Cassino - worse than Eastern battles?

[Monwar]

Hi everybody,

I am quite excited about CMAK and am trying to gain some knowledge on the Italian battles. I just came home from Dhaka Public Library where I read a lot - one book was about the Monte Cassino battle. Somewhere I saw that many Germans involved in that battle were saying that this is much worse than anything they have faced in the Eastern Front. Is that true? Was it really that bad? Worse than Stalingrad or Korsun?

BTW I have another question. Will CMAK be available in retail? That Battlefront.com sales it's games only via online is a source of great woe for me as I am a student and don't have a credit card. As a result I have CMBO (retail) but not CMBB :S!! I urge you to release this game in retail, BFC! Pls!

[ August 31, 2003, 04:21 AM: Message edited by: Monwar ]

[Moon]

Hi Monwar!

I seem to remember that I have read similar comments by the German soldiers relating specifically to the extremely heavy shelling of the Cassino hills.

CMAK will not be released into retail (USA) anytime soon. I would guess that only after we have the new engine finished or nearly finished in a year or so there is a *chance* for a retail edition. But - did you know you can also order by check? Email sales@battlefront.com for more details once the game is out.

Martin

[The Graeme]

By coincidence, am currently reading the 'Sound of War' by Canadian WWII Radio Correspondent Peter Stursberg who worked for the CBC.

Writing in 1993, he talks about 240 bombers hitting the Abbey in February, then 460 bombers hitting the area around the town of Cassino on 14th, March. This was followed by a five hour artillery barrage of 200,000 shells.

Quoting from John Ellis, author of 'Cassino -- The Hollow Victory', Stursberg writes: "The German Commander, General von Senger Etterlin, compared it to the battlefield of the Somme and quoted Hitler as saying that Cassino was the only battlefield of this war that represented those of the last."

He then states: "German prisoners of war said that Cassino was worse than anything they had experienced on the Russian front."

Most probably CMAK will include a Cassino scenario. Whether or not it does, I'm sure dozens of people will create their own. From the sound of it, and from pictures I've seen, the town and abbey-topped mountain will have to be a sea of rubble to be authentic. No intact buildings at all. Will need many turns just moving thru the rubble. Will be interesting to see how map-makers work this. If it is too authentic, might not be playable!

Note that British & Indian troops finally took Cassino, with some support from the First Canadian Army Tank Brigade, but that it was the Polish Corps that finally overran the abbey itself.

[Michael Dorosh]

I met Stursberg at an Italian Campaign Veteran's reunion two or three summers ago. He gave a terrible speech! How is his book? I'd be more inclined to trust an historian like Ellis than a CBC correspondent of the 1940s era.

The German paras did refer to Cassino as the Italian "Verdun", after that particularly miserable stretch of ground in World War One that was notable for human sacrifice and lengthy barrages.

[The Graeme]

Stursberg's book is amusing and anecdotal, but apart from his personal insight and experience, the 'filler' is gleaned from historians.

At a time when the American networks had a policy of live broadcasts only, the CBC had several vehicles fitted out with portable equipment which enabled them to record announcers with the live battle sounds in the background, at Cassino & Ortona for instance, and forward the records for broadcast later. These were more impressive to the listener than the cumbersome live studio broadcasts or live remotes which, often for reasons of timing, sometimes described events taking place 'live' when in fact they were over before the broadcast began. Many American correspondents in their memoirs have commented on how frustrating the mania for live coverage was to them, especially since the CBC broadcasts were often repeated by the US networks due to their dramatic nature, yet the American correspondents were not allowed to do anything similar.

In what way was Stursberg's talk terrible?

[Dandelion]

It is quite possible to create a Cassino scenario in the CMBO engine. You have all you need for it. The only actual attempt that I know of is that of Patrick Feyret, which is highly fictional (it rather looks like the Texan crossing of the Rapido with the monastery in the background). But it can be done none the less.

A scenario designer problem is of course the impossibility of the tactical problem. As long as Cassino formed part of a cohesive defensive line and was occasionally resupplied it could not be taken by any known means. Only after the French (read: North Africans) had broken through, causing the Cassino line to collapse, did the Germans start their fighting withdrawal, enabling Anders and friends to seize the by then useless Cassino position. It was the way to go about it. The early allied frontal assaults, and continual reinforcement of failure, are difficult to retrospectively understand. But then again Freyberg was very much a WWI general.

Said the beerhall strategist.

Anyway, if this is the requests thread I personally would really like to see a Crete scenario in the CMAK. This cannot be done in CMBO, and it presents excellent opportunity to show off dust effects, as dust was a major issue around Maleme.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by The Graeme:

Stursberg's book is amusing and anecdotal, but apart from his personal insight and experience, the 'filler' is gleaned from historians.

At a time when the American networks had a policy of live broadcasts only, the CBC had several vehicles fitted out with portable equipment which enabled them to record announcers with the live battle sounds in the background, at Cassino & Ortona for instance, and forward the records for broadcast later. These were more impressive to the listener than the cumbersome live studio broadcasts or live remotes which, often for reasons of timing, sometimes described events taking place 'live' when in fact they were over before the broadcast began. Many American correspondents in their memoirs have commented on how frustrating the mania for live coverage was to them, especially since the CBC broadcasts were often repeated by the US networks due to their dramatic nature, yet the American correspondents were not allowed to do anything similar.

In what way was Stursberg's talk terrible?

Well, he got some of his historical facts wrong, but from what you just said, I suppose that wasn't his forte. He did go into detail about his recording equipment - again, which you mention - and the fact that it took up the better part of two jeeps (this stuff was BIG, not like the cassette tape recorders you could buy 25 years later). He also repeated himself a bit, but it was understandable given his age.

There are some snippets of WW II CBC broadcasts on the net; at an old Ortona site they had a particularly good one of Matthew Halton interviewing engineers building a bridge; you could hear a Bren Gun firing very close by. Very enthralling stuff, especially when you think there was no television in homes back then.

[Firefly]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Anyway, if this is the requests thread I personally would really like to see a Crete scenario in the CMAK. This cannot be done in CMBO, and it presents excellent opportunity to show off dust effects, as dust was a major issue around Maleme.

Cheerio

Dandelion

Well as the pre-publications publicity says the game is set in North Africa, Italy and Crete you'll probably get your wish .

[Los]

"But then again Freyberg was very much a WWI general."

It's still a wonder that Freyberg wasn't sacked for good after the Crete fiasco, but then again taking decisive steps against defective or damaging senior commanders has never been a strong suit with the Commonwealth. Beevor rakes him over the coals quite harshly in his Crete Book and Ellis is not too far behind in his Cassino book.

Los

[Andreas]

Los, I guess that maybe down to there not being a large pool of senior officers to replace the duds with, in the Commonwealth, and a reluctance to let the British command the Commonwealth forces directly. Probably related to the WW I experience. Michael had posted elsewhere about the lack of training for senior Canadian officers.

Sacking senior commanders in the British Army did happen frequently, e.g. in Africa, and again some much needed weeding early on in Normandy.

[Dandelion]

Yes, Beevor makes a lot of Freybergs mistakes in his book. I think he is being unfair though. No living man had ever seen 10 000 people drop from the sky before, including the guys dropping down, and nor had anyone seen an airhead of any size before - nor indeed an airbridge.

For Freyberg to remain convinced that the number of paratroops would resemble something like that of the low countries, and that in the end an invasion had to be anchored by the conquest of a harbour, is rather understandable to me. Especially as Freyberg is described as being not very imaginative (in fact he was such a brave man that I don't believe he could have had any imagination at all).

I also believe Beevor is mistaken about Freybergs misconceptions being the rabbit in pepper. The deployment was far from ideal deflecting an airlanding invasion, but deflected it was nonetheless. Freyberg held on to reserves, but divisional reserves proved enough to finish the remnants of 7th and Sturm anyway.

There was just this little random misunderstanding that got in the way. The evacuation of Maleme. This single incident saved the German operation from being manifestly the complete failure it latently already was. It wasn't Freyberg's inability to adapty to modern warfare, nor German tactical prowess. Just a misunderstanding in the confusion of battle.

If anyone on the allied side is to blame (I guess its funnier to write a book if there is), I suppose it must be Hargest. But for me, Student stands out as the bad guy. Seemingly sans any remorse, he throws his entire Corps for the dog, dropping them where rabbits and foxes say goodnight and in spite of understanding that they are being slaughtered, he sends more of them in, all to save his career.

Hm. This armchair is getting worn.

The CMAK ad says North Africa, Italy and Crete? But I wanted to play the Middle East, Greece and Sicily!

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Los:

Beevor rakes him over the coals quite harshly in his Crete Book and Ellis is not too far behind in his Cassino book.

Los

I don't know much about Freyberg's record, but I would not trust a book by Beevor much further on anything than my 2-year old nephew can throw it.

ISTR that Ellis is harsh on him, but qualifies it by saying he was a good divisional commander, just out of his depth as a corps commander. Or maybe that is from a beer-hazed conversation with Kip in The Chandos. Hmmm...

[JonS]

Re: Freyberg - he seems to have been universally well regarded throughout the war, both by peers, higher commanders, and subordinates and men, which I think says a lot about his fitness to commad. Perhaps more important, he was well regarded by the Government back in NZ, and he took his responsibility to them, and the men in his division, VERY seriously. After Op CRUSADER (which of course followed on from Greece and Crete) he effectively told 8th Army 'you guys can go fvck yourselves, we're outta here', and had the Division posted off to Syria for six months rather than staying and fighting in the desert. He didn't bring them back until after the fiasco at Gazala and Tobruk.

Freyberg obviously wasn't a fireball (although the advance to Trieste after crossing the Senio in 1945 was pretty much textbook stuff for the mobility fetishists), but he was very good at divisional level. Certainly he was the most experienced divisional commander the British - or anyone else for that matter - had in the Med. I think that maybe where he comes a cropper. At Crete, and again at Cassino (plus a few other times) he was given a corps to command, and frankly didn't do very well. Having said that, Crete has been well covered by Dandelion, while at Cassino he was on a hiding to nothing. It's all very well to say that attacking straight into the town and up at the Monastary was the wrong thing to do but Div, and even Corps, commanders didn't have the freedom to set their own higher objectives and battlespaces.

Finally, his personal bravery was unquestioned - they don't hand out VCs for nothing, and the number of scars on his body grew quite considerably during WWII. Though, naturally, this in itself isn't a great indicator of command ability.

Andreas: interesting comments about Beevor - care to expand on the theme?

Regards

JonS

[ September 02, 2003, 04:56 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

Andreas: interesting comments about Beevor - care to expand on the theme?

Regards

JonS

I read his book on the Spanish civil war, and was left unimpressed. Had a look at his Stalingrad book and decided not to bother any further with him after that.

Two other board members whose opinion I hold in very high regard think that his Stalingrad book was an abuse of perfectly good paper, and his Berlin book was a total waste of space, distasteful, and boring. Respectively.

I am paraphrasing to some degree.

[mcbeth]

So, what would you suggest for reading about Crete, Stalingrad, and Berlin?

[Los]

Actually Freyberg's popular reputation came from his stellar heroic service as a junior and mid grade officer in WW1. (Gallipoli, The Somme, Royal Naval Division in Antwerp, VC holder) A big tough guy, with multiple wounds, he was a hero to the people of NZ. He was a man who deeply cared for his men and one hwo even aftyer the battle admirably refused to shift blame on others around him (and there was certainly enough to go around.) Churchill was a great fan of his. But have you ever heard of the Peter Principle? "Everyone rises to their natural level of imcompetence." There are two things a good commander must do. Care for your troops and accomplish the mission. As Beevor says:

"The battle for Crete would be a contest where fast reactions, clear thinking and ruthless decisions counted most. The metality of linear defense and the holding on which lingered in some minds form the First World War would be a grave handicap."

Through Ultra, Freyberg had advanced and clear intelligence on the attack. Where the drop zones were, units involved, the plan of attack, what portion of the invasion would come from air and what portion from sea. The brits even had notification when the waves were inbound. Virtually none of this intelligence was acted upon, even after several complete copies of the invasion plans were captured which could confirm what their won eyes were seeing. Even as the Germans unfolded the plan just as he had been briefed by British intelligence at the highest level said it would. Do you have any idea what kind of advantage such a clear picture of enemy intentions and strengths, in particular of an airborne invasion, give a commander?

If that wasn't bad enough, once the attack came, he lacked the decisiveness to act at once against the invasion despite the pleas of his junior commanders to cut them loose. In fact during the most critical portions of the battle Freyberg had a sort of breakdown and focused himself on the smallest of details while allowing the bigger more critical things to go awry. (i.e.) He was constantly obsessed wit a seaborn invasion. But don't rely on what I say, here's, for example here's what BG Inglis one of his Brigade commanders said in his offical report to Churchill:

"I am far from reassured about the tactical conduct of the defence by General Freyberg, although full allowance must be made for the many deficiencies noted above. There appears to have been no counter-attack of any kind in the Western Sector for 36 hours after the airborne descents had begun. There was no attempt to form a mobile reserve of the best troops, be it only a couple of battalions, there was no attempt made to obstruct Maleme Airstrip even though he knew tehre would be no (british) Air (units) in teh battle. the whole concept seems to have been of static defence of positions instead of rapid extirpations (sic) at all costs of the airborne landing parties."

Actually there's no point to me recounting Freyberg's incapacties for higher command since they are well catalogued in most every account of either Crete or Cassino. Certainly the NZ official histories go a little bit easier on him and seeks to shift the blame to more junior officers. But again that goes back to a trend you see from time to time of inability to say ill things about commanders who throw away thousands of troops and lose critical battles becuse they're one of the good old boys.

At Crete you have an example where you have some of the finest troops, a clear picture of enemy intentions, (giving YOU, if you will, the element of surprise), you are fighting on home turf, with active popular support from the locals, you have a very vulnerable enemy at the end of a tenacious logistical chain, and you have a command structure so utterly lacking in vision decisiveness or understanding that they drop the whole thing without making even slight use of any one of these advatages which may have sealed the fate of the German attempt to take Crete.

Sidebar: I' not trying to take away anything from the German paras who fought in the battle. Another carefully constructed and often repeated myth is that they were so far in the hole at the start of the operation that only Allied incompetence in the conduct of the battle itself saved them. This of course is meant to propogate the myth that the Anzacs, Brits and Greeks were somehow better fighters than the Fallschirmjager and that circumstances above the control of the commonwealth soldier alone led to his defeat. At this stage of the war the British had not quite been disinvested of their comforting theories that German troops would go to pieces in the absence of their leaders and plans going to pieces around them. Para corporals, Sergeants and Leutnants soon found themselves running threadbare platoons, companies, and battalions and exercizing the kind of the fast reactions, clear thinking and ruthless decisions needed to keep the presure on and keep attacking despite horrendous initial losses that would have sidelined most units for the duration.

And I didn't even start on Cassino yet...

Los

[ September 02, 2003, 09:37 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

[Michael Dorosh]

As Andreas points out, I've already posted elsewhere about the problems of finding senior commanders for the Canadian Army. The Peter principle exists, but I don't think in hindsight it is fair to use it as an accusation.

Vokes was certainly not an imaginative man during the Moro River battles in December 1943, leading to Ortona. But, I think like so many CW commanders, he was the best that could be found at the time.

Inadequacies at higher command are not often identified before the person is in the job; sometimes they are and there is simply no one else to do it. Such was the case with Tommy Burns, I think, when he took over I Canadian Corps in 1944.

Crerar, commander of the Army, never commanded as much as a division in action until he took over I Canadian Corps during the post Moro winter stalemate.

I would be surprised to learn New Zealand really had a lot of options as far as division and corps commanders, frankly.

Unfortunately, physical courage (as evidenced by Freyberg's scars) don't always equate to moral courage, skill at arms, or leadership abilities.

[Los]

True Michael on all points. Nor do I mean to imply that there was any shortage, or even lesser amounts, of imcompetent officers in any other Armies. It would be interesting to see how aggresively Armies rooted out incompetent officers. It does seem that the Ggermans spent a a fair amount of effort in rooting out incompetence in their division in higher officers (though certainly their national leadership led them right into ruin).

In addition I think there's a book which details identity, cause, and circumstances for every American general who was fired or relieved of duty. Can't recall the name right now and am too busy to go research it tonight.

Los

[ September 02, 2003, 09:36 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by mcbeth:

So, what would you suggest for reading about Crete, Stalingrad, and Berlin?

Crete - pass. Never read anything about it. If you want to read an excellent book on the Aegean desaster in 1943, get 'Churchill's Folly'. It is all that Beevor is not.

Stalingrad - Chuikov's book on Stalingrad, available in English, isa very good start from the Soviet side (just ignore the ideological dross). For the surrounding battle, Glantz 'From the Don to the Dnjepr'. Allegedly the best blow by blow account, although in a weird coffee table format and with a cringe-making title is Stephen Walsh's 'Stalingrad - Hell in the cauldron'. While I have not been able to bring myself to shell out the money (yet), the book 'Death of the leaping horseman' (privately published, look for the website on Google) details the fate of 24. Panzerdivision in Stalingrad, based again on interviews and documentary evidence.

Berlin - Cornelius Ryan's 'Berlin - the last battle' is a must-read, and has stood the test of time extremely well, AFAICT. AIUI, Beevor does not add anything to it apart from that claim on the nuclear angle. Again, Ryan interviewed a number of the key actors, amongst them Konev. Also, Konev's memoirs, second volume (The year 1944/45) are a very good read on the topic - unlike other Soviet officers he is sparing on ideological dross. Zhukov's memoirs are interesting, but nowhere near as good. There is a German book dealing with the Halbe cauldron in which most of 9. Armee perished - it is on my stack of books to read, but I have yet to get around to it. Siegfried Knappe's 'Soldat' (English title) details elements of the Berlin battle at the beginning. He was chief of staff to the military commander of Berlin, IIRC.

I hope this is somewhat helpful.

[ September 03, 2003, 08:09 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Los:

It does seem that the Ggermans spent a a fair amount of effort in rooting out incompetence in their division in higher officers (though certainly their national leadership led them right into ruin).

That is something I am not so sure about. An example for a dud would be von Mackensen in command of 14. Armee at Anzio. Other examples are Luftwaffenfelddivisionen, which often seem to have been led by total incompetents.

A German historian states that one problem with promotion in the Wehrmacht was that it was all for the wrong reasons - you got promoted for being a dashing risk-taker, not for being a thorough and exact worker. This could have its advantages, but also had drawbacks. Then there are cases where promotion seems to have been as much for allegiance to Nazi ideology as for performance, e.g. Busch, Schoerner. Last but not least you have a significant number of competent officers fired for failing to carry out orders that simply were impossible - especially in December/January 41/2, but already before that (I have a case detailed at home of an divisional commander made scape-goat for complete bollocksing-up by his Corps commander in Autumn 1941). The following promotions of course further draw on the resources of an already depleted class - fully trained general staff officers, cascading down the chain of command. But this just exacerbated an already pressing problem with the rapid expansion of the Wehrmacht.

[Dandelion]

"Another carefully constructed and often repeated myth is that they were so far in the hole at the start of the operation that only Allied incompetence in the conduct of the battle itself saved them."

Very carefully constructed conspiracy I must say. Even the Germans agree. von der Heydte in his published account Daedalos, the Heilmann paper of the US Army historical report series, Meindl in article in Bund Deutscher Fallschirmjäger - all say the operation would have been a complete failure if Maleme had not been handed over to them.

Either way I look at it, and regardless the bravado of the kids in the 7th and all their Sgt Kunzes, the Germans were "Absolut Schluss" (v.d.Heydte) by the time of the first allied command mistake - evacuation of Maleme. They had failed to achieve a single of their many ambitious objectives, they had no water and little munitions, no heavy weapons and units were shattered and scatterted. They were wholly unable to perform any operationally significant military action, inclusive of the conquest of Maleme in the face of opposition.

It wasn't incompetence though. The evacuation of Maleme was just a mistake, made possible by the disruption of communications, with bombs cutting the wire. Everybody makes mistakes.

Regards

Dandelion

[Los]

Except keep in mind that von der Heydte's fight was removed from Maleme, tied up in prison valley as he was. If the Germans did not continue to push aggresively against 107 and the airfield with what they had left in the area, and had just gone to ground and decided to bide their time, they would have been sunk. The point being, fairly clearly stated already, that while the Brits lost Crete, the Germans paras were not passive riders just along for the visit. Maleme was not just "handed over" per se. The NZ troops were under heavy pressure from paras, who were already on the airfield, and all over the surrounding foothills of Point 107. This psycological pressure on the commander was not concocted out of thin air,that was the Germans pressing on them. Now you add to this concoction confusion, night, very poor directives and communications and there you have it.

It's one thing for one side to make a mistake, it's another thing for the other side to recognize the mistake, and agressively take advantage of it. Even after 107 was seized the Allies had every means at their disposal to recover and failed.

Ineptitude of Allied leadership through failure to adequate prepare their defenses (or even really look at their deployments), Failure to take advantage of critical intelligence, and a failure to react quickly or agressively did them in. But at the same time, the Germans, recovering from their initial disaster (and fair amount of their own making also with their poor intelliegnce and preparations too) kept pressing kept attacking and kept taking advantage of allied mistakes. They realized that Maleme was the key and fed reinforcements into that area, (though why they split of the second para drop in that area and put some guys down east of Maleme was a waste of two companies.) Even after the intial arrival or 100 GJR the Germans were heavily outnumbered and outgunned but kept on pressing. While the Germans elsewhere hunkered down through lack of supplies heavy weapons and strength they also nonetheless kept the Allies frozen in their positions and proved difficult to dislodge, denying freedom of movement to the Allies even if had occured to them that they needed to manuever.

Both factors contributed to the loss...

Los

[ September 03, 2003, 11:50 AM: Message edited by: Los ]

[Los]

"An example for a dud would be von Mackensen in command of 14. Armee at Anzio. Other examples are Luftwaffenfelddivisionen, which often seem to have been led by total incompetents."

Yes and the Germans had what? 300+ divisions or more and how many Corps and Armies? How many did the British have or the Americans. The question (unanswerable most likely) is what percentage of incompetents were allowed to remain or gone unnoticed. In particular after clear failures of leadership. That would be an interesting thesis.

Los

Sidebar, anyone read "Battling for Saipan?" or "Howlin' Mad against the Army?" Both have varying degrees of interesting detail of the relief of a division commander in combat (though in that case it's been fairly well proven unjustly so.)

[Andreas]

Los, I all I intended to point out was that while you may have the impression that the Germans spent a lot of time rooting out incompetents, there are easy-to-find examples where this did not happen, or where on the contrary officers were pushed up based on their political allegiance or their ability to nod bravely in acceptance of every stupid order coming from OKW, while competent officers were sacked.

I also have some choice comments on the performance of Bittrich (GOC 9. SS PD) at Tarnopol in April 1944. Again, he was not sacked for it, or even reported to SS HQ as a dud by Balck or Raus. They found another way of dealing with it (by not giving him the important task), and by the time of 9.SS's fight in Normandy and Holland a few months later he seems to have been able to handle it. All this is anecdotal evidence at best though.

I can not draw any general conclusion from that, and I have no possibility or intent to compare it to the US or Commonwealth forces and their handling of incompetents. But I would be interested in why you think the Germans were better at handling these cases than the Allies?

[Michael Dorosh]

Canada had a paltry five divisions, formed into two corps, and finding senior commanders was understandably tough given the puny prewar army.

I would imagine the German Army had the same problems multiplied many times; - they expanded from 100,000 in 1933 to over 3 million in 1939. Some people think that the Germans used their time in the 1930s to develop all kinds of wonderful strategies. They didn't. They also didn't develop any technologies that would make the armoured concept work; the majority of their infantry walked or rode in unarmoured trucks throughout the war. I would be surprised to learn that they were any better at developing divisional and corps commanders, though with such a large force they did have better raw material to choose from; if nothing else the law of averages would suggest proportionally more talented commanders. Given the Wehrmacht's unpreparedness for war in 1939 in any category you wish to name, it would be interesting to see an in-depth analysis of how well their divisions were commanded.