanned systems. Regardless, Russians abandoning these systems for the Ukrainian tractor brigade, makes zero sense.

This is absolutely spot on. It also outlines a major flaw in mobilization "myths" that extend to this day and across western nations. A lot of politicians with zero military experience took a history class or two at whatever elite college they went to and in that class they were told about mobilization during WWI and WW2, and how Johnny Lunchpail went from upstanding citizen to infantryman slogging through France in 6 months, and then came home to become their grandpa. So when they get in the upper chairs - as clearly god intended - they think, "well we don't need to spend all that money on a standing military when there is no war on, if one comes we will just do what I learned at school between drinking binges. Much easier and cheaper. Of course we have to keep some people happy on the whole Defence thing, so let's spend as little as possible and look like we are doing something." That entire theory of defence is broken for all of the quoted reasons. Further, as also being aptly demonstrated by Russia, you cannot suddenly become expert at operational/strategic levels of warfare overnight either. WW1 and WW2 are monuments to amateurish early form of higher level C2 and planning. It takes years to get enough staff experience to understand how to coherently put large military actions in motion [aside: likely why the Germans did so well in the Early War comparatively, as they spent years pulling together operational level planning and coordination for the war they wanted to fight]. So Russia cannot simply come out of the phonebooth with Divisions and throw them at this problem. Ukraine already was invaded/split back in 2014 and had been training and planning for this years in advance - and still there were failures (e.g. bridge demolition). They have mass produced local defence/resistance but they also are not going to be able to create trained conventional forces before this war is over.

Oh I love a "technically" fight, especially with int types. My western bias is no doubt showing but in the west where a bridge is parked does not reflect ownership. Bridges are operationally (and in some cases strategically) controlled assets, the Brigade or lower have them attached in a command relationship for employment but that can be pulled at any time. There are exceptions such as an independent Brigade Group but even then strategic gets really touchy around bridging assets. The "so what" here is that these are near the top of the Joint Target List-like so much abandoned Russian kit on display, often above other Brigade level assets because there are so few of them (1 per MRR and 3 per TR in the old Soviet layout, no idea as to current Russian TO&E) and targeted as Div or higher level assets. Now the Russians may be going in another direction and might have parking lots full of these things [aside: the pontoon bridges we saw earlier are parked and owned at a Div level in the old Soviet parlance] and allocate them as a Bde Comd's personal toys but either way this is a high-level asset that was abandoned...and we are back to "WTF?!"

And on the subject of UA conventional actions...if valid, this is what that would look like.

It is a long shot but Putin has crossed every line we ever thought he would not, including a full scale invasion scenario that is trying to unfold. I do not believe that all war is rational, too much history is on side with that, in this Clausewitz missed the boat somewhat, or perhaps to be kinder relative rationality is at play. So WMDs - Will it work? Short of a tactical nuclear weapon or higher, doubt it. Chemical is bad but places like Mariupole are already a level in hell so gassing civilian is worse but I do not think it will break the resolve of the Ukrainian people, in fact it may very well have the opposite effect. Hell, at this point I am not even sure tac nukes would do much. Further the Russian logistics mess will only be made worse by making the battlefield dirty, they thought they were having fun before. - Is Putin deluded enough to try? I honestly do not know. I am starting to align with "he has lost the bubble" here somewhere and is starting to behave irrationally...invasion of another European state was kinda the first hint. If boxed in and desperate enough, will the same mind that came up with this first nut-job plan start pushing buttons...maybe...gotta go with maybe. - Will Russian military go along with a WMD. Oh my, here things do get interesting. I am not so sure to be honest. Even the most devoted Russian general, complete with Putin pajamas and teddy bear, is going to think twice before stepping down that path and even if they do not, lower level commanders are going to. Why...? - Because the possible response from the west. A WMD release on civilian centers, or even on a military target might just get the West off the couch. Sanctions will be permanent and this may even take Russian oil and gas off the table. A WMD will trigger western military action, the question is how much...and seriously I do not know. Things get so slippery at that point, that a naval strike group in Romanian waters can turn into WW3 pretty quick. No fly zone? R2P cuts both ways and no Russian general wants to face down NATO.

https://comb.io/RBzyR4

Ooo, that is an other good one. Hey, I get it the Russians are lying every time their lips move. But I am on the lookout for that "no other choice bit". So softening of strategic bargaining position + up to 20% of invasion forces lost and stacking + zero real gains on the ground + economic hellstorm + now coming hat in hand to China = signs that this thing may crumbling strategically faster than we thought (remember - "Russians will grind for months" narrative?). Guess we will see, hopefully soon and does not include some desperate WMD nonsense.

Ok so let's break this down then. A. I know there are systems out there in development but hitting a small fast moving missile is incredibly hard and the next gen of smart AT systems will likely include stealth/spoofing, top-down EFP and PGM DPICM artillery. This will likely continue to counter/counter-counter systems race that has in reality been going on for decades. Problem is that explosive technology and miniaturization or on the side of the attacker and not the defender because the defender is attached to 70 tons of metal. There also becomes a return on investment issue as it will become so costly to keep a tank alive, one has to ask what the point of doing it becomes. They basically become land ships that are impossible to hide and draw more fire than they are worth. B. Sure...obviously. But again very hard to do as missile systems become cheaper and smaller. We could not keep AT out of the hands of the Taliban, let alone the next crunch we get into where now China and Russia are supplying the next-gen ATGMs to our adversaries. C. Every western military has identified UAV as a major issue in the coming years. The idea that we can sweep them from the skies is not realistic. Particularly when we could be seeing hybrid UGV/UAV systems. All military grade systems are going to be shielded from EMP/EW, or fully autonomous so the link between pilot and system need only be occasional (enter ethical issues but this will be a race to the bottom). Wishing away UVs of all shapes and sizes with some sort of magic gun is right next to wishing away machine guns. We will need to learn to live with them and exploit their strengths better than an opponent. D. Disagree. What proof is there that connected light infantry need civilian populations to work? That is how it is working in Ukraine but so what? We have had light infantry operating all over the world without civilian support, we call them SOF. Western militaries are investing a lot into field networks so keeping small light groups linked in a hostile environment is already on the menu. I think the questions are "how much and where?" E. Kinda runs counter to point C but I didn't think that one was accurate anyway. This is not what we are seeing in Ukraine right now. The basic reality is that light is still a thing because 1) it is fast to project, 2) it can go places mech cannot and 3) it is harder to find because it is not riding on thousands of tons of steel. It main weakness was low payloads which restricted lethality and sustainment when separated, and survivability once it did get found (again offset by dispersion). Lights ability to disperse and swarm could increase its survivability versus heavier forces in a totally illuminated battlefield whereas heavy is a relatively slow moving, very visible target. The reality is that this is not going to happen over night but these are questions that need some serious re-think and we cannot box them up nicely in "well sure Ukraine but..." Some of this has been a long time coming, we had the most powerful mechanized forces in the world and they largely proved less than decisive for the last 20 years in the unconventional fights we have been engaged in. Now we are seeing a hybrid/conventional war and there are some weird things happening here too. I have already heard army types going "ah ha, at last a real war, see we need tanks". Then as I look at the list of Russian tank losses and the real lack of ground gained, I have to wonder if this is all "dumb Russians" or something else is not going on.

Ok, so that is a "no" this has not been brought up then. Ok, the political process belongs to the Ukrainians on this front, not even going to try and make a judgement on what they should or should not do. My point being the Russian position appears to be softening, which could be an indication that the military strategic reality is starting to sink in, or this is some sort of two-step but I am not sure what the point would be. As I mentioned before a significant component of war is negotiation be it through violence or at a table, one way or another both sides in this conflict are negotiating. The primary role of military power is to communicate through violence (and other ways) in order to shape that negotiation. People were asking for indicators, this is one of them.

So I kinda fall back on my assessment: Russian forces don't control sh#t right now, but they are terrorizing everywhere and none of that is good from a long term occupation standpoint.

That does not change the assessment. All these high level assets, Arty, AD, Engineering, Comms and CPs, logistics (e.g. re-fuelers) are not normal losses. Tanks, IFVs are supposed to die...it is their job. All this other stuff is not, at least not in the volumes we are seeing.

So did someone already post on this? https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-delegate-says-talks-with-ukraine-may-soon-produce-draft-agreements-2022-03-13/ This is an indicator if true and not just stall tactics. Russia came into this with a zero compromise position, if they are starting to drift on that it is likely due to loss of military solutions, which matches the piling up of losses. Or , they are just stalling for time, but since there is no ceasefire or sanctions hanging on a result, this is not really effective stalling.

That is a Div/CAA level asset. The steady stream of these types of losses demonstrate the merry hell the UA is waging in Russian rear areas.

So first, that is horrible and constitutes a warcrime reckoning. Second, it is the single worst way to try and manage local security when occupying another nation. For every home invaded and people hurt or killed, you make dedicated resistance go deeper and meaner. Russian patrols start go go missing and sentries found dead. Third, it is patchwork at best. So I suspect that locals in these "red zones" still have the means to communicate. Question is, do they have the ways. Not sure if that Starlink thing every amounted to anything but unless the Russians have finally gripped the communications networks in controlled areas they are literally shooting themselves in the face. Fourth, this control is porous, there is simply not enough Russian manpower to control this amount of area. So farmers have cellhones, they definitely have reason to use them, the only question left is can they. Regardless your original point that finding Russian command centers is very likely a level up from the local support networks...enter western ISR support here as well.

Definitely fuzzy pictures but I am getting more confident by the day on some things: - Russian forces have stalled operationally. Will they get it back? Dunno - Operational pre-conditions were not met in air, info or logistics. Russians are likely trying for some of these but have little to show for it so far. - By all metrics and analysis the Russians have lost a significant amount of men and material. Further the nature of those losses point to system failures in the Russian C2 and logistical system. - The Ukrainians have exploited all three of those points above and continue to a level that is starting to lead to some questioning some of our fundamental theories of how war is supposed to work. Early days but we will see. A lot of these observations are not based, at least on my end, on what I am seeing through the heavily filtered lenses, it is what I am not seeing. Or still seeing that should not be there. These negatives tell as much as the positives on social media.

@Haiduk Do we have any indications the Russians are actually conducting this door-to-door control in occupied regions effectively? This is straight out of the playbook but I have not seen a lot to indicate the Russians have been able to organized an effective counter-resistance security effort anywhere. I mean searching every house for a phone, or trying to DF locate is a lot of work and labor intensive, and next to impossible. Have they even managed to knock out cell towers in the areas they "control". For that matter has EM jamming been seen as effective?

Well I am a trained military strategist and all I can say is we are at the tip of what could be a very deep iceberg - that, and most trained military strategist have no real idea what is happening in this war either. Your home team/social media observations are valid and another sign the Russians did not set pre-conditions. I did a post awhile back on the vertical dimension of this war for the Ukrainians which very much captures a lot of this. The question for all militaries is "how do we do this in the away game?" and "how do we protect it in the home game?"...or simply "how do we establish information superiority?" [aside: think how weird this would get in a civil war]. So this is the concept of self-synchronization - distributed groups able to synchronize and organize organically outside of a C2 framework. I think we are seeing a lot of this right now and the question is really how to box it up and employ it anywhere while denying the same to an opponent? For an invading force, this gets into field networks based on a lot of different communications systems designed to weather denial. You cannot depend on local support, so you turn that off and then have a networked system that allows your own forces to self-synchronize in motion. In the home game, we have no doctrine to describe what is happening here - basically crowd sourcing ISR, but it is happening. This speaks back to my original point that I am not sure the Ukrainians need a lot of concentrated mass outside of the urban environments a this point, it may be counter-productive. Unless they can really manage the time and place as a crushing blow to the Russians at an operational level. I think at a strategic and operational level the Ukrainians are getting a lot of outside ISR support, it is one of the few things the west can do inside the Ukraine right now. But how that picture is meeting the publicly generated one is also going to be very interesting as I am sure there needs to be a level of deconfliction occurring as the UA does not control the public system and mis/dis information will no doubt be fed into it as well. As to the famous OODA loop, I am not sure to be honest. I am not sure the speed of that loop matters as much as the quality of it. I can see the Russians making bad decisions faster while the UA is making better ones slower.

Only readily available indicator is the numbers of logistical vehicle losses and some more indications of drop offs in Russian power and tempo; shelling a city to ruins takes a lot of ammunition. Of course to secure supply lines takes combat power away from the main effort. I am sure someone is pulling a picture together somewhere online, I have not seen one yet though.

Been waiting for something like this. Need to see if it sticks. At this point we don't really know if this is a Russian re-org in preparation for one more big push, or the Russian war machine coming to a grinding halt. Further it might be both in different locations. I am pretty sure the UA knows because it likely has access to satellite feeds.

We know the Russians have UAVs up as they did in 2014; however, it is much harder to find 2-4 men in the bush than an armored formation (the ones the UKR are looking for). There was the famous example from 2014 of 2x UKR Bns destroyed in minutes by the Russian use of drones, linked to MLRS (https://prodev2go.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/rus-ukr-lessons-draft.pdf, pages 12-17 really get into UAV and lethal fires). This shows what Russian could do with their approach against similarly arrayed mass and this got a lot of attention in the west, along with the armor-counter revolution with anti-ATGM systems. [aside: not a lot of evidence of the famous ARENA etc seen so far. Could also be that most UKR attacks have been against soft skin logistical vehicles based in the whole "abandoning observation".] I suspect the Ukrainian current broad approach of hybrid warfare is negating this Russian tactic by simply leaving little mass to fire upon, let alone find.(to Haiduk's point I also suspect that conventional clashes are happening but no very big ones, or at least well known ones. And it is the interests of one side or the other to make a big tank battle public (i.e. the winning side)) This, is the question and I think everyone is waiting for the other shoe to drop. At a minimum it made this into a long war and not a short sharp one and that is significant on its own as a strategic outcome. Next question will be how this plays out in the long term. Hybrid theoretically only works when one has room to maneuver, not in city sieges or urban combat (although there are lessons from Mosul that suggest otherwise). But here I am wondering if the Ukrainians can keep hitting in the Russian LOCs using hybrid an actual siege may not be viable for the Russians. In reality it is all "less bad" outcomes for all parties at this point, the issue of "my less bad being better than yours" is what a lot is hinging on. I also do not know what to believe and we likely will not have answers for a few years; however, I am at a hypothesis point, now to see if it survives reality...they rarely do, which is not a bad thing.

Quite right, this is the very definition of "hybrid warfare" (or at least western one). I have no illusions that the UA conventional lacks the ability to create and project mass. However, I will be very interested to see how that relationship was managed and who was doing what and where? I also suspect that if the Ukrainian Army does not time its move back to mass very carefully it may be in for some nasty surprises. However, the shattering effect of heavy is not out of the game yet, particularly if one has eroded an enemy system badly. If the UKR light infantry are only conducting delay actions until the UA feels it can do a heavy decisive battle, I am left wondering if they still need to? If one can attrit 20% of an opponents combat power through hybrid tactics then the only reason to create heavy mass would be at exactly the right place and time to very loudly demonstrate a collapse of the Russian military at an operational level. I suspect this will evolve in the course of the fight but the UA does itself no favors by forming mass like it did back in 2014 and essentially play the "Russian game". The UA has invented a new game, one they are very good at. The Russians came to play rugby, while the Ukrainians poured water over the field, froze it and brought skates. I suspect this will definitely change in the urban environment as we will be really down to infantry mass; however, in this space the odds even up dramatically as mech becomes supporting.

Very good analogy. In this case, as could be for the Ukrainians, an evolving primary role for infantry is not just to take and hold ground, it is to project friction onto an opponents system to such an extent you can break it. This effectively makes mass a liability as it is vulnerable to its own weight. This is evolution of light unconventional use of infantry we have been seeing for some time now. Except now those mounted light infantry have comms, drones and portable ATGMs with a range, reach and lethality we only saw in vehicle mounted platforms. Thing about evolutionary moments, you really don't realize what happened until it is too late. I suspect one could model this in CMBS right now.

Lotta lessons no doubt, but at the tactical level the one I am watching for is "are highly mobile and connected light infantry upscaling and able to effectively stop heavy mech through a combination of speed, range, lethality and self-synchronization?", has "Deep Battle" become "360 Battle" in conventional warfare? For the historians in the group, one of the last times this happened the Mongols took over most of the known planet...so there is that.

So we are probably overdue on a discussion on what is going on at the tactical level. I have held off trying to do an analysis because things were simply too turbulent to draw any real conclusions, still are in fact. However, I will offer a hypothesis of what I think is occurring and we can try and go from there. In the west we have been watching these "Russian wars" with a lot of interest over the last 8 years. The reason for this is that we are all very paranoid of becoming a 21st century version of the WW1 generals - discovering on the battlefield that our doctrine has become completely obsolete. In WWI at the tactical level it was machine guns and fast firing artillery at long ranges, at the operational and strategic it was railways, telegraph wires and canned food preservation. They all added up to totally different war than anyone was expecting that included the end of some pretty major stuff like cavalry. So in this war we have all been watching and scratching our heads as to "what just happened?" At the tactical level back in 2014, and was confirmed in the short Azer-Armenian war, that something had changed. The Russians had linked UAVs and massed fires at the tactical level, the Azerbaijanians mimicked this in 2020, and the effect was to be able to crush massed enemy armor formations over the horizon and then move in mechanized forces for what was essentially a "sweep up" close battle. Everyone was expecting the same for this war. The Ukrainians, being at the receiving end in 2014 have likely figured out that playing by the old rulebook will not work. So my hypothesis is 1) the Russians have been trying to follow their doctrine of long range Find, Mass Fires Fix/Attrit and Heavy Close clean up to Finish, but 2) The Ukrainians have adopted tactics that negate #1. The evidence for #1 is the fact that the Russians have appeared to stick with the BTG which is a concept with massed fires at the tactical level baked-in: (https://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/images/btg-image01.jpg|||Battalion Tactical Group) In western doctrine a BG will have integral mortars and likely a Arty Bn in close support. The Russians added 6 x MLRS to this mix and if you look at Soviet doctrine, MLRS are normally at Regimental/Div level. This matched what we saw in the field in 2014 and 2020 very closely. The evidence for #2 is all over social media. The Ukrainians, learning quickly from 2014, look like they have dis-aggregated. More importantly and to the point, they have largely abandoned defensive mass but have not lost lethality. I think the Ukrainians are still forming mass for offensive actions but the defensive is a lot of small units dispersed all over the place with weapon systems that are light, portable and have really extended range and reach; they have become the swarm the Russians are trying to hit with a shotgun. Further, by dis-aggregating the Ukrainians look like they have turned some ideas about maneuver on its head. Rear areas are not not "rear" anymore, it is all FEBA because small units with next gen ATGMs are cutting Russian logistics to pieces, making all the Russian mass heavily dislocated (or perhaps contributing to Russian mess ups). We spend a lot of time slagging Russian failures, and there are quite a few and well earned, but we should also keep an eye on Ukrainian victories, because they might very well be happening on their own merits and not all on Russian screw ups. For example, we may be seeing a lot of abandoned Russian MBTs because there are no refueling or recovery assets left due to Ukrainians adopting a new path very effectively. So what? Well the question is, "are we seeing an anomaly or trend?" As we look over at our own heavy steel, we have to ask ourselves "what if our next opponent looks and fights like the Ukrainians and not the Russians?" The answer to that question may be a blip in military force development but is also may be a signpost much in the same way 1914 was because the technology that enables the Ukrainian tactics is accelerating - smart, very long range autonomous systems that can overwhelm current mechanized protection/shield at a system level. Personally, I think it is too soon to call it. There may be times ahead where mass demonstrates it merits and they may be decisive; however, it is all worth watching closely because none of us want to the a "horse cavalry commander" in the next war.

I guess to me the French General’s assessment is nonsense as the role of the operational level is to 1) align tactical actions and outcomes “the right battles” to strategic objectives - the campaign design and 2) to enable and “scene set” the tactical level, again in line with strategy in order to create advantage. To say “the Russians are failing Strategically and Tactically but succeeding Operationally” basically means that you are aligning failures and enabling them at the same time…and call it success. The example of losing every battle but winning the war is true but that normally means a really switched on operational level to ensure you can keep feeding the fires in the right places to eventually let attrition pressures succeed. Anyway, I am seeing a complete failure at the Operational level on the Russian side as there is no real alignment or design at play here and we know enablers have been a major issue. One could argue the military Strategy was not bad, a 5 axis overwhelming assault designed to shock the Ukrainian defence (personally I would have focused on a western cutoff to isolate first) and come at what they think was the UKR Center of Gravity, Kyiv from multiple angles. Of course the Strategy is useless if on cannot actually do the “overwhelming” part and that is on Operational and Tactical level.