The_Capt

Well Clausewitz kinda left these parts out. War is personal and worse it strips off all the veneer of civilization pretty quickly. Military discipline is not just about keeping people from running away, it is just as much about ensuring they can still see which way is up. Why did they do it? Because they can. And in the end we are all scared monkeys that are equal parts kind as we are cruel. You de-humanize your adversary hard enough and it is a slippery slope right to this sort of stuff.

Kind of puts the knee-capping incident into a different perspective. This was almost inevitable sad to say. A lot of this has the whole “civilian reprisals” feel to it. However I would not rule out some old fashion “ethnic cleansing”. Not much to add on a military assessment as this sort of thing is a blight on the profession. I would only add that this either demonstrates an extreme loss of control, or Russian high command has gone to a pretty dark, and stupid place. Stuff like this results in assassinations and reprisal attacks for a century. Further any hope of normalization with the west has left the building as any easing of sanctions will now be tied to warcrime investigation and prosecution. This sort of thing also plays into any anti-war support in Russia itself as these tales of atrocities come home. This right here is why war is best left to gaming.

Fellas, this bug spans titles, we are seeing the same in CMCW. Been reported and worked on.

So we gotta get this guy playing CM

Given our immigration policies...Canada? I joke, I joke...kinda.

Absolutely agree. I am not saying attacks on Russia are even a bad idea, I too have been wondering about those railheads, but they come with a different set of risk calculus. Again, I am not to fussed about what Putin is thinking as we already have a pretty good bead on this. I am very fussed about what the Russian people are thinking. Many have said "this will end when Putin says it will", well maybe but it can also end when the Russian people say it ends as well. Putin appears to still be bound by Russian law - a contract between him and the people - otherwise we would likely be seeing a much broader mobilization in Russia, but I suspect hands are tied. Putin is definitely bound by Russian Will, I do not agree that these are irrevocably one in the same, or we are likely looking at a major war between the west and Russia to which Ukraine is but the opening appetizer. As you point out, let's not discount this was Ukrainian "testing the waters" as well, to see what echo they get back from this signal. As a min the political and strategic military bureaucracy has to be losing their minds..."they did what?!" Because this was not supposed to be possible. This is akin to the Doolittle Raid, not much damage anywhere but the minds of the target audience which was the point.

This is really interesting and very surprising. So back in 2014 we were all pretty surprised on how the Russians employed UAVs, which we saw again in the Azer-Arm conflict but I am getting the sense that the UA has taken things to a new level. In 2014 and 2020 the Russian doctrine appears to be "make arty better", which frankly makes perfect sense given the deep historical attachment Russia has with artillery going back at least to WW1. They consistently built their systems around the guns and MLRS to link UAVs through a tactical commander to create rapid and deadly accurate massed fires. Then is this war a couple things appear to have happened: 1) the UA has gone in a way that don't give massed fires much to shoot at and 2) they have taken a UAV doctrine to "make all targeting better". And here it appears to follow the US multi-domain targeting concept. The UA is still using them to do artillery targeting but they are also employing them to sync up ATMG and ambushes targeting. I suspect they are employing them to make aerial targeting better and faster. And they are employing them much more widely in an integral strike capacity (as demonstrated in the video). This is what I was going on about something is happening here, armor and its logistical trains are getting hit along the entire length of their mass and UAVs are an important part of how that appears to be happening. The UA, thru no small part of crowdsourcing and hybrid approaches are in essence conducting omni-directional manoeuvre through firepower and creating shock along the entire Russian operational system. By simultaneously hitting everywhere from every direction the Russian system has no where to go, and UAVs in supporting/creating this effect is new. Lastly, the UAVs are being used to create information effects, both in a C4ISR sense and the fact that we, sitting back in the west, can see what is happening. The information/messaging these feeds have conducted in creating positive strategic support has been amazing.

Ok, I know what is being said at many levels on "what we think about what Putin is thinking" and it plays well in political theatre, but any professional military assessment is going to be very concerned with what the other side is thinking, why they are thinking it, and how they keep thinking it. The only exception is a war of extermination where your opponents frameworks are completely irrelevant because you are aiming to completely erase them from the books. Neither side in this war is at that level, in fact that level is very rare - think Mongols. This is also much bigger than "Putin". For all we know he is already in favour of WMDs to "solve this" and it is the domestic response, linked to military response that is keeping him in check - despite the noise, he is not a god-king - and sustained attacks on Russian homeland, especially when a missile goes off course and hits a school, is strategically risky. I say "risky" because obviously there are benefits in sending a message but potential costs as well...all war is negotiation as well. "Maximal support for Ukraine" - no, because that would include us attacking Russia directly up to and including nuclear weapons. I am all for Ukraine an this one but we are not "all in" on this one. One needs only go online and read the predictions of a full nuclear exchange and you can see why. We may even be "all in" as a proxy war, for the most part (e.g. I don't think we will be sending WMDs to Ukraine) but direct confrontation with between two nuclear states has only occurred a few times since we opened that box and every time it was like a barfight when someone pulls out a gun...a "whoa" moment. Finally, this is not about "Putin desperate", he is already there. This is about "Russians desperate" and any realistic assessment of this thing needs to separate those two concepts. Go check the history books on what happens when the Russian's get desperate, nothing good. The strategy being employed here is "poison-perogy-to-induce-vomiting", not to destroy Russia in fire and righteousness.

"What are your legs? Steel springs. How fast will you run? Faster than a leopard!"

Now this is interesting. I have been wondering if Ukraine was going to stretch out and start hitting outside its own borders. This one is tricky: - It is Russian soil and it could create more popular Russian support for the war (i.e. assist Russian Will); however, one has to consider what the real state of Russian Will is and is not. I do not trust polls conducted in Russia right now on several fundamental levels, so it is hard to really see where the domestic front is at, but this will play into the "hawk" hands as an escalation, - On the other hand, it is a clear demonstration of Russian weakness and failures. So if the UAF can strike 25 kms into Russia, where are all the things that are supposed to stop that from happening? Further, if this operation is "all going according to plan" and Ukraine is barely holding on, this is a strategic demonstration (and a pretty good one - hard to hide a refinery fire). The Russian immediate counter is to try and claim it was an industrial accident but that is weak tea. - I doubt this will impact the Russian war machine too much, hitting a military fuel farm or railhead would have done more to do that. This looks more like a strategic target and a SOF aviation job to be honest, small highly empowered capability right at the seam of operational and strategic. The target was no doubt "legitimate" in a legal sense but its link back to the invasion force was probably somewhat distant. This looks more like a legitimate strategic target in that it is part of the architecture of Russian national power. This one bears watching closely in my opinion. Actions like these are really signals (war is communication) which further reinforce the idea of posturing that is going on here. Unless Ukraine is going to begin a SOF Aviation campaign to cripple strategic oil and gas nodes (oh man that would be something to watch), this may be the start of some more military signaling outside of Ukraine itself. The fact that Ukraine is even able to achieve information dominance to do this op (e.g. they must know there was a hole in Russian strategic ISR and AD) has got to be driving Russian high-command nuts right now. Political level is likely losing his mind as well. Ukraine has to be careful though, this is how WMDs do get justified, another reason I am surprised they went with it.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/risks-russian-ceasefire-offer Don't think this has been posted yet. Some very good points, the main one being that we in the west need to rethink the algorithms of this war in terms of what it really is, and not the lens we normally have viewed this thing thru. In the west "ceasefire" is a prelude to peace...for Russia, not so much. Of course I have zero doubt that the Ukrainian government does not already know this. The concept of a ceasefire in this war is not really between Ukraine and Russia, it is really between Russian and the West.

Does anyone have any reliable data on this? Ukraine losses are likely not small but as proportion of their overall combat power? Also, I think conventional is more important here unless the UA cracks the code on how to get hybrid to conduct large offensives. I am not sure if we are seeing stalemate or just a Ukrainian recon-in-force phase.

Sorry but this makes very little sense from a couple perspectives. I am not sure why so many people need to somehow find a dark genius in Putin's actions and strategy. I guess some have invested so much in making him the boogey-man that their own interests are at stake here while others sound like they are on the Russian payroll. So internally, starting a war and then losing it has never been a smart path to reinforcing internal control. The worse one loses the more internal (not less) internal tension it creates. This reinforces the idea that a quick war may have solved some of those internal issues. Why try and suppress free press when they are crowing a quick victory parade in Kyiv? So the idea that this was all a clever ploy to get a better domestic grip does not make a lot of sense unless you can get a quick win, which did not happen. Every day Russia bleeds in Ukraine makes things worse, not better. Resource grab. Well first off, if this was the aim they missed it: https://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com/export/sites/trade/files/market_studies/Ukrainian Energy Market_0.pdf Russia already had the Crimea. It might have grabbed that thin sliver in the south and took a few nibbles from that big eastern field but the majority of that field is still in Ukrainian hands. This might have been a goal on the initial invasion but the debacle we have seen unfold for a month now does not support an oil and gas grab strategy. Further, resource-wise this makes little sense. Russia is sitting on 4.8% (ish - number swings around depending where you look), while Ukraine has a whopping .06%. Gas is even crazier with Russia at 25% and Ukraine at .6% (https://www.worldometers.info/gas/#:~:text=There are 6%2C923 trillion cubic,levels and excluding unproven reserves). Why on earth would Putin risk the massive sanctions, which further exacerbate his domestic troubles, in order to try and grab a fraction of a ridiculously small share of oil and gas? There are significant Black Sea reserves (https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/02/28/as-russia-closes-in-on-crimeas-energy-resources-what-is-next-for-ukraine/?sh=5ef9b6d829cd) but why wage a freakin land war all over the place if all you want to do is exploit offshore gas in a region where you already have vast naval superiority? Finally, how exactly has Putin achieved any of these strategic aims thus far? He has to try and keep a lid on over 10k dead (and times-3 wounded) to avoid domestic pressures, increasing economic failure due to sanctions - leading to domestic pressure, and zero to show for it in "black gold", that you can only sell to China - who is going to gut you price-wise - thanks to said sanctions. There is no master plan here, or at least not anymore. Being an ex-KGB autocrat, Putin demonstrate acumen at subversion strategies; however, on this one he tried to "go loud" and is likely suffering from Dunning-Kruger shock right now as he slowly realizes that he is nowhere near as smart as his cronies have been telling him.

Honestly, really way to soon to be calling this a doctrinal shift. Could very well be a strategic shift, or even making stuff up on the spot. But I doubt the Russians have anything resembling a functioning doctrine right now. Whatever they brought to this war got shredded and they are more likely ad hoc-ing a lot, particularly as they really don't have a joint command structure. So we are likely to see 4 or more attempts at SOPs and operational improvisation. Doctrine is what this Russian clown show is going to do once they go home (those left), fire a bunch of generals (some out of cannons) and undertake a military reform that will likely last a generation. Then when we are all really old farts - turn based only - we can watch them try again.

I honestly do not know. Ukraine is in a tricky situation right now. Unless they want this thing to drag on for months they need Russia to have an out (as in "get the hell out") but at the same time they need to keep up the pressure so that Russia does not get too comfortable. Second to this I am not sure about UA offensive combat power. This hybrid/crowd sourced warfare worked very well in basically integrating a bunch of local defence into a living nightmare for invading forces. If they can somehow point that at something and get it moving we then have to see how it does against conventional troops dug in WW1 style. My honest bet is this will look like steady chewing until they see an opportunity for an operational move (if they see one). But again too large a gesture and Russia might dig in a choose the hard way. UA will definitely pursue c-moves, my bet would be around Kyiv as top priority and then any other major urban centers they can to get the guns out of range. Then once they do that then it will depend what the political level want to demonstrate. I am not sure the UA can do large scale offensive actions, it will be Xmas morning if they can take their current approach on the road in a big way. Donbas (DR/LR) are definitely in play, but I gotta tell you I honestly think Crimea is off the table. The West was ready to basically live with it, I am sure Ukraine is still pissed but we are talking Sevastopol and the Russians are not going to give that up. As you point out the Russians might just play the race card and declare it an attack on the homeland, which not only means mobilization but we might still get a chance to see them WMDs we were all worried about. And I am not sure the West would see a tac nuke on a UA offensive in the Crimea in the same light. We were definitely not cool with killing civilians but UA conventional troops advancing on Russian soil makes this really awkward and weird because every nuclear power has pretty much declared they will do the same thing. It probably also explains why we have not seen deep attacks into Belarus and Russia before now, all those railyards are actually in drone range. So stay strapped in cause it could still get wackier.

Those ATGMs had nothing to do with diplomacy, they were a desperate scramble to try and slow down what was looking like a Russian roll over. Like the intel, lethal aid is what we could do after diplomacy failed. We were in effect pulled into a proxy war and it looks like we backed the right side. However, we cannot and will not get around the fact that diplomacy and the global order failed in the first place. The giant cracking sound was on 24 Feb and even though we will try, we cannot un-hear it.

So I think it has become apparent that the feel of this war is changing, or at least that is how I am perceiving it. Way back I mentioned that when looking at any strategic military picture I always ask "what does the options space look like?". We have seen from Day 1 the Russian military options steadily go from "I can attack Ukraine anywhere of my time and choosing...fear me!", to "The quick war may be a loss but I will grind you into powder city by city until you beg me to stop...and my Belarusian attack dog is by my side!!", to "I will hold the ground I have taken and pound you from afar", to "I will try and take/hold ground that will give me the thin veneer of a win while trying to fail-slower everywhere else". While Ukraine has sustained its option space and now it looks like that space is expanding as they decide where to attack. The "so what?" is that this war is not about the militaries that are fighting them anymore. Nor is it really about military strategy or operations. It is looking more and more like we have entered a "posturing endgame". So military action is likely to be governed more by appearances than anything of real substance. The Russians have literally run out of options at this point, they are down to: - Stay and likely collapse under their own weight and Ukrainian offensive action - Withdraw a shattered wreck before #1 - Double down where they can and try to pull a "win" out of this turd pile - Go full crazy and nuke everything. When I talk about "options" I really am talking about good ones that may lead to victory, everyone always has bad options, lots of them. The only good option left to the Russians, barring some fully automatic rabbit they still have in the sock drawer, is #3. They will have to try and maintain credible threat on other fronts but this Pac Man strategy of slowly munching in the Donbas up to some arbitrary "victory line" is starting to look more and more likely. For Ukraine, they are under competing demands of 1) to stop the suffering and damage because the cleanup is going to just be nuts and 2) an overriding desire to kill more Russians. Unlike the Russians, Ukrainian forces of all types have all sorts of options on the table. They can attrit where they want and simply hold elsewhere. They can try limited offensive and try and line up an operational knockout blow, but that might run afoul of political desire to get this thing over with. Either way, I am getting the sense over the last week that we have entered an end-game phase of this thing unless the Russians have dug a tunnel to the mole people and made an unholy alliance with the underworld. Not sure when this will end but it has that "post-culmination feel". Of course we sat around in Korea for like 2 years at this state. What we do know: - Russia has failed in this war to a point that is historic. We will be studying this for years trying to figure out what happened. - Russia will declare victory in this thing even if it means they only took a single square foot of Ukrainian real estate. - Russian power dynamic will be in for a shake up. No idea if that means Putin is in or out but people will need to take the blame for this and those oligarchs looked like they were choosing sides. Gonna get messy back in mother-Russia but at least Putin will be busy in his own house...if he can stay out of the ground. - Ukraine's biggest problem will be falling off the front page of western news media. The clean-up and reconstruction effort will be massive but I think their odds are good as the west sees their best interest in a strong functioning Ukraine, plus no small amount of guilt at only being able to do so much. The West is going to lose its mind for awhile yet. NATO just secured its funding for the next 25 years (hell the Canadian government might actually buy F35s, something they have dragged heels on committing to for two decades.) We are going to be all skittish but ever so smug in that the global order has been re-established...huzzah. It will take time but the smell of BS will eventually overtake the most optimistic - we are entering a time where "power is power" and Russia just proved it by destroying half of Ukraine while we sat around and made duck sounds. Even though Russia failed gloriously, it had little to do with our collective global order, liberal diplomacy and visions of a better world. It was done by Ukrainians with smart ATGMs killing a LOT of Russians, which is a lesson in 21st century reality right there. And of course China is still in the backfield looking for its moment...

I guess the Ukrainians did the same thing but local area defence with territorial troops who are building on an existing reserve structures, cause you live next door to Russia, is one thing. Taking what are essentially conscripts and rolling them into an offensive actions in the modern age is insane. We will be seeing human wave attacks at this rate.

Its not the pulling them from society that I am talking about, one can do that in a gymnasium. It is gearing them, theatre training, refresher training (stuff like combat first aid, mine threats etc) and rotating them into theatre. The trying to integrate 100k troops into a fight is not an easy task if you don't want an armed mob with no idea what is going on. This is one of the biggest logistical challenges a military can take on and so far we have not seen Russian logistics as the high water mark of the science. It isn't the 100k of fighting age males, even if they are all hardened vets of 2014 or Syria, it is taking a group of former civilians and turning them into a fighting force and then getting them into theatre in organized units/formations and integrating them into current operations, it take months. Unless the Russians are at the WW1/WW2 model of "here is your weapon, go that way", which then leads to the logistical problem of 100k corpses you need to try and repatriate...or not, just leave them in a hole, great for morale of their families.

Right!? I mean the majority of their "combat veterans" are likely dead at this point. The effort to RSOMI 100k troops is enormous.

Do the Russians have 100k reservists with "combat experience"?

I was kinda hoping they could tell me what is happening to be honest. From a human being standpoint every minute of this war has been a horror show. From a professional military standpoint every minute of this was has been a fascinating horror show. I say this with no small amount of guilt but I chose the red-handed path far too long ago to flinch away now. I think we are all watching to see how the Ukrainian Doctrine works on the offense. I am not sure how much is "slow" and how much is "deliberate" at this point. I also suspect that there is a lot of collective learning and adaptation happening right now. We saw hints of this in Mosul, as light/SF forces would push to contact and then "stonk" forces would come forward when the enemy was "Found and Fixed". In this war, I am thinking we might see more "Isolate, Find, Fix" then stonk. The tempo and pace of that action will be a key indicator of where offensive action may be heading. On the downside you still basically have hybrid forces for the most part, or at least until the UA figures the time is right for conventional mass; however, the Russians have taught all one thing, use conventional mass carefully. So hybrid forces do not normally move with the speed and tempo of large conventional ones, it is one of the reasons we look down on them as a "poor mans force". What hybrid forces do have, particularly in this war, is more freedom of movement. That and a very high level of self-synchronicity which is a big plus for tempo as it becomes decentralized. A guy named Antoine Bousquet wrote about "chaoplexic" warfare, a war on the seam between chaos and complexity, and hinted at a lot of what Ukrainian forces appear to be doing, whilst the Russian forces were more rigidly adhering to our old solution. I think we can all agree how the defensive phase for Ukrainian forces went, I am going to be watching closely as the offensive phase occurs. But it is probably way too early to draw any solid conclusions.

Well let me start by saying we are all making a lot of assumptions here kinda the biggest hint we are in a disruptive time. I think you and I are looking at different envisioning of the near-future battlefield and both of us are probably wrong. However, it is also possible we are both correct, just at different points of time. To your point above, conventional land warfare combat systems unable to defeat both the ISR and kinetic effects of long range, highly lethal smart unmanned systems is not an assumption it is a fact - one the Russians are living with every long hard day in this war. Right now every western (and no doubt eastern) military is having a "huh?" moment. And they will no doubt suddenly escalate spending in defensive systems to try and re-create a level of symmetry in order to preserve the conventional systems that they have already invested trillions in for defence. Frankly this is the wrong reason to do this as they should be investing in what will work better in defence but welcome to military procurement strategy. Very good point on naval power and an awkward one to be honest. The last time we had a fleet-v-fleet action outside of a video game was during WW2. So we really have no idea what that would look like and likely why every modern navy has tried desperately to only face 5 Somalis in a fast boat armed with RPGs as the high water mark of counter-fleet actions. If a US carrier group were to face off against a Chinese NTG we have no idea how that would actually go down. Would they be able to "shoot down" with multi-layered systems against hypersonic? Smart, multi-munitions? Or simply the weight of missiles one side could put in the air? Theoretically we want to say "absolutely" because if you think we invest a lot into land systems, all that floating hardware is too "big to fail"; however, the real answer is really, really scary and could quickly include tactical nuclear systems. This is largely why naval power has been relegated to where it can easily establish sea control and project/support operations ashore. So important here to understand which "surprise" I am talking about; surprise for conventional mass. Like land based full spectrum area defence, the ability for ISR to reliably detect small dispersed infantry, all armed with said smart unmanned, does not currently exist. Light Infantry, or in the case of Ukraine - hybrid infantry, with smart weapons are the submarines in our naval analogy. They have the asymmetric capability to still be able to move and fight without being detected easily. Conventional mass, down to the tactical level cannot. Why? Because with a highly illuminated battlefield trying to hide tons of hot steel and the system to keep it "hot" is impossible to hide...even from satellite. This fact alone may be turning land warfare on its head at a pretty foundational level. And no, we did not have "perfect drone cover" in Afghanistan, not even close. In fact our COIN experiences underline the above reality as well. In Afghanistan it was very hard, almost impossible to surprise the TB. They were asymmetric in their ability to hide amongst the people and we were tied to out big lumbering IED-magnets. The only time we could effectively surprise them was when we 1) got actionable intelligence from locals and 2) used SOF or something fast and light in the dark, or a drone strike/artillery/air. Our conventional mass was nearly useless. So yes, ambushes did happen...they happened to us and the insurgents didn't even need drones to do it, they had unconventional anti-mass. So I already covered why dispersed small units have an advantage but let's unpack the collective area defence argument for a second. I am not sure what this would look like to be honest, you seem to be pointing at a sort of land borne B17 formation mutual defence cover concept. Ok, maybe? I mean it is not a bad idea and may turn us back to mass being able to better defend than dispersed offence can attack. However, there are several problems with it. First, is it possible? I mean we are not just talking missiles, which are bad enough, but ground based systems can cover a suite from direct fires, to minefields that can get up and walk. I am not sure how one could build a full defensive suite to counter all that, but let's for argument sake say we can but it is only effective when mass is in formation, like the good old days of the Roman testudo. Well second, is mobility. Staying together for collective defence will hamper mobility, already does, but it may mean greater restrictions on formation which is going to cause problems. Third, LOCs. You would also need that mass all the way back to along your logistical tail, which now needs to be an iron pipe. This further restricts mobility and flexibility. Fourth, Cost. I am getting the sense that to trick out current APS, all one needs do is tinker with a Javelins software, whereas to do what we are talking about with respect to full collective defence is going to cost an enormous amount of money. In the end, we might wind up with rigid, slow moving and incredibly expensive mass that in the end minor tweaks to the offensive systems could sidestep. The current manoeuvre warfare theory states that one can move-to-exploit by outpacing/tempo an opponents ability to cover their vulnerabilities and/or exploit you own. This assumes that we cannot see the entire battlefield when it comes to conventional mass. The UA is absolutely making effective use of this principle right now but they are doing it by employing "anti-mass" in combination with mass. So in the future manoeuvre warfare is still going to be a thing but how we do it will likely change. We will need anti-mass that can attrit the snow globe to the point of collapse and then we move in with conventional mass to finish...this is pretty much what was seen in the NK War, except the Armenians did not have a snow globe to start with. Essentially our current understanding of manoeuvre warfare will need to shift under this sort of battlefield, particularly if we adopt the wide and powerful area defence systems you are describing. Those will need to be defeated in order to create the conditions for manoeuvre; we no longer move to exploit vulnerability, we create vulnerability to move. Again, for conventional mass. For unconventional/hybrid/anti-mass they are still very hard to detect even in the open. Terrain will still matter for mass on mobility; however, less so for fires. We will no longer really have dominating ground as a conventional land formation would have effective ranges well beyond LOS. Urban terrain is another excellent example. It is toxic for conventional mass, while anti-mass can thrive in that space. So this builds on the asymmetry theme. Finally, I am not saying conventional mass is dead as its ability concentrate force will likely be decisive for years to come. How we generate and employ that mass is looking more and more like it will undergo major revisions. Will we see anti-mass in layers out in front of mass in some sort of very intense Recon battle? What does snow-globe war look like? What vote will defensive systems cast? If tactical surprise, let alone operational, is dead for conventional mass, that alone is going to mean re-writing great swaths of land warfare doctrine, and frankly I have no idea how far that rabbit hole goes. Hey I am glad you appear firm in your convictions. I have been in this business for over three decades and I am frankly freakin out a bit here, which is inexcusable because the signs have been on the wall for awhile now. I am sure we will go to immense effort to try and ignore/wish away/justify/ what we are seeing in Ukraine right now but the evidence is mounting to an uncomfortable level here. The inconvenient truth is that the Russians are fighting our fight. We still think in terms of Battle Groups and TFs sweeping across the field to create shock and paralysis in an opponent. It worked in '91 and '03, all that COIN stuff was State Dept's fault. Russian performance in 2014 just underlined that smart mass was the was to go. NK, reinforced it, all while we missed some obvious implications. So here we are with a war where Russia should be crushing a much smaller - dispersed force and is failing gloriously. We are falling back in "ya but Russians suck" (which definitely has some truth to it) but everyone in the business has to be asking themselves "ya but what if we had to fight the Ukrainians right now? We have big fat formations with very vulnerable LOCs as well...huh?"

Follow up. When you think about it, I was wrong on this as better information also eleviates some of the other sources as well. Perfect information is not viable so perhaps this will become a competitive de-frictioning while projecting friction onto an opponent. Regardless, how we used to do business will change as the information balance of warfare changes. And indications that this is significant.

If one goes by Barry Watts: 1. danger 2. physical exertion 3. uncertainties and imperfections in the information on which action in war is based 4. friction in the narrow sense of the resistance within one's own forces 5. chance events that cannot be readily foreseen 6. physical and political limits to the use of military force 7. unpredictability stemming from interaction with the enemy 8. disconnects between ends and means in war. (i.e. bad strategy) https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA316730.pdf And this does not even count the other deeper sources that Clausewitz missed, such as cultural blind spots, prejudice, progressive unreality in centralized leadership and the list goes on. All we are really talking about is #3 and I don’t think perfect information is attainable. What we are talking about is an illuminated battlefield where conventional mass cannot move or stand without being detected at ranges where it can be engaged. Deception will always be a part of warfare but what viable options and what that looks like will likely dramatically change and the character of land warfare with it. Spoofing and decoys are an option but “illuminated” means multi-spectral and multi-resolution. It doesn’t mean trickery is dead but how and what one can do with it will likely narrow dramatically without penetrating the cognitive systems of an opponent. It is the principle of surprise that is under strain at least as we know it. I suspect that we will instead see land warfare evolve to prioritize two things as forces meet; Sense war as each side attempts to blind the other and collapse that snow globe, and Projecting friction onto an opponent through any means possible along all of those other possible pressure points above. Then an attritional phase to strip away shield system and then manoeuvre to defeat a blinded, sticky and vulnerable opponents fighting power. This is akin to the knife fighting in Frank Herbert’s Dune, fast race to position, then slow and steady attrition, then a fast finish.