The_Capt

This is all pretty much stuff I have built up over years. It is a surface level framework really, each one of those components has a lot to unpack. I am sure there is stuff out there on it. I built it on professional observations and looking at history over the years; most of them based on the mistakes we made at the institutional level and in places like Afghanistan - we sought positive decision in a place built on negative/null ones. Heh, well I guess it gives me something to do when I finally do retire.

Holy crap that is some precise work.

So this post got me thinking and raises a really good set of points. Right now we have been handing out a lot of fish on this thread. We pull in the data, filter it, assess and then pull out analysis, which leads to some level of prediction. What we (I) have not done is provide enough fishing rods. Of course you guys are swimming around the internet and being exposed to all sorts of narratives, some good and some bad. It may be helpful to arm you with some ways to do your own analysis so that while you are out there you can come at it better. Everyone has got their own system, western military teachings all tend to cover the same ground (e.g. PMESII, OPP, whatever that thing Bil does, which must work because he keeps beating me). Eastern approaches are different and take into account different criteria, I am not an expert on these so I will let someone else weigh in on them. I will give you my personal system and the one I teach, see if it helps and if it does not keep looking around. My system is pretty simply to be honest and focuses on two main areas: what is seen, what is not seen, but should be. That first one is much easier, the second requires a lot more depth but we can walk to that. What is Seen I think I posted this before and @sburke lost his mind a bit. Let me try a less-powerpointy version (seriously guys it is the message, not the medium). Ok so this is a representation of what is essentially the western operational system. It starts on the left with what is basically "Command" and works its way to a desired Outcome. Everyone is focused on the "Boom"...of course you are...it is exploding! The reality, however, is that the Target is really only in the middle of this whole thing. It is an indicator - one of many - but it is not the only indicator. I think everyone here gets that but they often do not know what else to look for (although some clearly do). So the big red system on the left is often referred to as the "kill chain" (thanks for nothing Brose). It is really the center of what we call a "targeting enterprise" and frankly we in the west are very good at this. This is "cause" space that translates human will, through capability, into energy (and here it can get quite complex), through mediums (also crazy complex) and onto a target and foresaid "boom" (yay!). Be it an ammo dump, shopping mall, tank or goose (I hate geese) the process is pretty much the same, and volumes have been written as to how to do this faster/better than an opponent. The point of the big red circle is that when we see a "boom" it is important to analyze the entire Cause chain all the way back to determine 1) if that was the actual intended target or was it simply happenstance, 2) how well the chain is doing in competitive terms and 3) what is this all signaling about Will? All of this also has to take into account context and the situation on the ground. Cool. We now have a bead on Cause. Effect is much harder and more important. The big blue area is where the pay dirt really sits. A lot of big booms are impressive, but trust me if they do not translate into that big blue space you are going nowhere loudly - and I speak from experience here. So the first question is "what effect is this actually happening?" Here an effect is a "consequence of action", so for example the effect of all those HIMARS booms - who are at the end of their own kill chain - was (allegedly) to have the Russian logistics system tie it self in knots to get away from them. Great, outstanding...but was it decisive? Second is Decision. I have written about the three types of decisions available in warfare (at least) - positive, negative and null. Let's leave off the last two and just focus on the first one. A positive decision is a "death of alternate futures". There was a future where Russia pounded Kyviv into submission for two months in Mar-Apr 22. The Ukrainian government tapped out because western support was being cut off from the west and Russia occupied half of Ukraine and the capital, set up a puppet government and then enjoyed an insurgency-from-hell that would last 20 years. That future died in March when the Russians were held off and pushed back from Kyviv: it was positively Decisive. The Russians may actually have a future where they are back at Kyviv but it won't be in Mar-Apr of 22, the reality will be very different. The HIMARS are having an effect, that much is clear. What is not clear is how decisive the sum of those effects are as yet. If the Russians lose the ability for operational offensive for a significant duration (e.g. this "pause" never ends) then we can say it has been decisive, because there are dead futures on the floor. Last are Outcomes. "What is the difference between a Decision and an Outcome Capt?" My personal definitions is that an Outcome is a death of options, normally strategic options. The sum of decisions in western doctrine is supposed to lead to "Objectives" which are the "Deal Done" points in western military planning. Frankly these have let us down in the past, so I go with Options. If Options die, they kill off entire fields of futures....a future-cide if you will. Here something like the entire collapse of the northern Russian front was an Outcome to my mind because the Russian strategic options space collapsed. Same thing happened after the first week of this war as the strategic options spaces that led to a quick war also died - it is why we got all excited about it back then. The most significant Outcome is the end of the war of course, but that Outcome is the sum of a bunch of other ones, that all loop back to Will. So whenever something blows up, look both left and right on that spectrum, and ask a lot of questions. How is the Cause chain doing comparatively? What is happening with Will? What is the problem with Russian Capability translating into Energy and Targets? Really keep a close eye on the Blue circle, the indicators of the important stuff are there: what is the actual effect? Is this decisive? what was the Outcome? Ok, so that was the easy part. What is not Seen, but should be. While books have been written on the first part above, the second is the land of experience. Here a deep understanding of history comes in very useful as it provides a lot of context. This space (which I do not have a snazzy picture for) is essentially "what should be happening but is not..." It is very tricky and takes a lot of experience to "see the blank spaces", it is where the effects should be happening but are not based on whatever time and space we are in within a given scenario. For example, let's take the Russian cruise missiles (and this is not a beat up of @panzermartin, he is asking some good questions). We know the Russians have a lot of missiles (https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/) and they had launched roughly 1000 of them in about a month at the beginning of the war. And another report that they were at 2125 total "68 days into the war" (https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare#:~:text=Russia launched more than 1%2C100,68 days of the war.). Now if we take "What we see" as the only indication, well this is a clearly functioning Cause chain. Will, Capability all landing on targets. A little shaky on the dud rate and "missing" military targets by many reports, and the Medium of UA AD has been pretty effective (then we get into competitive system effects which is a whole other thing - there are red and blue circles in collision); however, that is a lot of "boom". The Effects we saw were a lot of damage, some of it military and the UA definitely had to react to defend itself by moving AD and C2 around. I am not sure they have been Decisive, but we will get to that. So that is what we saw, and on the surface 2125 incoming missiles all over the Ukraine is not small and frankly looks scary...but I only see what is missing: A Ukrainian strategic center of gravity is the inflow of support from the western world. We are pushing a lot of money and boom-boom over the border from Poland. High on Russia's list of high value targets has to be to cut off that incoming support anyway possible. They have done strikes in Lviv on training bases, so they clearly have the capability to hit. But what are we not seeing? I am not seeing rail infrastructure being crippled in Western Ukraine. I am not seeing road infrastructure being destroyed faster than Ukraine can repair. I am not seeing 30 Ukrainian ammo depots in western Ukraine being hit to cut off the supply of 155mm shells - it is what I am not seeing that is the biggest indicator something is going very wrong on the Russian side. The Russians have the capability - range is no excuse as they could park missiles in Belarus, so why are they not using all them there 2125 missiles on what really matters? First answer is that they are "dumb" but that is too easy. Split Will, missiles spread across disjointed commands all lobbing on their own priorities much more likely. Lack of ISR to consistently hit things when they need to be hit like UA ammo dumps and logistics nodes, which tend to move around...also very likely. This is the same thing very early on in the war - why was I still seeing Ukrainian social media feeds 72 hours into this war? All them tanks getting lit up, old ladies with balls of steel etc. Rule #1 of country invasion: make it go dark. Russian failed in this, it was missing and should not have been. Wargamers have an advantage here as they play these problem sets all the time. We have seen it a lot on this thread. A wargamer can ask..."why did they not do this? I would have." And this has nothing to do with an echo chamber either, but we do need to be careful. For example, we have not seen UA operational offence yet, and nothing that looks like all traditional arms manoeuvre. This one has me particularly puzzled and we are getting more data in on why this may be happening. I will sum up by saying that in order to really filter the "reality" from opinion and BS, take all this and apply it to what we can actually see and not see. We can build assumptions but they have to remain on speaking terms with the facts. Once an assumption becomes a fact [edit for @Combatintman. “without sufficient validation”] we are in trouble. Enough facts put through the lenses of the two frameworks I give here become a trend, and it is those trends that told us that Russia was losing the first part of the war while most of the mainstream were figuring out how to deal with a Russian victory. Good luck and surf safe.

We speculated on this way back - high resolution find, infiltrate, isolate and kill in detail…repeat. Bite sized chunks, all the while hammering deep high value targets to disrupt logistics and dislocate reserves. 21st century manoeuvre through attrition, distributed mass, precision fires - fog eating snow. Now let’s see how it works

It is an incoherent video with a bunch of weirdly disconnected shots from 21 Mar - about the time the entire Northern Russian front collapsed. That was a BM-21 as far as I can tell and that last hit on the shopping mall was a ballistic missile of some sort. The ability of Russian missile to strike targets they can pull from Google Earth is not a clear indicator of superiority in anything. Yes, they have a lot of long range missiles that can hit static target the size of the building...so what? How does that lend to leap in logic that the Russians and Ukraine have deep strike parity somehow? Type in "Russian Ammo Dump explosion" into You Tube and see what comes up. Type it into Google and you get this: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-military-strikes-with-western-arms-disrupt-russian-supply-lines-2022-07-14/ I could post this and reference stuff posted on this thread all day long. So let's talk "grounded in reality". We have reports of over 30 operational high value targets being hit in Russian depth over the last couple weeks. The Russians are being forced to react. Their offensive operations are slow and small gains, and very costly - to the point they had to invoke a week+ long operational pause after taking a few acres in the Donbas. UA c-btty seems to be working. The Russian offensive has the hallmarks of stalling, just like it did in phase 1, and now we are hearing speculation on a UA Kherson offensive - after they hammered that bridge with PGM, to the point the Russians have to restrict traffic. We have debated Russian morale and are looking for indicators one way or the other as to where it is pointing. None of it is pointing to "good news" for the Russian system. In fact it appears kinda sick, if these trends in desertion keep going. The RA can still attack so they are not out of it yet but getting a weird vibe. Look, you want to be "the counter-thinker", cool we definitely need them. However, come with facts. We have been pulling assessments in from everywhere and adding our own, if you indeed have one then lay it out. Right now I am seeing a lot of opinion and one grainy video that is running counter to about the last 200 pages. Some questions to consider: - How has Russian deep strike affected the UA operational system? - How has that erosion supported the achievement of Russian operational and strategic goals. - How has Russian deep strike affected Centers of Gravity as different levels? - Have the Russians achieved any operational level superiority beyond massed artillery fires? Have they eroded UA superiority. - How has Russian deep strike opened up strategic options spaces? (it sure as hell has for the UA). - How has deep strike affected each sides Will? Now if you can answer those, with some facts or even a credible professional assessment then lets hear em.

How can we possibly know that? We can guess at the Russian target list but so far we have seen a lot of apartment buildings and shopping malls hit. Ukrainian industry has been hit but UA logistics are still up, they are pushing new capability to the front and as far as we can tell Ukrainian information architecture is running very well. UA ISR has been impacted by EW in narrow fronts. Meanwhile 4 bloody HIMARS appear to have forced the entire Russian operational logistical plan to push back about 100kms, and we covered the impact of that. It has been noted by Russian milbloggers that Russia is shooting in the dark ISR-wise, and it shows. If we compare the overall effects, I am not sure how one can put Russia and Ukraine on anywhere near even terms with respect to deep strike capability. Russia is lobbing missiles as terror weapons, which is reinforcing western centres of gravity, while Ukraine has been hitting operational targets with precision (a bridge for f#cks sake!) to the point it has forced the Russians to shift operations.

The AD problem with the HIMARS as I understand it is the high trajectory. The ATACMS has a altitude ceiling of 160,000 feet according to wiki (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MGM-140_ATACMS). And I have it an some authority that the GLMRS goes above 60,000 feet. Trying to hit what is a basically a high trajectory ballistic missile on the way down is very difficult - an 80% intercept rate is pretty dubious. I suspect the Russians have not bagged any GMLRS or Russian social media would be all over it. In fact, have we seen faked HIMARS intercepts yet? If the Russians were capable of intercepting at 80% there should be GMLRS missile parts all over the countryside. As to 57mm guns...good luck. A quick calc here (https://www.omnicalculator.com/physics/terminal-velocity#:~:text=How do I find terminal,drag coefficient and projected area.) has the terminal velocity of a 500kg GMLRS (warhead is 500lbs alone so guessing on additional body weight minus fuel) in and around mach 2.4 (used streamlined shape and area of about .3m based on listed diameter of 24 inches - it is like they designed the thing to come in really fast). More here, but I am always careful with these: https://jaesan-aero.blogspot.com/2022/03/few-ballistic-missile-analysis-w_18.html So basically you have (for ATACMS, GLMLRS is going to be slightly different) a very small diameter streamlined missile coming down from over 18-50kms up at a very high trajectory, and they want to try and hit it with another bullet.

What is special about HIMARS is that they are linked into a western backed ISR/TA architecture. The UA can see with very high resolution, we know the US has been feeding them intel, likely spaced-based, pretty much from day one. The Russians, as was noted a few pages back, do not have anything near that level of resolution, likely why they are hitting large buildings they can see from G-earth. While UA is hitting ammo dumps and logistical nodes faster than the RA can build them. Western artillery had a similar effect - we actually do not know how well c-btty did at Severodonetsk - however their ranges were more modest. UA has information superiority right now, and it has been decisive. The RA cannot conduct operational manoeuvre as a result and has been forced into very high concentrations of mass to take very little real estate, very slowly- all at a burn rate it cannot likely sustain. Finding beats flanking.

Ok, now we are getting somewhere, seriously good stuff. Valuable insight into RA mindset, I would pin it up on the board and lets see if it flies but we may be on to something here. I have wondered why the RA is still able to do offensive with shattered and cobbled together units. Attack is harder than defence - a human being will naturally defend themselves, moving out from safety to attack takes some working up to particularly if you know the opponent is ready. The "insecure superiority complex" could go a long way to explain some of what we have seen in this war. Now your last line: "Operational deep strike is a new operational manoeuvre" - I have been wrestling with this from about day 3. I suspect this is correct; we have seen essentially manoeuvre via projected friction (i.e. firepower) throughout this war. And here I mean manoeuvre in it purest sense - the ability to find and fix (expose), and hit an opponent's vulnerabilities at a faster tempo than they can deal with, leading to systemic collapse; it is in essence "manoeuvre without manoeuvring" , at least in the traditional sense. This was a principle tenant of AirLand Battle, with airpower doing the deep strike and traditional combined arms doing the manoeuvre - what is weird about this war is that the effects of manoeuvre warfare look like that may happen without the combined arms part. It is a form of manoeuvre thru attrition. What has changed here is the level of precision of that deep strike and ISR available to find it. Taking this with your first part, then theoretically the UA need only deep strike/project friction in order to force the RA into the defensive, and they have effectively attacked an RA morale center of gravity. Now that is a hypothesis!

Ok, I am sold, let's do the first CM Movie - Dust in the Firestorm.

Ok, so what is keeping the RA in the fight?…and they are in the fight. That slow grinding action at Severodonetsk was very costly for the RA but we did not see mass mutinies or even desertions. The Russian system is clearly under stress but the signs of a complete morale failure are not there. It may very well happen or even be happening but RA troops are believing in something right now. I get the cynicism, find me a soldier without it, however, the state of mind of the Russian soldier is directly related to their performance. I have no doubt there is fear of their own side - the Russians have a long history of that, but I suspect there are deeper belief systems at play. Or at least I would be cautious until we can confirm otherwise. We also have to be careful with the de-humanization of the Russian troops. Not because we have sympathy or “like them” but instead to build a clearer picture of their mindset and how to exploit it. If we consider them “un-human” then we are left with “kill them all” and/or grossly misunderstand their resolve. Based on what we have seen the RA definitely has issues with moral and motivation; however, they are still attacking. And in my experience troops do this very dangerous work for various reasons but at the foundation has to be a level of belief in something. I, for one, am waiting for the whole rotten edifice of the RA to fall apart again like it did in Mar, but until it does, I am very interested in what keeps them going as it will shape decisive battles, such as the one that could be forming up at Kherson.

Very good question. We have not seen any really big prisoner grabs in this war (or I missed them). We have seen some prisoner exchanges but also some nasty rhetoric as well (e.g. tweets about not taking prisoners), along with possible (and some definitely confirmed) warcrimes. This is a nasty war, nothing clean about it. Russian soldiers are being fed a diet of BS to dehumanize and vilify Ukrainians. Ukrainians only need have access to an internet account to see some of the medieval stuff the Russians are doing. This is not an environment of widespread mutual trust of one’s captors sticking to the LOAC. Especially as thing drags out and becomes more vicious. If we are talking Kherson, we could be talking a month or two from now, after more terror strikes on Ukrainian civilians…so there is that. Now Ukraine has been pretty smart and restrained in all this, considering. I guess we will see.

This, plus this Has me questioning what the average Russian soldier thinks. They have been fed a diet of “Ukrainian Nazis” and “Manifest Motherland Destiny”, there is likely a percentage that actually buy in. Now whether that translates to actually hard fighting while cut off…? And here we are in full agreement, it was what my original point was trying for - avoid urban combat, especially if you have not shaped it.

Not really a disagreement to be honest. Troops with nowhere to go and belief that surrender is not an option tend to fight a lot longer and harder just to stay alive one more day. Now if the RA has an “out”, even just walking out over foot bridges I also expect them to crumble based on the quality of troops they have been pushing. Or if the UA can convince them surrender is a good idea etc. Either way, it will be a test for the RA one way or the other and a very public one. I also think full operational collapse is a possible outcome, we should know once we see big bold blue arrows actually happening. The risk though is Kherson soaking up too many UA resources in urban fighting, which does not require a whole lot of the RA to make it happen (see Mosul). First we need to see what this UA offensive looks like, if it indeed is happening.

So Kherson...ooo boy. Well first off, I am buying off on the whole "traitor" theory that Kherson was likely sold-out, that or the UA simply got stretched too thin but this is the major southern axis so I do not see how they did not prioritize it - maybe they did and Russians down this way actually demonstrated talent. Why? Well because on paper this city should be damn near impossible to take from the South: By my eyes there are roughly 5 crossing sites that one can pull from Google. The Dnieper is a deep old river so I cannot tell if there are any fording sites but I doubt it. Wiki says the Dnieper runs at about 1.5 m/sec which is fairly slow and easily swimmable and pontoon-able. However, Kherson is right on a major delta stretch, to the point that a second river breaks out called the "Konka" (sp?). Anyway this is a major water obstacle, like Rhine river "major". The river itself ranges from 500-1000m but that is not the rub, it is the delta - that is a very angry and hungry looking swamp that looks like the mouth of a Dune Sandworm to mobility. Sure you can pontoon the bridge but those wetlands look like they will eat Divisions, we are talking major road and causeway work in order to sustain. As I said there are 5 possible crossing sites: -Starting on the far left, there is a possible amphibious run between Sofiivka and Rybal'Che but this is also a major undertaking. That is a 12km run so we are basically talking D-Day but there is infrastructure on either side to support (I am not sure about the shoreline, would need to do an MSFS flight). - Then we have the Antonovskiy Bridge that the UA is currently turning into swiss cheese. That is a 1000m crossing without the bridge and a lot of greenish looking swamp hell on the N bank. Tough. - We then have what looks like a rail bridge called "Antonivsʹkyy Zaliznychnyy", not sure if it still up but it is about 6km upstream from the Antonovskiy. If the UA did not blow that one up it will have to go as well (did a quick check but cannot see if it was already). - Next is what I think is the only decent amphib/pontoon site along this gawd-awful shoreline. Just on the western outskirts of L'vov about 34 km up from the Antonovskiy there is what looks like a viable crossing site. The south bank aint great but this is a hydro-electric line crossing so road infrastructure is there (note would have to do a second small bridging op about 1km to the east on a small inlet), which takes one up to an old monastery in Korsunka. - Last, is the road bridge at the Kakhovka hydro electrical station. Looks modern and solid. After that further upstream the Dnieper expands out and although one could find a decent shore line we are basically back to D-Day. So What? Well it is like Stalingrad, a city with it back to a major obstacle coming from the UA side. All war is communication and retaking Kherson will send big political signals in all directions. It would be a clear sign that the UA can do offensive in a major way, which should assist in shoring up the cottage-cheese spines of some in the West. It would also be a major blow to Russia, effectively undeciding that entire front. I am sure they will try and sell it as "we withdrew for the good of the people" noise but even the most doe-eyed Russian believer will have a seed of doubt planted. So to the big question: how does the UA take Kherson? Well a couple schools of thought, first a Western solution: Coming from the Western School of Manoeuvre, the game here would be to cut off Kherson and choke it out, without having to do heavy urban combat. So Shape, Manoeuvre, Isolate and Attrit would be the order of the day. A big armored led spearhead thrust down from the North across all that wonderful tank country. A bounce crossing on those two eastern sites, complete with SF, Airmobile snaps and then swing westward and cut the Russian LOCs completely. Meanwhile keep the pressure on Kherson from the North, while using deep strike to Fix supporting forces. Very nice, so long as one has air supremacy. I will say it now, if the UA can do this, the war will be over much sooner than anyone thinks. As I have noted before, I have grown allergic to big bold strokes in this war. The biggest issue, beyond establishing pre-conditions, is time-space-force. That is about a 130 km thunder run and would likely take a couple modern heavy divisions to pull off, maybe three. I do not think the UA has that kind of force, nor are they going to get the pre-conditions to support it. I have no doubt that pundits will start drawing stuff like this...use it for profiling purposes. I pray to god that the UA could pull off this offensive but I also do not think he is listening...very unlikely. So what could a UA offense look like? Attrition-to-Manoeuvre, not the other way around. The UA could compress Kherson and pull in a lot of RA in reaction. With their superior ISR and deep strike they could do a lot of damage in depth - given the ranges, this whole thing at Antonovskiy could be a setup for ATACMS arrival. If they start hitting EW, then UAS are also back on the menu. As they compress Kherson, their artillery will pull in range as well. As they pull and bleed the RA, an opportunity to do a North South offensive opens up but only take it to the bridge at the hydro-plant, while cutting every crossing. You might bag the RA forces to the east. The major problem with this one is Kherson itself. If the RA is trapped like rats, they will fight like them. The UA could break itself in a city of that size (which they know after Mariupol). My guess is that they will simply bleed the RA white here, hitting them once again along the entire length of the RA operational system. This presents the modern dilemma of "stay and bleed out" or "withdraw, preserve force and lose the city", either way, so long as the UA can keep pulling the RA in and killing them in numbers while they try and hold onto Kherson it is a winnable situation. Key will be setting operational conditions and holding onto them. Deep strike, deep strike and deep strike. They need to keep hitting RA logistics to keep the RA guns silent and then the UA guns can go to work on the rest without fearing overwhelming c-btty. How is it actually going to go down...no idea. In fact it might not happen at all, the whole thing could be a feint. But one thing is for sure, it has got the Russians wondering. And on the battlefield uncertainty on your opponent is a useful thing.

Just turning to this development now. Taking a modern reinforced concrete bridge is tough at a distance. Doing it by air is normally a job for big stuff like JDAMs. I don’t think anyone has tried to do it with an MLRS system. Bridges are pretty tough but gravity is a harsh mistress. If you punch enough hole in the deck you can definitely erode the bridge and effect crossing weight and speed. However, the enemy can quickly over-bridge in these sort of situations. If UA gets the longer range HIMARS missiles, they could do better hitting the bridge laterally from Odessa. Hitting a pier a few times will definitely do damage to the bridge that is not easily repaired. But that is a long precise shot on a small target…one for the history books if they can pull it off. I am looking at the Kherson problem in detail now, more later.

Frankly if it does take us back to “every war ever” it would be revolutionary. We were convinced that the digital battlefield would fundamentally change command - and here we are wrestling with the same issues. I suspect it was, and always will be hybrid in nature (re: command approaches). The shift may be in intensity. Phase 1 of this war on the UA side had hallmarks of hybrid warfare and a command structure that appeared almost inverted at times. Self-synchronizing distributed command essentially inverts command and control from push to pull - again not new but having peer tactical units self organize to the level they did appears as something else. And now we have highly centralized operational command ISR that can see more than tactical units, and directly effect the battle space as well. I am not sure if that has led to more Detail/Task Command or not. Finally, the balance between Manoeuvre and Attrition warfare is definitely changed. We have seen highly decentralized Mission Command (above) be very effective in Attrition warfare but it is a new type. Precision weapons provides a hi-resolution attrition that appears to be able to yield similar effects we were looking for with Manoeuvre warfare, manoeuvre via attrition? It is weird and making me uncomfortable. There is definitely a shift occurring in the attrition-manoeuvre balance, one need to do the former to do the latter…which was not supposed to happen but evidence is that it must (and this goes back to Gulf War). Like Threat Based Planning, I suspect that this war will push us to rebalance command, warfare approaches and re-think mass entirely. At least two principles of war are in trouble, concentration(at least how we thought of it - firepower anyone?) and surprise (at least for one side) - and figuring out what that means will take some time.

Very true, however agency was also dangerous (still is) as it was how formations failed and collapsed. It is super interesting to look back at warfare back and then and see it as far more complicated than we assume. The Roman’s likely wrestled with the balance between agency and formation as much as we do. For more on pre-civilization warfare Turney-High and Lawrence Keeley have laid down some foundational works. The punch line was that historically speaking when small-high agency met large formation mass, mass won…eventually. And then the Romans built what looks like smarter more agile mass, which makes me wonder if they did not inculcate some of the tribal approaches. I am sure official histories tell how colonial wars were sideshows quickly forgotten but that is not really how military culture works. We tend to admire those we fight, particularly if they do it well. The lessons of our opponents tend to leech into the bloodstream. We definitely saw this one the North American continent with the (re) invention of Light Infantry mirroring indigenous warfare and in most cases fighting along side them. I personally find tribal based pre-history warfare fascinating, but that is me.

Well it was a matter of time until someone brought this up. Watching the video now and it kinda sounds like an academic semantics argument up to the 1 hour mark. I really like the link back to the 19th century and colonial wars but did not hear the most interesting leap. Auftragstaktik, as a concept as we envision it...no matter where it came from has a very long history in "the way of war of the savages". If one studies pre-history warfare, indigenous warfare and/or war amongst horse borne tribes from the steppes to the American West, "mission command" was simply an extension of a way of life. Warrior based culture did not have hierarchical chains of command we see in modern militaries. For example, in the Comanche culture a war leader was followed only as long as he was winning, often by extended family members. There was no legal constraints nor punishment for leaving a war party; there were for cowardice in battle, but this was a cultural stigma as opposed to a formal legal mechanism. In Europe, Central Asia and the Far East as armies got bigger the ability to move and fight larger formations required a whole system of command, control and training - we invented "formation" so that mass human power could be marshalled, sustained and directed. To do this we had to remove human agency from those standing "on the line". Tales of 19th century officer standing tall as cannon balls flew at their heads is a poignant example of the power of formation and conformity. This system worked great for phalanx, pikes, muskets and rifles - mission command was relegated to the cavalry as an enabler arm for the most part. And when cavalry was decisive it had to mass up old school regardless and take the guns to the front. Then we ran head long into massed firepower and the whole thing came apart. Mass was just a quick road to "mass death", as was proven repeatedly on the Western Front. In WW2 we invented armor and mech and suddenly the main thrust of warfare could move, quickly. So Mission Command, or at least the original idea was designed to build on this new ability to move and allow for initiative and agency in a hybrid modern military form. I like to think we got the idea from the colonial wars of the 19th century and its philosophical influence on a generation of officers in the late 19th century. And then it got political. My hypothesis is that modern "Mission Command" as a cornerstone of Manoeuvre Warfare a la Cold War was more sales job than actual military doctrine. The idea is still seen in modern doctrine where Manoeuvre Warfare - empowered by Mission Command - allow friendly forces to exercise initiative [aside: it also plays well as an extension of 'democracy' but isn't] to go along with all that new found mobility. This combination means much smaller (and affordable) forces can dance around and through much larger ones to create effect. This whole thing built up into AirLand Battle as an idea; however, remained largely untested. It did however become a cult as the entire west, following the US, bought into the uni-polar philosophy of Mission Command and Manoeuvre as how we will defeat a larger, dumber and more command constipated opponent. As I said...where was the proof? We got hints of it in the Arab-Israeli war, Gulf War and '03 but these were not definitive, particularly the last two as mass airpower appeared to play as much, or more a role than the land doctrines. Then we had all sorts of COIN/interventions where nothing worked, Mission or Detail Command did about as much as air supremacy in Afghanistan. The Taliban employed it far better and more than we did but it worked for an insurgency likely because of its root in tribal based warfare to start with. And now we have this war, and why so many are watching so closely. Is Mission Command delivering? Is Manoeuvre War delivering? What are the trends and where do thing seem to be going? My guess today is "its complicated". There are definitely signs the UA is employing a form of this to effect, we saw this in Phase I; however, there are also signs that on the digital battlefield higher may know more than lower due to modern ISR and as such Detail Command may be back on the rise. Attrition warfare is clearly not going anywhere, so fast cheap and easy wars may have been a mirage all along. So what? Well what we do not know about warfare as a result of what we are seeing in Ukraine is growing, not shrinking. I do not know if Mission Command and Manoeuvre Warfare will survive as concepts - we will definitely hold onto them tightly as we have invested a lot into them. My sense is that something else is emerging from this war that we can only see peeks, shades and outlines of based on events so far.

This is bigger than munitions dumps at these ranges; railheads, industry, IT infrastructure and airfields as a start. We are basically looking at ersatz air superiority effects without the need of aircraft, at strategic ranges. And again, we know western ISR can see all those targets.

Just to add to this: - Means greater chance of misdrops and error. The Russian rely on a very simple “iron mountain” stockpiling system that is designed to overload sectors with ammo up front. By pushing them back complicates things greatly with more routes and trucks to deal with. - More exposure. Based on the average range of extension looking like at least 100kms, that is an extra 1-2 hours on the road for resupply. They will be open to arty, UAS and deep strike a LOT longer, particularly if they need more trucks to sustain. And if you check Oryx, the Russian have taken a beating on logistics vehicles (1255 at last count, at least) [aside: at some point we should look at how much it is going to cost the Russian military to rebuild all this losses]. - Greater strain on Russian logistics in general. Greater maintenance bills, more spare parts, and much more fuel costs. This, plus data strain to keep this all organized, on an already crappy logistics capability is nothing but bad news. - This will do nothing good for Russian morale on the ground. So What? Well first this looks like a pretty good indicator (if confirmed) the effect the HIMARs have been having. Next the US should give the longer range precision ammo because a lot of those depots are on the beach and cannot pull back any further. Then, the UA needs a cheaper deep strike capability to hit logistics vehicles along those roads. Finally, this will limit the Russian offensive even more because they rely so heavily on massed fires. Not only in ranges but duration. We will likely see pulse offensives as opposed to continuous hard pressure. If Russian logistics are blunted and fractured we may see the UA begin to shift operational targets and we may see Russian offensives become more narrow.

Key word in that report on this “cheap”. HIMARS and their ammunition are not cheap and likely very tightly controlled. Using them on EW is likely too low down on the HVT list right now - it is like that video early on is the UA soldier firing a Javelin at a truck, kind of a waste. A cheap self-loitering or even ground based EM homing makes a lot more sense right now; that or give the UA 50 more HIMARS with all the ammo.

The RUSI report is very good; however it does not discuss space-based ISR feeds being pushed to the UA. One thing I am very confident of, is that the UA knows exactly where the Russians are in high resolution. The problem they are having is enough deep strike capability to exploit that ISR advantage. As to SEAD, I am not sure what that looks like in 2022 to be honest. Against Russia traditional SEAD would likely work to an extent but the combination of MANPADS, ISR, communications and UAS means that control of airspace is likely much more negotiable than before. One can see and hit IADS larger SAMs and radars; however hitting a bunch of MANPADS that can deny airspace at 15k feet, or small UAS is basically impossible at scale. The UA have a better chance and HIMARS could be employed to support this; however right now the priority is to cripple Russian logistics in order to stop their advances. And with only 8 systems (we are at 8, right?) the UA is going to prioritize. Now if the UA had 40 systems…deep precision strike is acting like cavalry of old, wreaking havoc in the rear. Except now one cannot send forces back to deal with it, you have to either use your own deep strike/ISR or breakthrough, and Russia really does not have those choices; the trick to game changing weapons is knowing which are and are not, and how they change the game.

Well a key indicator in the direction of this war will be when either side is capable of operational manoeuvre. The constraints and restraints on massing appear to have increased dramatically in this war; we are even seeing the risks of Russian massing of fires on their logistical system in the last two weeks. Once one side can establish the pre-conditions for manoeuvre, which is a steep hill, the next problem will be sustaining it. There was no breakthrough in WW1, will be interesting to see if one can happen here.

It might but it won’t solve for Russian missile systems/deep strike which can hit UA logistics chains if they mass up…unless one hits them as well but now we are talking subs in the Black Sea. The report only glances off space based ISR and communications but it impacts are pretty significant. Even Russia has “intermittent” spaced based ISR in play.