Andrew H.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS: To answer your question about the TOE, the bren was used - as a seperate team - in many units. Read Simons' post on the first page of the "Bren: Not Sold Seperately" thread. [ 08-26-2001: Message edited by: JonS ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> That's not exactly what Simon's post said. Simon says ( ) that there were apparently superfluous Brens assigned to various units, such as the Bn. AT, etc. This is not evidence that there were separate Bren teams (at least, not for the purposes of CM). The most logical explanation for this is simply that Brens were provided to these crews for local defense. No one would go to the AT crews, strip it of two or three members, give them a Bren, and put them in the front line to support an infantry attack. The mere presence of the weapons is not evidence of separate teams, any more than the fact that US tankers were issued SMGs is evidence that the US should have special SMG assault teams available. However, the earlier point about the members of Bren carriers fighting dismounted is correct as far as I can tell and should be permitted when the CM engine is rewritten

Note that the German SMG has a firepower rating of 36 at 40 meters. Not as good as the Thompson, but still better than the MP 44, despite the fact that the German SMG just fired 9mm pistol ammunition. I think that the increased firepower for the SMGs at very close range just reflects that it was easier to use these smaller caliber weapons to spray bullets around when you're close to the enemy. Remember that you are typically targetting not just one individual, but different members of an enemy team or squad. This same logic seems to apply to the MG 42. Note that the MG 42, which fires a larger shell than the MP 44 with a higher ROF, only has a FP rating of 20 at 40 meters. This, I assume, reflects the difficulty of using the somewhat unwieldy weapon to spray bullets around at close range.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username: BTW, German ammo boxes were specially designed so that two could be carried in one hand. That means a single soldier could carry (with some difficulty, like we simulate) 1,000 rounds all by himself. If three men in a HMG42 Team carried such a load you get 3,000 rounds right there. I posted a pic of the bren box earlier. Wonder what the weight could be and how it would compare to the above quote? Lewis<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I don't know the weight of the Bren boxes, but I think four MG 42 boxes weigh around 70 lbs total. No wonder my HMG teams are so slow. CAVEAT: I think I remember reading that one of those 250 round ammo boxes weighed 8.4kg. That seems about right, but I'm not sure if I'm remembering it correctly.

In Zaloga's book on the Sherman, he states that in the second week of June, divisional commanders were given a demonstration of the Sherm 76, but no one wanted them because the troops hadn't trained on them. Then Patton agreed to accept some if they were put in a separate battalion. After Patton agreed, some other Generals also agreed to accept them. So it seems realistic to infer from this that there were no Sherm 76s until July '44. That would correspond with other stuff I've read as well.

Jason: I think the bulge was not a good place to be part of a MG team. Here's a little more detail on what happened to the MGs. Near the beginning of the battle, when the MGs opened up on the exposed Germans around 500 meters away, I think that the only US troops that the Germans could spot were the MGs, so they concentrated on the MGs. Long range small arms fire and MG fire were pretty ineffective against the US MGs. There may have been some sporadic mortar fire, I forget, but it was not memorable. The biggest cause of casualties to the MGs, at least for most of the battle, was direct fire. The German AFVs seemed to move in pairs. The first thing they did when they moved out onto the slopes was target MGs (which, as I mentioned earlier, were probably the only thing they had spotted). The HTs were knocked out in short order by AT guns...but they weren't knocked out immediately, and so they got several shots off at the MGs (I'd say, two per HT) before they became aware of the AT guns. For example, on the left side of the board, two HTs appeared and took a MMG under fire. The HTs fired one shot each, mostly suppressing. The AT gun then fired at a HT, missing. The HTs don't notice the AT gun and fire at the MMG again, causing a casualty and some suppression. The AT gun fires again, knocking out a HT. The other HT spots the AT gun and turns to engage it. The AT gun fires and misses. The HT fires and does little damage. The AT gun fires and knocks out the HT. I think this AT gun was eventually knocked out by 81mm mortar fire from one or both FOs. The .50 cal had the worst experience when two Hummels and a 75mm HT opened fire on it at a range of around 300 meters. In one turn, the .50 cal squad was reduced to 3 men and a Panicked! state. Luckily, it was also able to knock out a Hummel itself, and a 60 mm mortar round knocked out the other Hummel; there were no AT guns with LOS to these vehicles. The 75mm HT moved up later in the turn and only got off one shot. The .50 cal team ran about 1o meters away from its foxhole, which was far enough away to break LOS with the surviving HT. The .50 cal. guys came back to good order a turn or two later and moved back into their foxhole; by this time the HT had moved elsewhere, I think to shoot at another MMG. At the end of the game, one MMG was captured (I didn't see it happen, so I don't know the details), one MMG was immobile, one MMG (in an unimportant corner) had suffered only 1 casualty, and the others had suffered between 2 and 3 casualties. The .50 cal didn't suffer any casualties beyond the 3 it suffered in the turn I described above. The MGs didn't take too many casualties from infantry fire at all, mostly because the MMGs were not near VLs; they were in places where they could cover the open area in front of the VLs. This also meant that, with one exception, they weren't too close to the regular infantry, since I had put the infantry near the VLs, but in places with very limited LOS. Given the AFVs propensity to target the MGs, it was probably good that the MGs were not too close to the infantry, since the infantry would probably have suffered some collateral damage. But this didn't really occur to me when I was setting up. Zook and mortar casualties were pretty light. I set the zooks up approximately even with my front line, in ambush positions that could areas where the Germans might try to flank. Mostly these units never saw an enemy. I think the only casualties were suffered by one zook squad when an enemy VG squad happened to run into a copse of trees occupied by a zook team. The 60mm mortars I set up with the regular infantry, except that I gave the unit in the woods the mortar that belonged to the reserve team (for a total of two). I set the mortars up so that they had their own LOS (often diagonally off to the side), but could cover a different LOS through the platoon leaders LOS. This worked okay; I'm not sure that the Germans spotted any of the 60mm mortars, or thought that they were important enough to target. I think the Hummel knocked out by the 60mm mortar was actually in the LOS of two mortars, but I'm not sure; the AI did the targeting.

The Patton Museum needs to invest in some subdued grass.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by David Aitken: The Bren is in a squad. It was also historically used outwith the squad, because it is a LMG. I fail to see your problem with allowing the Bren to be used as it historically was. You seem to think that if BTS model it in its historical standalone role, they will simultaneously bestow upon it unrealistic powers. I'm not sure why you think they would break from credibility to do this.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I'm in favor of having separate Bren teams if they were a normal thing historically (altough I will add, based on my usage of LMG teams, that they will be pretty useless). But there hasn't really been any evidence in this thread showing that there were standalone Bren teams, other than very unusual situations that the game need not model (i.e., the first squad across the Albert Canal). Possibly there is such evidence, but it didn't make it into the thread because of the meandering path this thread has taken (including the exciting "cite" discussion). But we should find some such evidence before suggesting that BTS do something ahistorical.

I just used these forces in a QB against the AI and it was about right. In human vs. human the attacker would be too strong; converting to an assault would help somewhat, I think (in human vs. human). I chose to defend with Force A (Inf.Coy, 6 AT guns) against an attack by VG Force II (two reinforced VG coys plus 6 75mm HTs and 2 Hummel). I think that large hills do a better job of depicting the difficult-to-negotiate terrain of the Ardennes. I chose dusk/dawn and random weather, ending up with overcast and damp. The map gave me a village along a road running perpendicular to the direction of attack. There were three VLs clustered just right of center (as I looked at the screen), and one, smaller VL, way off to the left. The area on the left side of the screen was more open than the area near the center VLs. The first thing that struck me looking at the map was that it was an awfully large area to defend with just 3 platoons. I elected only to defend the main VLs. I put two platoons near the VLs, but in a location where the enemy units would only have LOS when they reached close range. One platoon was in the far end of a woods, the other was in some small houses behind other buildings. I put the reserve platoon on a reverse slope about 150 meters behind the platoon in the woods. The unfortunate thing about the platoon in the woods is that it was actually behind one of the VL markers. Because of the German artillery, I spread the platoon as far apart as I could and still be in command radius. I then "hid" the platoons. There were three main wooded draws that led down to the center VLs. I put AP mines in all of them, and the two TRPs in two of them. I spread out the MGs (I think I had a total of 5, including a .50 cal) so that I had good fields of fire to open areas across which the Germans might attack, but still somewhat protected (like a little behind a building so that the MG can shoot diagonally, but not forward). I identified 6 clear areas where I thought the German armor might move through; I put the two AT mines I had in what I thought was the least likely areas, and covered the other areas with the 4 AT guns. I tried to keyhole the guns so that they had LOS to one or two open areas, but were otherwise covered. On to the attack. For a couple of turns, nothing happened as the Germans moved into position. Then they moved some of their 75mm HTs up, which were pretty easily knocked out by a 76mm AT gun. Then the Germans dropped Arty on some AT guns (I think both 81mm FOs were calling Arty on the same place. Anyway, eventually all but one of the AT guns were gone (the survivor being keyholed so well he did not have LOS to anything useful), and all armor except for two 75mm HTs was knocked out (a 60mm mortar killed one Hummel, and the .50 cal killed another). The German infantry had been delayed and taken some casualties from long range MG fire, and some HE from an AT gun, but they eventually committed to an attack through the middle wooded draw (there were some platoon sized probes in other areas, but I think more than one company attacked through one area). Unfortunately, I hadn't TRP'd the draw through which they attacked, but my FO had LOS to parts of this draw. A 105 kill-a-thon ensued, as happens when arty hits woods. One of the remaining HTs was killed by 105 arty. However, the wooded draw through which they were attacking was pretty large, and several squads survived to make it past the flag to the back of the woods where my men were waiting in their foxholes at the back of the woods. My men killed a lot, but more and more squad fragments kept coming, and some of my squads started to take casualties and become rattled; the surviving 75mm HT firing shooting at them did not help. I decided to try to bring up reserves and bolster this line. Mistake. Even though the Germans were badly battered, their SMGs did an efficient job of butchering my reserve squads as they moved into the woods. A random 150mm rocket hit very close to a key foxhole recently reoccupied by my reserves did not help, as it caused 4 immediate casualties and send the squad running back in panic. Although it wasn't all bad, as the attacking squad closest to the foxhole was sent running back to its rear. It pretty much ended here. There was one German VL, one US VL, and two ? VLs. Tactical Allied victory. I never got the last HT. The main attack took place from turns 25 to 28. Notwithstanding the one lucky rocket hit, I think the rockets caused more German than US casualties, as a couple of rockets went into the wooded draw filled with Germans.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by David Aitken: You are correct. But what kind of weapon is it?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> It's a club. It won't function as an SMG/machine carbine/military-style assault weapon unless you load it.

I usually give the AI only a +1 bonus, but +25 to 30% troops (Or I reduce by that much). Is there any advantage to greater bonuses in lieu of more troops?

I've seen pictures of drum magazines on MG34s early in Russia. I don't know if they were used on MG42s or were used later. I think that the use of these drums is relevant for comparison with the Bren, as I believe that they only held 50 rounds. This is still more bullets than a 30 round clip, but not 5 times more. I'm not sure how these were employed, either. They don't look like they would be as easy to reload as a clip, for example. But it's also possible that belts would be fed into the MG after the drum ran out.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman: As Jason points out, the US had so many other advantages that the deficiencies of the lightly armored, open-topped US tank destroyers (or the Sherman 75's) were simply not nearly the problem they could have been. [skip] It's not that the Allies won the war in the west, that was going to happen no matter how many bad decisions they made, it's why it took so long and cost the casualties it did when they had such overwhelming odds on their side.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> But how many casualties are we really talking about, and under what conditions? If the US had upgunned all Shermans to 76mm in 1943, how many fewer casualties would there have been? A dozen? A hundred? Did many tankers really die because their 75mm shell bounced when a 76mm shell would have penetrated, and they were then killed by the tank that they failed to penetrate? This is the kind of data you need to support any sort of causalty claim. [And I know it is more complicated than this; you would also have to figure out how many German tanks may have escaped being killed due to the 75mm gun and lived to fight another day. But this then gets pretty speculative.] Moreover, you would also have to figure out how many additional casualties there would have been due to the use of the less effective 76mm HE shell. Given that AT guns killed a lot of tanks, there is probably a (small) number of additional casualties that would have been caused by using 76mm shells. It's unrealistic to assume that the US could have started manufacturing many Pershings much earlier than they did, given the difficulties of bringing new production online. Indeed, one feature of the Sherm was that it made significant use of already existing materials -- in particular, the various engines used in Shermans were all minor adaptations of already existing engine designs, (aircraft engines, bus engines, car engines, etc.) which had the notable advantage of having already been in use for several years. Which means you avoid the reliability and teething problems that plagued the German big tanks (and the Pershing, according to Jason). Plus, it's unrealistic to attribute too much prescience to weapons designers: in some sense it would have been much better for the US to start working on the atomic bomb in January 1933. But no one could really be expected to know that.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Wilhammer: [QBThe Americans became notorious during the French and Indian Wars for targeting officers with sharpshooters, and earned more "praise" for this in the Revolution. The primary technology that made that possible was the individual talent of the marksman, especially in home made/customized weapons and ammunition. [/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Mostly it was due to the Kentucky long rifle, a very accurate weapon used by frontiersmen. Unfortunately, it took 3 to 6 times as long to load as conventional muskets, so it was not really suited to widespread usage. Aside from these specific sharpshooters, though, there's not really any evidence to support the view that "normal" revolutionary soldiers were any better marksmen than the british regulars they fought.

The real problem with TDs was the TD doctrine, not the actual TDs themselves. It was the TD doctrine that prevented regular Shermans from being upgraded with more powerful guns; that's the biggest problem with the doctrine. If the M10 were just used as adjuncts to regular tank battalions, or as replacement for towed TDs (i.e., AT guns), there wouldn't have been as much of a problem. As it was, the Sherms stayed undergunnned for too long. It's true that TDs were lightly armored, but vs. most German tanks, so were Sherms; I'm not sure that was much of a disadvantage.

That is an interesting way of visualizing the different elements of movement. But I think your point about it allowing too much micromanagement is probably the reason why this would not be a good way of giving orders: it's way to detailed, and doesn't correspond to any orders that would actually be given. Sort of akin to the sergeant ordering his men to crawl, and then adjusting how high their butts rise above the ground to control cover vs. speed. But I would like to see a chart like this used to explain the different speed/cover tradeoffs between the various orders -- like, is Move 1/3 as slow as running, but 4 times the cover. Of course, this might vary depending on terrain, too.

IIRC, there was some guy whose kid/lawnmower/annoyed wife destroyed his CM disc and BTS made arrangements to send him a new one (presumably at a nominal fee). Of course, I don' think he actually uninstalled the game, so you may be beyond the pale.

The design of the valentine (and I'm speaking of the III/IV here) was not very good; its primary flaw was that it was very slow. It's maximum road speed was 15 mph or so; max cross country was half of that. Which means a man on foot could outrun it. The fact that despite being an infantry tank it did not have a HE shell is another disadvantage, one shared with the Matildas. However, the valentine was an excellent implementation of a bad design. Everything I've read about the tank mentions its reliability. And reliability is probably why the tank was so popular with Soviet tankers: sometimes the most important feature of a tank is the fact that it's there. Given the poor infrastructure in the USSR, this was probably even more valuable there than it would have been elsewhere. If you're fighting infantry armed with 37mm AT guns and supported by Pz38(t)s, (or even StuG B's), you would be very happy to have a valentine show up in support. It can easily handle the lighter German tanks, and then use its MGs to help out against the infantry. Sure, a T-34 would theoretically be better...but if the T-34 doesn't show up because it's burned out *another* gearbox...you're going to be very happy with the reliable tanks that keep showing up. It is important to keep in mind how things were in the early war: Army Group North's armor consisted entirely of 38(t)s and 35(t)s. The 38(t) is a decent tank...probably a better all-round tank than the but... I don't think it could penetrate a valentine from the front (if so, only at close ranges), and it could certainly be penetrated by the valentine from the front at all practical battlefield ranges. Once again, I do believe the "failed tank" people are right, generally. But there were a lot of occasions where an operating "failed tank" was good enough.

The biggest mistake that the US Army made wrt armor was not substituting the 76mm gun for the 75mm gun much earlier. What they needed was about 3 76mm Sherms for every 1 75mm Sherm. What they had was no 76mm Sherms in Europe in June '44. Even by the Bulge, many units involved in the fighting had no 76mm Shermans. Of course, a heavy tank coy. per battalion wouldn't have been bad either. But there are legitimate logistical reasons for wanting to go slow on developing a completely new tank. There are none for not upgunning a proven tank with a proven gun. Of course, having a few fireflies would have been even better. IIRC, Patton was a big fan of the Sherman because it was incredibly reliable for the kind of sweeping fighting he did, where it was more important to be able to quickly encircle disorganized troops than to penentrate Jagdpanther frontally at 1000 meters.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fairbairn-Sykes Trench Knife: Actually, guv'na, the Bren used a 30 ROUND CLIP. I'd try to use factual specs when attempting to support arguments that call the Bren an ineffective weapon. If this is your observation, i dare say you don't often use Commonwealth forces and have not read much about their deployment.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Well, the Encyclopedia of Weapons of World War II gives the Bren a 20-round magazine. I don't know whether that is correct, or the bren website is correct. But even with a 30 round magazine, the Bren would still have more similarities to the BAR than the MG 42 (although I do agree that 30 is better than 20).

If commonwealth forces had a two or three man Bren team somewhere in their TO&E, this should be modelled in CM, the same way that the 2-man German LMG team is modeled. But I don't think that CM should bother to develop elaborate squad-splitting rules to simulate the fact that Brens may have operated alone on occasion; this takes things down to the level of modeling single soldiers. Brens and BARs are more similar than they are alike, esp. when compared to the MG 42. Both the Bren and BAR have 20 round clips, which limits the amount of suppressive fire that these guns can put out, even if a spare rifleman acts as a Bren loader. Nevertheless, the Bren did have a quick-change barrel, which would permit more sustained fire. The Bren is slightly heavier than the BAR, too -- 23 vs. 19 lbs, I think. Oh, I don't think the absence of a separate Bren team has much effect at all; I have never had much use for the separate German LMG teams, and I would imagine that a separate Bren team would be even less useful. Nevertheless, if they existed, they should be modeled, if only for completeness. [ 08-21-2001: Message edited by: Andrew Hedges ]

It's a noun, a synonym for citation. (It's also a verb, of course). Thousands of people spend time working as cite checkers. Lots of software is available to perform automated cite checking (such as Westlaw's CheckCite). All law students are taught how to do cite checking. You can even buy books on the topic, such as Deborah Bouchoux's "Cite Checker." It's a word, and it's a noun. Its nominal (as it were) absence from a dictionary is a sign that the dictionary is not complete, not evidence that cite can't be a noun. This is, I think, getting off topic. Althouth the topic has a certain tenuous relationship to Gen. McNair's contention that tanks weren't for fighting other tanks; that's what tank destroyers were for. I suppose tenuous is the right word for the connection.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS: It didn't feel right, but I couldn't quite put my finger on what it was. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Must be something else making you feel uneasy: cite is a noun. If you want proof, do a google search for, say "cite checking." You'll get hundreds of fascinating hits, mostly resembling this exciting passage: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> This user-friendly text is the most readable and comprehensive guide to legal citations for legal practitioners. It explains the rules established in "The Bluebook," provides numerous examples, and includes exercises designed to reinforce the rules. "Cite Checker" is written specifically for the legal practitioner and focuses on the most common forms of legal writings - court documents and legal memoranda. This brief, clearly presented and organized workbook is an invaluable companion to "The Bluebook" and will help users master the often difficult task of cite checking. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys: Er, my impression has thus far been that once the ammo propellant ignited, further "choice" on the matter was speedily removed: the crew was usually rather forcefully ejected through the nearest handy opening in the hull, frequently in the form of man-shaped charcoal briquettes. :eek: :eek: :eek: Michael<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I sort of wondered about that myself. Zaloga's british, though; maybe that's just an example of British understatement. It could also be that a penetration caused some shells to break open, spilling propellant around the tank, and this spilled propellant caught fire first, and then spread to the intact shells. Which might give the crew a couple of seconds. There is a reference to "spilled propellant" in the thing I posted, although "spilled" is sort of an unusual word to describe powder violently liberated from its brassy confines by the impact of an AP round. The post also doesn't completely answer Brian's question about why German tanks didn't brew up as much (and I've never seen any evidence suggesting that German tanks burned that much). It may be that penetrations on Shermans were simply more catastrophic -- the Zaloga piece talked about how almost any frontal penetration on a Sherman would bring the AT shell into contact with stowed ammunition. Perhaps most frontal penetrations by US tanks against German tanks did not invariably hit the stowed ammo. Possibly the HE filler used by the Sherman was less likely to cause propellant fires, or else the propellant used by the Sherman was more likely to catch fire. Of these two possibilities, which are not, of course, mutually exclusive, the latter seems more likely, as German propellant was significantly different from US propellant. HE fillers, by contrast, were more similar.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by dalem: I believe the Germans were all diesel. I also believe that gasoline is more volatile than diesel, which makes it real good for going 'vroom-vroom' across the landscape, but also makes it real good for going 'whoosh-boom' near fires. Combine a more-volatile fuel with dangerous ammunition storage and you get the early model Sherman fireballs. Even after wet stowage was introduced I would expect that fires were just as common in the U.S. vehicles, and that the spectacular quick brew-ups were what decreased. So, maybe a possible piece of data to add to your general discussion is that a U.S.-built (i.e. gasoline powered) vehicle is always going to be more prone to catching fire than a German diesel powered one. Of course, my reasoning could be full of crap, as well. -dale [ 08-19-2001: Message edited by: dalem ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The reasoning is fine. But the facts are wrong: German tanks weren't diesel. Russian tanks were diesel, though. Here's what Zaloga's Sherman Tank in US and Allied Service says about Shermans and fire: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> The Sherman, besides being thinly armored, also had the reputation of being a fire-trap. This was popularly attributed by many in the US Army by the decision to use petrol engines rather than diesels. This view was sparked by the Tank Destroyer command's pitch to its troops about the supposed advantages of the diesel engines (used in some of the M10s) over the petrol engines used in most US Army Shermans [snip story about scaring rube soldiers by throwing lit match into tank of diesel fuel]. In fact, battlefield experience and Ordinance tests established that the main cause of Sherman fires was ignition of the ammunition propellant. A lesser culprit was the occasional ignition of turret hydraulic oil, personal stowage or sometimes fuel. It was estimated that 60-80 percent of Shermans pentrated by AT rounds or Panzerfausts burned. This is easy to believe in view of the fact that a penetration form nearly anywhere in the frontal arc would bring a projectile in contact with ammunition, and once the casing ruptured, the HE filling used in many German AP rounds would ignite it. The common practice of storing 30 or 40 additional rounds of ammunition outside the bins and racks only served to exacerbate the problem. Once a propellant fire broke out the crew had little choice but to abandon the vehicle as quickly as possible. Ordinance developed two solutions to this problem. As a short-term solution, plates of applique armor 25-35mm thick were added to the hull sides over the two right-hand ammo bins and one left-hand bin to lessen the chance of penetrations at these vulnerable spots. The was reasonably effectivce against the smaller calibre anti-tank weapons still encountered in Italy in 1943 and early 1944, but it was ineffective against hits by Panthers, Tigers, or Panzerfausts. In February 1944 some late production M4A3s had "wet" stowage bins added: these consisted of racks surrounded by water. When the bins were hit by an AP round they poured water over the spilled propellant, either preventing a fire or inhibiting it long enough to allow the crew to escape. The propensity of American crews to pile in added ammunition meant that even this improvement could not be totally effective, but a study done by the Army in 1945 found that only 10-15 percent of the wet stowage Shermans burned, as compared to 60-80 percent of the dry stowage Shermans. The wet stowage was used on M4A1s and M4A3s fitted with the 76mm gun, and on a small number of late M4A3s with the 75mm gun. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss: The Commissar wrote: "Comrade commander, I'm all out of cartridges!" reported one of the men suddenly. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I know what that's like!