Blackhorse

I was there at the time. I was on Downs Barracks, 1st Squadron. Remember Wynn Noyes well. Some of my NCOs helped run the school. Allons!

sgtgoody, No I had moved on by then. Had friends who were however.

Adam, I'm a littel unclear on your questions, so forgive me if I miss the mark. 1. I believe you are referring to those who develop doctrine and force structure. If so, yes. However, the human element is so much a part of it that we can draw parallels to Mr. Rumsfeld and how we planned for and fought OIF1. One can argue that arrogance and pride prevented the opinions of others from being heard by key decision makers during the run up to OIF1. Arrogance, pride, and inflexibility and an inability to listen to advice could very well have existed during the development of doctrine and force structure. Who knows? i wouldn't be surprised. It's part of the human condition, so most likely was present in some way shape or form. Hell, it's all around us. That aside, those people still thought thier own ideas and beliefs were the right ones all others be damned. 2. I'm having difficulty understanding question two. The development/refinement of doctrine continues. We try to learn from our lessons. I'm not sure to what you are referring regards the Hercs and the Urban bit. Please clarify. Hope this helps. my disagreement with JasonC is that I like the STRYKER and the concept, and I believe that the Army got that right, and he doesn't. So we disagree. [ August 07, 2007, 03:18 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

I will try. I’m not even sure where to start, so I’ll just begin in the beginning. Forgive me, but I must ramble. I also want to provide some context. I Love the 80s Back in the mid 80s, when the Bangles were on top of the charts and MTV still had the Headbangers Ball, life in the Army was great. Lieutenants could go out and train whenever and wherever they wanted. Ronald Reagan was President, the Soviets were our enemy and everything was a-ok. We had $$, we had spare parts, we had awesome, awesome training such as the NTC, We had Abrams, we had Bradleys, we had Apaches, and the old M113s and M60A3s, and Cobra gunships were in the process of being phased out; the technological leap from those old platforms to the new ones was incredible. The new stuff rocked, the old stuff was...well…in young Lieutenants eyes, paleolithic. We had, it seemed, everything, including a new doctrine called Air-Land Battle. It was the product of several years work on the part of General Don Starry, who was heavily influenced by General William Dupuy. It was great. For Armor guys it was like being on top of the food chain. We were the “Combat Arm of Decision”! (I provide this link for anyone’s further reading on the matter: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/may-jun/romjue.html ) Then in 1989, we watched as the Germans fulfilled President Reagan’s 1987 urging to Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” and the long expected Soviet enemy and the dreaded possibility of Airland battle on the soil of Europe began disappearing before our very eyes. Within a year, the old nemesis was gone, and the Cold War was over. For seasoned Lieutenants, times were indeed becoming interesting. Nirvana- the 90s Meanwhile, the United States was doing its part to no longer be a part of the Cold War. Congress enacted a Drawdown plan for the Army to take the Army from 18 Divisions, down to 14 by sometime around 1993. Saddam decided to invade Kuwait in the summer and we had the Gulf War. Young Captains gained valuable experience and were presented with tactical problems that while similar to the old Cold War style of warfare were also wildly different. The Nation dealt with Iraq, and afterward, the drawdown continued. VII Corps, the Corps HQ for Desert Storm, disappeared, as did 3AD, 2AD, 5ID, and 7 ID, and the 197th Bde, the 195th Bde and 2ACR. Then in 1993 The SECDEF conducted a review and implemented the plan to take the Army from the remaining 14 Divisions, down even further to 10. This was no easy task, as we had soldiers for 14 Divisions. The Army came up with Voluntary Separation Initiatives (VSI) and Soldier Separation Bonuses (SSB). The former was voluntary; the latter the equivalent of a pink slip. During this time, as the Army drew down to 10 Division, the officer corps went from: 106,877 officers to roughly 80,000. Captains saw several good mates go and the slightest blemish on a record was means for separation. It was truly hack and slash, despite General Sullivans reassurances of “No more Task Force Smiths”. Many a fine officer cashiered out to work in the civilian sectors and those that survived in the Army counted their blessings that “there but the grace go I.” Times were strange indeed and it definitly smelled like teen spirit. At the end of the drawdown, the Army had gone from 780,000 soldiers to roughly 480,000 soldiers. Along the way it had eliminated 8 of its 18 Divisions. The Army stood at 10 Divisions, 1 ACR, and one 1 LCR or in Bde terms, 30 Brigades. Captains who had served in the 11th ACR were crushed. Their favorite unit was nothing more than part of Army history now. Times sort of sucked. Meanwhile, the optempo of the Army was increasing. There was a new sheriff in town and he and his deputies liked to use the military just as much as the previous guys. The problem was, there was less of the military to use. Significantly less. The challenge then became for senior leaders (both military and civilian) to meet the challenges while at the same time making use of all Army forces. The Army couldn’t tap the 10th Mountain Division everytime it needed a Light Infantry unit for a mission (82nd and 101st were off-limits due to being in the Rapid Reaction mode, and the 25th was on stand-by for Korea). Thus, the Army needed to change how it fought. The Cold War influenced Air-land Battle Doctrine no longer applied to the post Cold War era. And so senior leaders went to work trying to determine how best to use and structure our Army for what they thought future conflict would look like. I don’t for a second believe anyone of them showed up at work with the intention of screwing the pooch or to make bad judgement calls. Decisions that were made during this time were made with the belief that those were the right decisions. In the late 90s General Shinseki shared his vision of how to handle the new Contemporary Operating Environment and the vision of the STRYKER was born. Additionally, the concept of transformation was designed to provide the Army flexibility. The Brigades, did in fact become somewhat ACRis in structure. Each is now self sustainable. The result is that the 10 Division Army of 30 Brigades has gone to a 10 Division Army of 44 Brigades. Y2K The millennium bug passed with nary a freeze up and Junior Majors were busy training and preparing for whatever was in store. Nobody expected 9/11 and Bn S3s watched in horror as TV images depicted a nightmare. Then things got, as President Merkin Muffley says to Premier Kissov “Kind of Crazy, you know crazy crazy”. I’ve repeatedly mentioned the book Cobra II as s a book to read. You are correct Adam, it doesn’t depict certain aspects of the military in a good light. That is precisely why I recommend people read it. If people want insights into the decision making (or more precisely lack of it), for the War with Iraq, then look no further than Cobra II. Meanwhile, the discussion concerning the STRYKER is innocently started by 11b and here we are. In direct response to JasonC then (Hell yes it’s taken a long time to get to this point, but like I said, I wanted to provide context.) And, by the way, if anyone is insulted or feels talked down to or that I’ve condescended or ubered , please don’t be; that was not my intent at all and any such outcome is inadvertent. I think its obvious from the way the civilian leadership and the military decision makers have handled this war that none of them saw the insurgency coming. They are trying to deal with it now, but it’s not easy. General Petraeus is a very sharp and brilliant guy. I personally never thought that, so I cannot admit to it. I’ve always thought heavy would work in cities. I never thought that so won’t admit to it. I’ve always thought it screwey that we’ve tied a vehicle of the future to an airframe developed in the 50s. Nothing to disagree with there. That is happening. It’s not easy to take new technology and simply kludge it on a vehicle. There are ergonomic issues, power issues, all sorts of issues that need to be worked on. There are people working on it. Ok. I’ve nothing to say to that. OK. Again, not much to say to that. Who is to say what the future holds. None of us can predict the future, otherwise we would have predicted the insurgency. I mostly agree, but I’ll never say never. Ok. Nothing more to say. The BCTs today are in fact very much like the ACRs of days gone by (only 1 of which remains today…the 3ACR). Bosnia probably had a huge role in helping to drive and influence the SBCT. We have 44 active Bdes, 6 of which are SBCTs. We have 20 active HBCTs. We have 8 Active Infantry BCTs, We have 10 Active Airborne BCTs. All of them are modular and self sufficient like the ACR. In the Reserve Component (includes Guard) we have 1 SBCT, 10 HBCTs, and 23 IBCTs. That is our Army. All modular and all very very similar to the ACR, minus the proprietary ACR equipment. This is why I wanted to provide context. I agree. Old School never went away, and shouldn’t go away any time soon. So there you have it. Allons and Good Luck. [ August 07, 2007, 10:10 AM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

1SG, Thanks for your post and thanks for your service. Jon and Jason, Here's a serving STRYKER soldier with whom you can talk about actual operational and tactical experiences and you guys attack him. You guys seem to be getting offended by certain remarks he made. Dang it guys, not everyone can post perfect, inoffensive messages every time. Jon, get over it already. He didn't know. 1SG, JonS was/is NZ Army. He was involved in East Timor and has extensive experience in a successful counter-insurgency. I believe he's chuffed that you assumed less and that you went on the offensive against him by asking what he had done lately. Credit where credit is due, Jon has actually done a lot lately. Anyhow, it's late. Take care all.

[ August 06, 2007, 10:15 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

Jon, I believe the rationale for not having 25mm turrets on the LAVIII (for testing) was that the requirement was to have an ICV not an IFV. There were most likely also weight issues involved with regards to the turret and 25mm gun, as well as space issues inside the vehicle.

tell me about it. Sorry for contributing to the sillyness.

- U.S. ARMY AWARDS GENERAL MOTORS, GENERAL DYNAMICS $4 BILLION CONTRACT TO SUPPLY NEW ARMORED VECHICLES - The U.S. Army has awarded GM GDLS Defense Group, a joint venture between General Motors and General Dynamics Land Systems, a six-year requirements contract with an estimated total value of $4 billion to equip its new Brigade Combat Teams with the General Motors LAV III eight-wheeled armored vehicle. "We are truly honored to have been selected by the U.S. Army to equip our nation’s brigades with the General Motors LAV III armored vehicle, said Harry J. Pearce, Vice Chairman, General Motors Corporation. "On behalf of General Motors and our defense unit, I’d like to commend General Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, for his vision to transform the army for the 21st century into a more agile force through the use of wheeled vehicles. GM is proud to have partnered with General Dynamics and we share the army’s confidence in our products and people." "This is a strategically important award for General Dynamics," said Arthur J. Veitch, General Dynamics Senior Vice President. "It is the result of a decision we made a few years ago to change our product offering to match the requirements of our customer rather than to continue to focus only on the products that we historically produced. As a result, we entered into a teaming agreement with General Motors which optimized the strengths of both companies to meet the Army’s transformation requirements. The success of that strategy can be seen with this contract award." The Army requirements-based contract is to equip up to six Brigade Combat Teams, 2,131 vehicles, through a series of delivery orders starting this year. The initial delivery order will be for $61.7 million in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; the second order for 366 production vehicles is worth $578.4 million. The LAV III is a full-time four-wheel drive, selective eight-wheel drive, armored vehicle weighing approximately 19 tons. It can attain speeds of 62 mph on the highway and has a maximum range of 312 miles. The basic infantry carrier vehicle (ICV) has armor that protects the two-man crew and nine on-board soldiers from machine gun bullets, mortar and artillery fragments. The LAV III ICV variant includes configurations such as the reconnaissance, anti-tank guided missile, and medical evacuation vehiclesand anti-tank guided missile vehicles, as well as carriers for mortars, engineer squads, unit commandercommand groupss, reconnaissance and fire support teams. The Mobile Gun System variant consists of a General Dynamics Land Systems 105mm cannon mounted in a low-profile turret integrated on the General Motors LAV III chassis. General Motors and General Dynamics will share fabrication and final assembly of the vehicles among plants at Anniston, Alabama; Lima, Ohio; and London, Ontario. GM Defense is a group of GM-owned business units engaged in the design and production of Light Armored Vehicles and supporting turret systems for military use around the world. The group comprises research, design, and manufacturing facilities in London, Ontario; Goleta, California; DetroitTroy, Michigan; and Kreuzlingen, Switzerland; and Adelaide, Australia. Operations within GM Defense have more than 50 years of experience in the design, manufacture, and delivery of a unique family of light armored vehicles. Those vehicles are in service with the United States Marine Corps, the United States Army National Guard, and with other military forces around the globe. General Dynamics Land Systems is a wholly owned subsidiary of General Dynamics (NYSE:GD). General Dynamics, headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia, employs approximately 43,000 people worldwide and has annualized sales of approximately $10 billion. The company has leading market positions in business aviation, information systems, shipbuilding and marine systems, and land and amphibious combat systems. More information about General Dynamics can be found on the Internet at http://www.generaldynamics.com. More information about General Dynamics Land Systems can be found on the Internet at http://www.gdls.com/. Editorial note: Photographs of the LAV III ICV and MGS and the LAV Specification sheet (PDF format) are available by selecting the links below

?????? Jon, The LAVIII was what won the test back in '00 and became the STRYKER. How are you not making that connection? taken from: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Dec/Armys_New.htm from: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Sep/Army_Approaches.htm [ August 06, 2007, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

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What about these?

[ August 06, 2007, 08:05 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

More likely these http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/08/mil-070803-general-dynamics01.htm

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JonS, I'm not sure I would characterize it that way. The Chassis is LAV III. there is a LAV III command post vehicles and LAVIII recovery vehicles, and they are still LAVIIIs despite not having a 25mm turret. The STRYKER traded the turret for more infantry carrying capacity. If, in your mind, that means it's not the LAVIII, so be it.

MikeyD, The other significant difference between STRYKER and all those you mention is that STRYKER has significantly more infantry carrying capacity. The slat armor was first usde by the USN on its Monitor Patrol Boat Riverine force on the Mekong Delata in Viet Nam in the 60s (it was called bar armor back then). http://www.ancientalley.com/ancient/alley/webnam/nampics/m2%20bow%201a.jpg [ August 06, 2007, 02:26 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

Yeppa.

[ August 06, 2007, 08:07 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

the LAV III is the STRYKER

Seems the puddle turned out to be a pond.