Close Air Support in CM:SF

[c3k]

Steve, et al.,

I'm starting this topic to break it out of the UI in CM:SF thread.

I'm not going to hold forth as an expert in CAS. I will throw out some issues and we can see what may have a game effect or not.

- Marine CAS is VERY different than Air Force CAS, both in concept and equipment. (Marine Air has a much higher reputation with the Marine ground elements than the Air Force has with the Army.)

- Helo Support is VERY different than Air Force CAS.

- Artillery Support is VERY different than any CAS.

I'm not trying to be disruptive or through stones at the game design: I am trying to get relevant information into play.

I'll add more to the topics I listed above at a later point.

Thanks,

Ken

[Sgt Joch]

It's an important topic. A stryker brigade would rely heavily on air and artillery support to get it's mission accomplished.

CAS should be an important component of CMSF. There was already a wealth of information in the UI thread, but some questions are not clear, such as:

-who can call in airstrikes? everyone or just dedicated FAC units. Perhaps there should be two level, with regular units being able to call in basic strikes while dedicated FAC units would have more options, accuracy and quicker response time.

-what about friendly fire? the US armed forces keep trying to minimise it, but it's still a fact of life. How will it be handled in CMSF?

C3K, regarding your comment about Marine CAS, my understanding is that Marines do everything better than the other branches on a smaller budget, they are sort of like the Finns in that way

[cassh]

A close friend of mine was a British Army FOO for Telic/OIF and had both USAF and USMC FAC and naval gunfire teams placed under his command in his FOO party - I think he had two marines and four USAF guys.

Three things that were very clear in his mind:-

1. He said the marines were "switched on" and had some good basic soldiering skills and were adept at co-ordinating CAS when his guns weren't ready, in-range or were on the move.

2. It was clear that when the guns were firing, the CAS guys would take a back seat. Rarely did arty and CAS mix on a single target. He didn't expressly say this was to stop the aircraft getting sodding great holes in them from gunfire arcing in, but it would seem most probable - although the overkill of neutralising a target twice also presents itself as another reason!

3. That there was a very tight control from higher echelons on any and all fast-mover fixed-wing CAS as the potential for Blue-on-Blue and mis-identification of targets was high in a fast moving, high tempo battle. It was generally called in when large or intractable targets had caused a pause or slowed the momentum - i.e. it was laboured and required more co-ordination compared to getting USMC Cobras or British/USMC guns firing on a target. The exception was USMC AVAB Harriers which apparently operated a taxi-rank type system as used in WW2 and were fast to respond and very precise in their runs and ordnance release.

PS - As a side note on the USAF CAS team, whom I believe were reservists of some sort rather than regulars, he said they were a "f%&*ing liability"; lacking in any basic soldiering skills, fieldcraft and common sense.

He also explained they were very Gung-ho and were desperate to kill any Iraqi they could.

At one point whilst calling in a fire mission on an Iraqi D-30 gun position about 2.5 Km away one of the USAF guys asked if they could fire smallarms at the Iraqi gunners on the position. My friend with radio in-hand and eyes fixed through sighting unit turned and politely told them he was a little busy but at that moment actually directing the fire mission and that it was probably not a great idea to compromise their location for such a bone idea. Well that's what he told me he said!

I think this basic lack of trust in their soldiering skills meant he was reluctant to utilise their CAS services. Whether this invalidate point 3 above I don't know - I just thought that was interesting that the lead times for getting fast mover CAS on target meant they were not used that often.

PPS - Interestingly he also said the organic MFCs for his [sic] rifle company were essentially the FOO party's "brew bitches" as the mortars were invariably out of range when fire-missions were called for. The mortars it seem were mostly just out of range or on the move when needed. This could mean increasing their rarity in meeting engagements and when attacking-in-attacks, whilst not effecting mortar rarity when defending (in attacks & assaults) or attacking-in-assaults?

[SgtMuhammed]

That's because every Marine pilot has gone through infantry training and so has a first hand knowledge of what they are expected to do. The Air Force considers itself above such trivial matters as the needs of the PBI.

[c3k]

Gents,

Thanks. This is exactly the sort of information needed for a game/simulation of the quality BF.C is known for.

My knowledge of CAS and Arty deconfliction is limited. My understanding is a higher HQ delineates supporting fires, both arty and CAS. One of the elements of the plan at the Joint HQ is setting up artillery fire corridors. These are rectangular, from the arty position to the expected targets, and extend into the airspace for quite some distance. (I'm leaving out any kind of numbers since I do not have concrete references at hand.) NO air assets will knowingly allowed into these corridors. (Timing may be allowed.)

In a game sense, this seems to me that modern combined arms in the U.S. military will NOT allow for simultaneous artillery and air support.

Regards,

Ken

[Dinger]

These kinda threads are fun because you get folks talking about how things actually happen and often losing sight of how things should be implemented.

Airspace segregation of fixed- and rotary-wing Aircraft, and artillery shells? Just what kinda a game are talking about here? Sure it'd be cool and all that, but those are the technical details, like the supply system, that I'd rather not have to deal with. Segregation can be by altitude, by setting up "Do not cross lines" or by time; this sort of coordination occurs all the time.

So let's say that if you have aircraft and artillery in the same battlespace, some segregation plan has been implemented somewhere.

I mean, I'm a big fan of artillery, NGF and CAS simulations, but these elements, as cool as they are, aren't, or at least shouldn't, be the focus of CMx2.

Anyone with a radio can call in airstrikes/artillery? Well, sure, probably. But let's move behind the BS about "My CAS can do this" or "USMC rocks because" to exploring some of the roots of these anecdotal comments and what they translate to in simulation terms.

I generally don't know what I'm talking about, so feel free to correct me.

Given that FO and FAC are roles that "anyone with a radio can play", what does that mean?

Haul out your favorite infantry field manuals, and you'll see a short section on FO and FAC duties. So, at some basic level, every one with a radio should have had some training in "You, this is me. FFE Grid 08675309." In practice, I'd give the ability to request artillery/airstrikes to each Platoon HQ unit.

Above that, you'll have something like a company forward observer that actually has experience calling in fire; and training in its effects. I'd assume this would be represented by the company HQ unit.

Then you get the specialists: the FISTS, the ANGLICOs, the FACs, and so on. These are the folks who have extensive training not only calling in fire, but in the capabilities of the platforms they are coordinating. They also can have their own fancy equipment. Many of them (such as ANGLICOs) have cross-training in coordinating other kinds of fire; the specific training and the degree of "versatility" depends a lot on the purpose of the unit and the quality of the troops.

So, if you like, we can consider three categories: Field Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Aviation, and give numeric scores to each group, reflecting their ability... something like:

___UNIT______FA___NG___AV

USA_Pltn HQ___0____0____0

USA_Cpny HQ___1____0____0

USMC_CpnyHQ___1____1____0

FA_FIST_______2____1____1

ANGLICO_______2____2____1

anyway, you get the idea...

What does unit quality translate to in raw game terms?

Better trained units will be: Faster, More Precise, More Effective, and More Versatile.

Faster: Imagine a green PL with questionable radio discipline, trying to describe a target using landmarks (the tall house) and cardinal directions. Now imagine a pro giving the same directions.

More Precise: Target Location, Target Description and Error will all be better.

More Effective: The better the training, the better the Observer/Terminal Controller will be able to tailor the effects to the specific tactical situation. For example, the volume of fire will more closely reflect the volume needed to achieve desired results: he won't be calling in 20 rounds of 155mm HE to suppress a single MG. If you request a smoke screen 800 meters long along a NE axis, that's what you'll get; not simply a mass of smoke in the general area.

Also note that effectiveness in aviation extends to survivability of the aircraft. A trained FAC will be more effective at describing ingress/egress routes, and identifying and avoiding anti-air threats. Likewise for setting up rotary-wing firing positions.

More Versatile: I'd have the "special toys" only available to the FO/FACs with higher-level capabilities. I can't imagine a CM:SF scenario where a SFW could be used, but if there were one, the PL wouldn't be the dude calling in it; You could also make stuff like Time on Target attacks only available to Company HQ and better units.

Now, how to run this through the interface?

For each mission, I'd specify

A) Preplanned strikes (set up on turn 0, or locked by scenario designer)

Available assets (with optional reinforcement schedule to specify when they come on/go off station)

For the units with an observed fire capabiility, "calling fire" would bring up a menu of all available air, NGF and artillery assets; The observer would be "Tasked" to an asset, and then selects a target -- area or unit, and the precise results (ammunition expended, type of munitions, error, loss of aircraft) depend on the quality of the controlling unit.

Well, that's how I'd do it anyway

[GSX]

I have some experience as a FAC. For the game I would like to see a FAC as we have an Arty spotter in CM1 now. He would define the target, but, in a built up area I would like to see a percentage chance of the ac actually hitting the building/target that has been defined. Not all FAC/CAS is laser designated, a lot is done by just talking and describing, i.e. you would say, 'look at the biggest building, I want you to hit the third building from that on the left'. Ground and air perception arent the same, and sometimes it goes all wrong. And if the air just isnt sure, they wont drop. Thats UK though, not US. Also, if the drop is wrong and it lands on friendlies, its the FACs fault......

[c3k]

GSX,

Thanks. Where and when were you a FAC?

Dinger - I certainly agree: I wouldn't want to play a game where I have to set up all that coordination. However, in a simplistic view, I'm suggesting that perhaps air support and artillery support are EXCLUSIVE of each other in a game of CM:SF's scale.

Regards,

Ken

[c3k]

Dinger,

Not piling on, but for the rest of the audience, why do you suppose that YOUR radio is compatible with MY radio (in my F-16/15/18/22/23)? Why are you assuming YOUR map coordinates are the same as MY map coordinates? Why are you assuming YOUR map coordinates can be input by me into MY weapons? Now do you see why I'm asking these questions?

Ken

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Dinger:

Airspace segregation of fixed- and rotary-wing Aircraft, and artillery shells? Just what kinda a game are talking about here?

I agree that, at least until CM transmogrifies itself into a "command game", it would be daft to expect deconfliction to be directly represented (althouygh, yes, I would be sad enough to want a game that included this, together with the thrilling business of dealing with real-estate bids in Div Rear). I think the way it would show up in the game is in larger command delays when multiple sources of support had to be mixed and matched. It's only a sampel of one, but the one time I have monitored a brigade net on a CAST exercise, the longest wait of all was the hour it took to set up a JAAT strike.

Originally posted by Dinger:

I mean, I'm a big fan of artillery, NGF and CAS simulations, but these elements, as cool as they are, aren't, or at least shouldn't, be the focus of CMx2.

That, I think, depends how far you believe the RMA fol-de-rol about Network Enabled Capability, Kill Chains, Effects-Based Warfare, Sensor-to-Shooter links, Precision Strike and all that gee-whiz neato stuff.

Originally posted by Dinger:

Anyone with a radio can call in airstrikes/artillery? Well, sure, probably.

Anyone on the gunner net with a radio, which is a rather radically different thing.

Originally posted by Dinger:

Haul out your favorite infantry field manuals, and you'll see a short section on FO and FAC duties. So, at some basic level, every one with a radio should have had some training in "You, this is me. FFE Grid 08675309." In practice, I'd give the ability to request artillery/airstrikes to each Platoon HQ unit.

Not in any British inf trg manual I've ever seen, but it used to be accepted that NCOs should be able, in a pinch, to call for fire. However, the occasions on which this happens are aboput as common as rocking-horse manure; and in the British forces at least, the idea of an infantry NCO (other than a dedicated MFC) calling for fire seems to have fallen entirely out of fashion.

Originally posted by Dinger:

So, if you like, we can consider three categories: Field Artillery, Naval Gunfire and Aviation, and give numeric scores to each group, reflecting their ability... something like:

___UNIT______FA___NG___AV

USA_Pltn HQ___0____0____0

USA_Cpny HQ___1____0____0

USMC_CpnyHQ___1____1____0

FA_FIST_______2____1____1

ANGLICO_______2____2____1

Not a bad idea, and vaguely reminsicent of the WRG modern rules distinction between MFC, FOO, FAC and NGSFO, controlling mortars, arty, air and naval gunfiore respectively, and what they call a Fire Support Team, capable of controlling any of the first three.

I also quite like the WRG rules for requesting fires: Observed fire must be requested by a fire controller of the appropriate type; Predicted fire may be requested by any command element (platoon or above); and DFs or silent programme tasks by a command element with comms to an appropriate fire controller.

I think the biggest limitation in all this is not so much the skill of the parties concerned as the availability of comms. With secure, frequency-hopping radios such as SINCGARS, getting on the same net as the people you want to talk to is not a simple matter of twiddling the dial to get on the right frequency. It would be nice to think that tactical internets let you send instant messages to anyone in the battlespace, but I doubt it isgoing to be a practical method of fire control in the forseeable future.

All the best,

John.

[Dinger]

Coordination of aviation and artillery. Here's on of my favorites . Chapter 4 is on aviation. Anyway, starting on page 4.7 you'll find a simplified overview of how you put Artillery fire, Fixed- and Rotary-Wing aviation in the same battlespace. The various kinds of support do impose limitations on each other, but they don't exclude mutual operation. In fact, this manual is for Artillery and NGF specialists, and only secondarily for Aviation needs (hence my labored description above of the different levels of training) -- so even at the "more basic" levels of training, coordination of artillery and air is emphasized. And, as the manual notes, the chances an aircraft is going to be hit by a friendly artillery shell are very low compared to the thread of enemy AA. (well, assuming they're not flying below DPICM dispensing alt)

As far as radios and the rest; the notorious problems of converting grids to lat/long, and all that nonsense: well, that's "lessons learned" already. So, maybe it isn't. In that case, well, either somebody does have a radio that can reach the aircraft, or nobody does. If nobody does, then there's no need to include those aviation assets in the scenario. If somebody does have a radio (say back at the off-map Battalion HQ), then you've just got the problem of a lack of specialization expressing itself in yet another way: the additional time and inaccuracy acquired by relaying through another controller. That requires no additional representation: the loss in speed, precision, efficiency and versatility is covered by the fact you're using an underexperienced controller.

[cassh]

Theory and practice are completely different when the shooting starts for real - the chances of anyone other than FAC or a special forces team calling in an air strike are remote to say the least.

I think that for a Stryker Brigade the only real elements really capable of calling for, and controlling CAS in the timeframe of an CMx1 game (max say 60 turns) are an attached FAC unit, the Bn HQ, or the organic FIST teams. Now whether the game mechanics of CMx2 make this command delay factor irrelevant will need to be seen - but it is generally true that Lt. John Smith of 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company aint gonna be calling in no B-52 JDAm drop without some organisatioal dramas along the way.

I think it's clear from what we've all said that we're not ruling out CAS and airstrikes but command delay and rarity in game terms needs to be very high unless the scenario designer specifically includes a CAS directing element amongst the ground units and with sorties on the board ready to strike.