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High Ranking Officers in Combat


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Read Wild Bills article on El Alimein and noticed in the final defeat of jerry, some General Von Tropp or something went into battle in a MkIII in the final stages of defeat got KO and then awaited capture by his burning tank! Another section has i think the 11th/8th or maybe 9th! British Armoured Brigade being ordered by monty to some suicidal attack in which the commander some brigader personally decided to lead from the front.

If a area collapsed and was completely overrun I know HQs awaited capture or shot themselvesd, but anymore examples of leading by exampl.

Was it common for High ranking officers to go into combat? Bn Hqs are in CMBO so whats that Colonel level? But generals and brigaders?

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Rommel once took over command of an AT-Gun, during Crusader IIRC. Very brave, but he should have been back at HQ, where his staff were running round like headless chickens.

Because of rapid advances, senior officers were often caught up in the fighting, both General O' Connor, on the British side and General Cruwell on the German side were taken prisoner and another British General (I forget his name) was briefly taken prisoner, but managed to escape shortly afterwards. O' Connor also later escaped, but that was from a POW camp.

[ October 03, 2003, 12:30 PM: Message edited by: Firefly ]

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Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

For some reason that conduct seems to have been more common in the desert than in any other theatre.

Didn't Jock Campbell on at least one occasion ride into battle in an open touring car alongside his tanks? Or have I got the wrong general?

Michael </font>

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Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

[snips]

Didn't Jock Campbell on at least one occasion ride into battle in an open touring car alongside his tanks? Or have I got the wrong general?

IIRC Jock was well up at the sharp end in a car during the Sidi Rezegh battles -- didn't this get a mention in Rob Crisp's "Steel Chariots"?

I also seem to recall that G. le Q. Martel was well towards the pointy bit of the 1940 Arras counter-attack when it kicked off, but for how long he stayed there I don't know.

There has never been any marked disinclination on the part of British brass to get well up to the front. As Richard Holmes is fond of pointing out, contrary to the "Blackadder view" of WW1 history as being run by generals snug in their chateaux, 50 British generals were killed in action during the Great War.

One of my favourite "General at the Sharp End" stories is about General Norman "Dutch" Cota, 2-i-c of the US 29th Infantry Division when it was one of the assault divisions in the Normandy landings. This account is taken from Joe Balkoski's excellent "Beyond the Beachhead", pages 155-166, and takes place on D+1:

"During the fighting near St. Laurent, Cota came across a group of infantrymen, pinned by a few obstinate Germans ion a nearby house. Cota sought out the man in charge, an infantry captain, and asked why the men were making no attempt to take the building. "Sir, the Germans are in there, shooting at us," the captain replied.

"Well, I'll tell you what, captain," said Cota, unbuckling two grenades from his jacket. "You and your men start shooting at them. I'll take a squad of men and you and your men watch carefully. I'll show you how to take a house with Germans in it."

The astonished captain watched as Cota led his little group around the house to a nearby hedge. Suddenly, the General and the group raced forward, screaming like wild men, hurling grenades in the windows. Cota and another man kicked in the front door, tossed a few more grenades inside, waited for the explosions, and then disappeared into the house. As the rest of Cota's team followed him inside, the Germans streamed out the back and ran for their lives.

Cota returned to the captain. "You've seen how to take a house," said Cota, still out of breath. "Do you understand? Do you know how to do it now?"

"Yes, sir," the captain replied meekly.

"Well, I won't be around to do it for you again," Cota said. "I can't do it for everybody.""

All the best,

John.

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Lieutenant Shea described Cota's actions: "Exposing himself to enemy fire, General Cota went over the seawall giving encouragement, directions, and orders to those about him, personally supervised the placing of a BAR, and brought fire to bear on some of the enemy positions on the bluff that faced them. Finding a belt of barbed wire inside the seawall, General Cota personally supervised placing a bangalore torpedo for blowing the wire and was one of the first three men to go through the wire. At the head of a mixed column of troops he threaded his way to the foot of the high ground beyond the beach and started the troops up the high ground where they could bring effective fire to bear on the enemy positions."
General Cota on D-Day
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Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

For some reason that conduct seems to have been more common in the desert than in any other theatre.

Didn't Jock Campbell on at least one occasion ride into battle in an open touring car alongside his tanks? Or have I got the wrong general?

Michael </font>

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Originally posted by John D Salt:

IIRC Jock was well up at the sharp end in a car during the Sidi Rezegh battles -- didn't this get a mention in Rob Crisp's "Steel Chariots"?

Very likely. I've come across mention of the incident in at least two different books and that may very well have been one of them. One other might have been that siege of Tobruk book that was mentioned a few days ago. If I ever find my copy I'll look for the reference.

Michael

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Here's another Cota story from Normandy, courtesy of tanker Lt. Holmer Wilkes, 747th Tank Battalion (Cota later suffered real damage to his reputation during the fiasco at Kommerscheidt when he commanded the 28th ID because he was far to the rear and had no grasp of what was happening on the ground):

The column . . . formed up at Vierville in terrain curiously free of hedgerows. We started out in column on the road with Company C leading. I know not what others thought, but I thought we were marching to the front. This impression was corrected minutes later by the appearance of an infantry skirmish line. Although it was my first taste of battle, I knew what that meant. . . .

[One] strongpoint was Osmanville. And there on a clear day this village was attacked by a dozen British fighter-bombers.

The Company C platoon leader of the advance guard was killed trying to display his identification panel. Other officers threw out smoke grenades.

But the strike was pressed home until the pilots had dropped all their bombs and expended all ammunition. As a result, 32 infantrymen were slain, plus our officer, and Company C lost an entire platoon of tanks. . . .

This seemed to paralyze the infantry command group, as well it might. Omaha was their first combat too. After sitting on the road a while we were notified to attend officers call in a field.

There we found Major General [Norman] Cota (the assistant [29th Infantry Division] commander), officers of the 175th [infantry] Regiment and 747th Tank Battalion officers.

The general asked for a situation report upon which the regimental commander told him he could not get through the enemy line by any means, frontal or flank. He would have to wait for artillery support, which probably wasn’t ashore.

The general replied, "All I can tell you, Colonel, is the commanding general told me this attack has to get moving."

He then addressed the 747th’s commander. "Colonel Fries, can you get us through this strongpoint?"

To which the Colonel replied, "Yes, Sir."

"Who will be your leading officer?"

The colonel indicated the 3d Platoon, Company A [Wilkes’ platoon] would be in the van, whereupon the general was introduced to the officer [Wilkes], who promptly received a pep talk.

"Is there a place for me in your tank?" asked Cota.

The reply was a crewmember would have to be dismounted. And if the general rode, it would be as assistant driver, which entailed handing ammunition up to the turret.

"I can do that. Which is your tank?" he replied. . . .

Cota’s request (actually an order) made me nervous. The general had to serve as a crewmember. Hence I as commander gave him several orders during the night, all of which he obeyed with alacrity. . . .

Before describing the attack, two things must be understood. First, we were then in the bocage. The macadam road was lined with hedgerows over which a tank could climb only at the expense of shaking all ammunition and other moveables loose. Second, by the time the attack started dusk had fallen.

Now, the plan as [i outlined it to my] tank commanders was to drive along the road until targets were encountered (meaning buildings. We had found out the enemy would be in buildings.) Then the first tank would ease left while the second tank, commanded by Lieutenant George P. Gale, then an enlisted man, would pull alongside. The commanders would engage targets on their respective sides of the road.

General Cota and Captain Stewart listened to the order but said nothing. After all, there wasn’t much else one could do. The infantry was stymied. No one had told us about these hedgerows, and to sit still was to invite disaster.

The general took up the assistant driver’s slot in the officer’s tank and was furnished with crash helmet, headset, and microphone.

An infantry captain accompanied by a Browning Automatic Rifleman came up to report that his company was attached to the platoon. The BAR-man was an alert, clear-eyed soldier, an encouraging sign under any circumstance. The captain said they would be right behind the lead tank any time needed them.

At 100 yards, the first buildings were successfully attacked. The advance continued.

No flank guards were visible, therefore after dark commenced throwing hand grenades over the hedgerows. After a while, the infantry captain requested this be stopped so he could put out flank guards. . . .

Coming upon a mined place, the point stopped. The division had not placed engineers forward with the advance guard. No one present knew how to remove the mines.

The infantry captain suggested firing the coaxial machine gun at them. This was done, but no mines exploded. Therefore it was thought the mines were inactive.

The march continued and the platoon sergeant’s tank was blown up by the mines. . . .

[Lieutenant Colonel Fries] came forward on foot to be captured by American infantrymen who promptly stole his pistol (One reason this happened is that the 29th Division landed wearing olive drab uniforms. The 747th landed wearing gas impregnated fatigues that were nearly identical to German Army uniforms. Several tankers were almost shot before we could get a change of clothing).

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Unlike John D, for once perhaps, I do feel there was an extreme reluctance in the general officers of WWI to get anywhere near the front. I don't feel it was a particularly British trait. I fail to see any nation having very many Generals in the trenches. Nor do I believe it had anything to do with cowardice really.

Hooge is such an illustrating example that I cannot help to use it. As this is thread for people with time for anecdotes, I think it might fit in.

Hooge lies on the road between Ypres and Menin, not far from places the British call "Inverness Copse" and "Polygon Wood". In fact it's not far from "Hill 60" either. It is low country south of the Vilmy ridge, crisscrossed by canals and perpetually flooded. It was originally a manor ("White Castle") used by the British as HQ during the first Ypres in 1914. By christmas, the Germans had smouldered the castle and conquered the ruins, but the British held on to the stables and the large greenhouse.

The manor park became nomansland. As artillery plowed the area endlessly, every trace of there ever having been a castle there was erased. Gardens, greens, dams and flowerbeds were all craters and mud. Both sides used debris from the castle building trenches and positions. The tapestries, staues and marble debris apparently gave a particualr feel to Hooge trenches. As it was always flooded, the stench of corpses is rumoured to have been the worst along the front.

So followed the battles of Ypres, Langemarck and Passchendaele, Hooge was always in the centre of conflict. From october 1914 to the end of the war there was not one calm day at Hooge. People died there every single day of the war, until the German line collapsed in 18.

On the staff maps Hooge was not only a castle, with gardens and parks. It was a german bulge, from which the Germans seemed to be threatening British rear lines. Indeed, from the castle, it was argued, the Germans could observe the British rear for artillery purpouses. Staffs on both sides agreed it was so. For the duration of the war, none of them ever went to take a look.

In july 22nd, 1915, the British used their special corps of Welsh miners and worked their way under German positions using the ancient Castle tunnels, and blew them up. All of it blew up in the air and the bang was registered in London. The castle was now a crater, and a company of Englishmen seized it. 14 days later, the Germans avenged their loss by blowing their own huge mine under the same place. The crater was even more huge, and the Germans attacked, using flamethrowers.

From this date, the Germans held one side of the flooded huge hole, the British the other. At points the positions were less than ten meters away. And they just kept fighting.

From the German side came perpetual orders to hold the "bastion", from the British came the order to "straighten out the line". In fact no orders were needed, the two sides were too close and could never disengage. A day's work; 19 officers and 426 other ranks of the 8 Rifle Brigade, 12 officers and 289 other ranks of the King's Royal Rifle Corps. Just any day, no particular orders, the list goes on.

Not a bit like cricket, I think the phrase goes.

In november 1917, General sir Lancelot Kiggell, British army chief of staff, arrived to the front along the Bixschote-Langemarck-Passchendaele. His comment upon reaching the line is quite famous. "My God, have we been sending men to fight here?" He cried his eyes out, and not many weeks afterwards he suffered a nervous breakdown and was sent home.

They had no idea of what they were doing, asking or ordering. Very few of them were ever at the front. Like Kafka illustrates in his Das grosse Wagnis, they were living in a dreamworld.

Of course, meeting the opposite extreme of these men, in people like Rommel, I am not entirely convinced we fared any better in WWII. Really chummy to have the general next to you in the trenches, and jolly good show and all, but its a little like riding a cab, and suddenly finding the cabdriver sitting next to you in the backseat gaffing away - who the h_ is driving?

Regards

Dandelion

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Originally posted by Harry Yeide:

Here's another Cota story from Normandy, courtesy of tanker Lt. Holmer Wilkes, 747th Tank Battalion [Good story snipped]

Harry, can you supply a complete reference for this story, please? Or is it an "oral history" piece? I ask because it includes a blue-on-blue incident which I don't think has yet been catalogued by a pal of mine who is compiling the world's biggest list of amicide incidents.

All the best,

John.

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Originally posted by Dandelion:

[snips]

In november 1917, General sir Lancelot Kiggell, British army chief of staff, arrived to the front along the Bixschote-Langemarck-Passchendaele. His comment upon reaching the line is quite famous. "My God, have we been sending men to fight here?"

Indeed, the line is now so famous that it no longer requires any evidence of Kiggell having said it. ;)

http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/kiggell.htm

Originally posted by Dandelion:

They had no idea of what they were doing, asking or ordering. Very few of them were ever at the front. Like Kafka illustrates in his Das grosse Wagnis, they were living in a dreamworld.

[snips]

I don't think you should believe everything you hear from Kafka, or Sassoon. ;)

I know it is not especially fashionable to say anything in favour of WW1 generalship, but, considering that the commanders of the time had to get a grip on more and bigger tactical and technological innovations in four years than we have seen in the last four decades, it's not altogether suprising that it took them a while to learn how to do it right.

All the best,

John.

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Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

And let us not forget Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, assistant commander of the 1st. Inf. Div. who won a Medal of Honor on Omaha Beach.

Well I must have forgotten, 'cos I could have sworn it was 4th Infantry Div and Utah! ;) </font>
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Originally posted by John D Salt:

I don't think you should believe everything you hear from Kafka, or Sassoon. ;)

Well Kafka and Sassoon, along with Owen, Graves and Remarque, accurately reflected the feelings of the troops at the front toward their senior commanders. Keegan in The Mask of Command argues that the Chateau General mentality was a least a contributory factor to the mutinies that all armies (apart from the US) in the war suffered from and makes the point that many of the senior commanders of WW2, themselves junior officers in WW1, actively rejected it. 'No more Sommes' was virtually a mantra in the British senior command in WW2. Carlo D'Este tells the story of how an American officer, involved in the planning of D-Day and exasperated by what he saw as British intransigence was told by a British colleague 'It's not just British intransigence you're up against, it's also the ghosts of the Somme' (quoted from memory, so probably not word perfect).
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Originally posted by John D Salt:

I don't think you should believe everything you hear from Kafka, or Sassoon. ;)

Wa? You mean people don't suddenly turn into huge insects in their beds? Come off it lad, soon you'll be saying they never taught that monkey to speak either, right? :D

Well Firefly beat me to it above, I have nothing to add to his statement. Except a name - Kisch. In "Schreib das auf, Kisch!". The book is so long forgotten I feel it a duty to market it whenever I can. This seemed an opportune moment. The author was, btw, a good friend of Kafka's and a well known reporter (to contemporaries that is).

Best regards

Dandelion

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Regarding high-ranking officer casualties at the sharp end, I would suspect that first the encirclement battles of 1941, and then the destruction of army groups Centre and South Ukraine would have yielded a lot of these in the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, respectively.

Also, the Soviet love for forward observation posts from which formation commanders could observe the battle directly would presumably add to these.

A Major General may have been an important figure in the desert, in Russia they came a dime a dozen, or sumfink.

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Brig John "Jock" Campbell, RHA, won a VC whilst in charge of the 7th Armd Div Support Group at Sidi Rezegh on 21st Nov 1941.

On 21 November 1941 at Sidi Rezegh, Libya, Brigadier Campbell's small force holding important ground was repeatedly attacked and wherever the fighting was hardest he was to be seen either on foot or in his open car. Next day, under intensified enemy attacks, he was again in the forefront, encouraging his troops and personally controlling the fire of his batteries - he twice manned a gun himself to replace casualties. During the final attack, although wounded, he refused to be evacuated. His brilliant leadership was the direct cause of the very heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy, and did much to maintain the fighting spirit of his men.
Tragically, though perhaps not surprisingly, he was KIA three months later.

Regards

JonS

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I don't think you should be too hard on Cota. If I remember right, the plan for the 28th's attack in the Huertgen wasn't his. He remarked "It has a gambler's chance of succeeding."

The problem was that the American leadership didn't realize that the fast-paced puruit of the summer was over, and the Germans were going to resist in a big way here. So they split the 28th Division's attack into three different objectives, rather than concentrating their combat power. Additionally, their doctrine for combat in dense forest was not up to date and did not fully utilize combined arms teams.

Lastly, the engineers lacked the big equipment to open the Kall trail to vehicle traffic, and a lot of the ill-fated plan hinged on using the Kall for resupply and armor reinforcements.

Just my $.02

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