kipanderson

T34/B had high quality sights. Hi, Yesterday I took the day off and went down to the Bovington Tank Museum in order to take a look around their archives. This is something I have done before, but not for some years, and what I was after was all the technical reports they have on Soviet WW2 tanks. The reports cover many types of Soviet WW2 AFVs but most are based on a T34/B and KV1 that were sent to the British in 1942 as a thank you for all the supplies we were sending them. The greater number of reports are on the T34/B. Some are very short, only a few pages having survived, some are very long and detailed. Chemical analysis of armour, diesel fuel, lubricants, test firings of HE shells against different targets, everything and anything you can thing of is covered. (Strangely, the one thing I was most keen to see was not there, test firing of AP shells, must have been done, only in separate report.) Anyway, I will cut the waffle and get to the main subject of this post. The longest and most detailed report, “A Report on the Investigation of a T34” School of Tank Technology, in turn had a long section on the sights. In the conclusion to the section on sights the final paragraph starts with this sentence, “Telescope and periscope are of very fine construction and appear far superior to most of the equipment and components on the tank.” Very different from that which is normally assumed about Soviet sights. There are two reasons why this was not a surprise to me, one trivial one not so trivial. The trivial reason is that this fits with my personal experience of T34 sights. I have looked through the site of a T34/85 model44 and found the sight to be of stunning quality. Those that have looked through a high quality telescopic sight at dusk/in poor light will understand what I mean when I say that the landscape through the sight was “sharper, brighter and lighter” than that with the naked eye. Not just enlarged. I call this a “trivial” reason because there is no certainty that the sight I was looking through was the same as those used in WW2. As the Soviets would have said, it may have been a “modernised” sight I was looking through. However, it may have been a sight of the same kind used in the war, it may even have been produced during the war. It cannot be totally disregarded. The second reason why the conclusion of the report on the T34/B was not a surprise to me is that in another very extensive, 1947 document I have covering all Soviet ground equipment of WW2, there is no comment on the low quality of Soviet sights. I agree that a “negative proves nothing”. However, if you could see this 1947 document, both its length and nature, you too would find it “strange” that the low quality of Soviet sights was not mentioned, assuming that they were in fact of low quality. The 1947 document is full of comments on the quality, or lack of quality, of each type of equipment it reviews. When all three of the above are taken together, the report on the T34/B, my experience of T34 sights and the lack of any adverse comment in the 1947 document a case begins to build for doubting if reports of low quality Soviet sights are correct or just myth. In all I must have seen about half a dozen reports with sections on Soviet sights and have never seen an adverse comment on their quality. It is also worth noting that the T34/B and KV1 in question will have been produced at the time when the Soviets were under greatest “production stress”, just after the great post 1941 shift in production. Yet still the sights and specifically picked out for praise. Before Steve and Charles launch themselves into coding for low quality Soviet sights I feel they should take another look at what evidence there is for this view. I know Steve is always very careful about trying to avoid falling for any of the standard Eastern Front myths, but in the case of Soviet sights he also needs to be careful. Certainly “some” Soviet AFVs, even of 1942 war production, had high quality sights. Maybe all of them, I still have seen on evidence of low quality sights, and as you can tell, I have looked in the places where one would expect to find such evidence if they were of low quality. All the best, Kip.

JasonC, Yup, agree with all you say, Soviet Operational Art was their secret, or not so secret, weapon. I would just add a couple of points. Now the Soviet true losses are known my views of Stalingrad and Kursk have changed, and are a little unconventional. I am not so sure I count them as victories for the Soviets. What I mean by this is that a loss ratio of, Soviet to German, 4:1 at Stalingrad and 3.5:1 at Kursk was “too” much. If the Soviets had continued with that sort of loss ratio during the period September 43 to September 44 they would not have won the war in the East. The fact that the loss ratio fell to 1.64:1 was a “necessary” but not “sufficient” condition for their victory. The Soviet Operational Art alone, would not have won them the war in the east. It was this, which kept many Germans fighting. The Germans no longer controlled the battlefields after the fighting so they did not “know” how many causalities they were inflicting. Had they still been inflicting losses in the ratio they did up to and including Kursk they would have succeeded in bleeding the Russians dry. Steve, You did say something along the lines I quoted. I think you did anyway, stuck in my mind because I thought it was a bit strange. I may be wrong, my brain may be going…. Anyway, to me the important thing is that I do trust the fact that you are open minded and “if” someone can make a strong case you are willing to listen. As you can tell I am hugely looking forward to CM2. Jeff, No, I did not know that the Dupuy Institute was still producing work. Will look into it. What is necessary is that post 1995 data is used, or there abouts. When it comes to Bagration we are counting in slightly different ways. Agree 100% with your figure of 765,815 for Soviet losses, page 145 of my edition of the Krivosheev book. However, you will notice that is in regard of a 68-day operation by a starting force of 2.3 million men. The losses on the Soviet side depend on the time you cover and how wide you go on the flanks. David Glantz counts the main Soviet forces as numbering 1.2 million, rising to 1.6 million. He also gives German losses on a totally different time scale. Quote from When Titans Clashed, referring to Bagration, “ In the twelve days from 22 June to 4 July, Army Group Centre had lost 25 divisions and well over 300,000 men. In the ensuing weeks it lost more than an additional 100,000.” The figures that stuck in my mind, probably from a Glantz book, in the same time period, are 400,000 German losses and 250,000 Soviet. Anyway, if we sat down together and looked at all sources we could find I am sure we would agree a figure for a given time scale and force. Only I do not believe we are still looking at a Soviet “steam roller”, something very different is afoot from Kursk a year earlier. Machineman, I agree with your point about the importance of US trucks in the attack. All fun stuff, All the best, Kip. PS. As I indicate above, the strange thing is I take a “far less flattering” view of the Soviets during Stalingrad and Kursk than most. Given the knew, true figures, I am not at all sure they won.

Hi, just seen Grisha's comments on the other thread. Yup, we agree on this one. All the best, Kip.

Ari, Maastrictian, hi, The Soviets counted all, non-party members, Mongolians, the lot. Krivosheev makes it clear that the Soviets did keep detailed strength and loss figures. They kept records of types of wounds, recovery rates, all sorts of things. What they did not bother with was names and addresses and reports to relatives and so on. All the types of statistics that are militarily useful, and casualties certainly are, were collected and kept. All the best Kip.

Hi, These discussions are always fun and we will never all agree. All adds to the fun. Tero, Jeff, hi, The Dupuy formula already assumes the sort of concentration of forces you talk about. I agree fully with both of you, but so does Dupuy. His formulas “can” work with battalion level forces, just one click up from CM. However, Dupuy is quite open about the fact that his formulas are designed for “operational” level analysis. He recommends forces of 15,000-60,000 should be used. In my calculations I have assumed German forces of 20,000 and Soviet forces of 54,000. As I say, concentration of force by the attacker, as you both mention and describe, is assumed. Vanir Ausf, hi, Yes, I agree with you. Roksovkiy, hi, The Soviets did keep full records of casualties in the form of “strength” reports. This is not the same thing as reporting losses to relatives or keeping records of names and addresses. I have dug out some stuff I posted a few months ago. It is almost on the same topic as we are discussing here, but not quite. Anyway for what it is worth here it is, “Soviet Combat Effectiveness. Hi, You have asked a lot of interesting questions, only some of which I may know the answer to. Over the years I have done a lot of work on trying to calculate Soviet Combat Effectiveness during WW2 and due to the flood of great books and articles over the last five years I believe a clear picture has now emerged. I have been threatening to do a longer post on this topic, for what it’s worth, but for the time being here are some of my conclusions. There are three forms of analysis I have used, a) TN Dupuy’s classic quantitative “combat effectiveness” approach, losses per one hundred frontline riflemen, per combat day and finally c) what might be called the “historical” record, i.e. the narrative of events in books such as those by David Glantz. All this is now possible because since the archives were opened in the early 1990s it has become clear that the Soviets did, in fact, keep detailed records of losses and the forces employed. Here are my conclusions, however little they may be worth. a) If you set Soviet combat effectiveness, during the second half of the war, from 1/7/43 to 31/3/45, to equal 1 then German combat effectiveness over the same period equals 1.15. To set this in context the similar figure for the Germans against both the Commonwealth and American forces during the campaign in NW Europe was 1.20 i.e. Soviet forces were of marginally higher quality than the western allies. The reason for this relatively high figure for Soviet combat effectiveness is that their losses and their overall force ratio advantage, were both very much lower than had been believed before the true figures became known. Taking into account all factors, importantly, including the relative size of the forces employed, one would have expected Soviet losses to number 1.4 times those of the Germans assuming, and this is a very important point, that Soviet forces had been of “identical quality” to German forces. In fact Soviet “actual” losses over the period numbered 1.6 times German losses. Only 0.2 different from the losses the Germans would have inflicted on their enemy had they been fighting “clones” of themselves but numbering the same as Soviet forces “actually” numbered. When looking at losses per one hundred frontline riflemen, per combat day, I did not compare Soviet and German forces but Soviet and American forces. This does not tell us, directly, anything about Soviet combat effectiveness but does tell us something about the tactics being used, the style of combat. If the Soviets were suffering twice as many casualties per one hundred front line riflemen, per combat day, as the Americans in Europe then it can be taken as evidence that they “may” have been using more bloody tactics at the small unit level. If you go through the statistics in detail what you find is that from the autumn of 43 onwards losses per one hundred frontline riflemen, per combat day, were the same in US and Soviet units. Contrary to popular belief life in a typical, frontline Soviet rifle-company was no more dangerous than life in an American rifle-company. There was still horror and tragedy in bucket loads but not the mass slaughter some German accounts imply. What this implies, I put it no more strongly than that, is that similar tactics were being used by the Soviets and the Americans. No more mass infantry attacks against concentrated machine-gun and artillery fire, unless something had gone horribly wrong, as it did now and then. c) When is comes to the “historical” record the operation that has never really been able to “fit” into the traditional German view of Soviet combat effectiveness is Bagration, or the Destruction of Army Group Centre. It is not that the Soviets “won” the overall battle, but the nature of their victory, that has always been the problem. The Soviets won at both Stalingrad and Kursk. However, at Stalingrad the loss ratio, Soviet to German, was 4:1 at Kursk 3.5:1. During Bagration the overall loss ratio, Soviet to German, was 0.7:1, during the first two weeks 0.2:1. Something very different was happening. If one looks at he battle in more detail the picture becomes even more puzzling for those that take the “German” view of Soviet combat effectiveness during the latter half of WW2. German pockets of 10,000-20,000 troops, in areas that had been fortified as “fortress cities”, were being collapsed in 2-3 days and at very little cost to the Soviets. What was happening was that German combat teams were being despatched to block an advance, along one of the few “dry” corridors through the swampy terrain, and being pushed aside with ease. The speed with which the German pockets were collapsed, and the very light Soviet casualties, means that at the level of the contact battle, company v company, the Soviets must have been the equals of the Germans. If this had not been the case the causality ratio in the first two weeks would not have been so in the Soviets favour. Also the German pockets would not have collapsed as quickly. Non of the above is conclusive, there are imperfections in the approach on all counts. However, taken together the above has convinced me that, indeed, Soviet combat effectiveness during the second half of the war was every close to that of the Germans. I will end with two pieces of information that go some way to illustrating why the view of Soviet combat effectiveness has changed in the last five years. Firstly, it is now known that Soviet losses during 1943 were no greater than the annual intake of conscripts. Even as early as 43 the Soviets were no longer being “bled to death” as the Germans hoped, and many believed. Secondly, the following is a paraphrase of something written by David Glantz in the mid-eighties. “ During the second half of the war force ratios were not as high as the Germans claimed, 7-8:1, nor as low as the Soviets claimed, 2-3:1. More likely they were 4-5:1 in favour of the Soviets.” We now know that the average force ratio throughout the second half of the war was 2.7:1. (These figures can be found in David Glantz’s own books form the mid nineties onwards, and other sources.) As the true figures have emerged so the view of Soviet combat effectiveness, post Kursk, has changed. I know from previous posts that Steve, as in BTS, believes the Soviets did not return to the level of combat effectiveness they had in 1940 until 1945. Clearly, I disagree with this. However, that is what makes the subject so interesting, we nearly all disagree. The good news is that, for those of us that are interested, there is likely to be a continuing flood of new books on the subject for sometime to come. All the best, Kip. PS. Sometime I will get round to making a far longer post giving a blow by blow account of how all the calculations are done, i.e. Dupuy’s combat effectiveness and others, with a full list of sources for all the data. (If any one is interested.)” It is worth stressing the point that all three of the above forms of analysis, using the same source I used above, confirm that during the first half of the war in the east the Germans generated 5-6 times the combat power for similar sized units. However, by the autumn of 43 all that had changed.

Tero, hi, I should just have said that all my comments referred to the German/Soviet fighting and not Finnish forces or the Winter War. I claim to know nothing about Finnish forces and the Winter War other than that the Finns are regarded as the best by all those that know. When it comes to Soviet causalities I believe we are no longer in the dark. Both David Glantz and John Erickson, in my view the worlds top men on the Eastern Front, in the English language, regard the work by Colonel-General GF Krivosheev, Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, as reliable and unbiased. One way to express what I was saying it to illustrate it this way. If the Germans had been defending against forces that numbered the same as Soviet forces “actually did” but, were in ever detail, “clones” of Germany’s own forces then the casuality ratio, attacker to defender, would have been 1.44:1. In reality it was 1.64:1, Soviet to German. This tells us that the Soviet forces performed nearly as well as German forces would have done in similar circumstances. All comments refer to the post Kursk period. All the best, Kip. PS. If you use the casualties from the above book for the early period of the war you find that the gap between German and Soviet forces is just as great as the Germans claimed in the fifties. It is just that from about the autumn of 43 onwards the Soviets were far better soldiers, and far fewer in number, than the Germans liked to claim post war.

Tero, hi, I see you mention the Dupuy formulas. I am a huge fan of his analysis. He was professor at Harvard and his work was used by both the British and the US for operational analysis. When is comes to operational analysis he has no equal, in my view. However, when it comes to the Eastern Front, although his formulas still hold in every detail, it must be remembered that the “data” he entered into his formulas was almost completely wrong, with regard to the Soviets. By this I mean that in order to use his formulas one has to “know” the force ratio, the size of the Soviet forces relative to the Germans, and, the causalities suffered by the Soviets. In the 1970s and 1980s the only people who knew the true size of Soviet forces, and even more so, their true causalities were the Russians, and they were not telling. Now we know both. As it turns out Soviet forces were far smaller than was believed in the 1980s; also their causalities were far less. The Germans were simply not killing as many Soviets, post Kursk, as had been believed. The average force ratio during the period July 43 to March 45, Soviet to German, was only 2.7:1. Not the 4-5:1 as had been believed. Also the causalities ratio over that period, Soviet to German, was only 1.64:1, not 2-3:1 as had been believed. (Remember these figures exclude the round-up of April-May 45.) To cut a very long story short if you run the Dupuy formulas, using the new data, you get a combat effectiveness figure for the Germans against the Soviets, during the period given above, of 1.15, not the 1.8-2 or 3 given in Dupuy’s books. This is no criticism of Dupuy; the figures were just not available in his day. The conclusion is that the Soviets were very nearly as good as a Germans, battalion combat team V battalion combat team, post Kursk. Note that is “post Kursk” not at Kursk. At Kursk the Soviets really fought in the “old” style for the last time. All the best, Kip.

Steve,or anyone from BTS, If you are still out there may I just mention one more feature request that I made about six months ago and for which there “was” a “lot” of support. (In fact there was so much support for it that I can not believe someone else did not mentioned it before me, anyway no matter.) That is reducing the elevation step change from a minimum of 2.5m to 1.25m. So in the editor one would have the option of 1.25m and 2.5m instead of 2.5m and 5m. I have no argument with things as they are for Western Europe but from all the pictures I have seen of what is now the Ukraine and Poland the current minimum 2.5m is too great. It leads to too “stepped” or “terraced” a look. For various reasons I have seen a lot of photos of the Ukraine and it is made up of gently undulating plains, not flat plains, broken by the odd steep sided gully. The very fine, but sadly very expensive book, The Battle of Kharkov by Jean Restayn, illustrates this point very well. It may take a lot of coding changes or a small coding change that has a big effect. I have no idea. All the best, Kip.

Steve, hi, Thanks for answering all my questions, can not ask for more than that. Great picture of mine roller on page 94/95 of the Steven Zaloga book, Red Army Handbook. I believe it was a common feature during last third of war. Will have to wait and see what your sources say. I have two reasons for thinking it was common. 1) Turns up again and again in books; this may be because it makes a good picture. 2) In “the” handbook on Soviet forces, by which I mean War Department Technical Manual TM 30-430, November 1945, Handbook on USSR Military Forces, it is taken to be as standard a feature of Soviet operations as mine ploughs are in the US Army today. All the best, Kip.

Steve, hi, Thanks for all the info. Everything sounds stunning, as I knew it would. Do not know if you will get round to reading this but on the off chance you do can not resist just making a few comments/ asking the odd question. 1) Go carefully on C&C restrictions on AFVs and infantry squads. Remember that in CM we play the role not just of company and platoon commanders but also AFV and squad commanders. If as an AFV commander or squad commander I see a threat and can not react because my crew/men are not trained well enough that may be realistic. But be careful not to code in such a way as to “assume” that “I” as the crew or squad commander, am stupid. It is important not to “over limit” the options of AFV and squad commanders beyond that which may be reasonable in representing the limitations of their crew or men. Hope you understand my point even if you do not agree with it. 2) Soviet PT 34 mine roller. During the last half/third of the war a common feature of war on the Eastern Front. It would also make for some great and challenging tactical problems in is use. Any chance it will be included? 3) Maximum length of battles in operations. I have always considered it a shame that the “maximum length of battles in operations” is just 30 turns. Any chance of giving us the option of longer battles in the operations editor? Constant frustration for me, I would like 40-60 minute battles in operations. I admit this is a minority view. If you do get round to reading this, thanks for your time, All the best, Kip. PS. John Waters, hi, good to see you are still out there, how are things?

Hi, OK, so no relative spotting. This is not a problem for me, as I had never really noticed any form of “spotting problem” to start with. I think spotting and LOS are handled very well. Quite understand some others do not share my view. Whenever changes are introduced extreme care must be taken to “spoil what we have” as I believe CM works so well in all fields. All the best, Kip.

Hi, Thanks for the shots. The entire thing looks great. The two touches I like most are the Soviet truck and the type of zimmerit on the StugIII. All real attention to detail. Someone on another thread said that he could sense CM2 excitement beginning to take off. I agree. With CMBO to play and with the CM2, say, one year away there was little point in thinking about it. However, now the clock is under six months to go I can feel my inherent “CM related personality disorder” coming on again. This may be hard to believe but am a mature, relaxed, forty something year old; on a good day anyway. But when it comes to a new version of CM I find I retard to my early teens and it can get close to sleepless nights stuff. I have to confess I am more excited about CM2 than I would be about being given one of the new Jag cars that has just been launched. Thank God CM2 will not cost the same as the new Jag. I would have to sell the house. Thanks for all the work, hope you all get rich, my guess is you will; people that are “the number one” even in a niche markets normally do, All the best, Kip.

Hi, Thanks for the replies. Seems to mean that manoeuvre units must “spot for themselves”. All sounds good. All the best, Kip.

Rexford, hi, With regard to the penetration of the IS2 122 against the Panther glacis you have confirmed what I posted on another thread. The AP round was developed before the APBC round and could not penetrate the Panther’s glacis without some luck. However, the APBC round, introduced May/June 44 could do the job even against the Panther’s glacis at most ranges. All the best, Kip. PS. When I buy from other small organisations in the States, I live in the UK; it is always done with an International Money Order. However, you will have to investigate what banking charges this adds at your end and add it to the price for overseas buyers like me. The fact is that that there is no cheap way of doing this if you are not set up to deal with credit cards, and that will not be worth the expense to you. What is very important is that you have airmail post to overseas available, again it will cost people like me but surface is unbearably slow.

Relative spotting, what is it? Hi, I fully understand why BTS are returning a favour to various magazines by letting them have the info on CM2 first. But for those of us outside the US, that realistically cannot get the magazine, I know because I tried, What does “relative spotting” mean. I am not asking for the entire article to be published on the net, just if someone, in his or her own words, would take mercy on me and explain what BTS mean by it. All the best, Kip.

Jeff Duquette, hi, No, never heard of the BIOS report. All my information, or the most interesting bits anyway, comes from the archives of the Tank Museum in Bovington, England. The full title of the 700+ page report I keep going on about is, Record of Foreign Weapons and Equipment, Volume 1, USSR. 1947. It makes clear that its sources are, equipment in British hands, German sources and the Soviets themselves. It’s in the library at the Tank Museum. I am always keen to know of any other such reports hiding somewhere out there. All the best, Kip.

Magua, hi, Great to hear that arrival is so close. There is not doubt that your buildings, and other mods, add a lot to the look and therefor the fun of CM. Thanks for all the work. All the best, Kip.

Hi, The British estimate of the rate of fire of the ISU 152 is clearly based on their estimate of what would be expected from a British crew. There is no reason to believe Soviet crews were any less capable. Just to remind you, the British 1947 estimate was 2-3 rpm. All the best, Kip.

Rexford, hi, For me this is close to sleepless nights stuff. Cracking under the strain of waiting for the book. Do not know which I am looking forward to most, CM2 or your book. I clearly have a personality disorder. All the best, Kip.

Dan Robertson, hi, Yes, I agree with what you say about the British figures for the 122 gun. In fact British penetration figures do tend to be “generous”. I realise fully they are based on their own 17pdr ammunition. The wargamer.org estimate of having to increase Russian figures by 5% to bring them up to the same basis as British figures I do not agree with. I believe the figure should be more like 20%. It will be very interesting to see what Charles goes for; after all he is the one that counts. He will not please everyone. When it comes to greater variation of outcome I agree with you. One just has to be careful that this does not turn into an excuse to “lower” the average penetration figure. And finally, yes, I have heard that Lorrin Bird is the guy for this stuff. I greatly look forward to his coming book. All the best, Kip.

Hi, In the 1947 document I mentioned above the British give the rate of fire of the ISU and SU 152 at 2-3rpm. This seems to me to be far more realistic. “If” a guy can lift a given shell and afterwards a given charge it is not going to take more than 20-30 seconds per round. If BTS have really said 1-1.5 minutes per round they have got me worried. Can not believe Steve and Charles would reach such a conclusion, must be making some strange assumptions. Once again we will just have to wait and see but as I say I would be worried if they are really going for such a low rate of fire. All the best, Kip. PS. German test firings of the 76.2M1942 AT gun, specifically using the standard Soviet BR350A APC round, give it the same penetration one would have expected from a German round of the same dimensions and velocity. To assume that most Soviet AP ammunition was a low quality and Soviet armour of low quality I do not believe is correct. Most of my sources are British reports on items of equipment that had either been given to them by the Soviets or fallen into their hands, often in Korea.

Hi, One of the things that make this forum fun is that so many of us disagree. It makes for far more interesting discussion. I disagree with what Roksovkiy said about the armour penetration of Soviet guns and armour quality of Soviet AFVs. My sources come mainly from the archives of the Bovington Tank Museum and the normal analysis of penetration using the Milne-de-Marre formula. In 1947 the British Board of Ordinance estimate of the armour penetration of the 122mm D25 gun was 179mm at 0 metres range and 168mm at 500 metres, against 30degree plate. Combat experience also showed that the D25 “could” penetrate the upper front hull of the Panther, certainly after May/June 44. This means that in terms of equivalent millimetres of vertical plate it must have been able to penetrate over 160mm-170mm. The general rule of thumb is that “official” Soviet penetration figures understate penetration by about 20% when compared to German and Western figures. The reason for this is the different way in which the Soviets defined/measured penetration. It will be “very” interesting to see what figures Charles comes out with. We will just all have to be patient, not easy. From the way Roksovkiy spells “armour” I assume he is British. “If” you have time visit the library at the Bovington Tank Museum and ask for the “Record of Foreign Weapons and Equipment” Volume 1 USSR. It is 700+ pages long and was produced in 1947 as “the” document on the weapons of the new enemy. I have a photocopy of it and you will not be disappointed. (That is if you do not already have the document, I cannot be the only one.) There is also a report on a T34/B delivered to the British by the Soviets during the war. (In return for all those obsolete tanks we sent them.) It specifically comments on the high quality but “poor appearance” of its armour. Anyway, we will never all agree, greatly looking forwards to CM2. All the best, Kip. PS. Paul, it has happened again, we post at the exact same time, clearly have the same habits. Will be getting back to you about the document. This is un-nerving, twice in a week.

Hi, I thought I would just add that watching the discussion on this thread has me puzzled. Why anyone would get hostile and angry with Steve is beyond me. I have had a number of discussions with him, as many of us have, and had a number of suggestions turned down. One example is that I believe that the MG42, in its heavy form, is overstated in CM. Should be about 120 not 150 firepower at point blank. However, Steve came down against me. I still think I am correct and feel I can justify that claim, but Steve said no. This does not put me off Steve or CM one jot. I disagree with him but am 100% certain he came down against me “not” because he is biased but because he thinks the evidence supports his view. The fact that we all disagree sometimes I see as part of the fun! The important thing is that everyone at BTS clearly is trying, and in my view succeeding, in building stunningly realistic simulations of WW2 combat. No one could ask for more. Looking forward to CM2, and some lively discussion of the Soviet armour penetration figures, All the best, Kip.

Hi, I agree with Steve. I only play CM and Steel Beasts and have found the more mature games magazines do give me fair warning that 99% of computer wargames are not for me. I would just add that a lot of CMs loyal fans are overseas, like me in the UK, and it is not as easy as Robert suggests to get the mags in the UK. I know I have tried. The only reasonable solution is for BTS to move to the UK. Surrey is a lovely place with lots of common land and woods. I could find you all fabulous properties with swimming pools, tennis courts….. All the best, Kip. PS. You will not get as much snow in the winters. Ever since watching Dreaming of a White Christmas forty years ago I have wanted to live in New England.

Hi, I just thought I have found that computer games magazines “do” seem to try and give honest reviews. CM and Steel Beasts are the only two I currently play but I find games magazines are honest about whether or not a game would appeal to someone like me. Invariably they would not. All the best, Kip.