PJungnitsch

Not quite done the post [ November 11, 2002, 11:00 PM: Message edited by: Paul Jungnitsch ]

The papers are found in the proceedings of the 4th International Conference of the International Society for Terrain-Vehicle Systems (ISTVS), held in 1972 in Stockholm, the second is from the 5th International Conference, held in 1975 in Detroit. I am going to university at the moment, and the engineering library has them on file, so I just photocopied them. ISTVS has the proceedings for sale at their website here, but they are very expensive. I shrunk the files to 2.5 and 4 MB, but still found e-mailing them a tedious process on my hotmail. Let's see what Matt thinks of them.

Some interesting things... One example he gives is the Elephant having only 12% heavier nomimal ground pressure (NGP, weight per track area) than a King Tiger, but having a mean maximum ground pressure (MMP) approx double, at 370 compared to 184. They more or less have the same weight and track area, but the suspension designs are quite different. Another is that Christies original suspension/track design gave good floatation partly due to very long-pitch track, which the Soviets mostly stuck with, but which is hard on track pins and very noisy. (Jives with what I've heard about T-34's) The British designers halved the track pitch in their cruiser tanks which got away from this, not realizing that it halved the floatation also. His conclusions are (I quote): 1)tracked vehicles with MMP over 300 are scarce and short-lived. 2)Tracked vehicles with MMP substantially above 200 have been substantially affected by bogging, while vehicles below this are little troubled. 3)Vehicles below 170 MMP are noted for good mobility. Some examples: Churchill VII 182-223 (low speed suspension) Cromwell IV 352 (track pitch .097) Sherman VVSS M4 282 Sherman HVSS M4 205 T-34/76 174-186 (track pitch .171) T-34/85 196 JS-II 245 Panzer III 220-232 Panzer IV 184-191 Panther 150-155 (wide, overlapping) Tiger I 185-192 Tiger II 184 Elephant 370 Explains one reason why the Germans were so keen on putting everything on difficult to work on overlapping suspension systems. They got a high speed suspension with excellent floatation. An M60 has an MGP of only 221-236, but I guess fighting in the mud of the undeveloped Soviet Union of the 1940's was not a big worry. He goes on about trucks, half-tracks, armoured cars, etc as well.

Just wondering as I found a couple papers by a D. Rowland that deal with ground pressure and bogging. He has found that bogging has much more to do with something called mean maximum pressure, which takes into account chain pitch (length of the rigid portions of the track), and amount, diameter and width of the bogie wheels, as well as track size and vehicle weight. Little things like chain pitch seem to make a huge difference to how well a vehicle copes with soft ground. I've got them scanned and I'll send them on to BTS.

How is tank ground pressure worked out in CMBB? Is it simply total weight divided by area of track?

I bought a Minolta Dimage X digital camera this summer for a trip to Ethiopia and was very happy with it. Very small and thin, 3X zoom lense, movie mode, battery recharges in an hour. I found it quite easy to use and the picture quality has been very good. Once you get used to being able to view your photos immediately after taking them, you'll never go back to film.

One of the main design features of the T-34 that strikes me is how the turret overhangs the front glacis. Would strikes on the top half of the glacis plate (if they miss the huge drivers hatch) not tend to deflect up and into the bottom of the mantlet (at a desireable angle for penetration) or into the turret ring? A Soviet document from 1941 would seem to back up the T-34 had problems with 37mm: From this site

That is maybe the result of Naval gunfire support from the Baltic? German heavy ships were used quite effectively to break up Soviet tank attacks, same as the Allies broke up Panzer attacks in Normandy.

This comes up quite a lot. One thing to keep in mind however is that Panther production ramped up somewhat faster than the T-34 did, despite having a much shorter development time. T-34 prototypes (developed from BT series) 1937-1939 First year of production:1940 110 made Cancelling the T-34 completely was considered, because of the huge problems building it. Second year of production:1941 2800 made Third year of production things took off. From Russian Battlefield First Panther prototypes (from scratch) 1942 First year of production:1943 1769 made Second year of production:1944 3462 made despite massive Allied air raids. Third year of production the war ended From The Desert Fox

A few points: Cost is not directly proportional to the size or weight of the tank, or how formidable it is. The Germans own figures show the PzIII, PzIV, and Panther at being about the same cost. The Tiger was almost three times the cost of the Panther, and it is only about 25% heavier. The Kingtiger is only slightly more expensive than a Tiger, despite being considerably more well armed and armoured. German tank costs Just because it seemed a Sherman or a T-34 seems like it should be cheap does not mean it would be so as there are many other factors involved. About the slave labor issue that Panther costs are actually inflated to account for that. Actual cost of a Panther is closer to $32,000. The costs quoted are those of Alex Hellmunds from this thread: Onwar tank cost discussion If you think the Shermans that the Americans used were expensive, just keep in mind they charged the British $90,000!

Wow, looks like the Russians had their Maus as well.

You think you were skeptical, you should have seen the reaction of the SLS (Sherman Lovers Society) on Tanknet and Onwar. It was interesting that while everyone there expected the Sherman to be substantially cheaper no one had any figures proving this. Source is Mark Harrisons 'Accounting For War' Part of the problem could have been the 'cost plus' system that the US government setup with military manufacturing companies. [ October 15, 2002, 09:51 AM: Message edited by: Paul Jungnitsch ]

These figures were posted before: Average cost of Sherman combat models produced from January 1942 - May 1945 is $48,798 Panther: $39,000 T-34/76: 34,000 T-34/85: $29,500 Prices are dollars adjusted for various factors. While the T-34 was somewhat cheaper than its rivals, it was not by that much. And I would wager that production time of Panther (very slightly more than Sherman) in '44 was similar to T-34 as Panther was specifically designed for mass production. Each however did suit their own countries production techniques.

My German grandfather was another one of those unlucky enough to be of the right age to serve in both wars. Apparently in the first he was buried so completely in an artillery barrage that it was thought he was gone until a buddy found his hand and dug him out. Between the wars he was a teacher but in the second he was called up immediately and spent most of it in the east, not making it home until '46. One uncle was in the Luftwaffe and apparently bombed the same London that my English grandfather was working in at the time. I tried asking this uncle about the war but all that he said was that by the end they had no gas for their Focke-Wulfs and could only watch the Allied planes go by. Of course if he was one of the bomber pilots hastily converted to fighters at the end that may have been better for him. Another uncle has something to do with training tank crews and one aunt worked with searchlights on the anti-aircraft batteries. Everyone survived, including my father who was too young to get involved but was moved with my grandmother and the other younger children from Silesia to Dresden, where fortunately they were placed in the suburbs and were not killed when the city was flattened.

Some points maybe not mentioned (I guess they have more to do with defense): Hitler becoming ever more controlling of how the war was conducted as the war turned against him, whereas Stalin giving his commanders more and more freedom to move as long as they were winning. The opposite of the early war, with just as disastrous a results for the Germans as it was for the Soviets at that time. Concentration on 'Hedgehog' defense and 'Fester Platz', dependent on holding strongpoints in critical areas. Another brainchild of Hitler, born of his experience in WWII, and very effective in some cases, eg 'Operation Mars'. Progressive 'demechanization' of the German army, due to loss of transport and loss of fuel, combined with increasing mechanization of the Red Army, largely due to Lend-Lease providing 500,000 of the best trucks in the world. Considerable Soviet superiority in numbers of aircraft, artillery, tanks, and men. Together these factors add up to disaster. In my understanding, at least, the plan of holding the Soviets at the time of Bagration by controlling the few good roads had a chance of working, until the Soviets simply drove around the strong points in their new 6 wheel drive trucks. I submit that without a combination of all these factors the Soviet 'Operational Art' would not perhaps look quite as golden.

Here's a small article on how complicated rating the optics on just binoculars can get: binocular buying guide It is really interesting to go to a store that has a good selection of various types and qualities of binoculars to see what difference optics can make. Power, field of view, clarity, brightness, ease of use....

Nice link. Have been wondering how the optics thing was resolved, after all those arguments in CMBO

These quotes caught my eye: "one of the most effective assault gun formations...190th Assault Gun Brigade...26th Feb 1945 alone claimed 104 tank kills for loss of four vehicles...3rd March 1945 it passed its one-thousandth tank kill since its debut" Drs S and R Hart No doubt not typical, but gives an idea of how effective they could be. "The biggest advantage over a conventional tank was the low, squat, shape. A good driver could tank advantage of the low silhouette against the skyline and use the countryside....to minimize the risk of being a target" Max Flemming It has been suggested that one of the reasons that Wittman was so effective was that he started off in Stugs and learned to use the terrain extremely well. He also kept his rangefinding scissors binocs from his Stug days, AFAIK.

I've always thought that in an ideal world the abilities of Patton and Montgomery perfectly complimented each other. Montgomery breaks the Germans at El Alamein, then hands off to Patton who finishes off Rommel in the pursuit phase. Or Patton chasing the Germans across France, then leaving the Metz fortress battles to Montgomery. Unfortunate they couldn't seem to stand each other.

KingTiger may have better mobility over wet ground than the nominal ground pressure figure indicates. Heres a quote from another website discussion on Tiger mobility, which brings up MMP, or mean maximum pressure:

Something was certainly wrong. From what I've read so far it's like the Soviets improved dramatically from an army that would lose when vastly outnumbering their opponents to an army that would win when vastly outnumbering their opponents. If their operation/strategic skills were so amazing, was it their tactical skills (CMBB level, perhaps?) that were so poor?

I wouldn't mind seeing a cost breakdown either, but the fact that the Panther was cheaper per pound doesn't surprise me. There are numerous examples of the Germans making very effective changeovers from expensive and difficult production methods to fast, easy and therefore cheap ones, for example the changeover from the MG 34 to MG 42, or the manufacturing efficiencies involved in producing the MP44 or the Panzerfaust. The difference in the case of the Panther is the cost instead of going down went up, in exchange for getting a lot more weapon. The Tiger II was likewise only marginally more expensive than the Tiger I, but it was a much more formidable tank. Panther was actually built at six plants, btw, with PzIV being built at two or three, AFAIK.

I realize this is now way off the topic this thread is going too, but here is another WWII veteran interview, this one with fighter ace Johannes Steinhoff. link

In the atmosphere of 1941 I think it would have been very easy to believe the Soviets were planning an invasion. The previous two years they had invaded Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and taken part of Rumania. Not exactly a peace loving neighbor.