Finding the Enemy

[Guest Pillar]

Wisbech_lad,

Please email me.

[Guest Pillar]

If you guys want to talk about artillery limitations, let me throw this little statistic out to you:

During a Soviet breakthrough of a German defensive position, 250-300 guns per kilometer of front was the actual number concentrated.

A few 82mm mortar batteries would hardly be an unreasonable asset for SRE forces to all upon. LOL

[ScoutPL]

I guess its a good thing the russians weren't fighting on the western front then huh? If they were fighting in the west that would blow our debate right out of the water wouldn't it? Boy, I'm glad they decided to stick to their side of Germany.

[Guest Pillar]

For Jason:

As per our discussions on the principle of "Mass" a while ago, I thought you might be interested in this article. It's a little old but worth a look.

http://calldbpub.leavenworth.army.mil/eng_mr/text/VOL62/00000008/art2.pdf#xml=http://calldbpub.leavenworth.army.mil/temp_dir/hltd34D81A4A.pdf

Enjoy.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Russian artillery doctrine was screwy, and did lots of silly things. One was to put tons of guns wheel-hub to wheel-hub for fire support. This didn't increase the number of artillery rounds available for a prep bombardment a bit, and making the guns actually reduced the number of shells total. Where the Germans or the U.S. would have a battalion of 12-18 guns fire 200 rounds each, the Russians would put 72 guns and have them fire 35-50 each.

They wound up with seperate artillery *armies* before it was all through, continually increasing the size of dedicated artillery units. (The largest anybody else ever needed was an artillery brigade, and even those fired and fought as battalions, using the brigade organization for logistics and such).

But if you think the Russians were firing the same ammo loads through their oodles of guns, then just plain think again. The U.S. made and fired vastly more artillery shells than the Russians did. The number of tubes, they recognized, is beside the point, when your existing guns cannot fire continually anyway for ammo reasons.

[Gremlin]

On the matter of artillery, any recommended books? (The Guns: 1939-45 and Barrage: The Guns in Action by Ian Hogg are fine introductions.)

------------------

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[This message has been edited by Gremlin (edited 01-30-2001).]

[Henri]

Originally posted by ScoutPL:

Sorry but I'm still not convinced. What you have here is a commander who's first COA was to go up the roads, so he directed his reconnaissance there. They came back with the intel that showed the roads were impassable, convincing him to find an alternate route.

So he task organized his combined arms units to create a rather standard marching order for tank/infantry teams operating in wooded terrain.

[snip]

What we dont have here is a commander splitting up his infantry forces into "recon" teams, distributing them relatively evenly across his front and sending them forward to make contact with the enemy surfaces and hopefully discover his gaps.

The Russian document says:

In seeking routes for bypassing, considerable assistance can be furnished by dismounted reconnaissance elements. They can penetrate the hostile area unnoticed, ascertain unoccupied or weakly fortified intervals, and locate convenient approaches. Following them come separate combat machines and small tank units.

It seems clear to me that the recon elements here and therefore the associated small units are modifying their routes of advance as they advance, and not according to some preplanned routes previously reconned.

As to breaking up his units, the commander in the above case was using whatever recon elements are available, whether some were obtained from the following companies or not is unclear, and it seems to me, beside the point.

Since you seem to accept that this procedure is OK, I don't quite understand any more what your objection to Pillar's position about changing routes on the fly through recon that is sufficiently broad to find the weak spots. Does it only reside in the "breaking up of units"?

BTW, on the usenet war-historical forum, Fionn said that in many games against professional soldierwhere he used recon similar to what Pillar is proposing, he lost only once. Does this mean that CM is unrealistic, or does it mean that Pillar might have a point?

Henri

[ScoutPL]

The key to this article is what the commander knew prior to committing to a course of action. He knew the roads were blocked. He knew he needed to get the germans out of the woods and wanted to use his armor to do it since it gave him a distinct advantage. He developed a plan PRIOR to attacking and implemented it. Advance parties moving ahead of tanks to find suitable routes and locate enemy positions is not reconnaissance for the sake of reconnaissance. Its simply good tactical sense. The advance parties provide security to the main body (in this case the armor) and provide a heads up to the commander. Every movement formation from platoon up to the corps level (in any army's doctrine) emphasize placing security elements to the front and flanks. As you near the enemy positions these elements move farther out to the front and the formation as a whole slows down. This is not recon for the sake of gaining intel, its just good tactics. Pillar advocated pushing elements forward to determine as much as possible about the enemy setup BEFORE committing to a plan. If he wants to amend his prior statements and say he always backs those efforts up with his main body, then he's not conducting recon anymore, he's attacking. Albeit in a very haphazard manner since he has no real synchronization and would fall very quickly into reacting to his opponent rather then seizing the initiative at the very start of the fight and maintaining it. Exactly like this Russian commander did, by developing a plan and attacking.

There is no lack of preplanned routes since the wooded area isnt that big. The preplanned routes were to advance between the road and the open areas on the flanks, staying in the trees. No commander is going to be foolish enough to dictate to his subordinate units a specific route in such circumstances so the routes are very vague. Another requiremment for good front and flank security by dismounts. Yes, they are modifying their route as they advance, but if you read closely I think you'll see that it was mostly due to the terrain rather then the enemy. Whenever they encountered the enemy they attacked, knowing his forces in the woods were much weaker then those at the road blocks.

As far as Fionn goes I promised I wouldn't comment on his posts without discussing them with him first. So if he wants to jump on here and verify what you quoted him as saying I'll be happy to respond. I will say that alot of that has to do with professionals using TTP's that they are trained to use, a few which can be usurped by the game mechanics. Which by the way, I am convinced is the reason so many players advocate broad front recon in CM. With the see all/know all type spotting rules, the system contradicts reality to the utmost in this regard. Making such tactics much more successful in the game then they would be in real life. I think you will find Fionn would agree with this statement.

[Henri]

Originally posted by ScoutPL:

As far as Fionn goes I promised I wouldn't comment on his posts without discussing them with him first. So if he wants to jump on here and verify what you quoted him as saying I'll be happy to respond.

That's not possible of course, since Fionn has been banned from the BTS forums. I'm afraid if you want to discuss with him, you'll have to go to the usenet war-historical forum.

Henri

[ScoutPL]

Interesting. Why was he banned?

And,ahem, you were the one using him as a reference, perhaps you should get ahold of him and have him email me if its that important of a point for you. I still contend he will agree with me. We've talked about it before in relation to Pillar's posts.

[Henri]

Originally posted by ScoutPL:

Interesting. Why was he banned?

To make a long story short, he got in a fight with someone who Fionn alleged harrassed his family. Being Irish and having a short fuse, Fionn went beyond what BTS considered acceptable language on the forum and was banned.

And,ahem, you were the one using him as a reference, perhaps you should get ahold of him and have him email me if its that important of a point for you. I still contend he will agree with me. We've talked about it before in relation to Pillar's posts.

I don't want to get into the mode of speaking here for Fionn and being the intermediary between you and him; I only mentioned his opinion because he is well known to be one of the very best players of CM, and as anyone can verify by reading his postings on the usenet war-historical forum or his AARs, he supports breaking up squads and using them for recon and determining avenues of approach on the fly, and he explicitely criticizes the US doctrine of using pre-panned avenues of approach.Just one recent quote about US recon doctrine:

"A doctrine which throws away the ability of lower-level commanders to use maneuvre warfare to attack the weakest portion of the enemy position in full knowledge of enemy dispositions and, instead, accepts the fact that with only 2 or 3% of its total troops allocated to reconnaissance operations it is possible for its forces to attack into the enemy strength and does nothing about this situation isn't a doctrine I want to adhere to." (Fionn on Usenet)

Henri

[Guest Pillar]

out

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-30-2001).]

[ScoutPL]

This is a rather disturbing quote, fraught with inaccuracies and misinformation, so I'll go straight to the source and get back with you.

[Wisbech_lad]

Sorry Pillar, tried to email you, didn’t get through.

I re –read “Quartered Safe Out Here” by George Macdonald Fraser, who was a lance-corporal (2 i/c of a 10 man section) in Burma, 1945, as part of the 14th Army. Valuable, because it is a grunts eye view of the war – at one point he comments that Slim’s crossing of the Irrawady was called by historians a superb piece of manouvre and deception, but to him it just meant four marches and diggings in in 24 hours…

Anyway, it has points that support both sides of the argument

Anti- Broad screen recon

1) Very few radios. When he goes on a patrol, (4 man) it is to gather info. If they run into trouble, one man is designated to run back to the company and tell them what happened. So I still think that CM gives too much information too quickly to all your units, thus increasing the value of sending a screen up front. Even the platoon commander has a runner, not a radio (but Burma was low priority) At night, OP’s use flare guns as an alert.

2) When enemy position is known (they kill a Japanese officer with a map showing a certain patch of woods is an enemy concentration zone), the battalion attack is concentrated and accompanied by tanks/ aircraft bombardment. No infantry screen goes in first.

3) Non-mortar arty is inflexible, i.e. the idea that your fo’s can change fire mission based on info from one section up front is unlikely

Pro Broad screen recon

1) He specifically mentions “Tiger Patrols”, where the object was to locate and destroy Japanese units before they could concentrate enough to attack. This could involve the whole battalion. Essentially, his company would sweep around the country side, spread out, from village to village, trying to get shot at. Once they get shot at, entire company concentrates. Often nothing happens.

2) In a set piece attack on Meitikla, his company has to advance over several hundred yards of open terrain. They advance in line abreast formation, platoon at a time, with 5-6 yards between each man, to try and minimise losses to Japanese arty. This could be seen as broad front recon, in that they know the Japanese are in the town, but not which buildings contain strong points? But they are all in visual contact of each other (it is open ground)

Other

1) No Japanese tanks, so they leave the PIATS in stores

2) Japanese have 2-4 man bunkers

3) OP are 2 man units

4) Platoon very rarely operates independently

5) Phosphorus grenades are used for clearing bunkers, not for making smoke.

[Guest Pillar]

Wisbech:

Try adam_s_lloyd@yahoo.com

If not could you give matt your email and he can pass it on to me?

Thanks!

[Wisbech_lad]

Ok, tried again. If it doesn't get through then:

richard_reed@cathaypacific.com

[Silvio Manuel]

Bump.

Food for thought...I hope yer hungry. I sure am.

[Kallimakhos]

Good discussion. Just one point on the realism of broad front recon, which could be called also intense prebattle patrolling. For game play reasons, the whole time scale of CM is compressed, and rightly so - a battle which in RL wood take several hours is resolved normally in half an hour. Considering this overall time compression, broad front recon doesn't look at all unrealistic.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

To make those limits more flexible, one might simply cap the number of FOs at 3 for the US and 2 for the others, with only one the light mortar variety, and the other(s) taken from the common varieties mentioned above. Incidentally, it is my opinion that these common types are the most effective anyway.

In CM, the 4.2 inch mortars are popular on the Allied side, but in fact those were fairly rare (they are the "chemical" mortars). If one takes 3x4.2 inch and 1x81mm and consider the latter "for smoke", one is definitely being "gamey". But you knew that, LOL.

Those are reasonable, nay generous, limits for average sorts of units on a typical sort of day, certainly for number of observers. The problem, of course, is that in real life the number of observers and number of rounds are independent of each other (especially in the British Army, where an FO could call on thickening fires with a remarkable degree of flexibility if necessary -- "Mike", "Uncle", "Victor", and, if you really annoy someone, "William" targets for fire mission regiment, division, corps and army respectively).

ISTR reading in an old copy of the "British Army Review" (many years ago, so I regret I can't find a better citation) that battalions of the British Liberation Army in the Netherlands developed a tactic known as the "Javelin" attack. This relied on massed fires to be effective; a single battalion would attack with the fire resources of the entire division (which might include an element of Corps artillery). The mortar platoons would be collected from the other battalions of the division to support the attacking battalion; by my reckoning that makes 9 x 6 = 54 3-inch mortar tubes (trivia quiz question: What's the calibre of a 3-inch mortar in millimetres?). The normal arty support for an infantry brigade would be a field regiment of 25-pdr (25-pdr or 25-pr, please; never, ever "25-lber"), 3 batteries of 8 tubes each for a total of 24 tubes; three brigades in the div makes 72 tubes. The divisional MG battalion would typically have a company of 4.2" mortars to contribute (4 platoons each of 4 tubes). Corps might chip in a regiment of 5.5"s (2 batteries each of 4 tubes), say, giving us a grand total of:

54 3-inch mortars

72 25-pdr gun-hows

16 4.2" mortars

8 5.5" gun-hows

This is not including the possibility of a "pepper-pot" of underemployed Bofors, 3.7" AA or 17-pdr ATk guns being added in. Not bad fire support for a battalion, though, eh? In CM:BO terms I make it 13 modules of 3-in mor, 18 modules of 25-pdr, 4 modules of 4.2" and 2 of 5.5" (so, yes, 3 modules of 4.2" does have a distinctly overripe gamey flavour).

Of course, the best way to simulate this in CM:BO would be to have a fresh battalion advance over a moonscape of craters inhabited by the odd panicked and broken half-squad, which might not make much of a game. But the assumption that the Americans should have more fire support than anyone else is, I think, questionable.

All the best,

John.

[Brian]

An interesting point, John.

I used to know the calibre of the 3in Mortar, it is greater than 3in, which is the calibre of the round, not the tube. Mmmm, 80mm?

As to the assumptions of some, you have to remember, the flavour of the board tends towards being Americano-centric in nature because of their sheer numbers (yes, I know I'll get the usual stick for making such an obvious observation but the heck... ). You'll get used to it. Its nearly impossible to fight. CMBO is an excellent game but it is lacking somewhat in its accuracy in some of its simulations of British/Commonwealth equipment/OrBats/etc. It is apparently a whole better than it was though, when it was first released, by all accounts, so yes, BTS does listen to criticisms.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Brian:

An interesting point, John.

I used to know the calibre of the 3in Mortar, it is greater than 3in, which is the calibre of the round, not the tube. Mmmm, 80mm?

Close enough for government work -- 81mm, same-same like everyone else's bar the Russians.

Despite the miserable range figures typically given in weapons books, the 3-inch was no worse than the German 8cm in this respect if you simply put in more increments than the official top service charge (according to a paper reporting a comparative shoot-off between the two by the Small Arms School).

All the best,

John.

[Brian]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:

An interesting point, John.

I used to know the calibre of the 3in Mortar, it is greater than 3in, which is the calibre of the round, not the tube. Mmmm, 80mm?

Close enough for government work -- 81mm, same-same like everyone else's bar the Russians.

</font>