WW2 Leadership lecture

[Affentitten]

How much of a reality is that view that everyone standing around Stalin was in mortal peril and terrified for their life? Is there a basis for that "management by fear" reputation?

[JonS]

Are you talking about during the purges, or after June 1941?

[Affentitten]

Are you talking about during the purges, or after June 1941?

I mean 41-45. Like the kind of Hollywood idea that people would be in with Stalin, he'd ask them why such and such an attack had failed and they'd be dragged out and shot if the answer wasn't satisfactory. Or dragged out and shot on just on personal whim.

He has the reputation of being a psychopath. Was this real and was it present in his leadership of the Great Patriotic War?

[JonS]

IIRC that did happen to a fwe in 1941, but not so much after that. Then again I'm far from a Stalin grog. Then again, again, having proven beyond doubt that he could and would do that (in the 1930s adn in 1941), perhaps the requirement to actually carry out the threat wasn't so acute after 1942. And things were going better by then, generally, which tends to put everyone in a happier, less homicidal frame of mind.

Still, I think most this is a fairly minor, tangential point WRT your lecture.

Speaking of which, have you thought out a general approach? You could look at different leadership styles, and suggest which style each of The Big Four tended to use most of the time, and how it worked out for them - ie, how effective was their style, and would a different style perhaps have worked better for them. You could also perhaps examine how Churchill, Stalin, and Hitler (and to a lesser extent FDR) changed their leadership style between times when things were going well, and when they were going ... less than well. You could also look at different qualities of a leader, and how each of the Four embodied those qualities. Something else to cover, I would think, is how wartime leadership differs from leadership in other times, and continuing that theme you could compare and contrast the Four's leadership styles in war and in peace.

[Affentitten]

It does have to do with leadership 'style'. Note this is not a history lecture as such. It's more about leadership and the way that these men managed their war efforts.

[JonS]

Note this is not a history lecture as such.

Yeah. Keep that thought front of mind.

[Affentitten]

And basically it's a 50 minute lecture. So that means roughly 10 minutes on each guy plus a few general comments.

[JonS]

Did you consider Mussolini or whoever was in charge of Japan instead of one of the Allied leaders (i.e., two winners and two losers)

[Affentitten]

I didn't get a choice. I've been called in because of (perceived) expertise to fill a gap in someone else's lecture plan.

I guess Il Duce is not quite as important, given his realtively short war leadership compared to the other four. Japan of course is a far more mixed bag given the situation of Emperor and the more diluted military/political leadership.

Personally I think I could lose FDR but the American contribution can't be ignored and I think the dynamic between he, Stalin and Churchill is important.

[Sgt Joch]

the view of Stalin as a psychopath is gross exaggeration. He was a smart politician who did what had to be done to survive. He did not mindlessly kill people unless there was a reason. Remember, he was a Georgian, from a poor background who rose to become leader of the USSR. He knew that he would always be looked down to by the traditional Russian ruling classes.

Yes, during the purges of 35-38, an estimated 1,000, 000 people disappeared, about half of which were killed outright and the other half sent to camps. The major purpose, from Stalin's point of view, was to get rid of any one who could be a potential threat. He was very suspicious of any potential political opponent, certainly bordering on paranoia.

In 41-45, his relationship with the people working around him, military officers, politicians, staff member was professional. He did not threathen to shoot people who did not agree with him. I was surprised to find out that many generals had no qualms about arguing with Stalin if they thought their position was correct and Stalin had no problem changing his mind if he realized he was wrong. In fact, he seems to have respected people who stood up to him, as long as it was done in a respectful manner and the person had a well thought out argument. Zhukov often disagreed and argued with Stalin, sometimes to the point where Stalin lost his temper, but if did not affect their relationship during the war.

Stalin himself though never did the dirty work. If he wanted someone eliminated or discredited, he would give the order to a staff member. In due time, the target would be arrested with the charge and the evidence being tailored whether Stalin wanted him or her killed or just jailed for a few months or years.

[Michael Emrys]

It was almost wholly political. Greece was an ally an in 1941 those were pretty thin on the ground and helping them out was seen as giving a positive impulse to those on the fence.

Correct, and it was a tough call to make. Certainly taking the opposite course was not obviously better. But we, blessed with hindsight, can see that though the expedition to Greece demonstrated that Britain was doggedly determined to follow through on commitments, it also showed that it lacked the power to do much about them. I have my doubts that potential allies were positively much swayed by the spectacle of the British being thrown out or yet another country.

It's a good question whether at the end of the day the forces sent to Greece might have served the Allied cause better if they had been retained in the Middle East. Rolling up Tripoli, as some have suggested, would not have been on for logistical reasons, but Rommel's spring offensive might have been blunted and held farther to the west. Plus there would have been more force in hand to finish off the Italians in Ethiopia and to deal with problems in Iraq and Syria.

The Dodecanese islands were also very political. Capturing was thought to bring the Turks closer to war. Though I doubt they would have, not acting would have seen them back off. Then again, the ultimate failure put the Turkish DoW even further in to the future.

I think that's a fair summation.

But the big prize was access to the Black Sea. Considering the trouble of the Artic convoys it was a worthwhile attempt.

I think that may be overrated. In the first place, just how much access to Odessa would passage through the Bosporus have allowed, given that at that point in the war the convoys would have been attacked from the air based in southern Ukraine and Rumania? And in any event, the Persian Corridor was at that time coming on line. Going via the Black Sea to Odessa would have meant a shorter water trip, which would be desirable because of the chronic shipping shortage, but probably would not have had the ships unloading any closer to the defense plants, which was also a concern.

The biggest blame that can be attributed to Churchill was that he didn't call the whole thing off when the operation was being actively undermined.

And that's the kind of thing I am talking about. He tended to squander forces on long shots, forces that the Empire and Commonwealth could ill afford. A leader with a more balanced temperament would likely have husbanded his forces until the opportunity came along to do something really decisive.

But these are just the the faults of an otherwise great man. History is replete with those, and I agree with the view that the Alliance would have been worse, not better, off without him.

Michael

[Pak_43]

And that's the kind of thing I am talking about. He tended to squander forces on long shots, forces that the Empire and Commonwealth could ill afford. A leader with a more balanced temperament would likely have husbanded his forces until the opportunity came along to do something really decisive.

But these are just the the faults of an otherwise great man. History is replete with those, and I agree with the view that the Alliance would have been worse, not better, off without him.

I'd agree with that summary completely. I'll retract my rather sweeping statement about distrusting intellectuals, it doesn't bear examination as I should have realised...

Although I did dig up a link about Churchills leadership style, worth a read..

http://homepage.eircom.net/%257Eodyssey/Quotes/History/Keegan_Churchill.html#6

[Sergei]

Stalin was also a notoriously hard worker who would often hold meetings in his office as late as 2 or 3 a.m.

It also had the effect of enforcing his power over his henchmen. He not only was making the decisions on policy making, he also decided when people near him slept! Just imagine what it's like to be called to the general secretary's office from your bed - especially when NKVD also liked to make arrests in the middle of the night.

[Boeman]

It is fair to say that the pre-war Stalin and the Stalin of 1942 onwards were completely different personalities insofar as their handling of military affairs were concerned. As individuals, they shared the same suspicious, vindictive and cruel countenances; common traits among most dictators.

Stalin's rule was based entirely on fear and premised on the condition where the apparatus of the state encroached upon every facet of Russian life. Not unlike Hitler, Stalin affected his authority over the civilian population through the secret police and commissariat.

To ensure the supremacy of his rein, Stalin replaced many government and military high command positions with his own cronies, however incompetent. The result was a series of mass executions that left the Red Army sorely lacking in experienced and proficient NCOs.

The initial purges conducted by Stalin had an absolutely devastating effect on the Red Army. This was underscored by the humiliating defeats suffered in the center of Finland prior to its capitulation in 1939. The Germans were, of course, only emboldened by this and a similarly inept Russian defense was carried out by the time they attacked the Soviet Union in 1941.

Stalin's micromanagement early in the war and his ardent refusal to allow strategic withdraws culminated in a series of disasters that gave him enough pause to even consider conceding the entire Ukraine in exchange for peace. Only through the relatively inexhaustible manpower and the assistance of the coldest winter on record was Moscow spared and the Red Army given precious respite - long enough for Stalin to recognize his limitations as a military leader.

Though Stalin retained his single-minded ruthlessness, indifference to casualties and a healthy amount of paranoia, he allowed his generals to perform their duties without external interference - except where he deemed it absolutely necessary. He had also compromised by fundamentally altering both the government and military wings by infusing them with more qualified personnel as in the case of selecting Zhokov in favor of Marshal Temeshenko as his top General.

As it turns out, Stalin had a highly retentive and flexible mind, well suited to military affairs. He was a master of manipulation, being able to squeeze out maximum performance from his subordinates. Although Stalin encouraged his generals to cooperate with one another, he also spurred them on by seeding deep and bitter rivalries (Konev vs Khukov). More often then naught, generals would find themselves racing against each other to their objectives. The fact that this resulted in a reckless of expenditure of lives was, to Stalin, no matter of supreme difference.

Stalin was as equally paranoid with his allies as he was with his enemies. Time and again, he would mislead Churchill and Roosevelt on operational timetables and rarely if ever revealed the true objectives of Russian military actions. He even went so far on one occasion as to suggest that Dresden, rather than Berlin, was the final destination for the Red Army.

It is probably ironic that Russia, and perhaps, the rest of the free world, owes their victory over Nazi Germany to one of the most unscrupulous dictators in modern history.

[Sergei]

It is equally ironic that Stalin and CPSU could thank for a lot an anti-communist and shameless imperialist who was a proponent of Allied intervention in the Russian civil war and, according to some claims, even referred to Mussolini as an example of how to deal with the unions and communists. Who in their right minds in 1919 would have imagined that 25 years later the Red Army would be using tanks named after Josif Stalin, Kliment Voroshilov and... Winston Churchill?!?

[Affentitten]

LOts of good comments here. Thanks to all. I am now off to a conference for a few days, locked in 4 star resort with a horde of 22 year old Public Relations chicks called Felicity or Jemma. So if I don't add to this thread in the next few days, it's because the Felicitys didn't have any good insight into Stalinist management for me to write here.

[Affentitten]

LOts of good comments here. Thanks to all. I am now off to a conference for a few days, locked in 4 star resort with a horde of 22 year old Public Relations chicks called Felicity or Jemma. So if I don't add to this thread in the next few days, it's because the Felicitys didn't have any good insight into Stalinist management for me to write here.

And believe it or not, I spent the small hours of last night propping up the bar with a Russian history grog. His name was not Felicity though.

[Michael Emrys]

Learn anything interesting?

Michael

[Affentitten]

Happily, I learnt that the resort my conference is at is also hosting Swimwear Fashion Week at the moment. The place is wall-to-wall with bikini models.

[Ssiissuu]

Pics or I call fake.

The Russian grog, I mean.

[Affentitten]

Does anyone have a link or info on comparative tropp numbers in WW2? I am at work and a quick Google has not borne fruit. I want rough troop numbers for USSR, USA, Germany (and allies) and UK & Commonwealth.

The intention here is to demonstrate to a group of Australians that the British/Commonwealth contribution was not as great as they probably imagine.

[JonS]

I can't help, but I suspect the point you are trying to make depends a bit on whether or not you include the RAF and the RN.

[dieseltaylor]

Possibly your Googlefu refused to look at Wikianswers

Answer

There were dozens of different countries involved in that war. I think Winston Churchill gives a partial listing of this information in his memoirs. Michael Montagne

Answer

Hi Pete

Your question is too great a task I think, but I can give you the official number of mobilised personnel for the major players;

USA 16 115 000 UK 5 900 000 Germany 20 000 000 Italy 3 100 000 Japan 9 700 000 Canada 1 500 000 Russia 29 000 000

The USSR never provided a figure on how many they mobilised, and the French count is too confusing to be of value here. Sorry.

Answer

Official numbers for USSR: 4 826 907 as of June 22, 1941 ( the date Soviet Union entered the war ); 29 574 900 mobilized between 1941 and 1945.

Answer

The numbers for France are as follows: 6 000 000 were mobilized in 1940; 480 000 participated in the liberation of North Africa and Italy (1942-); and 1 450 000 were in French uniform during the liberation of France (1944).

About 85 000 soldiers were in a French Army reconstituted under German orders after France was invaded by Germany, and meant to fight alongside the Axis.

Two of the countries above, France and Italy, also had internal resistance movements, i.e. civilians who fought on the side of the Allies but could not fight in uniform. About 400 000 French were at the core of that country's resistance movement. There were about 300 000 Italian resistants.

I assume you have Australian numbers : )

[dieseltaylor]

Numbers are not everything - quality of input counts too. I notice China and Japan do not feature in the answers given above which comes back to quality has a value all its own.

Radar, Asdic or sonar, Merlin engines, ATG's that worked, espionage, whilst possibly not war winning individually certainly made a difference to the positive side. The atom bomb would also fall into the equation.

Wikipedia actually does seem to offer all the answer if you scroll down in this link

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties

This is probably one bit you would like though it is worth reading the whole:

British Commonwealth

1. Number served: UK & Crown Colonies (5,896,000); India (2,582,000), Australia (993,000); Canada (1,100,000); New Zealand (295,000); South Africa (250,000). [1,253-254]
   
2. Total war related deaths reported by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission: UK & Crown Colonies (383,667); Undivided India (87,031), Australia (40,458); Canada (45,364); New Zealand (11,928); South Africa (11,903);[29,10]
   
3. Wounded: UK & Crown Colonies (284,049); India (64,354), Australia (39,803); Canada (53,174); New Zealand (19,314); South Africa (14,363)[19][18][20]
   
4. Prisoner of war: UK & Crown Colonies (180,488); India (79,481); Australia (26,358); South Africa (14,750); Canada (9,334); New Zealand (8,415)[19][18][20]