The_Capt

No, that would basically be an entirely new game. Think Bee Gees at their disco apex, Beatles had already broken up and formed whatever the gawd awful stuff they did later was....Wings?!

Here we go, 100 pages ago...yeesh. https://github.com/leedrake5/Russia-Ukraine Ain't perfect but likely the best we are going to get from open source - they built these off Oryx apparently. As you can see the UA is not on the edge as far as we can tell. A whole lot on this page but the trends pretty much show that the UA is sustaining (and maybe growing) while the RA is on a pretty much downward trend - but they had deeper pockets to start with of course.

No that is fair, we do not have the full information set. Ukraine has tightened up its information control pretty significantly since the early days, which is in itself a sign of control. Does this thread get out of control and start smoking its own supply, absolutely. We have lived thru "Russia sux, lols" and the Tankfest 2023 waves, and will no doubt see more spontaneous eruptions. Of course I think we tried to hold them to the same standard as the counter-narratives put forward by LLF - tried, and maybe failed more than we should have. We just had an Open Source trend analysis on the UA losses over time, lemme see if I can dig it out.

Ok guys we have been green lit to make a formal announcement on this shortly. Until then let’s just clear up a bit of confusion with respect to timeframes - we are going backwards not forwards. More to follow…

So coming back to this part. What makes this war very different is the whole “paternalistic” part. In this war the direction has gone the other way. In almost all of our wars of intervention or proxy we have had to do the pushing and shoring. We have pushed partners to our tempos and timelines because they have become more about us than the people fighting them. In Ukraine the entire thing has gone the other way. Ukraine is leading the dance on this thing. They are the ones pulling us into their tempo and timelines - they are shoring us. We are not pushing them, we are barely keeping up. In fact the major concern now is that they may accelerate away from us into escalation. That is fundamentally different than just about every other morass we have been pulled into as we try and solve for humanity in the 20th and 21st century. So if that has been the trend in this war so far then why cannot we rely on the “conditions that made those possible” going forward? This is the crux of issue, what has fundamentally changed? How have the operational conditions changed to the point we should begin to doubt the UAs ability to successfully prosecute this war? How have the strategic conditions changed to the point our interests in this war are misaligning or shifting? This is a free and open forum, moderated to be sure, but anyone can come here and challenge or push back on the main if they so choose. However, we also try and keep this to evidence-based facts in any assessment. What a lot of these crisis of faith feel like is random panic attacks as opposed to detailed assessments of the situation. Now if we start seeing some actual indicators of Ukraine or western resolve beginning to fail or evidence on the battlefield of UA beginning to lose, that would be a point where we could start to try and unpack what is going wrong. But so far, other than what is clearly an operational pause, I think we are at risk of jumping at shadows. I think Sun Tzu missed the back end of his little axiom - “…and in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. But don’t overthink it or psyche yourself the f#ck out in the process…sometimes it is just a damned spoon.”

Well I have read about the RA “adaptions” and they appear to consist of tying one’s logistics into knots. HIMARs and this new GLSDB round are the deep strike systems the UA will likely rely on. This would see strikes in C4ISR instead of logistics being prioritized. So Command Posts, comms infrastructure, ISR support and infrastructure. This will look different than ammo dumps and logistics nodes, more precision is needed and a smaller window of opportunity because once they do get wind of a targeting shift they will stat moving their C4ISR. And then there are the targets in Russia itself. I suspect that the gloves will come off on C4ISR in Russia proper. These are a smaller target set and make less of a bang so escalation is less likely. Where. My guess is a ann eastern feint to pull RA back towards the East, and then a main thrust down the middle towards Melitopol. Once they can cut that bridge and hold it, the big old bridge linking the Crimea to Russia is in range. Cut that and the troops in Crimea start to look pretty cut off and Kherson-like. Crimea is a much bigger prize and will create a lot more leverage. Work that while containing Donbas back into a box. To my mind this whole thing is Phase IV of this war.

So the thing about corrosive warfare is that is takes time…one has to let the corrosion set in. Further, one has to degrade an opponents entire military system at a faster rate than it can recover. By all accounts the UA is succeeding on both of these components; however, I suspect they are going to continue to bleed the RA and let it burn itself out until they can find or manipulate a break-in battle. Remember we calculated that average troop density is about 200 troops on the RA side. They have thrown minefields up but we have seen little evidence of how many or how much in depth. And the RA logistics system has to be straining right now, it was before this winter. So holding back, peppering with long range precision fires and hammering RA attacks does not seem like a bad strategy while they continue to force generate and integrate in the backfield. Now what that break in battle will look like is really what we should be talking about. My guess is that it will start with a concerted fires campaign on RA ISR to try and establish some level of surprise.

There are 8 campaign missions if you go all the way. How you win or lose the campaign is where one gets off the train, not how well you rode on it. So if you make it to Mission 5 and leave it pulls a draw. You do better the further down the track you go. There is a victory track and defeat track (don’t have the tree on me right now), if you get off on one track or the other there is also a campaign ending difference but it is slight. For example you were on 5a I suspect which dropping out yields a draw. If you were on 5b, it should have given you a minor defeat. When you think about it, it makes sense. I mean you only just stopped the Soviets and never defeated their main effort. Lemme dig out the campaign tree and confirm.

Wait one, there appears to have been a slight miscommunication. We are engaging.

Wow, dark. I mean sure, technically could happen. I mean the West would have to entirely abandon Ukraine in order for them to be pulled back into Russian orbit at this point. And if that happens, well we may as well all start learning Mandrin because we are doomed for the next real fight. The Donbas was not an "industrial heartland": https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10663-021-09521-w In fact Russia walked away from the actual industrial centers of Ukraine around Kyiv. Ukraine doesn't enter NATO and EU, well ok, not a great idea on our part but not a deal breaker. Nor does this preclude bilateral agreements, which is what has gotten them to this point anyway. Nor does this preclude western investment or reconstruction, particularly in the center and west of Ukraine. Lord knows we would never pour trillions into a nation still in a state of conflict - The_Capt says sarcastically eyeing Iraq and Afghanistan, and unlike those two gong shows Ukraine is far more internally cohesive and actually bordered by NATO nations. Of course heading into Western elections in '24, the big one being US, having Ukraine burning, abandoned and drifting towards Russia after spending billions is not a really good thing. So sure, this darkest timeline is out there but lets call it the "natural 1" and realize that a whole lot has to go wrong before we get there. Did you guys think war was without risk? That we are in one we can actually lose? Maybe that is the issue because all the rest were "over there" and of course we couldn't lose. Of course we can lose. You may have noticed that we are about one bad day away from a nuclear exchange between great powers. I mean it would have to be a really bad and unlucky day but that damned midnight clock isn't joking. https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/ But just because we can lose does not mean we will. Particularly if we hold it together and stop jumping at every setback like it was the end of days.

Well I guess that is because until we see some indication in a shift in Ukrainian military capability, or political will, there is no reason to think or deduce that they are somehow in worse shape than they were 3 months ago. It isn't "shhh dont inquire" it is "well what has fundamentally changed?" The UA conducted a double operational offensive last fall that took back roughly half the area the RA held. It was hard grinding at Kherson but not army breaking. Since then the UA appears to have dug in and happily let the RA break itself in the Donbas again. This time we are not seeing the massive artillery campaigns we saw last year, instead the RA is throwing what appears to be human wave assaults while the UA is giving ground very slowly. Everyone seems to think the RA may try to make a major push sometime this winter/spring, I for one am waiting to see what becomes of that. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2023 Beyond that the Ukraine is clearly in the fight as it continues to force generate, promote a pretty convincing narrative and the taboos on offensive weapons (yes, even those damned Leo2s) appears to be fading. Casualties - who really knows the estimates vary wildly https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War However, even the highest numbers for each side are nowhere near a demographic attrition threshold for either side. So we are down to social willpower and here the Ukrainians clearly have the upper advantage as this war is directly existential and non-discretionary for them - the only party in this conflict to which those critical strategic factors exist. So not sure what the fuss is about here to be honest. I am a little disappointed that there looks like there will be no UA Winter offensive, but apparently the weather has not been cooperating and conditions have not been met in other ways. Ok, there it is. If you have evidence of any significant degradation of the UA or some signs of political resolve starting to fail, post away. The Ukrainian political level has not signaled they are ready to blink and the Ukrainian people appear pretty much committed. Russia hasn't blinked yet either, or at least we have not seen it. We know Putin has not mobilized "millions" and that based on troop density the 300k they mobilized last fall may stabilize the line in places but is not going to really fundamentally change the calculus. I guess beyond the fact that war is very much hell and that it is not over yet, I am not sure what the hyperventilation is all about.

Ok, so an "open wound" war. Never ending struggle both above and below normal conflict thresholds. There is at least one nation on the planet that has been living this way for decades and it has double the GDP of pre-war Ukraine and 1/4 the population with a whole lot less real estate - Israel. A long open wound war is not a iron-rule indicator of economic success of failure. As to security, well frankly it becomes "risk-managed". So for every missile Russia lobs in this scenario you point, it gets another day, month, year of sanctions and economic isolation. Further, it reinforces western resolve to continue to pour in military and economic aid. This missile theory sounds a lot like the bomber theories of WW2 - the resolve of people will break as the bomber always gets through. Well it didn't and nations like Germany and Japan survived for years under a lot worse conditions than Russia can project on Ukraine - and they did not have the deep pockets of the western world. So we AD Ukraine up into Iron Dome 4, we arm the ever lovin crap out of them and at some point those Russia missiles and their infrastructure are going to become legitimate military targets. How does any of this make Russia's position any better? Russia may pursue a "well I am going home but am going to lob missiles at you because I am a sad bitter loser", but it is going to cost them billions to do it. It has a very low chance of breaking Ukrainian resolve, a low chance of breaking western resolve and in the end may reap more pain and loss on Russia. This almost assumes Russia is not a rational actor in all this. I actually think the root of all this is a fear of failing western resolve. We pull back, pull out and simply accept Russian dominance in Ukraine. Well I can't say it is not a possibility, but as this war draws on Ukraine is becoming too big to fail from a western perspective. We have invested too much at some point and cutting losses becomes untenable. I am not sure we are at that point, but we are a lot closer to it now then on 24 Feb. Political theatre aside, the risks to our interests are simply becoming too high with a Russian win at this point.

Ok, so I guess it is time for another talk on this. The main reason there has not been a lot of discussion on the progress of the war itself is because not a lot is happening - or wait, is it? And being human means we simply cannot accept reality for what it is, we need to start reading meaning and implications at every shadow in the dark. Nothing is happening because the UA has run out of steam. Nothing is happening because the RA has rebuilt itself into a lurking monster that can freeze this conflict in place. Nothing is happening because it is all a [insert boogie-man of you choice] - Belarusian Front re-opening is popular. Or here is a crazy idea, maybe nothing is really happening because it is the middle of a wet muddy winter. Or wait a minute, maybe something is happening - https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2023/01/23/monday-january-23-russias-war-on-ukraine-daily-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=72a88a92ba69 but because of unrealistic expectations we think nothing is happening. In fact we have become so fixated on questionable criteria of success that the fact that the RA is bleeding out appears to be getting lost in the noise. https://www.newsweek.com/nearly-5500-russians-killed-last-week-war-defense-ministry-1777316 (that is 1/3 of what they lost in Afghanistan in ten years). Oh but we all know the mighty Russian bear can generate millions of troops - which it has not - and come crawling out of the snow to retake all of Ukraine and usher in a new era of Russian dominance. And then pundits - seriously who are these guys? Say things like "Ukraine can only make progress with a deliberate offensive." Well no sh#t Sherlock, it is what they have been doing since last Sep. In fact the only successful defence-only operation was arguably in Phase I when the RA over-reached and collapsed out of the North. Every major UA success to date has been a period of heavy RA attrition/manipulation followed by deliberate offensive pressure - fast in Kharkiv, slow in Kherson - outcomes the same. "Oh dear, oh dear, Russia is going to win the war." Well Piglet, no Russia has already lost this one - we are only negotiating what that looks like here. (The_Capt's all war is negotiation has clearly fallen on deaf ears.) "But, but, Russia wins unless we take back every square inch of Ukraine in the next week." Well, ok by that metric then I guess we have lost this one but that is a terrible metric. "Russia wins if Ukrainians keep dying" - another bad metric because last I checked this is a war and people are going to die from it for decades - see UXOs and landmines. "Russia wins if Russia is not a smoking collapsed ruin with Putin hanging upside down from a telephone pole" - ok, seriously? The worst case right now is that the front does not move an inch. The conflict is frozen in place, locked in Korean style. The specter of Russia somehow turning those buckets of Chinese chips into a C4ISR enterprise that can achieve: information superiority; wage a SEAD campaign for the ages and somehow regain air superiority - and invent a CAS/AirLand doctrine while they are at it; then establish the operational pre-conditions they needed on 24 Feb - make Ukraine go dark - literally and information-wise, cripple transportation infra-structure, and paralyze political/military strategic decision making - is f*cking laughable. I mean if the RA still has those rabbits in its hat I will be absolutely shocked and of course ask the obvious question - "what the hell were they waiting for to pull them out?" So conflict frozen. So What? Russia has already failed on both its made up and real strategic objectives for this war. The real ones are stuff like: - Take full control of Ukraine, install puppet government and run the nation like Belarus. - Shatter the western world through a display of Russian Imperial might and re-assert Russian hegemony. - Render NATO irrelevant and neutered. With no doubt a longer term campaign to push them out of the Baltics through subversive means. - Simply wait for a few months before weak-kneed European resolve collapses and they all start to buy Russian gas again - renormalization, Russian supremacy in its neighborhood, western "rules-based-order" a burning wreck, and sit back and let the autocrat club rule the roost. Ya so not only did none of that happen, in many instances the exact opposite happened. So for all you students of history I think I am on pretty safe ground when I declare that this is what losing looks like. If on the weigh scales of history Russia gets "blasted and shattered Donbas, complete with reconstruction bill", and "Cut off and highly vulnerable Crimea", and "Strategic land bridge to nowhere", I think we can bloody well live with it. If we cannot and that is what breaks us, then we never deserved to be in charge in the first place. Russia just burned down its own storefront. It has isolated itself from it best customers. Its reputation on the global stage is in shambles, re-normalization is a very far off dream. It has been militarily crushed - I mean this is 1991 where Saddam drove the coalition into the sea type of thing - by all old metrics of warfare Ukraine should be in an occupied insurgency right now, the reality we are in should not have happened. Russian hard power credibility is a joke. And it is extremely vulnerable to really weak negotiating conditions. Further NATO has not been this unified since the Cold War. Western defence spending has been re-energized for a decade at least - I mean seriously Vlad, read the f#cking room, we were half-way to debilitating defence cuts in the post-pandemic economy but then you made your "genius" chess move. Europe is actually agreeing with itself. The US has finally found something they can agree on, mostly. And most importantly, I think the West finally woke up from its "New World Order" hangover and realized that one has to actually keep fighting to stay on top. And finally here is the thing....this entire affair is not over by a long shot. We have not seen anything that suggests the UA has run out of gas. We are pushing more and more offensive equipment at the UA, which suggests that they are lining up for another operational offensive. The RA is still flopping around with leg-humping in the Donbas. Spending thousands of lives for inches, just like they did last summer. So before we declare this thing "over" why don't we just buckle in and show something that most people do not get in the least about warfare...steady patience. Games and movies are terrible at teaching this because they are entertainment. War is more often a slow and steady grinding business, until it is not.

So that is simply not true. Now that part is true. No, doesn’t really track. Country went from zero to sixty in the 8 years after it lost a large chunk of Donbas and Crimea. In fact where the lines on the map are finally drawn really are not critically linked to either security or economic recovery at this point in the war. Seriously, you are painting this entire thing into a pretty bleak (and maximalist) corner with this line of thinking. I would have hoped nearly 2000 pages of in depth discussion and counter-points would have done something but apparently we are still at “it is all about the map!” So what are we going to do if Ukraine retakes all it wonderful land - filled with people who actively supported Russia by the way - and magically Russia does not cease to exist, nor does it recognize an end to the conflict? A new more nationalist Russia with some other nut job in charge - they have more in the back- who refuses to accept the lot of the “poor downtrodden true-Russians in occupied Crimea and Donbas”? Based on your absolutist criteria we basically have to win WW3 in order to fully secure Ukraine…pointe finale! And here is why what you are pitching is such a bad idea. If we ain’t absolutely winning…we are losing! Like war is some sort of digital experience like being pregnant. Based on your underlying strategic requirements as outlined by this narrative, the only way Ukraine and the West can win is through the complete destruction of Russia. This is not only a terrible idea, it is a dangerous oversimplification of the situation. I am glad to see we are still on schedule for our monthly “crisis of faith” because the war is not meeting these highly unrealistic goals and timelines. Based on these metrics we may just have to accept the loss then, I think over on the MacGregor channel they are already talking about pushing Ukraine into negotiations. Why don’t we just stick with the “a secure western facing free and sovereign Ukraine with a functioning democracy while well supported in economic recovery”. And work backwards from that? A lot of scenarios between here and there, and I am pretty sure the grown ups are working through them all. Strategy is not a choice between Good and Bad, it is a choice between Bad and Worse. We are living Bad right now. We are all looking for something other than Worse.

Yup, read it in the book as well. Human body is a weird bag of goo and can do strange things with flying metal. Old story but back in the Dust, I had a security outer cordon guy take an AK round right center of mass, no body armor. Apparently there is a bullet shaped empty void in the human body and the damn round when straight through missing everything by millimeters. We figure the round must have also been at end of flight because the hydrostatic shock didn't kill the guy either. Guy was up and showing everyone his new chest and back-holes a day later. Two weeks later same guy steps on a landmine, loses leg, hand and eye....he decided it was time to go home after that. Anyway, an RPG round is designed to go off on a deflection or glancing blow on just about anything, probably why they shoot them at people.

Yep. Most HEAT rounds have piezoelectric fuses in the warheads - which is fancy words for "explodes on contact". https://advanceandreview.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/history-ww2-heat-and-the-piezoelectric-fuze/ Once fired these things get pretty sensitive. During UXO training we were told to avoid casting a shadow on an unexploded ATGM because the temperature differential could detonate some of these fuses. So definitely hitting a human body - bones etc, wearing gear - armor, ammo etc is going to detonate the thing. However, there are stories of RPG rounds buying themselves into people and not detonating, making surgery really interesting. Some ATGMs come with proximity fuses because they double them up as AD https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/mediawiki/index.php/9M120_Ataka_(AT-9_Spiral-2)_Russian_Anti-Tank_Guided_Missile_(ATGM)

Well in the first hit there is clearly explosive trauma. A HEAT round is not designed for AP. As the name suggests it is designed to penetrate armor and then once behind it, spray hot metal and bounce all over the insides of a vehicle. So hitting a person or group of people with a HEAT round is both sub-optimal and overkill at the same time. The inverted cone of the HEAT round forms a hot very fast moving slug (you can actually see their contrails) after the initial explosion. The explosion itself does create blast and frag, obviously but most of the energy is converted into that slug. So what? Well unless you are hit by that slug directly (and in the first hit it looks like someone’s head has been taken off by it), then you normally “only” get fragmentation from the casing. This can still kill you but you are peppered to death vice blown apart, massive blood loss being the primary mechanism of mortality. In most of these cases it looks like blast and frag got them while the slug flew off and away.

That second one looks like another RPG, you can see it come in from the right. Those look like HEAT rounds with the slug flying off after the initial explosion. Sucks to be them. Don’t see any Red Crosses, so this is a righteous shoot, but still nasty.

In the business we call these "Uh-Oh's!". Actually there is a lot of disagreement on the whole thing. Extra-judicial murder is illegal; however, lawful engagement of a combatant is not. The problem lies in the definition of combatant. Terrorists etc appear to exist in a legal loophole - depending on who one asks: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/a21908.pdf

That is not a destroyed vehicle. It might need 4th line refit and repair (can’t see the inside) but I have seen destroyed vehicles and this one is recoverable.

Well someone is going to have unpack what the critical link between Israel and Russia is then, because it is not trade: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/rus/partner/isr Those are really small numbers compared to each nations overall economies. Not even 10 percent of what Germany was doing for business with Russia: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/deu/partner/rus So other than some pretty suspicious sounding “Israeli Elites” rumours, how is Israel or Russia dependant on each other in any meaningful way? Israel sold them some drones, but they sold those drones all over the world. Not sure why Israel is holding back but they have every right to stay out of this if they like. They are not part of NATO nor the western block in reality. They do have strong bilateral agreements with the US but that only goes so far. Either way it is pretty strong language (and not a little ironic) to put Israel in the same “supporting Russia” camp as Iran, and without any real proof as far as I can see.

Dude, not even close to the same circumstances as Iran. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAI_Searcher As far as I can tell this was all stuff the Israelis sold to Russia years ago. Along with a lot of nations, including Canada. Yes the Russians had/have a domestic licence to manufacture but again pre-war. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63318659 This does not translate into the Iranian sale of UCAVs directly to Russia in the middle of an illegal war in the least. Meanwhile Israel has been selling anti-drone systems: https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-defense-firm-selling-anti-drone-systems-to-ukraine-by-way-of-poland/ And providing humanitarian support pretty much since the beginning of this thing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_foreign_aid_to_Ukraine_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War

Didn't they find literally dozens of US components in RA UAVs as well? https://nypost.com/2023/01/04/iranian-drones-contain-parts-made-by-13-us-companies-report/#:~:text=The Iranian-made drones used,a downed Shahed-136 drone. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-war-russia-iranian-drones-us-made-technology-chips/ Does the US have some reasons not to "opposed some one else's war of righteous ethnic nationalism"?

A lot of the confusion and kerfuffle around cyber has nothing to do with the fact that is it in a magical elf-land called "cyber". It has to do with the context of the actor. If you are an ISIL cyber operator in some MENA country, hacking the FBI database in a basement, and the US can find you, the gentle knock on your door is going to be Pred strike - we have literally blown HVT off balconies for less. Finding, Fixing, and Finishing cyber players is challenging but it is all about the context. A know terror group attacking a hospital server equates to all sorts of boom-boom. When it comes from a non-state group with known links to a state that rhymes with "Prussia" working out of Belarus, things get a little more complicated. First off Pred strikes could start WW3, so there is that. And the level of attribution has to be a lot higher against another nation state...because the rules and all that. I think as the battle lines are being drawn for what is starting to look more and more like the next Cold War - although this one feels more like a gunfight in a phonebooth, I think all states are going to have to wrestle where "the line" is and is not.

Well yes and no. First off, lets say after this war is over, they arrest some cyber operator somewhere who did these support actions. They would face prosecution which would presume them innocent until proven guilty and burden of proof would include whether or not they were aware that their actions in support of Russia would/could be used in the execution of a warcrime. Things like Russian actions to date with respect to warcrimes would be considered, as well as what information was available to the cyber guy, and context the cyber operator was operating under. Were they aware of Russian actions? Were they coerced against their will? What was their state of mind? Then what about the act itself. Hacking a UA AD system in not a "legal action" under Ukrainian law (or any other for that matter). If they did so knowing that the RA was using missiles to target civilians, which is a warcrime and therefore they could be considered complicit. The bar for this is actually pretty damned high. We have seen prosecutions of admin clerks at the Nazi deathcamps, who never touched a weapon or did anything but run pay records for the guards. And they were still found guilty of being an accomplice to warcrimes. So right now, if a someone were to be feeding the RA opensource geolocating intelligence - that is perfectly legal cyber activity, but that intel is used to kill illegal targets - yep, that is at least investigable as a warcrime. In the same way if the person was on the ground phoning the info back to the Russians. This is why in the west, while everyone is going on about weapon systems, the professionals are mostly concerned with targeting - we always are. Targeting is the enterprise that has to turn a commanders intent/military objectives into reality, and it has to be done well inside the LOAC. That is why lawyers are literally part of the targeting cycle. Russia on the other hand appears to taking a more "blind drunk" targeting approach and are not even trying to keep the process above board. We have literally entered into the "Who Gives a F#ck Because We are Russia" targeting approach in the RA. And as such, anyone supporting or part of that targeting enterprise (to be really generous) had all be thinking very hard about personal legal exposure and liability. This is also a very big reason why the UA has to stay righteous in all this. Mistakes and accidents happen - in my business we call them "whoopsies". But blatant or intentional violations of LOAC by UA will end this party in an afternoon.