The_Capt

Didn't they find literally dozens of US components in RA UAVs as well? https://nypost.com/2023/01/04/iranian-drones-contain-parts-made-by-13-us-companies-report/#:~:text=The Iranian-made drones used,a downed Shahed-136 drone. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-war-russia-iranian-drones-us-made-technology-chips/ Does the US have some reasons not to "opposed some one else's war of righteous ethnic nationalism"?

A lot of the confusion and kerfuffle around cyber has nothing to do with the fact that is it in a magical elf-land called "cyber". It has to do with the context of the actor. If you are an ISIL cyber operator in some MENA country, hacking the FBI database in a basement, and the US can find you, the gentle knock on your door is going to be Pred strike - we have literally blown HVT off balconies for less. Finding, Fixing, and Finishing cyber players is challenging but it is all about the context. A know terror group attacking a hospital server equates to all sorts of boom-boom. When it comes from a non-state group with known links to a state that rhymes with "Prussia" working out of Belarus, things get a little more complicated. First off Pred strikes could start WW3, so there is that. And the level of attribution has to be a lot higher against another nation state...because the rules and all that. I think as the battle lines are being drawn for what is starting to look more and more like the next Cold War - although this one feels more like a gunfight in a phonebooth, I think all states are going to have to wrestle where "the line" is and is not.

Well yes and no. First off, lets say after this war is over, they arrest some cyber operator somewhere who did these support actions. They would face prosecution which would presume them innocent until proven guilty and burden of proof would include whether or not they were aware that their actions in support of Russia would/could be used in the execution of a warcrime. Things like Russian actions to date with respect to warcrimes would be considered, as well as what information was available to the cyber guy, and context the cyber operator was operating under. Were they aware of Russian actions? Were they coerced against their will? What was their state of mind? Then what about the act itself. Hacking a UA AD system in not a "legal action" under Ukrainian law (or any other for that matter). If they did so knowing that the RA was using missiles to target civilians, which is a warcrime and therefore they could be considered complicit. The bar for this is actually pretty damned high. We have seen prosecutions of admin clerks at the Nazi deathcamps, who never touched a weapon or did anything but run pay records for the guards. And they were still found guilty of being an accomplice to warcrimes. So right now, if a someone were to be feeding the RA opensource geolocating intelligence - that is perfectly legal cyber activity, but that intel is used to kill illegal targets - yep, that is at least investigable as a warcrime. In the same way if the person was on the ground phoning the info back to the Russians. This is why in the west, while everyone is going on about weapon systems, the professionals are mostly concerned with targeting - we always are. Targeting is the enterprise that has to turn a commanders intent/military objectives into reality, and it has to be done well inside the LOAC. That is why lawyers are literally part of the targeting cycle. Russia on the other hand appears to taking a more "blind drunk" targeting approach and are not even trying to keep the process above board. We have literally entered into the "Who Gives a F#ck Because We are Russia" targeting approach in the RA. And as such, anyone supporting or part of that targeting enterprise (to be really generous) had all be thinking very hard about personal legal exposure and liability. This is also a very big reason why the UA has to stay righteous in all this. Mistakes and accidents happen - in my business we call them "whoopsies". But blatant or intentional violations of LOAC by UA will end this party in an afternoon.

Guys there is this thing called the internet, and it literally has hundreds of pages on what is, and is not a legitimate military target. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml The original point being made was that if one employs cyber effects in support of a kinetic strike against illegal targets (eg an apartment building) then those cyber activities are also implicated in a legal sense.

Ya it was a crazy time. Largely because they sprung the entire mission on us and we went from a cold start. I was in the land staff at NDHQ back then and clearly remember the guys on international missions desk hearing about the Patricia’s going over on the news…lotta scrambling after that. SOF guys had been on the ground for months but they weren’t talking to anyone.

Very cool but just so you know, when we were working on SF in the 03-04 timeframe this is what the troops were wearing: https://legionmagazine.com/en/early-days-canadian-troops-in-afghanistan-2002-2004/ In fact we debated going full olive drab because as you can see that was how we were dressed. SF is set in 07, which by then we had finally gone all desert but the game was already in final production.

First time I ever heard the term was here on the forum. It is a good one, comes from the night of a release and everyone was refreshing their browsers to see when the new release dropped. Night of the Refresh Monkeys….a simpler time.

Still are, it is what is making this thing work for the UA. But unfortunately precision is still expensive and industry only made so much. So all western militaries are still lobbing dumb HE all over the place, and have lots of it. DPICM is basically distributed dumb HE that does much better coverage of any given area for fewer rounds fired...or at least that is the theory. I am still on the fence on military utility of DPICM in this war to be honest. It is legal and really will not make things relatively worse RoW wise, but as to how effective it is compared to other weapon systems versus the heartburn/hue and cry may not be entirely worth it. From a strictly military point of view I think they may have some advantages, but the political calculus is more complicated. That said if offered a pallet load of DPICM or Excalibur, I know which way I would go.

Absolutely true but we are not talking about Ukrainian violations of the LOACs wrt DPICM. We are talking about Ukraine employing a weapon system that got a lot of heat and light behind it when Israel decided that dumping heaps of old rounds into South Lebanon was a good idea. A large portion of the international community said "nope, we are not going to use them" and put pressure on others; however, none of that is anywhere near LOAC. What is and what is not within LOAC is pretty clearly defined by the CCW in Geneva: https://www.un.org/disarmament/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/ I got stuck in one of these a few years back and while the diplo guys were jerking each other around (note I said "around", because this is a family friendly channel), I actually read the whole thing. This defines what is illegal and legal, and although the anti-AP mine and cluster munitions advocates made some really strong cases, neither of these weapons are in fact banned by international law. They are restricted in use, much like all weapons of war; however, you are not going to wind up in front of The Hague if you employ them iaw CCW regulations. In Canada, I will wind up in front of a Canadian court because we declared them off limits. So in the grand calculus of "well we really don't like them" vs "hey look the RA just blew up another apartment full of children" this is a manageable space, in my opinion. Or in more fancy sounding formal terms, Ukraine is not a signatory of the cluster munitions protocol and neither is the US, so their lawful employment of these weapon systems in defending themselves in an existential war against an egregiously illegal invader is not likely to be a deal breaker at this point.

Ya that is kinda my read as well. This would have to be a side-deal between the US and Ukraine. I think there may be a concern that other countries could balk so hard that they begin to pull back on support in other areas. Honestly I think that was a real concern about 6 months ago but we have already passed so much water under the bridge at this point and Russia just can't help pooping all over the LOAC that I am not so sure it would be a real issue. Well that is an interesting point. The conventional wisdom is that DPICM drastically reduce the rounds-to-kill rate, particularly for armored vehicles. In CMCW we noted that they were devastating for troops in the open. But we are living in a new era here. Those HIMARs tungsten monsters seem to be doing very well at shredding. And you are correct, DPICM is actually less lethal than say Excalibur. If I had to choose, I would pick PGM everytime. I think they are still useful, I mean they will blow stuff up real good! But the context maybe narrower and they enter mid-field in a suite of ammo types. What I would like to see is the rumored next-gen precision DPICM, which was supposed by nearly dud-proof and able to kill from standoff. Son of this - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_Destroy_ARMor Regardless, DPICM will likely have utility but it is also not likely a hill to die on either. I mean they are not Leo2s which will sneak into Russia's house a night and wreck up the place!

Not really sure what the issue is to be honest. Neither the US nor Ukraine are signed on to the Dublin/Olso Convention. DPICM are not outlawed at the CCW. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-6&chapter=26&clang=_en So beyond some dirty looks from some western allies, and some noises from NGOs (but they all have to be remembering the Amnesty International fiasco), I am not sure what the real risk is in this context. RoW are going to be a concern but Ukraine has a century long RoW problem right now, not sure if modern western DPICM are going to be the major issue compared to the Russian created nightmare, while their usage could make a real difference. Definitely a possible political downside but as this war has progressed and Russia keeps lowering the bar, Ukraine employing these weapon systems deliberately and carefully (eg recording, transparency etc) seems manageable.

But sweet on the inside...kinda like a rancid Werther's Original.

Ah, well zero-for-zero then but I am all about anonymity. Leave them wondering and let the myths grow. I heard The Capt was a naval officer who lost an eye in a bar fight in Manila, and now runs guns and rum under the cover of a travelling manatee show. His insights on military affairs come entirely from MASH reruns and RoW tournaments.

For the life of me I can’t figure out who this is. I mean we all know who the caustic Kiwi gunner is…

I think this misses Russian reinforcements we heard about being pulled from other districts to replace losses. With a total force reaching 1M pers, I have to believe they backstopped the losses to some extent, hence the logic to go with their entry force numbers of about 200k. Of course we know that some units were way understrength. I mean we could go with a range of say 150-250 troop per km on average, and then much higher in areas of main effort/thinner in quiet areas. Overall point being is that the line is onion skin thin in places and with every wasted attack getting worse...this jives with the UA strategy of sticking in place and grinding it out with the RA in locales of otherwise low operational value. As to ISR, the UA is hooked into the largest and best ISR architecture our species has ever produced, while I expect Russian ISR, which was not "advanced" at the start of this, but not zero either, has been severely beat up. On Oryx for example it is showing a spectrum of ISR and EW equipment and over "225 Command Posts and Communications" (that is just crazy). So the ability for the RA to "see", understand what it is "seeing" and then communicating that understanding has been mauled up pretty badly, and this is stuff you cannot mass produce. So what? Well RA is getting blinder, dumber and slower. Which means it cannot react as quickly as it did at the outset of this war. Its OODA loop is stretching and as such it has to invest human capital along the line to hold it, as opposed to manoeuvre units that can react and cover off greater frontage with fewer troops. The UA does not need the same troop density to cover off the same ground because they can see RA massing and moving well back and have the ability to manoeuvre and fire in response. Gotta be honest, crunching these numbers and the current UA strategy of "hold and kill" is making a lot of sense.

I crunched the numbers on this but it bears re-calcs: So Russian forces - with paramilitary from DNR/LPR and Wagner, after mobilization are around 350k in country right now? (They had 200k in initial invasion, which they have debatably sustained and the mobilized 300k, of which half were supposed to actually go in-country). The "Line" is about 700km long from tip to tip. This gives a force density of about 500 troops per km, but this is not how things really work. First off this number has to include support troops so maybe 2/3rds are actually able to be "on the line", so say 340 ish per km. And then you need depth, reserves and rotations, which will take up nearly half in a normal military, but the RA is probably packing them in and leaving them there, so I would go 2/3rds again. So we are at around 225 troops per km, which is a healthy company group but of course this is uniform and does not account for concentrations for attacks, which are going to leave other areas pretty thin. I think I calculated a troop density of around 1000-1500 per km during WW1, but they did not have the ISR and range of manoeuvre, but even with that nowhere near that level. Russia would need to put nearly 1.5 million troops in country to create that level of sustainable troop density. My bet is that the UA is more than happy for the RA to pull in and grind itself as the rest of their line gets thinner and thinner. Eventually something has got to give. As the RA gets blinder and less mobile due to vehicle attrition all they will have is human capital, and not enough, to cover the frontage. UA is going the other way.

Ah, now we are talking about our competitive advantage. Bottom up democracy is much more resilient and agile, but does trade efficiency. In the warfare that a certain nation considers theirs, they have always been hobbled by their own addiction to centralized authority and structure. If one is going to do systems-based non-linear warfare - less structure, more agency and meritocracy are the better qualities to leverage. It is nuts but we need to re-wire approach, they would need to rewire their entire society - we can crush this competition but we need to wake up first.

Well I am not sure if we can even clearly define what we mean by "attack" at this point. I expect that the UA will continue to conduct a series of deep strike and attritional campaigns, continually eroding the RA at its critical points. Then once the corrosive phase of warfare is over, they will kick the door in (insert western tank shots). My money is on a diversionary push in the east, and then a main effort punch to cut that strategic corridor. Once they do that, they can go to work on Crimea and compress the RA back into the box where it started in the Donbas. They get to that point and we are basically at the "ok, so where do we draw the line?" arguments. Ukraine, obviously will want to push all the way back to pre-2014; however, the west might not be all onboard for this war to drag all the way into 2024 (and maybe beyond). That is a lot of money and hardware to finish that job and commitment may wane. But as I always say, let's walk to midnight one second at a time.

Not my equation. The actual algorithm does not exist because the entire thing is built on a biomachine made up of gooey stuff and about 2 million years of evolving to be the "best ape". We stick "great grandson-of-Checkers" in a moving 60ton giant steel box while other monkeys lob steel at him at 2km per second and wonder why it is "taking so long to train?!".

I think you just described the last 30 years of western military intervention.

Almost like the world could use a really detailed simulation of what war will be like against a China-like adversary in about 10 years. Something that lands somewhere between game and research tool…hmmm, I wonder where we could find something like that? As to your original premise in this war against Russia, I totally agree, NATO would cut through that is left of the RA faster than it rolled thru Saddam in ‘91. In fact if it weren’t for the nuclear equation I think we would have Gulf War’d this thing months ago. I am at the point that the RA has devolved so far back (human wave attacks, seriously) that a good old fashion front door kicking at the right place and time might just do the job. For example, what is the state of Russian C4ISR?

Actually in this equation when one of those factors is less than zero it starts to drag down the rest. So if one rolls out with skill as 0.5, you have just shot quantity and tech-quality in the foot. As to “more in depth”, look guys the resumes of some people sharing here could (and do) charge a hefty fee for this stuff. If you want a complete breakdown of conversion training from Levels 1-7 we are beyond the scope of an Internet forum discussion. In fact some of our peers are getting paid a lot to set this up for the UA right now. You can trust us, or it is a big internet out there with a lot of manuals and training stuff lying around.

In Ukraine against the Russians, very likely but when we are talking US/NATO next-war, this little shindig in Ukraine is the “sampler”. You are basically describing the western doctrine that got us through the last 30 years of dominance. Question is, “is that doctrine over?” Problem #1 - Air superiority. The war in Ukraine is what massive air denial looks like and it is very likely to get worse not better. Against another nation or coalition with significant ISR (space to ground networks) and dispersed cheap air denial systems gaining air superiority is the lynch pin we may very well get stuck on. If the answer is “we will never ground attack until we have air superiority” then we have just highly incentivized opponents to develop and field air denial capabilities. And then there is the “air superiority below 2000 feet” problem. The direction of things is favouring swarming autonomous systems capable of lethal effects. Against that our current doctrine is weak as traditional air superiority means less, and massed conventional force is the opposite direction one wants to go. Problem #2 - Our tanks need gas too. Our western doctrine of conventional mass requires enormous effort to secure its LOCs under the old rules. We saw insurgents cripple our supply lines for short periods of time. Against a peer opponent our current LOCs are extremely vulnerable because we are massing and burning a lot of energy to achieve overmatch. Take Problem #1 and project it into our rear areas and we might simply run out of gas before we can crush anything. Problem #3 - We still think and act linearly. I am getting the sense that against an opponent wired the same way we are, enabled the same way we are, we are in fact at a disadvantage. The issue is that our doctrine still looks at the problem sets as linear manoeuvre problems. Against an opponent that creates and projects a force that is fighting along a non-linear game plan we already know we are vulnerable - we saw this in COIN. However when that opponent is a peer force, well it changes the game in ways we are not well set up for. Problem 4 - Will. The elephant in the room is not even a military problem. Right now in police forces we don’t know who to trust if the problem at hand is along a divisive fault line. And I am not talking about the US here, I am talking about Canada. This is bigger than How We Fight but is directly going to impact both the inputs and outcomes. So if we get into a peer war, I am not convinced our internal integrity will hold longer than theirs. This is a precondition more important than air superiority and we do not even think in these terms while our opponents do. So as an example to pull this all together in your western crushing offensive - in the East somewhere in ten years NATO/US face off against an unnamed peer adversary who counters your entire scenario with - Ubiquitous ISR built on a backbone of space to sub-surface networks integrated into civilian architectures with enough ambiguity to make us pause and argue on legalities of hitting them. They can see us, all of us better than we can see them because we are all formed up enmasse while they go a different way. Air denial on a scope and scale that makes air superiority impossible. The air space becomes a Wild West. Employs fully autonomous systems (air/ground) with no human-in-loop while we are going to be stuck within our legal frameworks. Swarming lethal unmanned clouds pollute the battle space. Focuses on deep system attacks going back through our LOCs, SLOCs and all the way back to industry. Employs non-linear hybrid and dispersed warfare - we are the snow, they are the fog. Think 21st century Mongols while we continue to fight in blocks and squares. Has built in trapdoors and poison pills so deeply in our backfield that we funded the blind spots. We start taking casualties and the cracks widen on the first day. Russia is nowhere near playing at this level. All it has is the nuclear equation, which is so last millennium. However I can think of one nation that is heading in this direction, and it literally wrote the rules on on some of this over two thousand years ago.

And of course there is training people up to a level of proficiency that they do it on zero sleep while someone is trying to kill them part. And then training them to not kill each other by accident. And kill the other guys well in a disciplined manner. A lot of this is pure muscle memory which does not immediately translate from one platform to the next. Last thing you want is a crewman to react as if they are in a T72 while in a western tank.

Ok, well just skimming the wavetops here…going from 3 crewmen to 4 is the first real hurdle. Totally different internal systems so maintenance and operation is going to be different. Different capabilities which will drive how the crew will fight the vehicle (hell they will likely have to learn to live in it first). No point in getting a new platform if they intend to fight it like their current fleets. For example western tanks reverse much faster, which drives an entirely different tactical fire and movement procedures. Different fire control systems and gun behaviour (range, penetration etc), western systems are more point and click but then there is the battlefield comms and info sharing suites. Ammo handling, damage control and recovery are also different. And then you get into specialized drills like minefield breaching, water crossing and snorkelling, all different from Soviet equipment. In some ways when it comes to crew training I expect that untrained crews are going to be easier to train because they do not have to unlearn the old systems first. Also western tanks are designed to be fought in platoons of 4, not sure if the UA does the same or fight Soviet style in platoons of 3. This opens up collective training with just the tanks, based on numbers we are talking up to Company as a minimum. Training a company to march, shake out, deploy, fight, consolidate and sustain through all phases (offence, defence and withdrawal) is going to take some time as again these are fundamentally different systems. I expect if UA crews treat them like the Soviet stuff these western tanks will be broken pretty quickly. Western systems take a lot more TLC. And then once you do all that, unless you want to relegate the armor to being on its own, you then have to move up to combined arms training and integrate infantry, artillery and engineers - rinse and repeat on the phases of warfare. Most of these units are going to be in various types of equipment, likely some Soviet and western mixes which is going to get a little weird. You have to do all this without breaking your new tanks or getting people hurt. And then there is the logistics train. All the maintainers, recovery folks and specialists that the UA do not have and western nations are not going to put in country. And then all that has to learn to keep up with the new combat teams, that should not be moving like the current UA armor (see: indirect fire) or what was the point? So now specialized logistics trains are going to need to learn to keep up with stuff like break through. Oh and before anyone brings it up, this is crash course speed. Because the UA will be cutting corners and accepting risk, not too much or see Broken Tanks. So 6 months is at break neck speed. This is not moving to a slightly more modern vehicle. This is a completely new weapon system that takes 4 people to operate it. Its inherent capabilities and quirks drive how it is employed at basic levels. Upscaling those change how the units that employ these vehicles are organized and operate - in a contact sport where you do not get many second chances.