Panzer Group West and Ultra

[jacobs_ladder2]

Just checking on some sources and I have come up with some varying accounts of the wounding of General Geyr von Schweppenburg during the second week in June.

All sources agree that his HQ was located by Ultra intercepts and destroyed by an airstrike the next day. The strike followed a meeting with Rommel on the 10th of June in which Rommel stated that a counterattack would be impossible at that time for various reasons. Von Schweppenburg stubbornly ignored him and decided to pursue the attack anyways.

According to Carlo D'Este and Max Hastings, von Schweppenburg's HQ was hit the next day, the 11th, by fighter-bombers and destroyed. The General himself escaped with serious wounds, but most of his staff was killed. Dietrich took over and quickly decided against a counterattack, correctly deducing that the British were about to attack.

Anybody have any sources that disagree with this version of the events? Any further details would be much appreciated.

Cheers

Paul

[Dandelion]

Hi Paul

Yes. But only disagreeing with the very last sentence - Dietrichs role.

Here's what is said in the war diary of the 12.SS-Panzerdivision "Hitlerjugend", which was to participate in the never executed attack (excuse my private translation here).

The attack North from the Caen area, as suggested by AOK7, did not take place.

The war diary of Pz.Gr. West reads on June 10th "Planned night-attack 10./11.6. by the I.SS-Panzerkorps was aborted after discussion with Gen.Feldmarschall Rommel, due to lack of forces, and the reinforcement of enemy positions."

It is peculiar to read the contradictory passages of the war diary of AG B. By 2145 the same day [10th], this diary records a discussion between the Feldmarschall and Generaloberst Jodl, commander of the Wehrmachtfürungsstab. The situation over there is actually that the Pz.Gr. West is forced into a defensive posture. By 2215 however, the chief of staff Ob West says in a telephone conversation that Pz.Gr. West will attempt an attack during the night. O.B. [i.e. Rommel] has agreed to the thought, though he is quite convinced that the enemy superiority in artillery, and air, will prevent any decisive success. It is impossible to give any reasonable explanation to these contradictory logs. Suffice it to say that at this time, Heeresgruppe B was very much free to decide it's own course of action.

By 2030 the headquarters of Panzergruppe West was attacked and destroyed by Jabos [four squadrons of rocket firing Typhoons in this case, followed by 71 medium bombers]. The OB General Geyr von Schweppenburg was wounded. His chief of staff Gen.Maj. Edler von Dawans, and his Ia Maj.i.G. Burgstahler, were both killed. Among the total of 17 dead were also the liason officer of I.SS-Panzerkorps Hauptsturmführer Wilhelm Beck. The remnants of the headquarters were pulled out [of the region], the leadership of the Panzergrupp Abschnitt taken over by I.SS-Panzerkorps. Today it is known that the air attack was the result of an ULTRA transmission. At 0439, June 10th, the British Armygroup [reasonably the 21st?] received the transmission Headquarters Panzergruppe West Evening 9 in la Caine.

The attack, as desired by AOK7, probably planned by Panzergruppe West, possibly agreed by Feldmarschall Rommel but in either case never executed, was in fact in complete want of possibility. The units to be found around Caen were not strong enough for the task. The 21st Panzerdivision was locked in defensive battle and could make free no significant forces for any attack. The Panzer-Lehr division was with it's major parts tied down in an ongoing battle in the Tilly area, where the enemy was attacking, and would not be able to provide relief for the 12.SS-Panzerdivision "HJ", so that the latter could make free her 26th regiment for the attack.

[then follows a paragraph on the too late arriving 2nd and 116th]

And here is what Maj.Gen. Reynolds writes on the same theme:

The 10th June was a bad day for I SS Panzer Corps. Rommel visited Dietrich at his new Headquarters at Baron-sur-Odon and was fully briefed. After the visit, Rommel noted in a report

Unit commanders, especially Sepp Dietrich, report the enemy has complete control over the battle area and up to 100 km behind the front. Sepp Dietrich informed me enemy armoured divisions carry on the battle at a range of up to 3000m with maximum expenditure of ammunition and splendidly supported by the enemy airforce.

[---][notes on other events]

Rommel later talked with von Shweppenburg. The War Diary of Panzer Group West notes:

After discussion with Field Marshal Rommel, the planned attack by I SS Panzer Corps during the night 10/11 June will not take place. Reasons are lack of forces and enemy reinforcements.

[---][We now jump to June 11th]

On this same day, 11th June, General Dempsey was warned by Allied intelligence sources that the Germans were concentrating for a counter-attack out of the Caen area; little did he realise that Rommel, with Dietrichs concurrence, had already decided to delay this attack.

So it very much appears Dietrich needed not make any decisions at all after the transfer of command to him, after the airraid. Or is it air raid?

And I note Anglo-Saxons misinterpret his name. It was Gen.d.Pz.Tr. Frhr. Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg. Leo was his first name, meaning you should write Geyr von Schweppenburg even when only using his last name (well don't look at me like that, I didn't invent these nobility names)

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Dandelion]

Hrm. Geyr von Schweppenburg 'stubbornly ignores' Rommel is a note one must take with some caution.

You know the operational command of the I.SS-Panzerkorps was in Rommels hand. He delegates this command to Geyr von Schweppenburg on June 8th. The latter had always had the administrative responsibility of the Corps, but not operational control. Geyr von Schweppenburg was not really in a position to ignore Rommel by June 8-11.

The counter-attack was Rommels brainchild, sort of, even though his hand was forced. It begins on June 8th when Dietrich insanely orders his Corps to perform this attack all by themselves - by then only consisting of the 21st Panzerdivision and 12th SS. The former was heavily engaged in defensive battle, the latter had offensive capacity but had not yet arrived in full strength.

Rommel cancels this order the same morning, and decides to attempt a 3 division attack instead (awaiting arrival of the Panzer Lehr). He convinces both Dietrich and Geyr von Schweppenburg of this plan, and only then subordinate Dietrich to Geyr von Schweppenburg. But as Rommel travels along the front he obviously has a change of heart. By the evening of June 8th already, he tells von Bayerlein that he and his Panzer Lehr is not to take part in the attack, but go for Bayeux instead.

Geyr von Schweppenburg on his end is also travelling along the front on June 9th, meeting with both Dietrich and Witt (and Meyer), all of them being very enthusiastic about the planned attack. With these impressions he returns to his Hq.

By early June 10th, Rommel reaches Dietrich. By then, it was known that 21st Panzer could not take part, and the Panzer Lehr had been given other orders (Dietrich didn't know that). 12th SS was locked in combat and could participate only if relieved from the line. 1st and 2nd SS, 2nd and 116th Panzer were all too far away to take part. Rommel informs Dietrich at this meeting that there will be no attack.

Rommel then calls Geyr von Schweppenburg to tell him the same thing, a few hours before the latter is taken out of action by the allied air raid.

Maybe it is a projection of the heated disagreements between Geyr von Schweppenburg and Rommel before the invasion? Both Geyr von Schweppenburg and von Rundstedt had problems cooperating with Rommel.

Cheers

Dandelion

[Kingfish]

I remember reading somewhere, probably steel inferno, that the Canadian defense of Norrey and Bretteville really screwed up the 12th SS Pz's plans for an early counterattack.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

I remember reading somewhere, probably steel inferno, that the Canadian defense of Norrey and Bretteville really screwed up the 12th SS Pz's plans for an early counterattack.

Graves suggests as much in A Century of Service; by co-incidence was just reading that passage at lunch today.

[Dandelion]

I hesitate to agree with his suggestion as such. In a way - in another way I do agree. I mean I see the point - the plan entailed the 12th to pass Norrey and Bretteville, the very places they had been rebuffed.

Technically, by the evening of June 10th, the 12th had lost 25 of her 175 tanks, including those lost at Bretteville and Norrey. She had lost about 900 men. She was still a most formidable offensive force, barely scratched by the heavy engagements so far.

Had it been possible to pull her out of the line, she would have been able to participate with a vengeance. Given the highly academic redispositioning of artillery support to add weight to the three division attack, it might have worked. Had it not been entirely theoretical without any basis in reality whatsoever.

As it was, there was no relief allowing her extraction. Technically, I rather agree with the German analysis of June 10th, that sheer lack or assets prevented the counter-attack. The infantry divisions called upon, to enable the pulling out of the Panzer divisions, had not materialised.

There is another side to it however, as I most humbly see it. Norrey and Bretteville had the grave effect of significantly lowering the self-confidence of the LSSAH veterans commanding the 12th SS.

It became obvious that the enemy could not be frightened by shock assaults, and that any bluff would be called. The Allied troops thus proved quite another calibre than that anticipated, and tactics unfailingly successful in the East were suicidal in Normandy. The SS lost much of their (subjectively perceived) morale superiority.

The effects of such changes can be indefinately debated, but as I for one feel that battles are won and lost very much in the minds of men, I am inclined to believe the disbelief and frustration gave birth not only to the atrocities committed against the indomitable foe, but also the rather passive, confused and defensive posture displayed after Bretteville and Norrey.

Though probably a mere figment of my overly lively imagination, I have at times felt that I could relate to that complete loss of self-confidence felt at Bretteville and Norrey. Is this not what Anglo-Saxons refer to as a "sinking feeling"?

Meyer is often referred to as stubborn (to the point of idiocy) pressing the Bretteville attack. But I have never been entirely convinced that he was. I believe he was simply confused, and didn't know what else to do. But to press on. As his hyper-aggressive stance simply would not work - compare his entire carreer up until that point, from Greece and on - he had no other solutions up his sleeve. That's what he did, had always done, it had always led to success. In any combat zone, the man cool enough to know exactly what he is doing is the one who always comes out on top. As Meyer stands on the road in the flaming carnage that was the Bretteville attack, in the middle of the night, he cries. As Wünsche lost Lüddemans Panthers at Norrey, Mr Reynolds says "he could have cried" but in fact he did cry. Veterans of five years of war, of which three in the East, men known for the serenity of their countenance, their presence of mind, pretty centerfold boy-heroes of the Third Reich, winner-types, fall to their knees and cry, publicly. Is that not a display of utter defeat and helplessness? Feelings perhaps not dispersed by the mere cessation of those specific actions, but left smouldering, leaving these men confident only in the role of hugging on to Caen, or to an airfield, at all cost.

Just sitting tight, as we see throughout the war, requires only bravery, no skills or genious of any kind. Any heroic idiot can sit in a hole and in this task, this task alone, confidence remained.

Well, just a personal theory there. I know it is not very conventional.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Hi Paul

Yes. But only disagreeing with the very last sentence - Dietrichs role.

Actually this was not what D'Este said, but rather my poor choice of words. He does claim that the attack on Geyr von Schweppenburg's HQ effectively ended any chance of a counterattack, because the commander of Panzer Group West was the only person who still believed it possible. Dietrich, he goes on to say, did not support the attack either and so it was forgotten. In other words, Dietrich did not continue whatever plans Geyr von Schweppenburg had concocted before the air raid.

The strange thing is that both Hastings and D'Este seem to be under the impression that Dietrich could have done so if he had desired. Similarily, they both agree that, after meeting with Rommel, Geyr von Schweppenburg continued planning an attack regardless.

Odd.

By 2030 the headquarters of Panzergruppe West was attacked and destroyed by Jabos [four squadrons of rocket firing Typhoons in this case, followed by 71 medium bombers]. The OB General Geyr von Schweppenburg was wounded. His chief of staff Gen.Maj. Edler von Dawans, and his Ia Maj.i.G. Burgstahler, were both killed. Among the total of 17 dead were also the liason officer of I.SS-Panzerkorps Hauptsturmführer Wilhelm Beck. The remnants of the headquarters were pulled out [of the region], the leadership of the Panzergrupp Abschnitt taken over by I.SS-Panzerkorps. Today it is known that the air attack was the result of an ULTRA transmission. At 0439, June 10th, the British Armygroup [reasonably the 21st?] received the transmission Headquarters Panzergruppe West Evening 9 in la Caine.

Here is the key point I was after. What is your source for this imformation? According to this information the attack took place the evening of the 10th.

So it very much appears Dietrich needed not make any decisions at all after the transfer of command to him, after the airraid. Or is it air raid?

Air raid. Your information seems to lead to this conclusion, but I am wondering why at least two major accounts of the Normandy fighting agree that Geyr von Schweppenburg had decided to counterattack despite Rommel's words to the contrary. It seems clear that he, Geyr, felt he had the authority to do so.

Am I wrong in thinking that his successor, Dietrich, would also have had the same freedom? Well, freedom officially or unofficially. Or is there something wrong with the entire story?

And I note Anglo-Saxons misinterpret his name. It was Gen.d.Pz.Tr. Frhr. Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg. Leo was his first name...

Thanks. Damn Anglo-Saxons. Who could love them?

Cheers

Paul

p.s. Did people originally believe the air raid to be just luck? I mean, 4 squadrons of fighter-bombers and 71 medium bombers converge on La Caine, and they call it a lucky coincidence?

[Dandelion]

Michael,

Your sig there, the one with pestilence.

It reminds me of a guy over here, a Swedish guy.

He's the kind of guy who'd discuss any topic, enter any subject with no real sense of prestige or narrow mindedness. You know, a nice guy, the type of guy who'd normally always be welcome at any beer table.

Problem is, he has these really huge biceps and on them he has tattooed these "tribes" lines you know, like these

Very popular a while ago and very reminiscent of criminal practices.

That way, nobody realises what a nice guy he actually is. In fact people shun him, as he looks really... dangerous.

I've often wondered why he has those, seeing as he's a regular teddy bear and would literally not kill a mosquito having sucked his blood (female mosquito you know). But I guess it's a pact between us that I don't ask.

So I won't ask why you have that horrible sentence in your sig.

Cheers

Dandelion

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by jacobs_ladder2:

Here is the key point I was after. What is your source for this imformation? According to this information the attack took place the evening of the 10th.

The information is from "Kriegesgeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend", written by Hubert Meyer, the former Ia (Operations officer - I think maybe you call him S3 in your army) of that division. Published by Munin-Verlag in Osnabrück and arguably the best KTB (War Diary) I have ever read - with the reservation that I have not yet read the KTB of Pz Lehr, which has similar repute of quality. There is apparently an English translation of this work?

Also, the very same information is served in Maj.Gen. Michael Reynold's "Steel Inferno", published by Sarpedon in NY. An excellent, lightweight (as in easy-to-read, not as in poorly researched) alternative. In addition, it is Mr Reynolds who provides specifics about allied aircraft types and numbers participating in the attack, Meyer didn't know these things when he wrote his works.

The Hq attacked was not located in the village itself but in the Chateaux of La Caine, a Calvados (apple growing) producing Chateaux of little repute in those days. Of course it was completely obliterated. Another piece of obscure information obtained from Meyer.

but I am wondering why at least two major accounts of the Normandy fighting agree that Geyr von Schweppenburg had decided to counterattack despite Rommel's words to the contrary. It seems clear that he, Geyr, felt he had the authority to do so.

He, Leo. Or he, Geyr von Schweppenburg.

Leo had per se the authority to issue any orders to the entire Pz Grp West as he pleased, but there would be little use issuing orders he knew beforehand would be cancelled by his superior, Rommel. As he had been enlightened about Rommels opinion on the attack, there seems to be little point in continuing progress in a direction undesired by his superiors.

You know, before the invasion took place, there was a most heated debate with Rommel on one side, and von Rundstedt and Geyr von Schweppenburg on the other. This was due to the extremly confused command structure of those days. Even though Rommel was a Field Marshal, Geyr von Schweppenburg - not holding this rank - was able to speak up to him by virtue of his then independent command, directly subordinate to von Rundstedt, another Field Marshal, and not Rommel. Very much has been made of this argument and most literary coverage of the Normandy invasion spend a lot of text on it - and rightly so as it affected adversely the preparations. But as soon as the first allied paras landed, the chain of command was by-and-by set straight and Geyr von Schweppenburg had by June 8th securely landed under the foot of Rommel. At that point he no longer had a position from which he could successfully argue.

Rommel was an extremly difficult character to work with, yet I find no evidence in my sources of them colliding once the firing had started. Geyr von Schweppenburg was a pragmatic man, he knew the region by heart since his days planning operation Sea Lion, and quickly grasped necessities once the action started. A skilled and scholared cavalry man, eventually Panzer man, by all accounts I find. Rommel, lacking staff scholarship, continued his style of improvisation, sudden changes of mind and his tradition of being perpetually unavailable when any action started. He issued conflicting orders as he happend to stumble across various subordinates. All of his subordinates, not just Leo, were chronically confused and left in the dark as to Rommels intentions. It had been like that since Africa and his various staffs always loathed working with him.

I am thus not greatly surprised his Chief of Staff made that telephone conversation - he probably had no idea Rommel had long since changed his mind, but forgotten to tell his own staff.

Am I wrong in thinking that his successor, Dietrich, would also have had the same freedom?Well, freedom officially or unofficially. Or is there something wrong with the entire story?

I firmly believe he had this freedom. Chains of command were actually loosely set in terms of freedom of decision in the German army. Sepp made an attempt at issuing those very orders on June 8th, at about 0800 hours, but was countermanded by Rommel at about 0810 hours. Nonetheless, he certainly felt free - and was free - to issue any such orders concerning his Corps as he saw fit. His commander would of course have kept the privelege of intervening as he in turn saw fit, and Rommel is known to have been extremely interventionist for a senior officer. But in general, we speak Auftragstaktik.

Thanks. Damn Anglo-Saxons. Who could love them?

That's the whole problem of the equation. Had they not been lovable as such, they would have never gotten away with all the mischief they have caused.

p.s. Did people originally believe the air raid to be just luck? I mean, 4 squadrons of fighter-bombers and 71 medium bombers converge on La Caine, and they call it a lucky coincidence?

Fate, Paul, not luck. Centuries of christianity had not done much to eradicate the heathen belief in fate. Five years of war, many freak incidents. This was just one more. Remember that in the first years, Allied bombing missions were so severely inaccurate that the Germans never actually understood what they were trying to attack. I'm serious, it presented a real problem for the German intelligence services.

Any sending of any transmission brought about the danger of Allied air attack, although not at the level experienced on a modern battlefield, and the Chateaux was a real hub, with massive communications running out of it. It was not an unreasonable thought, that the sheer volume of transmissions had brought about the attack. Indeed, the Allies might have been after some other target, or just out roving - it could have all been true. Of course it wasn't, but it might have.

Rather an impressive reaction time is it not? Message received at exactly 0439, airfields all in the UK at the time, still attack on target begins at 2030 hours. Almost modern standards.

Cheers

Dandelion

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

The information is from "Kriegesgeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision Hitlerjugend", written by Hubert Meyer...

So where did Hastings and D'Este (and others) come up with an air raid on the 11th? I wonder if one of them didn't make a mistake and then become a source for the rest?

Leo had per se the authority to issue any orders to the entire Pz Grp West as he pleased, but there would be little use issuing orders he knew beforehand would be cancelled by his superior, Rommel. As he had been enlightened about Rommels opinion on the attack, there seems to be little point in continuing progress in a direction undesired by his superiors.

Yet in this case he, Leo, continued to plan a counterattack immediately after discussing the situation with Rommel. By all accounts he disregarded the conversation and went right ahead with his plans. Why would he do that if his orders would only be negated? It doesn't make sense. He must have believed that he could make the counterattack happen.

But in general, we speak Auftragstaktik.

What does this mean?

Fate, Paul, not luck...Rather an impressive reaction time is it not? Message received at exactly 0439, airfields all in the UK at the time, still attack on target begins at 2030 hours. Almost modern standards.

Cheers

Dandelion

Not bad at all. I thought the same. Quick and effective.

In fact, the massive Allied response is in proportion to the radio traffic that must have been going through the area. Now I see why they sent in that many aircraft.

Not sure about the fate argument, but I can see how Ultra's role in the whole thing could have been missed.

Cheers

Paul

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by jacobs_ladder2:

So where did Hastings and D'Este (and others) come up with an air raid on the 11th? I wonder if one of them didn't make a mistake and then become a source for the rest?

Could happend, both ways so to speak, I mean the KTB being the source for Reynolds. But it is unlikely that the Germans would be in doubt of what day area control was transferred to I.SS-Panzerkorps (an order is only as effective as the echelon signing it), and given that the War Diary of area control of that unit starts on June 10th it seems unlikely that the Hq was hit June 11th. But hey, no way to really know.

Of course, no search on the net will clarify. This site here (German) gives the date 10, and though this account is ambivalent (open for interpretation) it does seem the Canadians mean June 10th as well. But no stating of sources.

Yet in this case he, Leo, continued to plan a counterattack immediately after discussing the situation with Rommel. By all accounts he disregarded the conversation and went right ahead with his plans. Why would he do that if his orders would only be negated? It doesn't make sense. He must have believed that he could make the counterattack happen.

No it doesn't make sense. By all means; he might have wanted an attack to happend (they all did), he might have continued to make plans for a limited attack given realities et cetera. Maybe he planned on getting Dollman and the others onboard and to argue for it. Plenty possibility. But seeing as he had very little time to continue planning, if the air raid did take place at 2030 June 10th, and given that he knew Rommel would cancel any order to continue the previously planned 3 division attack, I also do not see the point in continuing, nor that he had very much time to continue at all. As you can see, the War Diary as read by our two independent researchers state no difference in opinion between GvS and Rommel. Nor that GvS continued planning.

But in general, we speak Auftragstaktik.

What does this mean?

It means a superior officers never gives detailed instruction to a subordinate (=no micromanagement, of for instance UK type (at the time)). Instead he describes the effect he desires, and leaves entirely to the subordinate to achieve this effect with the assets at hand - or the further assets demanded. Any which way the subordinate chooses. It was a matter of honour and professionalism, not to interferere with the work of subordinates even though they might choose strange paths, as long as they kept reaching desired goals. That's why Rommel was found so disagreeable as a commander. Anyway, this order-methodology has a long history to it, being born when the Germans realised orders had become too long to be practical, but I'm not sure you're interested and the end effect of it is an extreme degree of delegation (freedom for subordinates) anyway.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[JonS]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

[snips]

There is another side to it however, as I most humbly see it. Norrey and Bretteville had the grave effect of significantly lowering the self-confidence of the LSSAH veterans commanding the 12th SS.

It became obvious that the enemy could not be frightened by shock assaults, and that any bluff would be called. The Allied troops thus proved quite another calibre than that anticipated, and tactics unfailingly successful in the East were suicidal in Normandy. The SS lost much of their (subjectively perceived) morale superiority.

The effects of such changes can be indefinately debated, but as I for one feel that battles are won and lost very much in the minds of men, I am inclined to believe the disbelief and frustration gave birth not only to the atrocities committed against the indomitable foe, but also the rather passive, confused and defensive posture displayed after Bretteville and Norrey.

Though probably a mere figment of my overly lively imagination, I have at times felt that I could relate to that complete loss of self-confidence felt at Bretteville and Norrey. Is this not what Anglo-Saxons refer to as a "sinking feeling"?

Meyer is often referred to as stubborn (to the point of idiocy) pressing the Bretteville attack. But I have never been entirely convinced that he was. I believe he was simply confused, and didn't know what else to do. But to press on. As his hyper-aggressive stance simply would not work - compare his entire carreer up until that point, from Greece and on - he had no other solutions up his sleeve. That's what he did, had always done, it had always led to success. In any combat zone, the man cool enough to know exactly what he is doing is the one who always comes out on top. As Meyer stands on the road in the flaming carnage that was the Bretteville attack, in the middle of the night, he cries. As Wünsche lost Lüddemans Panthers at Norrey, Mr Reynolds says "he could have cried" but in fact he did cry. Veterans of five years of war, of which three in the East, men known for the serenity of their countenance, their presence of mind, pretty centerfold boy-heroes of the Third Reich, winner-types, fall to their knees and cry, publicly. Is that not a display of utter defeat and helplessness? Feelings perhaps not dispersed by the mere cessation of those specific actions, but left smouldering, leaving these men confident only in the role of hugging on to Caen, or to an airfield, at all cost.

Just sitting tight, as we see throughout the war, requires only bravery, no skills or genious of any kind. Any heroic idiot can sit in a hole and in this task, this task alone, confidence remained.

Well, just a personal theory there. I know it is not very conventional.

Great post D. Even by your very high standards.

[Aco4bn187inf]

About the air attack on geyr von Schweppengerg's HQ- (To expand on Jacob's Ladder 2's earlier point)

John keegan, in Six Armies in Normandy, seems to indicate that the air attack itself was prompted simply by the volume and character of radio traffic coming from the HQ, not by the eventually decoded content of the traffic.

(pp.150 to 152 of that book.)

'A by-product of the 'Sigint' which had prompted the air attack on Panzer Group West, however, was the warning, extracted by the Bletchley 'Ultra' apparatus, of its impending offensive.' (p.152)

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

Great post D. Even by your very high standards.

I second that.

[Bigduke6]

And I third Andreas on that, even if Andreas frightens small children with his dueling scars.

Originally posted by Dandelion:

SCHNIPP!

It became obvious that the enemy could not be frightened by shock assaults, and that any bluff would be called. The Allied troops thus proved quite another calibre than that anticipated, and tactics unfailingly successful in the East were suicidal in Normandy. The SS lost much of their (subjectively perceived) morale superiority.

The effects of such changes can be indefinately debated, but as I for one feel that battles are won and lost very much in the minds of men, I am inclined to believe the disbelief and frustration gave birth not only to the atrocities committed against the indomitable foe, but also the rather passive, confused and defensive posture displayed after Bretteville and Norrey.

(SCHNIPP AGAIN)

Well, just a personal theory there. I know it is not very conventional.

Cheerio

Dandelion

I think Dandelion goes to the heart of the practical collapse of the Wehrmacht during the summer of 1944. Events are connected, and less than two weeks after the Germans figured out the Anglo-Saxons were in Normandy with oodles of force and were willing to use it, the Soviets kicked off their summer offensive, the pace of which in a couple of months shattered two German Army Groups and took the Reds into the Balkans. And France is lost to even faster-moving U.S. forces (mostly) during the same time period.

What a shock that most have been for the German General Staff. Until the great Allied Summer '44 offensives kicked off, they could tell themselves German tactical skill and technical superiority could prolong the war almost indefinately, or at least for the forseeable future. But by September '44 or so the handwriting was on the wall and even the dumbest Landser could read it: the Allies can be delayed, but they cannot be stopped.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

As Meyer stands on the road in the flaming carnage that was the Bretteville attack, in the middle of the night, he cries. As Wünsche lost Lüddemans Panthers at Norrey, Mr Reynolds says "he could have cried" but in fact he did cry. Veterans of five years of war, of which three in the East, men known for the serenity of their countenance, their presence of mind, pretty centerfold boy-heroes of the Third Reich, winner-types, fall to their knees and cry, publicly.

How Wagnerian. Are there actual eyewitness accounts of Meyer on his knees crying?

In any event, I think your sense of the morale of the German army at this point is (as usual ) pretty much right on.

Michael

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

It became obvious that the enemy could not be frightened by shock assaults, and that any bluff would be called. The Allied troops thus proved quite another calibre than that anticipated, and tactics unfailingly successful in the East were suicidal in Normandy. The SS lost much of their (subjectively perceived) morale superiority.

The effects of such changes can be indefinately debated, but as I for one feel that battles are won and lost very much in the minds of men, I am inclined to believe the disbelief and frustration gave birth not only to the atrocities committed against the indomitable foe, but also the rather passive, confused and defensive posture displayed after Bretteville and Norrey.

Though probably a mere figment of my overly lively imagination, I have at times felt that I could relate to that complete loss of self-confidence felt at Bretteville and Norrey. Is this not what Anglo-Saxons refer to as a "sinking feeling"?

But did that "sinking feeling" begin to sink in at this early stage? If Norrey and Bretteville came as a shock to the German self-confidence, then they surely got a boost from the results of Villers-Bocage or the June 7th attacks at Buron and Authie.

[Dandelion]

Yes Michael, eyewitnesses, and Meyer himself didn't mind being openly emotional, although this is the only instance of crying that I can recall him mentioning himself. Meyer was a spontaneous character, quick to laugh and quite amiable in a social context. He liked teaching, liked being a leader, liked to be around young people and he handled rigid hierarchies by providing comic relief. He had a very fatherly approach to leadership after his transfer to the 12th, and had he not been a convinced Nazi (which he remained until his dying breath) and had there not been a war, I imagine he might have been an ideal athletics teacher at some University, or the coach of some football team or something (that's soccer in your house).

Wünsche was quite another character. I actually came to think of him watching that US TV series Brothers in Arms. There is a lieutenant there, reputed to have murdered German POWs and so everyone is afraid of him. He says little and is obviously slightly insane, yet he very very consciounsly builds and tends his own mythos, so he can use it in his leadership. Wünsche was a bit of the same on all counts really. Everyone around him worshipped him, but it wasn't like anybody used to hug him or cry on his shoulder. It must have been a staggering shock for his men (kids of 19-20) to see him lose control. He never did.

Maj.Gen. Reynolds also came to think of Wagner, though in his case the Ride of the Valkyries.

Hey Brooklyn, that was an impossible sig to use in conversation Meaning no disrespect to your unit there, the 187th. Keegans theory sounds very plausible to me and being no expert on ULTRA, but having rather good insight as to the volume of communication at a Army Hq (which Pz.Gr. West actually was), I am prepared to believe him.

Right, I'm off to the Rhein valley tomorrow, and will have a go at the Mosel (Moselle) as well. Anyone need anything from that area? Photo's of something or maps or the like? I plan to go South from Cologne down to Strasbourg then Colmar following Rhine/Rhin, then up to Trier, then up along the Mosel to Koblenz again. For once I plan to not stop at the BA/MA My wife will not accept another turn there, will have to do it when travelling on my own. Will visit the Köln-Wahn war cemetary to pay my respects to a number of relatives, will put a flower on a grave belonging to your family if you want.

Sincerely

Dandelion

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

But did that "sinking feeling" begin to sink in at this early stage? If Norrey and Bretteville came as a shock to the German self-confidence, then they surely got a boost from the results of Villers-Bocage or the June 7th attacks at Buron and Authie.

King,

Very esoteric matters of course, and not easy to carry a non-technical argument, but no, I don't think it had "sunk in" on June 8th-10th. I think there had been created a strong feeling of doubt within a number of key players. I think a number of commanders had lost faith in their abilities, making them cautious and passive, reluctant to undertake the previously so predominant high-risk activities. I think the feeling spread and kept spreading, until it had finally actually "sunk in". I cannot see the return of the extreme spirit of aggression that characterised German arms in the war and was, as I see it, the fundamental reason for her success on the field (tactical level I mean). Such a spirit requires a belief that anything is possible, that everything that could be done should be done, and a substantial degree of self confidence. If you have no self confidence, everything seems impossible, and doing nothing is perceived as better than making a mistake.

As such, the battles of June 7th confirmed the credibility of German arms, I do not believe they were a boost as much as relieving confirmation of normality. For the men fighting these battles, it was their baptism of fire and I guess it was probably very relieving for them to see that they could all manage, and that their veteran leaders were everything they had promised to be.

Bretteville and Norrey came after these battles and after being halted here, there were no German advances or gains of territory in that sector. No dashing shock assaults or smart manoeuvres, just dreary battles of attrition.

We see extreme fighting morale in some German formations long after June 8th - the battles of Caen being good illustrations. While loss of confidence creates passive troops, it need not mean they are not prepared to give their all in a situation they feel they can master. Such as defence.

Villers-Bocage was regarded as a "Husarenstreich" by Wittman, a lone hero roving in a long German tradition of roving hussars and lancers (Uhlans). German arms needed these heroes just like the UK needed their commandos. Wittman was already a myth and so was the Tiger. It will have boosted morale and faith in German arms, but not necessarily the self confidence of the German troop commanders.

Regards

Dandelion

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Michael,

Your sig there, the one with pestilence.

It reminds me of a guy over here, a Swedish guy.

He's the kind of guy who'd discuss any topic, enter any subject with no real sense of prestige or narrow mindedness. You know, a nice guy, the type of guy who'd normally always be welcome at any beer table.

Problem is, he has these really huge biceps and on them he has tattooed these "tribes" lines you know, like these

Very popular a while ago and very reminiscent of criminal practices.

That way, nobody realises what a nice guy he actually is. In fact people shun him, as he looks really... dangerous.

I've often wondered why he has those, seeing as he's a regular teddy bear and would literally not kill a mosquito having sucked his blood (female mosquito you know). But I guess it's a pact between us that I don't ask.

So I won't ask why you have that horrible sentence in your sig.

Cheers

Dandelion

As you see through Meyer, you see through me. Would the rest of the English speaking world have your vision. I can see why your Swedish friend would get along with you.

I think it is past time to delete that "horrible" reference from my sig in any event; one needs to be careful of the company one keeps. I will, however, keep the famous quote by the devoted National Socialist; like Schneller Meyer, Rudel would have gone far in athletics. Weren't they all like that under National Socialism, though?

One of my girlfriends wants me to come to her sister's wedding in Germany in late December; still considering it but too far off to really know what the future might bring. Perhaps I could visit one of those cemeteries with you sometime.

[Aragorn2002]

Originally posted by aco4bn187inf:

John keegan, in Six Armies in Normandy, seems to indicate that the air attack itself was prompted simply by the volume and character of radio traffic coming from the HQ, not by the eventually decoded content of the traffic.

(pp.150 to 152 of that book.)

'A by-product of the 'Sigint' which had prompted the air attack on Panzer Group West, however, was the warning, extracted by the Bletchley 'Ultra' apparatus, of its impending offensive.' (p.152)

And what if the revisionist theory of treason at the general staff of Heeresgruppe B is correct? What if Speidel, Rommels chief of staff (known for his suspicious behaviour in the handling of the 21st Panzer Division in the first hours of the invasion), did advise the allies to take out Geyr von Schweppenburg and to insure that way that the only person who could convince others that a German counterattack was necessary, was removed out of the game? Far-fetched as it may sound, Speidel could even have informed the allies about the location of Geyr von Schweppenburgs HQ. He knew exactly about his intentions and his whereabouts. "Take him out, just to be on the safe side"...

Dandelion, your view on this matter please. I rely on your open mind. Personally I think it is very well possible there WAS treason during the Normandy campaign. Perhaps a lot of treason has been camouflaged by the ULTRA story. And Speidel, among others, is a strong candidate for this role. Of course this is mere speculation, but if considered it explains a lot of events and things that went wrong on the German side during the Normandy campaign.

By the way, great reading, people, especially your analysis about the emotional effect of the failing of the German counterattacks on the German commanders in the field, Dandelion.

[ July 11, 2005, 11:50 AM: Message edited by: aragorn2002 ]

[Kingfish]

Far fetched indeed. This theory assumes that Siedel knew Schweppenburg was going to counterattack despite Rommel's orders to the contrary.

Also consider that a German counterattack may have been to the allies benefit. Monty certainly planned for such an attack, and had ordered Crocker to concentrate his armor in anticipation of it. Had it gone off it may have caused grevious damage to the allies -or- to the better part of the German armor reserves in the west.

Now there's a 'what-if'

[Andreas]

All things considered, things went extremely well for the Germans in Normandy. The Germans managed to hold on so long because the defense multiplied the superior aspects of their weapons (range and hitting power) nicely, while avoiding the problems (immobility of tank guns, lack of infantry to take and hold ground, exposure of large formations in the open where they fall victim to artillery). It also allowed them to deny the Allies the knowledge of their exact positions, and avoided things like Panthers being shot up like ducks in a row, because of having to expose their thin side armour. As happened at Norrey, and again to Wittmann and his Tigers at Cintheaux.

Had they attacked with all those nice Panzers it would have been over that much quicker.

[Dandelion]

Aragorn

Hans Speidel was severely disreputised in David Irvings book on Rommel. In it, Mr Irving accuse Speidel of selling an innocent Rommel out to the Gestapo. Though Mr Irving is not very credible as a researcher we don't see a lot of disputing the description of Speidel.

Mr Irving is not alone in his belief either. People like President de Gaulle had the very same conviction long before Irving had, and vehemently opposed Speidels position of NATO commander in the early sixties. Other German army officers have aired similar opinions.

Speidel did push a lively argument for the closing of a separate peace with the Western powers in the summer of 1944. He was up to his neck in the conspiracy against Hitler. Speidels recorded reactions to the allied landings stand out as... peculiar. He did nothing at all even as he receives reports of massive airborne landings and later on the arrival of the largest fleeting force humanity had ever seen just off the coast.

On the other hand, Speidel came to Rommel recommended by Zeitzler, a Nazi fundamentalist. Wöhler had also recommended him, a convicted war criminal who was into the Einsatzgruppen hobby in the East. Speidel even had connections with Schörner who, apart from being an extremely disagreeable character, was also in the inner circle of the dedicated Nazi Generalship. To round the collection off, Sepp Dietrich lay a word for him during the proceedings as well. These were his buddies.

What then to make of this enigmatic, reputedly intelligent, pianomastering, womanizing, alpinist General Staff general? God knows. Question marks remain around his character and one cannot unreservedly discard the notion of treason.

In this particular case, I fail to see the gain of treason. If it was the counter-attack as such that he wished to abort, he will in his position have had information enough to know he needed to do nothing at all. Counter-attack with what three divisions? It was just another impulse of Rommels, a spur of the moment idea that he himself discarded before the passing of eight glasses.

That's leaving aside the practical problems of contacting the enemy, leaving this kind of information, being believed and trusted and so on.

What does Speidel himself say in his book on the Normandy invasion?

Sincerely

Dandelion

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

What then to make of this enigmatic, reputedly intelligent, pianomastering, womanizing, alpinist General Staff general?

Didn't he also have a degree in philosophy? I read that somewhere years ago and wondered if it were true.

Michael