The_Capt

Do we have any photos? Every one seems pretty tight-lipped about the thing.

Not sure if this was reported but it feels "stealthy Switchblade-y" https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/meet-phoenix-ghost-the-us-air-forces-new-drone-designed-for-ukraines-war-with-russia/

Or could be two guys with vodka bottles filled with soap and gasoline. The thing about political or subversive warfare is that it takes time to set up and put into motion. Normally done through assets and asset networks in the target country, trained, funded and supplied with equipment and information. This sort of war is very hard to see and very hard to attribute by-design. They will definitely include cyber along with a possible suite of "special" capabilities. All we will likely see on the outside are manifestations and weird reports, kinda like fires/industrial accidents within Russian infrastructure, accidents of key leadership - although the West does not condone the use of assassination as a tool of warfare I am not so sure where the Ukrainians stand, leaking key information and all sorts of shenanigans and monkey-shines.

Ah, well we should probably have a conversation on an aspect to this war almost no one is talking about; however, over time it is going to accelerate and that is the employment of political warfare with Russia itself. This in effect allows for political and strategic friction deeper into the Russian system normally it stays in the information space but there are no rules saying it has to though. This is a really tricky arena because it is how things like WW1 start but we were talking about options.

Ok so this plus the fires is starting to get weird. Could be one of three things to my mind: 1. Coincidence, but that is starting to strain. 2. Russian false flag setup to justify broader mobilization, but some of this is looking like it is starting to hurt. Have the Russians spun any of these as foreign attacks? Nazi Saboteurs? 3. Western political warfare is beginning to kick in and we are seeing the emergence of a supported insurgency in Russia itself, it could be an organic movement or a combination of both.

So this is a very common misconception. A ground force is like a ship, simply having in the field erodes it over time, simple interaction with the environment causes wear and tear. Troops get sick and hurt. Morale wanes over time as living in a hole like an animal sucks. Equipment also needs constant maintenance and spare parts, it also gets damaged in accidents etc. So yes, simply taking an unit out into the wild and parking it will begin a process of slow attrition over time. Attrition that will need resupply, refit and rotation. Add in actual combat and that process speeds up dramatically. So basically any army in the field is like a bag of water with a hole in it. How big that hole is depends on all sorts of factors, including combat. At the top of the bag is how quickly one can pour resources back into the bag. [aside: for those paying attention, yes, all military forces are living examples of the Theseus paradox]. So the question of "how long" is actually a combination of the front end and back end. Right now that hole is pretty big and the water coming in is not matching, I am not sure if Russia can get a matching back-end to be honest as these are not simple things to replace. However, this is also tied up with complicated concepts of power I outlined in that other post.

So this is called a Black Elephant and we have danced around it margins a lot on this forum for obvious reasons. I am Canadian and try not to weigh in on any one nations politics - we have got enough silliness of our own and do not intend open up this can of worms but maybe we can look at the can. The road to this war extends across the aisle, the world does not "happen" in the 4-8 year US administration cycles. If US readers of this walk away with one thing, let it be that. The US has enormous influence but in a highly complex system such as "war" the causes are rarely determined in a few short years of a presidential term. More succinctly "it is not all about you", and this applies to my own country as the political noise is trying to play this one as well. Putin has been in power for over 20 years and the western failures leading to today are long and winding on both sides of the aisle. No one US president is responsible, they all are - kinda comes with the job. As to the particular former administration, I will lean in slightly: listen to the advisors and spokes-people before this war and it gives a hint at what the actual policy might have been. I point to Col Macgregor as one of my favorites, a former military advisor to the White House and someone I take particular issue with, not only because he has consistently been wrong but also because he has sold out on a core principle of objective military advice. Look up and listen to his analysis and assessment on YouTube for those looking for a window at what advice would have been provided in this crisis...and I will leave it at that.

Do you guys sleep? It must be a time zone thing. First off the new Perun video dropped and it is also on the long war, haven't watched yet so FYI for now: Second, I think it is a very good idea to look inside the adversaries head from time to time so well done to @LongLeftFlank for pulling all this. First thing that struck me was how much of this are noted vulnerabilities of the Russians which tracks as a lot of propaganda plays on projection mechanisms. This whole assessment, on both sides, is really asking what is the calculus of attrition in this war. The overarching theory in the mainstream is that "the war is costing the Russians a lot but they have much deeper pockets/UA is on the brink" The theory being that in a long war, Ukraine will break and Russia will be able to achieve its original aims - some see this with fear, others with glee depending who you talk to. The high-level idea is that if a nations power is drained faster than its opponent their ability to resist will crumble = "victory". The reality is that it is a lot more complicated than that....like macro-economics complicated. So for arguments sake let's break out the Capt's national power model and do some comparison: Strength: Let's start here as it really is all most people tank about. On paper, even if we accept Russian faults, failings and corruption, the Russian Federation is "stronger" than Ukraine. It has much more manpower, its economic strength is still higher even given sanctions, its standing forces - even if we cut them in half - well outnumber the UA and Russia has a strategic weapons inventory to rival the US. The hard power reality is that Russia could turn Ukraine to glass with a small fraction of its nuclear arsenal and could do a general mobilization that could threaten the entirety of Europe if it put it all in motion. If this was a uni-dimensional model, we should all be asking why Russia "has not won yet?", and many are doing just that. But Strength is a slippery beast and not one that simply responds to the sound of its masters whistle....we will come back to that. Relationships. Oh my when you start to unpack this one the view on Russian superiority swings dramatically. Ukraine has relationship superiority in just about any metric one wishes to measure. Externally the disparity is obvious as we ship heavier weapons and billions in support to Ukraine, while Russia gets deeper into the desert of international isolation. However, it is the internal relationships that are even more interesting. Internally Ukraine is a lot stronger, again for obvious reasons; however, the moral and collective connections in Ukraine scream "unity", Ukrainians are willing to die for each other and are proving it everyday. Russia is a bit more complicated. The Russian domestic audience is clearly a factor here based on the lies its own government has had to tell them, which are getting progressively larger and stretched. When it comes to narrative superiority, Russia is clearly struggling. I am sure internal polls in Russia are showing 110% support to the war but the amount of crackdown effort and epic "alternative facts" building going on do not speak to a galvanized Russian population. Lastly, this whole war crimes thing was literally the dumbest thing Russia could do (beyond being barbaric), as it has become a strategic turning point in the relationship space deeply in favor of Ukraine - hence the crazy lies of Ukrainian snipers coming from Russia...worst damage control scheme ever. So score a solid win on Ukraine for this one. Will. No need to really get into this one too much because my assessment is that Ukrainian Will has increased over time while Russian Will has eroded, worse it is very fragile because it is largely coming from a single node - Putin. Over time Will ebbs and flows, shaped by events/outcomes and factors such as Strength and Relationships - remember all war is negotiation with the future, so people use these factors to weigh their odds. Ukrainian Will is incredibly high right now... I do not care if Russia get that big naked blue guy from the Watchmen to stride the battlefield zapping Ukrainians with his laser eyes; the second that happens Ukrainian defence will work on how to cut his toes off. Ukraine is all in, like Taliban all in. I see pictures of 12 year old with toys guns and that says to me that for Ukraine, killing Russians is becoming cultural, part of their identity - this is how global powers are born. In 100 years when Ukraine is a major power in Europe and the globe our great grand-kids can point to this war as the start point. So, again, a major win for Ukraine and this is really the one that matters. Opportunity. I left this one for last because it links back into Russian Strength. This is why Russian strength is not what it appears on paper. Russia is lacking in a lot of the stuff it take to create the opportunity to bring its national power to bear. Relationships, make its nuclear arsenal almost useless as any use immediately risks drawing in the western powers, who have much more Strength. Nuclear weapons have enormous deterrence power but almost zero coercive power as once used whatever the aims were to justify their use become irrelevant. Will is the other problem. Russian will is not strong, or Putin could have ordered general mobilization by now and he has tried every trick but that. Then even if he did the tyranny of the physics of this universe means it will take time to pull together that Strength to the point it is "Opportune", worse that time further erodes Russian Will and Strength as economic sanctions start to kick in. Ukraine is the exact opposite the lights are almost all green on Opportunity. It would really appreciate more and even for NATO to get directly involved but here we have Opportunity costs of our own to worry about...you can see how it gets complicated. So back to LLFs list. Well the first three are all Strength-offset-by-Relationships. Until the RA cuts off supply from the West or the will to support fails, there is nothing there that we cannot simply drive across the Polish border. Russia completely failed Step 1 of Invading Another Country (it is a lecture package) - Isolate and as such there is nothing we cannot send to the Ukrainians on that list. The last one "Capable Soldiers" is probably the one thing, aside from volunteers, we cannot provide but we can help Ukraine make them in Poland and send them back across the border with the equipment...and I will bet money that is happening right now. Finally, what is interesting about the Russian-list in the OP is what is missing. What about Information? The Russians are clearly not even thinking in terms of modern warfare because any list I would make up would have Ukraine is cut off and in the dark due to lack of information and then build some BS reasons/examples why. But information superiority isn't even in their lexicon, let alone C4ISR. The fact that Russia propaganda is all on Strength and mentions nothing about other dimensions of power that really matter tells me more about the Russian mindset than anything else...and it screams amateur hour.

Well one could argue that the organization was marginalized long before this whole dance. The US invasion of Iraq in 03 was definitely a nail in its coffin. The global order that the UN was supposed to both represent and embody has been stressed and cracking for decades, this has likely just finished the job. This is not good news. As constipated and dysfunctional as the UN was it is better than the alternative, which is back to the old anarchy of nations with multipolar power arrangements largely ungovernable besides the rule of the gun. That is where we were in 1914 except now we have nukes. So yes Ukraine is bad but what could follow may be a lot worse if we don’t put this whole thing back in a box. Putin’s sins in Ukraine are historic but if we don’t get our sh#t together collectively he is going to go down as a footnote, assuming there is anyone left to write it down. And if that wasn’t hilarious enough we have climate impacts coming straight at us.

That is not how the UNSC works, nor is it how the UN works. Just because a country is on the UNSC doesn't mean that they have a "right to invade". In fact no country has a "right" to invade under the UN Charters, it was kinda the point. Problem is that the UNSC has become dysfunctional, and given the fact it survived the Cold War is saying something.

ISW assessment is up for today: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21

Standard play is "somebody else's kids" so they will milk that cow until it bleats (already have). As to 100k or even 200k. In the west it takes us about 1-2 years to create a functioning basic infantry person. That is basic and battle school, even our reserves here in Canada take at least a year. These are totally inexperienced with no heavy weapons training, minimum fieldcraft and just enough skill not to shoot themselves or each other too often. But this rabble do not make a tactical unit. You need NCOs, Officers, technical specialist etc. A recce troop takes 3-5 years to make, a good NCO 5-10, a junior officer (if one waives a degree requirement) 2-3 years - more if they are in a technical trade. So yes, if they want kids standing in trenches holding a rifle they could technically "mobilize". But they will not hold ground under pressure and forget anything complex like offense. I mean if you want third world quality, sure Russia can mobilize but they will get crushed in days. The UA is producing veterans at an alarming rate, to the point I would be concerned about taking them on with a western military right now. They are on their home soil so no worries about motivation, and they are being equipped with some of the best weapon systems in human history. But I am sure Russia will stick an 18 year old with strange holes and stains on his uniform, in a different country, no real support and an AK with one mag and call it a "Wall of Steel".

Based on the Russian losses...mobilize what? So by my count Russia is about half-way to the losses of the Iraqi military during the Gulf War. Now Russia has reserves of equipment but plenty of doubt as to the condition of those reserves. Men, well sure but it takes months to create a basic rifleman and years for anything beyond that. Everyone keeps bringing up "Russian Mobilization" but I am really not sure what that looks like given the serious damage done to their field force, steadily increasing pressure from economic sanctions and the Will of the Russian people.

Ok, but if sooner means "before Russia is fully baked" you can see the problem. This will likely be conditions based and not a set timeline. Unless you mean by "ending" simply giving up territory at the negotiation table, but I do not think that is reasonable. I am not so sure all our western political crap really matters in this. Our options are back off and risk another Russian rogue movement or go with the Cold War strategy of containment. This is bigger than political party cycles, or at least I hope it is.

Definitely tricky, these would be the political considerations. If they go too soon they risk failure, too late and you have other issues. On the economic front, if the West does not have a Marshal Plan ready when this thing stabilizes than shame on us and we deserve what happens next. And I am not talking a loosie-goosie feel good "free market capitalism" thing - that can come later - I mean nation re-building and serious mega-development, under-written by western economies. We do it for the exact same reason we did it for Germany, to build a functioning buffer state between us and Russia. If this turns into "pass the hat" and "hey look what is on the other channel" we could seriously screw this up.

Hey, I think my prowess in IPB and map usage is well documented in the Beta AAR with Bil, I have war colleges begging me for my secrets. The only other option is to try and build citadels but they can be isolated even easier and you just lose more troops faster. My bet is the Russian play is to hand off to the local republics as quickly as possible also known as the "Kabul Kasbah" manoeuvre and the local forces can take the blame when the whole thing collapses. And back to options spaces...I can see how Russia is just going to go from one crisis after another after this. Oh and this is the same answer even if the RA pulls off a miracle in the next few weeks and take all of Donbas...the problem of frontage and holding it does not go away, it may even get worse. Why? Because they failed in the first part of this war - defeating the oppositions will to resists. In fact they did the exact opposite.

Now that is another conversation. My thoughts are that this long a frontage is too long for the Russian forces, and they are likely to try and hand the defence off to as many contractors, DNR/LPR conscripts and Arabs as quickly as possible so that they can show the "Russian boys coming home". So it will be a porous and brittle lines without integrated ISR or fires, its LOCs will be exposed and fragile as C-UAV is just not in the cards for Russia right now. So my guess is that UA forces will still employ a hybrid approach but it will be to infiltrate, isolate and then destroy at key seams in the Russian defence, all the while hammering LOCs and logistics with deep strike capability. [aside: if the UA gets PSM HIMARS Ukraine could hit Moscow from its NE border...crazy]. Russian defence will buckle and then break as they slowly get chewed up but at this point Ukrainian political has to think about drawing Russian back in and trying to re-build, all the while keeping the good will of the West. More likely, if I were on the Ukrainian staff I would advise to wait, build up and let the sanctions do their work while putting every single war crime investigation back on the front pages of western media. Let a movie or two be made, starring Jeremy Remer - "Hells Factory - Mariupol" and then as Russia gets weaker and the UA becomes the best armed military in Europe, then I would go for the big wins and take it all back in 48 months. When Russia, with a newly established government, is begging Ukraine not to attack across the border and the West is willing to pay them not to do it, that is what winning looks like militarily.

One thing we have learned in the last 77 years is that anytime a global nuclear power goes to war the nuclear specter is raised: https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/how-close-did-the-united-states-actually-get-to-using-nuclear-weapons-in-vietnam-in-1968/ https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/how-korean-war-almost-went-nuclear-180955324/ And here we are again. It is a concern but I assess the probability as very low. First Putin has to be insane enough not to see this as a highway to escalation that Russia is not well placed to win - he has to be wondering about all that BMD technology the US has been working on. Second, those behind the throne need to be insane enough to hitch their wagon to this runaway idea. Third, the military C2 structure under all of this has to be onboard and they can do the math as well. I mean, yes, the mechanisms are there but a whole lot has to line up for it to really come off [aside: and I realize the irony of that statement given they just invaded another European nation]. More to the point, if nuclear weapons fly in this war then it will fundamentally shift the war itself. It will no longer be about Ukraine nor will it be contained in the Ukraine, it will spread. And that is a conversation I fervently hope we do not have to have. It is also down the road of a fractured Russia, another Russian civil war, now with nukes. So many dark paths here that a stupid fake May 9th parade and frozen conflict lines are starting to look pretty good right now. Of course we are teetering on all Clausewitz had to offer here and that has to be making a lot of military theorists and strategist queasy right now. The nature of this war is still: violent, human interaction and political but it is also things beyond that, it is also cultural and personal. Putin pushing buttons would be personal, not political and the fact that is a real option kinda throws our concepts of strategy for a loop...well some peoples concepts at least.

Considering the Russian military has been throwing up on itself for nearly two months straight now, I think "tidy" is off the menu.

To which I would add "we used to sell them for hitting terrorist but we want in the big game".

Maybe but let's for argument sake that Russia pulls back and digs in and claims all lands south of the Dnipro cutting a line to Donetsk - the famous land bridge. And then that hunk south of the Oskil, so roughly, and for arguments sake: By my math, that is an area roughly the same size as Ireland above and beyond the old DNR/LNR and Crimea lines. Why not just call that, plus Mariupol and be done with it? Victory, Peace in Our Time...now if anyone mentions it again, they get a free trip to a shallow grave. I mean the Ukrainians are going to hack away at that but if you need a 9 May "win".

Whoa...we call the ball correctly on this, we should start thinking about moving to another business. I have to agree. I think an attempt to look like there is a big offensive without actually having one makes a lot more sense in all this. And what we are seeing is the Russian military trying to posture-while-negotiating with its own political level. Further all this probing and fumbling towards glory going on could be just so they can turn to the boss and go "we tried but it looks really bad. Wanna just declare victory now?" A lot of signals do kinda match up with this like the math not adding up on force-to-space.

The flaw here is that any outcome in Donbas will somehow translate to a better strategic situation. Externally we already know that it is a frim "no". A long war is in Ukarine's favor, not Russia's. The West's attention stays on Ukraine and the money keep flowing, while Russia's economy and military keeps bleeding; in the long war, Russia is more likely to break than Ukraine. No matter what happens in the next weeks, the west is not going to go "oh sorry about that" and stop support, pull back and reject Finland/Sweden into NATO, defund NATO and/or re-normalize with Russia economically. Ukraine will be westward facing for a century no matter what happens as well. Nothing in this whole Donbas dance is going to change the external strategic position. So internally, what is the magic flag waving moment (that they cannot manufacture) that makes it better for an internal audience? What are they doing this for if they can manufacture giant lies for their own people?

Agree, however, at this point there is nothing that Russia can do beyond this above. Russia can not shoot its way out of this larger "loss" with respect to political/diplomatic isolation, western perceptions, actual concrete regional influence or gains in context of Ukraine itself. That ship sailed about 2 weeks into this thing to be honest. So all Putin has left is shoring up domestic support and internal power structures aka staying in power. So we are back to "why do this whole drama, when you can make up whatever end state you like...Vlad?"

I am an expert on military operations and this war makes very little sense in both purpose and execution.