kipanderson

Hi, Good picture. CMBB will be fun, no doubt about it. All the best, Kip.

Hi, I agree 100% that “relative spotting” and “relative command” and such, are best dealt with by team play. With three, four and one day a dozen players on each side, all these issues would disappear for the reasons you give. Team play, and a quality operational/campaign layer, are my number one hopes for CMII, the new engine. All the best, Kip.

Hi, Yes, zimmerit was an anti-magnetic plaster/cement. I am not sure “exactly” what it was made of but it was used between August 43 and mid-September 44. It was every suddenly stopped because the Germans suddenly got it into their heads that it was a fire hazard. I know, it sounds strange. But an order went out to all plants to stop using it immediately on about the 14th September 44. It was of no practical use anyway. Hence no one else used the stuff during or after the war. All the best, Kip. PS. Information comes from one of the Jentz books, I “think” the one on the Panther.

Hi, looks good. I will use them when they are out. all the best, Kip.

Hi, For me the big three, when it comes to “settings” for war games are, 1) WW2 Eastern Front 2) WW2 NW Europe 3) Current, say 1994-2004 As BTS want to keep everything “in-house”, and are happy with their small team, we are clearly going to be rationed in terms the number of CM type games they will produce. If they do not wish to do a current/modern game, my vote would be to return to NW Europe with a new engine for CMII. The “big” feature I would like to see in the new engine is live, online team play. This is, in my view, however little that may be worth, the only satisfactory way of handling “relative” spotting and command. If one had, say, four players on each team then a company commander would only be able to spot with, and issue orders to, his own company, and so on… He would only see what the units directly under his command see. I am very keen that there should not be too many restrictions placed on ones freedom to control squads/AFVs directly under ones command. The reason is that in CM you are not only the battalion and company commander, but also the platoon “and” squad/AFV commander. Restrictions on a squads freedom to react quickly due to lack of training within the squad personnel and AFV crew are fine but the coding must not go so far as to, in effect, “assume” that the squad/AFV commander is stupid. The other “big feature” I would like to see in CMII, in the perfect world, is a quality operational layer. So one could move battalions and companies around on a map and then “zoom” in to play a CM type battle when one wished. Not unlike the way CMMC works. This would be huge plus if BTS could pull it off. I believe they could pull it off. All the best, Kip.

Yarb, thanks for letting us all know it has been posted. All the best, Kip.

Richard, hi, I halfway agree with you, but cannot go all the way with your views. What you suggest would be great in a “command” game. By this I mean that “if” we, the players, just played the part of battalion/company commanders then I would agree with you. But that is not the case. For me, a large part of the fun is that in CM I play the role of the battalion, company, platoon “and” the squad and AFV commander. Because one plays the role of so many individuals, at so many levels of command, there is no way of avoiding being able to “see” everything all friendly units can see. Also, there has to be a limit on C&C modelling. It is all very well limiting the squads/AFVs power to react to an order from a platoon/company commander but you are then also limiting “your own power”, as the squad/AVF commander, to react to a threat/situation you can see. Given that in CMBO and in CMBB one person plays so many roles I would not like to change things. I enjoy playing the part of the squad/AFV commander at least as much as playing the part of the battalion commander. However, what you are after I believe will come with later CM engines. The answer is to have “team” play on each side, in my view. If in CM3 there was the option of four players on each side then there could be three company commanders and an overall battalion commander. The company commanders would only “see” what units in their respective companies could see. This would a ply to both enemy units and friendly units. And so on. The same restrictions to ply to issuing orders, only to units in your own company. I later versions of CM there could be even more players on each side, thus causing realistic C&C problems. All the best, Kip.

Lorrin, hi, This is all “very” interesting stuff. Thanks to the research you and your colleague have done I believe a fuller picture is finally starting to emerge as regards the penetration of Soviet rounds. Charles will clearly have to “tweak” the equations for Soviet ammo, showing less penetration against the vertical but greater penetration at higher angles of attack. i.e. against side armour at 30+ degrees. In thinking about the “type” of battles there will be in CMBB it is worth remembering that many Panzer attacks will be against “PAK fronts” of twelve or more Soviet AT guns on a map of, say, 1.5km by 2km. In the more open terrain of Eastern Europe there will be any strikes against the side armour of attacking German AFVs. The Soviet advantage at these higher strike angles will show up. I have done a “test shoot” over open terrain using 6 pdrs and attacking Panthers and life is “very” dangerous for the Panthers due to their thin side armour. All good fun, All the best, Kip.

John, hi, I am happy to go with what you say. My post was just one of those small items of information that one reads and then it sticks because it is of interest. When it comes to the quality of Soviet HEAT rounds my information, from British sources, is that in artillery shell form we are talking about diameter to penetration ratio of 1:1. The last generation of German HEAT shells, which were produced 43/44, had a diameter to penetration ratio of 1:1.2. This means that Soviet 76.2mm HEAT shells had a penetration of 76mm and the last generation of German 75mm HEAT shells could penetrate 90mm. For bazooka type weapons penetration is greater, relative to the diameter of the weapon, because the stand off distance is greater and the velocity less. All the best, Kip. PS. The RPG 43 does mean that “if” one can separate German AFVs from their infantry Soviet infantry could destroy them. The RGP 43 could penetrate the roof of any Panzer with ease, if it hit.

Hi, I cannot resist answering this one as I read in one of Glantz’s books, I think it was one of Glantz’s books, that the reason is that the “entire” team developing the infantry AT weapons was wiped out in the purges. Just random bad luck. The explanation goes on to make clear that the Soviets were as up on HEAT technology as anyone. You will see a lot of it in CMBB for the various Soviet guns. I forget “exactly” where I read it but it stuck in my memory because I too have wondered about the reason for no Soviet HEAT throwing weapon. BTW the RPG 43 HEAT grenade was a fine design within its limits as a hand thrown grenade. All the best, Kip.

Rexford, hi, It is very interesting what you say about Russian APBC rounds. At a given velocity they perform less well against vertical, but better against sloped armour, than US rounds. This does show that Charles will have to be very careful about how he models Soviet APBC penetration in CM. As I say in my post I agree with Charles that in the contest of CM, or any wargame, the way to go is to start with a De Marre style analysis and then to look at the quality of the rounds. This is what I tried to do. What you bring in bucket loads is information to help in making a judgement on the quality of the different nations rounds. Rexford, may I take the opportunity of asking how I can get hold of a copy of your book? I live in the UK. I am sure there was an announcement but I must have missed it. I have tried the search engine with no luck. As you can imagine, someone with my interests is hugely looking forward to reading your book. All the best, Kip.

No, it is still there. It is difficult to get hold of at the moment but I did have good access yesterday. All the best, Kip.

Rexford, hi, Sorry for asking this here, I tried to use the search engine but it is hopeless. How can I get hold of a copy of your book? I live in the UK. I must have missed the announcement. All the best, Kip.

Steve, hi, Thanks again for the time you put aside to answer. Just one quick point and I will leave you alone to get on with your work. I do not think I ever said there was “no real difference” between the firepower of the M1919A4 and the MG42. At least I think I did not. I will just quickly “put my money where my mouth is” and give the figures I believe the MG42 should have. At point blank the M1919A gets about 85 firepower, the MG42 about 155 firepower, I think. From my reading about 125 firepower at point blank for the MG42 would be about it, given the 85 for the M1919A4. But with the advantage to the MG42 opening up with range for the reasons you give. I agree with 90% of what you say about the two guns and modern trends. All the best Kip.

Steve, Thanks for the taking the time to explain how you are going to handle things. If the result comes even close to the very clever way you are going to handle human wave/assault then all will be happy. What I read in the Gamespot article was hugely impressive on all counts. As I say you lot deserve to become rich, and being the “absolute number one” even in a niche market, you probably will. All the best, Kip.

ASL Vetran, hi, Basically I agree with the point you are making in the sense that the two second rule from the Jane’s article and the Shrivenham stuff are not the exact same, and importantly, the authors clearly only regard them as a “very rough guide”. If you look at the quote from the Shrivenham book the guy is very open about the fact that it is only a rough guide. However, even if you take the larger figure as given by the Shrivenham book and make only the most straightforward adjustment back to WW2, in regard of muzzle velocity, you still have to halve the Shrivenham ranges. Lets go straight to the heart of what some are saying. If you assume the firing tank is a Tiger 1, muzzle velocity 773mps or 800mps, depending on source, then one would still expect its maximum range to be 2000m, not 2,500m or 3,000m. Importantly, even a maximum range of 2000m assumes it had a modern laser FCS. Clearly a WW2 FCS was not as good at long range as a modern FCS using lasers. I admitted in one of posts that I have no idea what the adjustment should be for going from a modern FCS back to WW2. My guess, and it is only that, a guess, is that one should knock 20% off. May be it should be 10%, may be 25%, I do not claim to know. Anyway, it will further reduce the maximum range to something under 2000m. The view of the Jane’s journalist and the staff at Shrivenham is clearly that once a shell has been in the air for two seconds it is struggling to hit what it was aimed at, by the standards required for tank engagements. If this is true for modern FCS then it must also be true for more primitive WW2 fire control systems. The “reports from troops” in all those stunning Jentz books clearly are not a pack of lies. I am not saying they are. However, given that there is a clear conflict between the “impression” given by many of those reports and what I read in modern textbooks and Jane’s journals about the real world abilities of modern tank guns I tend to go with the Shrivenham view of these things. I do fully believe those long-range hits by Tiger 1s happened, but far more rarely and after firing more rounds than the “reports from troops” would imply. It is human nature that we will not all reach the same conclusion from a given bit of evidence. As I explained before I have come across this previously when one of the other Shrivenham textbooks, on small arms, makes it clear that the difference in practical, real world, firepower between the US 1919A4 and the MG42 should not be as much as in CMBO. This is due to heat, even taking into account a spare barrel for the MG42. However, this does not put me off CMBO one bit. I never think about it. Its Steve’s game and he is the boss. Military history fans such as us will always disagree. All the best, Kip. PS. On all matters Steve and Charles will come up with something reasonable to all the evidence. But I do not expect to agree with every tiny judgement they make.

Clubfoot,Hi, I have never been taken by any of the conversions before. Not because they are not very good, they certainly are, but because they have never taken my imagination. Happy with the straight game plus the odd mod. However, this “conversion” has taken my imagination. It looks great and seems to me that a realistic modelling of beach assault may be possible. I look forward to giving it a go. I always thought it a bit of a shame that beach assaults were not covered in CMBO. Only a “bit of a shame”, still stunned by how good CMBO is even without beaches. All the best, You certainly know what you are about, Kip.

Hi, I realise I am in a minority of one in believing some weight should be given to the “2 second rule”, and I am quite relaxed about it. However, someone above has said that I am either “misinterpreting” or “misrepresenting” it. Neither is the case. It would take me hours to find the exact quote from one of my Jane’s magazines, I know, I once had to find one to do with the Soviet K5 armour, however, I do have the exact reference to the quote from the guys at Shrivenham. The following quote comes from Fighting Vehicles, ISBN 0-08-036704-6, 1991, a textbook written by the staff at the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham for use by visiting service personal attending course at the college. “It is always difficult to be specific about the ranges that should be considered “short” or “long”, but as a rough guide, for tank engagements, 0-1000m is defined as short range, 1000-2000m as medium range and 2000-4000m as long range.” How one “backward converts” the above opinion from modern 120mm, laser FCS to 75-88mm, WW2 sights is anyone’s guess. I gave my effort in a post above. However, when it comes to the meaning of the above quote there is no mistaking what was meant. It is not taken out of context; the guy who wrote it means what everyone reading this post will have understood by it. You may disagree with the opinion in quote but I am neither “misinterpreting” nor “misrepresenting” the views of the author. All the best, Kip.

John, hi, Always good to read your views. I basically agree with you about Soviet/German sights. Given the views of the British experts who’s reports I held in my hands last week, that Soviet sights may even be high quality in 1942, and given the view of the Germans that they were low quality, what do Steve and Charles do? There is no way to square the circle. One area that we still disagree on is WW2 tank gun range. But that is all part of the fun. It is just that having seen all the equations and tables in the Shrivenham books, once any shell has been in the air for two seconds or so it is struggling to hit what it is pointed at. Even today. Of course, all this is relative. All the best, Kip.

Magua, hi, I knew your new work would be stunning, and it is. The buildings are everything I was hoping for and more. However, there was a nice surprise regarding the trees, bases and other terrain features. I was using the subdued trees and such which I believe may come from DD, cannot remember. Anyway, they were great, and not being artistic I it never crossed my mind that someone could improve on them. I was wrong about that. I am now using your subdued trees and such and they look unbelievably realistic. Although they are subdued I think you have put more contrast into them, or some such thing, I have no idea. Anyway they are truly shockingly realistic. You said somewhere that they look best from ground level and from ground level they are about the most “photo-realistic” scenery mod one could ever hope for. Hugely looking forward to fighting a battle through your Normandy terrain. As I have said to you before, I cannot wait to see what you come up with for CMBB. Hope you will still be interested by then. Thanks for all the work, All the best, Kip.

The two second rule. Hi, As I seem to be in a minority of one in agreeing with the rough outlines of what someone above called the “the two second rule” I thought I would just see if I could quickly find some supporting opinion. Trying to find the paragraph I referred to in one of my Jane’s magazines would take forever, you should see the piles of issues. So I turned to my other number one source on such matters, the textbooks written by the lecturers at the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham. I have a number of them, they are stunning value, you would pay hundreds of pounds for the same information from Jane’s, anyway in one of them I found this in the introduction to the section on tank firepower, “It is always difficult to be specific about the ranges that should be considered “short” or “long”, but as a rough guide, for tank engagements, 0-1000m is defined as short range, 1000-2000m as medium range and 2000-4000m as long range.” Not quite my/Jane’s “two second rule”, but in the same ballpark. As I said these books are textbooks and are full of graphs, equations and tables of data. The above book was written in 1991 and makes clear that they are assuming a muzzle velocity of 16000m/per/sec unless otherwise stated. It must also be remember that the above refers to a tank with modern FCS, fire control systems, including laser range finders. The question is can the above sentence be converted into anything that may be of use in terms of WW2? Well, yes, it can. Firstly, the simple question of muzzle velocity. The above sentence assumes a muzzle velocity of 1600mps. If we assume a muzzle velocity of 800mps, for a WW2 tank gun, then all we need do is halve the above ranges. If we do this then the “spin” is actuality in favour of the WW2 gun, if there is any spin. This is because smaller rounds have a more rapid drop off in velocity over time than bigger rounds. I am assuming we are dealing with WW2 guns of 75mm-88mm. Anyway if we adjust for WW2 muzzle velocities we end up with a sentence like this, “It is always difficult to be specific about the ranges that should be considered “short” or “long”, but as a rough guide, for tank engagements, 0-500m is defined as short range, 500-1000m as medium range and 1000-2000m as long range.” However, we can not leave it there. The above sentence assumes a WW2 tank gun of 75mm-88mm, with muzzle velocity of 800mps, but also with a modern, laser, FCS. The last question we have to address is, “what is the percentage change in practical range when moving from a modern, laser FCS back to a WW2 sighting system?” The truth is I have no idea. What I am going to assume is this, no change in short range, a 10% reduction in what may be called medium range, and a 20% reduction in what may be called long range. This would mean that when referring to WW2, rather than current tanks, the staff at Shrivenham would probably have written some thing like this, “It is always difficult to be specific about the ranges that should be considered “short” or “long”, but as a rough guide, for tank engagements, 0-500m is defined as short range, 500-900m as medium range and 900-1600m as long range.” All in all very close to what the guy from Jane’s wrote about the “extreme outer limit of range being two seconds of flight time at muzzle velocity.” Clearly the staff from Shrivenham and the author from Jane’s are roughly in agreement. As I would have expected. It is important to note that both are clearly referring to battlefield conditions and not what may be achieved on a testing range. I am sure all the reports of long range hits in WW2 are not false. However, it is my view, and I could bore you all with a specific example to illustrate this, that many “reports” will have been exaggerations. This is, in my view, others will disagree, because of the huge stress combatants are under. This does not reduce my respect for those that fought inWW2 and managed to hold things together, even for those that did not manage to hold things together. All the best, Kip. PS. There is no perfect answer, that is the fun of these discussions, in my view.

Hi, I thought I would just add that the “two seconds of flight time at muzzle velocity” is not my judgement, I have never fired a tank gun, it came from one of the Jane’s publications. I subscribe to both the Defence Weekly and International Defence Review, the monthly publication. It was in one of them. It also gave a number of statistics to back it up. Off the top of my head I forget the exact figures but you would be shocked by how much the drift is due to even very gentle side winds after two seconds of flight. There were a number of stats referring to matters such as “ballistic dispersion” all of which started to build up to unnerving levels after two seconds. There is no mistake, the guy from Jane’s considered two seconds flight time at muzzle velocity the extreme outer limit of range. Of course, in a war you will always get some examples that break these types of rules. Basically it would come down to how many rounds fired would be considered “practical”. Personally I put a lot of weight on the opinion of the guys at Jane’s and also at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham. However, I know not every one does. To give another example. The text books written by the lecturers at Shrivenham will tell you that the difference in practical firepower between the American M1919A4 and the MG42 are not as great as in CM. It is all to do with heat. But people give different weight to a given piece of evidence. The same can be said about “reports” from troops. I always tend to think that reports from, say, German troops about hitting a T34 at 2000m will tend to be exaggerated. But I accept some people give them more weight. For a lot of this stuff one would have to set up ones own tests, and that is not going to happen. The fact that one gets lots of different views is fun. Greatly looking forward to the Rexford book. All the best, Kip.

John, hi, It is interesting what you say. That it is the general rule that British and American inspections of Soviet sights result in the conclusion that they were OK. In some cases even good quality. This does lead me to the belief that Soviet sights, certainly on wartime production models, are likely to have been “good enough”. This remains me of the quote from the famous Soviet Admiral; he cannot have been that famous because I have forgotten his name, but anyway, there is a quote from a famous Soviet Admiral that “Perfect is the enemy of good enough.” Soviet sights look like a case in point. All of the above in turn remains me of something Steve has implied by some of his comments, if I understood them correctly. When dealing with the question of the range of tank fire there is a general rule of thumb, which still applies today. That is that the “extreme, outer-limit of the practical range” of a tank gun can be taken as two seconds of flight time measured at muzzle velocity. To take a modern example, this means that a long-rod penetrator fired from a NATO 120mm gun will have an extreme, outer-limit range of around 3200m against tank targets. If you assume that the average WW2 tank gun, AT gun, had a muzzle velocity of between 750m per second and 800m per second, and many did fall within this category, then one way to think of long range is this. Anything over 900m is long range, anything over 1200m is very long range, and anything over 1500m is “getting silly”. Given these sort of ranges optics need not be of that high quality. A tank size target, if not obscured by forests and buildings, an easily be spotted at 1000m, but not at 2000m. If in the area in which you live you attempt to spot a small lorry or large van at 1000m you will have no problem. Clearly wartime fear and confusion make it more difficult, but the importance of optics at WW2 ranges can be overstated. I my view, which I admit may not be worth too much. I have never fired a tank gun. All the best, Kip.

John Waters, hi, As always you have a huge range of sources and I am always very cautious, when it comes to disagreeing with you, because you clearly know your subject. However, all I am saying is that the fact that the use of the Krivosheev data to cover the first half of the war gives a “combat power” ratios of, Soviet to German, 1:5-6 is an illustration that the Krivosheev data may not be understating Soviet losses. It clearly does not for the first half of the war. If it does not for the first half of the war then “maybe” his data for the second half is also accurate. I am more open minded on the subject than I may sound. A second edition of the Krivosheev book would be great. I also realise there are other Russians that have looked into these matters and may know what they are talking about. I do hold to the view that if Soviet losses had been as high in the second half of the war as some claim, the Soviet would not have won. Two points to illustrate why the Soviets did win; in my view, however little that may be worth. Walter Dunn, in his excellent “organisational” history Hitler’s Nemesis, points out that Soviet losses in 1943 were no more than their annual intake of conscripts. When you combine this with the fact that the November 42 edition of Soviet “Combat Regulations” for rifle squad through to company, are what in the UK we would call “pure skirmishing tactics”, you begin to get an idea of why the Soviets won. They were not suffering “unsustainable losses” and were using the correct tactics. All good fun, All the best, Kip.

Hi, May I first apologise for not having responded for a few days. It looks as though some people have asked my direct questions and I should have got back to you before. Those that did ask me questions will understand when I say that real life does sometimes get in way of me being able to spend as much time on this stuff as I would like, no doubt the same for all of us. As far as I can tell, where people have been good enough to ask me questions I will try to answer them. When it comes to my point about the Soviet/German casuality ratio at Stalingrad and at Kursk it is quite correct that I was using figures for the “schwerpunk” or attritional centre. The figures for Kursk come straight out of the Glantz/ House book on the battle and are for the “14 days of the hot spots”. I should have used one of those small smiley faces to show that I was stirring things up somewhat. However, the point I was trying to make I stick by. Had the casuality ratios of 41/42 and the first half of 43 continued the Soviets would not have won in the Eastern Front, in my view. My point about the fall in the casuality ratio, Soviet to German, being a “necessary” but not “sufficient” condition for victory I hold to. This brings me on to the discussion about the Krivosheev figures. In discussing his figures I will include some discussion of the Dupuy formula, as all are inter-connected. When it comes to such matters we all have to take a view on which authority is most likely to be correct. I am not in a position to go to Moscow, learn Russian, and go through the raw documents myself. (I have gone through raw documents in archives on some other subjects such as T34 sights.) The fact that “both” John Erickson and David Glantz regard his book as reliable and unbiased I take as very important. I believe they are the world’s number one guys on the Eastern Front, in the English language, others will disagree. However, just because they say something does not mean that I automatically agree. When I run the Dupuy formula and find that German combat effectiveness, with regard to the Soviets, was only 1.15 during the second half of the war, there is a way to do a check. One way to check is to check across to other types of analysis, as I described earlier. A second way is to take the same sources, i.e. Krivosheev’s casualty figures, and run the Dupuy formula for the “first” half of the war in the east. When I did that I found that, certainly in terms of “combat power” if not combat effectiveness, the answer was that one German unit of a given size was as effective as a Soviet one 5-6 times its size. Importantly this tells us that the Krivosheev figures, and Dupuy formula, are consistent with German estimates of Soviet combat power during the first half of the war. If Krivosheev’s data is accurate when dealing with the first half of the war why should it suddenly become unreliable when dealing with the second half of the war? If Krivosheev’s data had resulted in a German combat effectiveness of, say, only 2 for the first half of the war, I also would have thought “ hmm.. maybe this guy simply understates Soviet losses”, but it didn’t. The problem with German estimates of Soviet combat power during the second half of the war is that they had no way of knowing how many causalities they were inflicting on the Soviets. They did not control the battlefields after the fighting, capture millions of prisoners or vast quantities of documents. This brings me to another point I believe Jeff raised. That is the weight that should or should not be given to the German accounts of the war in the East from the nineteen fifties and sixties. I do give a lot of weight to them and nothing that Glantz comes up with changes that. However, it has always been my view that on some points, such as Soviet causalities, the figures given in German accounts should not be considered as reliable. As I have said above, and many others on this thread have also said, the Germans had no way of knowing, particularly for the second half of the war. When you want to know what Commonwealth causalities were in NW Europe you look to Commonwealth sources not German estimates of our losses. Non of this reduces my interest or respect for books such as Panzer Battles by Von Mellenthin. But even in the early eighties when I first read the book I always assumed German estimates of Soviet causalities were likely to be wrong. They clearly were just “estimates”. Quick point on Soviet casuality data. The Soviets did not keep personal records in the sense of Ids and names and addresses. But that is no reason to for assuming that combat commanders strength returns, casuality reports, as part of their SOPs were not reliable. The source I used for German casualties was a table at the back of one of those nineteen fifties studies done by the Germans and US on the war in the east. Defence against Russian Breakthroughs. The version I have is one of the originals, not a Greenhill version, and I do not know if the Greenhill versions have all the tables of data. It is made clear that the causality figures are the German chain of command’s own figures. In both cases, Soviet and German, I use KIA and missing, i.e. POWs. The Russian count slightly differently, they call such figures “irrecoverable”. The Soviet figures also include wounded that were not expected to recover. Lastly I will just take another quick look at the figures for Bagration. If you remember Glantz describes German losses thus, “ In the twelve days between 22June and 4 July, Army Group Centre had lost 25 divisions and well over 300,000 men. In the ensuing weeks it lost more than 100,000 additional men.” Then consider that Krivosheev gives total Soviet losses, this time including sick and wounded, at 765,815 for a 68-day operation. If one looks at the detail of the Glantz statement on German causalities, as given above, it is reasonable to assume a figure of around 500,000 for the full 68 days Krivosheev is discussing. This would give a casuality ratio, Soviet to German, of 1.6:1. Exactly the same as for most of the second half of the war. If you focus down on killed and missing, irrecoverable, you find the Soviet figure was 178,507. I have seen a figure of 250,000 for German killed and missing but cannot remember where of the top of my head. Anyway, whichever way one looks at it the Soviet casuality ratio was clearly no more than the Dupuy formula would tell us to expect from forces of similar quality to the Germans themselves. The fact that we will all never agree adds to the fun. Greatly looking forward to CM2, All the best, Kip. PS. this post does not take account of some of the "lastest" posts above, things are changing so fast I cannot keep up! Jeff, thanks for the compliments,even though we do not agree. Quick take on Bagration force ratios. Glantz puts total German forces involved at 850,000, does not say over what period. Total Soviet at 1.6 million. Even if you take the higher Krivosheev figure of 2.3 million Soviets involved it still gives a force ratio of around 2.7:1 as I would have expected if the "big" pictures was taken. Given the "big" picture loss ratio of 1.6:1 as I give above, it is all unnervingly close to the global picture for the entire second half of the war. [ 06-15-2001: Message edited by: kipanderson ]