Andreas

Did you manage to dig that one out by any chance? I find that claim very hard to credit, too. A bit like the 'one bomb throws 3 T-34 through the air like Dinkytoys' claim. I just read the figures again - Allied pilots overclaimed their success at a rate >10:1 when the operational research lads got down to counting wrecks on the ground. This based on research carried out after Falaise and in one area of the Bulge battle. The $64k question for CMBB early war now is - since the Germans did not do similar research, do we have to believe their figures at face value or should we assume a similar 10:1 reduction in direct air support effectiveness? Which would still give Rudel 52 tanks to his name BTW, still not bad. I guess what this all comes down to is that pilots probably had too much time on their hands bragging about what they did when they were in a pub at the end of the day trying to impress the WAAFs and Blitzmädels, respectively. Sorry if this has nothing to do with .50s, but I guess that topic is through anyway, not?

Following feedback from a number of people in the last few weeks, I have now restructured the site I created a while back with information about German counter-battery practice, lots of pictures taken by my grandfather, some new pictures and links. It is now much more accessible, informative and should make more sense. It is here and also linked in my sig. Any feedback you may have is appreciated. Hope you enjoy it. All the best.

It seems that tech groggyness is taking over. I wonder why it is inappropriate to compare the PF and the PIAT? After all, both of them had a very limited design spec. Kill tanks. The question that was asked is which one was best at doing the job, not which one was reloadable or did leave a signature mark when fired, although both of these would come into the assessment. To give you a non-groggy example. I compare the train against the plane all the time when I think about getting from London to Cologne. That does not mean that they have anything more in common then that they would get me there. I don't look at how they work or how the driver is trained or clad or what colour scheme they come in. That is a bit irrelevant to me, although I can see how anoraks would get all excited about it. To get back to the question - despite the shortcomings of the early versions in terms of range, all things considered I think the PF would win the contest. It is easily carried, simple to use, cheap to mass-produce, and extremely deadly when it hits. The kill numbers (and ratio of all tanks killed) achieved by the men using it in the east are impressive.

Is that a European or an African pilot?

Please read my post on the previous page. I don't agree with the assessment for the reasons outlined. I suspect that the Blitzkrieg Luftwaffe pilots were as prone to overstating their claims as the 1944 Allied pilots, but without the operational research to tell them how wrong they were.

Interestingly General der Flieger Deichmann in his 1950s monograph for the US Air Force 'Spearhead for the Blitzkrieg - Luftwaffe Operations in Support of the Army 1939-1945' says that bombs were almost useless against tanks. He is talking about 1,100lb (500kg) bombs, and states that they needed to detonate within 12ft (~4m) of the tank to incapacitate it. He also states that if the bomb did not detonate above the ground, even such a near miss was unlikely to damage the tank. So I am a bit doubtful about what exactly the footage you talk about shows. I somehow find it hard to correlate it and the statements made by Deichmann. All this BTW led to the development of special HC cluster munitions, and Stukas with 37mm guns. Those worked, bombs did not is the conclusion by General Deichmann. The upside down Tigers are also an interesting case, since we don't know if they were turned over by air attacks (some probably turned over when they were pushed aside after the attack), or what kind of air attack (the carpet bombing that hit the German positions south of Caen may have done that. A single bomb from a Thunderbolt probably did not.)

Jary in 18 Platoon offers the view that the typical German rifleman was not more than a carrier for machine gun ammunition, and that the fire-power of the MG42 was what kept the German squad going. One of his section leaders was of the opinion that the profligate use of ammunition by the squad MG was one of the main reasons why Germany lost the war

Just checked, 13 out of the 18 scenarios I have done so far are involving the Commonwealth, all available at Der Kessel. No Churchills though. Out of the two in the pipeline, one will be. Hmmm. Since twenty is a nice round number, I guess I shall stop doing CMBO scenarios then and prepare myself for CMBB.

Nice work Michael.

The numbers of Panzer I (not Befehlswagen) present in the Panzerdivisionen seem to have been given to the Pionier units, from what I read in Glantz 'The initial period of war' (explicit references for 1. and 7. PD IIRC). It was clear that they were obsolete, and not a front-line tank. The number of 800 may refer to Panzer I numbers in total, i.e. including Ersatzheer, security and training units (where e.g. Stug 7,5cm/L24 were held until 1945). AFAIK the frontline tanks in the Panzerregimenter were either Czech models, Panzer II, III or IV. While BTS may model them, they should probably be rare.

Shermans were used in indirect fire roles as well, especially during the later stage of the campaign in NWE. A big difference to me would be that the Germans never became that profligate in their use of artillery.

Not necessarily - I think BH posted somewhere somefink about low level barrages against likely avenues of FB approach. Could it be for one of those? Brian thanks - very helpful. So basically they would last through a very limited number of indirect fire preparations, and not much more?

Err no, I knew you had asked, but I did not have time before buzzing off to Cornwall to answer. I would agree with that GD might have done things differently - the 'warning platoon' looks like that to me, because I think those were just sections in Engelmann and the OOB given on my site (sig link). Is that actual or TO&E organisation you have got there?

[green]Good for you![/green] I've seen that referenced all over the place, and it should be rather interesting. With any luck it will contain enough hints to be able to figure out techniques. Just had a quick squizz at bookfinder.com. Gulp! Regards JonS</font>

The rarity option won't help, because neither the KV-1 nor the T-34 were 'rare' on 22 June. They presumably were two months later, but that had other reasons.

The gun was progressively redesigned from Flak 18 to 36 to 37 to allow for a faster barrel change among other things. The Flak 41 was an 88 L/72? flak gun.</font>

Thanks - I suspected that from reading about the problems the Pommies had when using LAA in the ground role. So there would be a serious disincentive to use them in the ground role. Jon - thanks for that info. Also, got the money today, but came home too late for the pub. But I got the official ' Royal Artillery Commemoration Book 1939-1945' , published in 1950 for members of the service. It is heavy and looks great with maps and stuff, and I shan't mention the price. Suffice to say that my wallet hates Devon (Honiton, to be precise) and second-hand bookstores.

Well bugger me with a three-pronged pitchfork. Engelmann has all the data you want - unfortunately the English translation is not explaining the abbr.s... date 01.Sept 1944 Unit type: armoured observation battery 5 Officers 31 NCOs 133 OR 1 Motorbike 1 11 Car 11 19 (3) Truck (trailer) 7 Sdkfz 251/12 (I think this was a specialised CB vehicle) sub unit: command section 1 Sdkfz 251/12 (OC Bty) 2 cars sub unit: survey platoon 3 cars 1 light truck 1 medium truck Sub unit: armoured light ranging platoon car for platoon commander 3 Sdkfz 251/12 car (unspecified use) truck w/medium trailer Sub unit: armoured sound ranging platoon 1 Sdkfz 251/12 (platoon commander) 2 car (unspecified use) 2 Sdkfz 251/12 (for OPs) 2 light trucks (for OPs) 4 medium trucks (one medium trailer) Sub unit: trains 4 medium trucks (1 1.5t trailer) 1 motor bike Sub unit: mech repair section 1 car 1 light truck 1 medium truck I did not add up the numbers to see how they turned out. The strength went from 184 all ranks on 01. April 1941 to 210 all ranks on 01. July 1943 down to 169 all ranks 01.sept. 1944. vehicle strength accordingly 47 (1) to 50 (1) to 38 (1). Source: engelmann 'german artillery in WW2' Schiffer

Michael - working from my grandfather's recollections, a light ranging platoon would be broken down in Messtrupps (?) (sections) led by a sergeant (Unteroffizier) or Corporal (Obergefreiter). One Trupp would occupy one OP, and be a five man group, including the section leader, radio operator and three goons (i.e. don't know what they did). Assuming that four-five OPs would cover the frontage of the Abteilung, a platoon would have about 20-30 men including platoon HQ ( a lieutenant in my grandfather's case). I suspect that the basic organisation would be similar for sound ranging, except if there are more or less tasks to be done. Also, a sound ranging platoon would include the advance warning section. I shall go and ponder this a bit more. BTW - I am gone to Cornwall walking the dog for a few days and this thread dives to fourth page with no answers. Call yourself grogs...

Sydney Jary in 18 Platoon has an interesting anecdote about coming under fire from105 (indirect) and 88 airburst (DF) simultaneously in Holland. He seems to have been able to distinguish quite well between one and the other - then again, he was the longest-serving infantry platoon commander in 21st Army Group IIRC, so he must have learned something... As a rule, I would think that 8,8 would be primarily used in a DF role when used in ground combat. It was well-suited to that with the easily arranged airburst capacity, a high-velocity shell (meaning the explosion occurs before you hear the crack of the gun being fired = no warning), its long range and its AT capabilities. Having said that, I have a picture of British gunners using captured 88s in what suspiciously looks like an indirect role on the Maas. Does anyone know how much barrel wear was an issue for the 8,8? That would probably come into consideration when used regularly as indirect artillery.

Problems of the KV-1 (except for the transmission, replaace KV1 with T34) 1) weak transmission, leading to frequent breakdowns (in 1943 during operation Gallop, 50-60% of Red Army tank strength was lost due to this cause before entering battle) 2) untrained crews, exacerbating 1) 3) lack of ammo 4) lack of fuel 5) use in piecemeal, pointless counterattacks during the summer of 1941, frittering away the tank strength Main weapons the Germans had: 1) 8,8cm Flak (although it seems that sometimes failed too where the penetration tables suggest it should not) 2) 10,5cm lFH firing over open sights 3) 10cm Feldkanone firing over open sights 4) infantry with satchel charges 5) air support (limited) 6) (later) 5cm PAK 38 with Tungsten (Rotkäppchen) rounds 7) Higher level commanders who stayed calm in crisis, particularly in the mobile divisions Weapons that failed 1) all 3,7cm tank guns 2) 3,7cm PAK35 3) 7,5cmL24 w/hollow charge rounds Just working from memory here.

The Spanish division was relieved? What did they have against those poor bloody Belgians?</font>