The_Capt

The real war!

I was thinking now is the time to get out and cash in on that tsunami of contractor money they are going to need to spend...they can keep the medals, I want the cash...sweet cash....

Nope, that was 2 BGs and a Service Bn. Afghanistan was a BG, a PRT and a bunch of enablers. Last time was 4 CMBG in Lahr. We could probably bolt one together out of what is left, sustaining it should be fun. So glad I am not in the CA right now, they must be going nuts.

Regional power maybe, but when your kingmaking influence only extends to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, I am not sure it puts a nation in the "global power" club. Most of the US and Chinese influence has been $$$$ - and as we discussed Russia did not have a lot to start with and even less now. I mean, sure, I guess? But they need that vacuum and just started a war that did the opposite. I mean that is a bit of a Rube Goldberg Strategy - IF we get the US to contract, AND IF we can count on the Europeans to sit on the sidelines, THEN we can extend influence in Eastern Europe - still without any real economic power, but maybe gas? So this is the disrupt US and put in "friendly president" theory - which has some merit but I suspect that there are a lot of check and balances in US involvement in NATO (arms industry for one) that even the most isolationist US president could not easily side-step. Of course his best strategy was patience if this were the case, not this train wreck. I for one cannot see any rationality in this invasion. I do see a lot of relative rationality and insular echo chamber type of thinking - building some pretty weak assumptions and no one to challenge them. Ok, so now we are getting somewhere...this plus "undeniable defeat" means that people in that power structure is going to start to see that their interests no longer align with El Putin...this is the stuff of quiet "retirements". To be clear, I am not talking about any dramatic decapitation strikes, or Jason Bourne with a sniper rifle - that is Hollywood BS. Most times you want an unworkable a$$hat out of power, you simply go down the list to a new a$$hat you can work with and "encourage" him to make his move. In fact if you have done it correctly you might have a couple fallback options for later. Problem is that you need to do the work to truly understand that power bloc at the top in high resolution, and there I am not sure if we have done the homework...because global order/new age/thousand points of light/terrorists/pandemic and picking a fight over our own toenails on just about every issue we can. Putin is a 70 year old man you can take a trip down the stairs like anyone...trick is finding someone who will do the pushing, quietly. So this requires a level of underhanded "tinkering" we have not done in some time. And you are correct, it comes with a lot of risk. In most cases those risks outweigh these sorts of actions; however, not so much right now. Further if you even hint that you are doing this you can drive a dictator to distraction with justified paranoia, which means he may very well slip up and accelerate the process. Regime change is really the final step - we are kind of jumping to the end. It is everything we do to keep Russian isolated and contained before that happens that is important. And we are already doing it - they got Canada to agree to sending a Brigade, which is hilarious - considering the Liberal Party is in a minority situation with the NDP propping them up. Putin managed to unite the left in Canada and made them war hawks - crazy.

Well we have to find one first....

Fair points. I agree that it might matter to the Russian people, there is history of this in their Afghanistan experience; however, as in Afghanistan, as the body count increases the reality of this war will grow. To call it anything else is essentially lying to the public for political reasons. Russia's threats in the subversive realm are likely the only vector of power delivery that they demonstrated a world class aptitude; however, we need to be careful here as to how much was them and how much was us. But that point stands. What I do not see is how to translate a global reach and influence in subversive or political warfare into a global power pole. It can definitely support and reinforce it, but at some point "power is power" and a nation has to be able to demonstrate this across dimensions - Russia could not, and now can not. One thing that I do disagree with is this sentiment that "Putin is in the drivers seat", that he somehow has the strategic initiative. He does not, unless we cede it to him. He can take the Donbas, declare victory and demand peace, play the 'wounded victim' card when UA keep kicking them in the crotch...the Ukrainians are not likely to roll over and we in the West would be seriously remis in trying to push for that. It essentially gives Russia a win that will come back and bite us all viciously later. The reality is that we, the West, are in the driver seat - we gots all the money and guns; what we seem to be shy on is the will. We decide when this is over, not Russia. We could pull all aid and support and this thing would end badly for Ukraine in a few weeks. They would resist, I have no doubt of that, but it would be a long agonizing insurgency with no outside support. Further, we decide when to stop holding Russian feet to flames, not Putin. We can re-wire energy sectors and put Russia in the doghouse for a half-century if we are willing - we did exactly that to the Soviet Union. Putin's only chance, and he has bet it all on this, is that we will split, falter and fail. It is on us to see this for what it really is and not let that happen. The good news is that so far we have done amazingly, far more than most ever expected, but do we have the will to go the distance? That is the big question here.

Attack? Seriously?...well I am sorry if that is how you took it. I was stating counter-facts and context. Russian exports were about $330 B in 2020, right below Canada at $371B, much like GDP positions. https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus#:~:text=Exports The top exports of,and Germany (%2414.2B). https://oec.world/en/profile/country/can My overall point being that beside playing the possible "I am an a@@ spoiler card" as outlined by GrigB Russian dreams of global power rest on historical delusion and nukes - not actual metrics of national power (i.e. DIME). They had a slim case before this war, and a non-existent one now as a result of the damage they are triggering (seriously: UK and EU are something like 45% of the Russian market, and they just burned it). Russia is not simply "not in the same league" as the US and China - they aren't even the same economic species: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/usa https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn#:~:text=Exports The top exports of,and South Korea (%24110B). Canada has more economic and diplomatic power than Russia right now, and likely has a better chance of forming a 3rd global power pole.

So this is an interesting spin by the Russians - special military operation. Last two terms there make sense but are important - this is a military led operation with all other governmental orgs in support. In fact they have likely moved beyond Russian hybrid warfare; however, all the contractors still leave me wondering. So all this hangs on "special", which is vague and does not have a common point of reference. For example, for a small territorial defence force, any military operation outside of their own territory would be "special". So what makes this current Russian operation "special"? I frankly have no idea, beyond political manipulation; however, my questions are: - It is not total war - so limited short term objectives with a clear exit strategy...? I am sure the Russian plan may have looked that way but I am left wondering how they thought they were going to do it. Maybe in Russian mindset anything not total war, is not war? - No full mobilization - specially selected and trained forces-in-being? Very doubtful given the reports we had at the start of this this, a lot of reports of forces simply being lied to. I am not sure about selection as no criteria is really visible. No indication of special training for this, like COIN, nation building/stability operations, CIMIC or anything on the Peace Support Spectrum. Nothing I have seen looks like upscaled SOF: Direct Action, Special Warfare, C-WMD or SpR - the closest was maybe special warfare in the Donbas but this looks a lot more like employing locals as cannon fodder and not "support to resistance". There was something like a decapitation DA at the opening but that was a special operation within the "special operation"? - How is this less than full spectrum? At this point the only thing the Russian have left off the table are WMDs (and there are arguments for thermobaric and DPICMs in this regard). The tricky part is the definition of "war", which is oddly without a common universal definition given how much we do it. The narrow legal interpretation is a "formal legal declaration", which has not happened but that is window dressing on reality. We get the slightly wider Clausewitzian definitions of "political discourse built on decision of arms", so we have to be killing each other as an extension of policy - this war definitely meets that one. Then there are even broader definitions; an irreconcilable violent collision of certainties as a function of human social interaction. Or an extension of evolutionary impulse etc. So short of a formal legal definition, this war meets pretty much every other mainstream view on the thing. Further, the word war itself does not matter because we all agreed, even Russia, that we would not conduct acts of "aggression" except under specific circumstances - and this thing definitely meets the definition of "aggression"": http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/GAres3314.html Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof, (b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; (f) The action of a State in allowing its temtory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein So there is that. This may be why we in the west are collectively having so much trouble understanding this for what it is, we have been fighting pretty low stakes affairs for years and this one is of the old gods of existential survival in several dimensions. Honestly, it does not matter what Russia calls this, it is what it is, a war they started and one we need to finish. But, and I stand by this, this cannot mean the complete destruction of Russia as a state - too many risks there. So this will likely remain a limited war, or at least I really hope so, because the stakes are extremely high.

Likely explains the relative weak economic power to be honest. Ain’t selling enough and nowhere stable enough to invest in. However, Russia will not get many export duties when exports dry up. And when that “moderate” state revenue dries up, how does said state offset the loss? Print more money or raise more taxes. Neither make for a global economic powerhouse in-waiting.

Absolutely. That is why this is not about the Donbas, or sending a few more HIMARs this is about a multi-year massive effort to sustain unity of effort in that compression pressure and sanctions, while pushing hard wherever we can in the Russian backfield (I.e supporting internal resistance), without pushing Russia over the edge; this is likely our new normal. My concern is that we are straining to get to the end of this war, and have completely missed the fact that this does not end there - we must not let it end there. If in 2 years we are buying Russian gas and oil, sanctions are fractured and lifted, and Putin is still in power threatening everyone one and back to his A-game of subversive warfare, elections interference and assassinations, while rebuilding his military- we have definitively failed and have set the terminal decline of the Western global order in motion.

We should come back to 21st century political/subversive/information warfare at some point. You don’t need a 3-letter agency; you need an internet connection and understanding of what a portion of people want hear.

The Tsar was accepted by the people as legitimate for centuries, the crime boss might have a few decades (although there are counter-examples in Africa). 3rd pole as irrational: Global power poles are a zero sum game. So we have Russia at with a GDP less than that of Canada, and 4 times the population, and has been basically flat since 2014. (https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/, https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp#:~:text=GDP in Russia averaged 972.41,195.91 USD Billion in 1999. Dependent basically on a single, and vulnerable energy sector. It military was a Potemkin façade, its Diplomatic power is nearing coal-miners ass level dirty, with crumbling infrastructure and massive internal corruption. Russia is almost completely lacking in inductive soft-power and its hard power is becoming a laughing stock. It had sharp power but decided to bash it against the brick wall that is Ukraine. That country is not going to take on the West, nor China and is no where near able to create a regional, let alone global power pole. In fact all Russia really has is Europe's over-reliance on its cheap gas, and nukes - no high tech, service or manufacturing industry to speak of and any it did has been clobbered by this fiasco. It has a largely commodities based industry, which it also likely blew up. Its trade agreements are basically local (near abroad) or a rogues gallery (Iran), and it invaded a major trading partner: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx?MemberCode=643&lang=1&redirect=1 This thinking it can create a global power pole is like What We Do In The Shadows - "we control four houses on this street and one street over." So unless Putin and his cronies are completely irrational, I strongly suspect they already know these numbers...and this war made them so much worse. "Distrust and hardens positions"...I think we are already there. Let me be clear, this is a war between Russian and the West right now, as much as it is between Russia and Ukraine - and in a war, distrust and hardening are virtues. We are already there - Russia is already paranoid; sh*t is blowing up in their own country, and tens of thousands of its sons are dead, and we provided the ISR and systems to make it happen - does anyone think there is a "normal" after that? We win this by removing the paranoid actor and trying to find another one we can tolerate - because spontaneous democracy is not realistic - while containing (etc) Russia. I think this is the crux of the issue, and perhaps we can agree to disagree. I am of the opinion that we are already past the point of rational negotiation of an end-state with the current Russian regime - we passed it when Russian invaded a neighbor and committed war crimes on a massive scale and the again when we directly supported, and continue to support, the killing of Russians...in large numbers. Our unstated war goals are in line with what I wrote previously, if we are willing to admit it or not, or we even know it yet, or not. I cannot say how we must do what needs to be done, only that it needs to be done. Russia must be compressed and contained, the current regime must go, the crimes of this war must be answered for, and its teeth must be dulled to the point that we can do business in some sort of regional security dynamic that works. I get the sense that we in the West are still seeing this through some sort of odd - aggressive-discourse-until-it-is-over, a soft war like a game of sport in which we are spectators and where we can all shake hands when it is over. No, Russia must lose this war, badly, but not too badly or we will lose. We will be crisis managing this until such a point as all sides negotiate with what comes next: what can we live with, what can Russia live with, what can Ukraine live with - in the end I doubt anyone will be happy but if we stand together and are really lucky, we might get an outcome that does not revisit this mess in 25 years, or lead directly to nuclear war. However, do not take this as some sort of hawkish "ra-ra". Russia cannot fall apart completely for all the reasons in my first post this morning. We want stability and that will take a tricky balancing act. Russia needs to hurt badly enough, be contained and compressed but needs to function - that is the middle ground. It is going to be difficult to find, perhaps impossible...but that is the requirement; it gets much worse if we fail.

Oh man, that is a good point - everyone forgets the infrastructure. God, we could find ourselves propping up some SOB in Russia that we can live with before this is done. I guess it just re-underlines my point: this is a very long term massive crisis management situation, and we need to be much better than we were last time.

I have to admit this has been a bit of an itch at the back of my head as well. I think there is definitely an element of this at play but I am not sure how much. DPR and LPR elements of obviously picked a side with Russia, even before the war. How committed they are in "liberating" themselves is not clear, nor how that applies to the map. LNR and DPR forces are reportedly being used as cannon fodder - I do not think we can call them proxies as Russia is still far to heavily involved in all this; those weren't 900 LNR guns around Severodonetsk. Of course grown ups try to negotiate these sorts of things first, as opposed to attempting a full fledged invasion. If I was in the LNR or DPR and fighting on the Russian side, beyond being employed to catch shrapnel, a major question I would have is "who is going to pay to rebuild our newly liberated nation?" The Ukraine has the West, but LNR has Russia and I would not be entirely comfortable that they are going to be coming to fix anything in my lifetime. As to the RA collapse, well my thinking is that it is already collapsing and has been for a couple months now; this is why we have seen a devolution in its tactics. I do not believe that the Russian Forces are anywhere near able to conduct operational level of warfare today in comparison to 24 Feb - and joint warfare has simply left the building. They are able to conduct WW1 style tactical warfare - and maybe, just maybe, might be able to pull off mechanized/combined arms warfare but we have been waiting for that one for awhile, and I suspect their ability to sustain it is already broken. Everyone seems to be waiting for a complete dramatic collapse like we saw in March - it may very well happen but some pre-conditions/indicators need to happen first. For example, the Russian offence must stop or simply be no longer possible. Once the Russians go on entirely on the defence (and if you look at the line, they are already there except for Donbas), we enter into a new phase of this thing. But hey, buckle in, it has been a crazy ride so far and anything can happen...and it isn't over yet.

I suspect that we are agreeing loudly in many regards. There is no way to tie this up neatly - we can define Endstates, we then have to negotiate with them continuously. In fact all parties will need to. There is "taking Russia down", and then there is "taking Putin down" the man and his cronies are not the Russian state. There is no way we can renormalize with the current Russian regime...none. If we do we abandon the modern rules of war completely, we admit that there is no global order nor are we its champions; the impacts of this are profound. If Putin stays in power we will likely isolate Russia completely - Europe is already on a one way trip to doing this. We will not be lifting sanctions and Russia is very likely to become weaker and more vulnerable over time. Militarily we will box Russia in and continue to compress - plan for that is already in motion. Russians will eventually have to decide how much pain they can take - so you are correct in it being an internal decision. Internal mechanism can be "encouraged" by external forces, plenty evidence of this and we will do this as well. So Endstate = Russia: Contracted, Compressed, Constrained and Contained...until Russia finds, or is assisted in finding, an SOB we can actually work with. I am not sure what part of this is "neat little bow".

I am going to leave the rest as it is wrestling with How and frankly, I do not think we are there yet. We are trying to define Why and What. My post was to outline the most likely desired Strategic Endstates from our perspective - not predict what will actually happen. All war is negotiation and figuring out what that space looks like is a whole thing in itself. However, if what you say above it true then this highlights the requirement for regime change even further. First, we cannot re-normalize with the Putin regime and not threaten our own Endstates, more so if that regime truly believes the "third pole" theory, a "USSR v 2.0", then they must be removed completely, as a third (unstable) power pole is 1) irrational and 2)destabilizing to the point it threatens our interest directly. I think that the cynical kleptocracy that Putin and his gang have undertaken does not signal a Father of an Greater Empire narrative in the least. It looks more like "public consumption bullsh*t while we get take everything we can". But if I am wrong it does not change the Strategic Endstates as noted...it highlights them.

Possibly, at least in the short term. However, unlike containment of Germany through a punitive formal treaty the form projected on Russia would likely be better served by a version of the Cold War strategy of containment through alignment with everyone afraid of them - until we can negotiate with something rational inside Russia itself. Like WW1 Germany, it may very well bring the crazies out of the woodwork; however, here we may have to get pulled into subversive active measures to ensure that they do not get "too crazy". Also like pre-WW2, the bill is on us with respect to resolve - if that fails we could be back to this in 25 years. Do not get me wrong, this is a mess that will need to be actively managed for at least a generation or two...that is what 24 Feb really meant.

So I encourage everyone to simmer down a bit - it is not like we are going to solve it here. We all have opinions that are influenced by current events, and the heat is understandable. I would offer that we perhaps take a step back and maybe take a bit more pragmatic view of this whole thing. As far as I can see many seem to be weighing in on the strategic end state for Russia; however, this cannot be viewed in glorious isolation: Western Strategic Endstate - this is a gross oversimplification because "The West" is comprised of many nations, all with their own interests; however, we can probably sum up the western desired end-state as a "manageable version of the former status quo". In simpler terms, the west just wants the stability and order they have enjoyed for 30+ years so we can all stay rich - while at the same time allowing that wealth to slowly distribute globally. Kind of a weird global trickle down theory of wealth but if you crunch the numbers it actually happened, although not nearly as fast or as equitable as a lot of people wanted. The West wants to remain top dog globally and ensure that it holds the pen that writes the global order. Ukrainian Endstate - beyond basic survival, Ukraine will be focused on security and integrity of its state. It needs to be secure and free from what is happening right now in all its forms, and allowed to chart its own destiny as a collective entity within the international community. I think that Ukraine in the EU and NATO is almost a certainty as elements of that end-state. In fact being within NATO is about the only guarantor of security for any nation neighboring Russia right now. NATO is too big to fail and even Russia recognizes that triggering an Article 5 above recognized conflict thresholds is suicide. Russian Endstate - Only China and its growing global power is a viable challenger to the western bloc - and Russia already knows this, Putin's pipedream of somehow re-creating a third global power pole around Russia was weak-tea for domestic consumption. So wither goes Russia? Well first off, I get the heat and anger...and it is well deserved; however, the idea that the endstate is the elimination of the Russian people, as a people, is a dead end. We would break that Western Endstate if we endorsed a war of extermination in any form - so be angry, but western support will dry up the instant we get into the "destruction of Russia" territory. Beyond the disruption to the global order this is just a bad idea for so many reasons, all centered on the fact that Russia currently holds roughly 6000 nuclear warheads. Now I know some will say - "Ya but they are all under tight control in concentrated areas" - well good for them; however, if Russia fractures into several smaller states or duchies or freaking warlord centric tribes we basically have the worst parts of Africa with the power to kill millions rolling around the floor. Make all the arguments you like, we dodged a bullet in '91 and this would be a lot worse than that because we are not talking about dissolution into already semi-functioning former vassal states, we are talking new states and non-state entities. For example, what happens when a break away semi-state decides that a 500 year old grudge is worth firing off nuclear weapons? What happens when a non-state group decides that Ukraine is to blame? Or the EU? Or the US? Way too many factors to control and recall my rant on relative rationality, it gets more relative the smaller the social structure you are looking at. So no, I am sorry, but the break up of Russia or total dissolution is not on the grown ups table, and likely will not be unless we are talking WW3. Too many of our interests are threatened by this eventuality, to the point that if it did happen we would likely be talking about the largest intervention operation in history to secure those nukes, and we are highly likely to miss some. The contraction of Russia, however, is definitely on the table. As I wrote previously, Russia must be punished, be seen to be punished, and know it has been punished. In the West, I frankly suspect that we do not care what government rules Russia - so long as it is rationale, reasonable and we can rely on it for normal business. We do business and support dictators around the world right now (e.g. Saudi Arabia) and frankly could care less if another one rules Russia with an iron fist...so long as they stay in their lane and know their place. So regime change is also very likely on the table, the US has already signaled this. As is, the serious reduction in the Russian economy its ability to sustain military power is definitely on the table. This is to ensure that it cannot threaten its neighbors for some time; time to build security guarantees with any and all neighboring nations that want them...why? Because stability. So what is the strategic endstate for Russia? Contracted, Compressed, Constrained, and most importantly Contained...but not Shattered. We need a semi-functioning state in the penalty-box, cooperating in war crimes trials and paying reparations, selling off its nuclear stockpile "in kind for destruction"...all the while still selling cheap energy to us and not China. Russia's deep cultural dysfunction needs to be in a box where it can be happy at how miserable it is and leave the rest of us alone...not thrown up all over the geopolitical dance floor with a nuclear weapon in hand and mascara running down its tear soaked face while it blames us for "wanting to sleep with every other nation in the bar!!"

Or that a society is fundamentally flawed from inception with divisions amongst interests that no party has a desire to rationalize, so a dictatorship is the only way they can make it work. The impulse to project that externally then is almost impossible to avoid as it is baked into the unstable social construct at a cultural level.

I get the sense that space-based ISR + HIMARS is the old UAVs + Artillery, on steroids.

Looks like post-blast repair work is ongoing on that green-white house. They likely replaced the windows and telephone pole after the blast. This is an older crater by the look.

That is 241 meters per day. I also am hesitant to give Russia too much credit for adaptation in this last offensive. Back in May they looked like they were trying for manoeuvre/break out at Izyum and those attacks stalled. I suspect these grinding artillery heavy assaults are not some clever re-tooling, they are the only tactical offensive option the RA has left. The reliance on massed artillery is straight out of historical doctrine but we have not seen concentrations like this since WW2. The other weird thing is the near total absence of armor/mech breakout. The last big mech push we saw was back at that bridge crossing. Reports from Severodonetsk looked like infantry-artillery primarily, which may explain the walking pace of this thing. I think that Russian warfare has devolved over time, not evolved. I am very interested as to why.

You did but I am not taking it personally. The author does hit on a very important point - UA would be well served in solving for the counter-offensive. Tactically and operationally it would put further strain on an already shaky Russian operational system. Strategically and politically it would shore up some of the also-shaky boots in the West who are worried Ukraine is somehow near collapse because they have pulled out of a tiny corner in the Donbas after repelling 2-3 Russian operational axis in the North. The authors math is off on BTGs in the defence. 1 full strength BTG for every 5 kms is not bad but you need at least 1 to 2 more BTGs for the same piece of ground in order to sustain it over time. This does not even count for reserves, support/enablers and logistics. The front from Kharkiv to Kherson is about 800kms long, that is 320-480 BTGs at 2-3 per 5kms to hold what Russia has take with depth and rotations over time. The author and I do agree on one key point, Russia has lost this war - however it is still figuring out how badly.

This is a translation of that tweet thread? Lot to unpack here and I am not sure I agree with all of it - for example we have no idea what the Russian losses around Severodonetsk have been, so “minimizing risk for gain” could be way off. One thing I do not see on the Russian side is an actual strategy. For example, if the strategic end is to “take the Donbas and declare victory”, what is the Russian plan for the very real possibility that Ukraine won’t let them hold it? Russian strategy has been and continues to be in this war, entirely in isolation of reality and largely based on hope. Do they hope Ukraine has had enough and taps out? Do they somehow figure they can call the Donbas “mother Russia” and go nuclear? The reality is that it is taking just about everything the Russian have to take very small chunks of ground right now. I do not think they will be able to actually take the Donbas, Luhansk maybe, but not Donetsk; however, even if they do will they have broken the will of Ukraine to resist? The West? The West cannot not allow Russia to gain from this in anyway. Russia at a min must be economically punished, back to 2014 lines or better and with new internal power structure, one we can actually negotiate with, in place. If we cannot do that the western global order has failed…and China is watching. Ukraine has all the hallmarks of a nation that has embraced a war to the point it is now part of their culture. You do not defeat a nation in this state by taking a few hundred square kilometres of real estate, you would need to break their backs and shatter that unity or completely exhaust them. So long as the West keeps supporting, Ukraine will keep fighting…and we have reason to keep supporting. So back to Russian long game…and we have been over this. How do they defend what they have taken while Ukraine continues to mobilize and modernize, and they are heading in the opposite direction? How does Russian defend an extremely long front without enough troops against a very motivated opponent with increasing capability? Beyond that, how does Russia renormalize to remove sanctions, scare Sweden and Finland away from NATO, get NATO national to not spend trillions on defence and wipe humanities memory of their complete gong show so they can re-emerge as a great power? Short answer is that they cannot. At best, the Russian government may convince or cow enough domestic population in order to stay in power and basically get to sit at the same lunch table as North Korea for the next 25 years. That or we fail and the global order and all it pays for is at risk - and for the record, this is what happens when you let things slide. We failed in 2014 and here we are, we fail again and what does 2030 look like?

Where is the throwing up emoji on this thing…? Found it.