Preview

[Guest Pillar]

"Mass is the key to stopping an enemy force. If your forces cannot act as a unit, the enemy can isolate parts of it and obliterate them piece meal. I count on any good player to recognize opportunities for this. A good player will penetrate into a portion of my first echelon of defense. It is absolutely critical that I am able at the very least to make him pay for any penetration, and that favorably I contain or obliterate the penetration...."

"By keeping an eye on the enemy, you can tell (through experience) when it would be too late for him to change directions without taking significant time to do so (allowing your reserve to shift yet again). The SRE also must disseminate from the real enemy main effort and any deceptive moves he might make. Typically, deceptive maneuver is difficult to identify from the MLR due to distances. With the SRE, one can have no doubt..."

Coming Soon to Combat HQ.

Edit: Article is now available

http://combathq.thegamers.net/articles/Learning/learning.asp

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-25-2001).]

[coralsaw]

Looking forward to reading your essay Pillar.

Regards

[Guest Pillar]

Thanks Coralsaw. I'm trying to rouse some interest

[coralsaw]

Hey Pillar no prob, I enjoy the stuff you write.

Seems everybody is consumed with QB points these days my friend, while doctrine issues come second...

Regards

------------------

My squads are regular, must be the fibre in the musli...

[Guest Pillar]

Hehehe, too true Coralsaw.

I think in light of those comments you'll really like this article.

I hope it raises some discussion here so that we can stop talking about "who's armor is better" or "why my AT gun wouldn't fire."

[IntelWeenie]

Good doctrine/tactics can nearly always overcome weaknesses with equipment (historically or in CM). Unfortunately, most people tend to get caught up in the blame game (the tank/gun/AI is broken!) than realise the problem is the way they are playing the game.

I look forward to reading it!

[Terence]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Pillar:

"Mass is the key to stopping an enemy force. .<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Which American Civil War general said "Git there the fustest with the mostest?"

(Not to trivialize what you are saying at all, Pillar. I do look forward to reading your piece. Just a nod to the folks who came before and did their share of bleeding on unfriendly ground....)

[MoJo]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Terence:

Which American Civil War general said "Git there the fustest with the mostest?"...

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

IIRC, that would be U.S. Grant . Correct me if I am wrong.

-Mo

------------------

"For every soldier that died at Dieppe, ten were saved on D-Day"

--Lord Louis Mountbatten

[Guest Pillar]

Yes I think it was Grant. However, Grant had a very elaborate and extensive understanding of warfare. To him, those few words meant a LOT more than they do to you or I. There are many complexities and details to getting there the "fastest with the mostest".

There IS a reason why armies have elaborate field manuals and libraries on doctrinal analysis.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

The keyes of tactics usually are not found in a formula, but in an adaptation of several mutually contradictory formula to a tactical problem at hand. In other words, everyone has more military maxims than actually apply, and the trick is getting the right one. Because the reality is, everywhere there are trade-offs and countermeasures.

I mention this because of an example quoted in the article previewed, the principle of mass. Modern "blitz" or "schwerpunk" tactics make everything out of the principle of mass. In its simplest form, it is the idea of your force fighting 4 battles in succession against portions of the enemy force, at 4:1 odds each time, by manuevering tightly through a spread out enemy.

There is just one immediate problem with this. Artillery. In modern terms, applying the principle of mass underneath an MLRS savlo will ruin your whole day. In CM terms, the compact company-level attack through the woods is a brilliant application of the principle of mass (as well as the "covered approach") - until the enemy FO calls in 120mm mortar fire on the company.

The firepower of area weapons makes men spread out. The principle of mass allows a compact body to defeat spread out forces in sequence, one after another. Both are entirely true, and not only are they not truly contradictory, they only work at all because of each other.

Concentrated enemies are best dealt with, not by counter-concentrated attacks, which will result in great destruction on both sides but most of it on the side of a moving attacker, but instead by fire. Concerntrated "shock" action (moving to the close ranges at which the weapons are most lethal - which can be reasonable far away in the case of armor on the CM scale, by the way) defeats spread out forces.

To avoid easy destruction by the area effects of fire, an compact attacking formation needs to be able to keep moving, and moveover needs to be able to spread out again and if necessary to back away, if fire requires it. Knowing when you can afford to concentrate, and when the results to be quickly expected from it are worth the dangers it involves, is the real tactical issue.

The WW II era, down to recent times, was an era marked by a peculiar assymmetry in the effectiveness of area fire weapons. Artillery was largely ineffective against heavy armor, while remaining effective against all other types of units. Before the era in question, only immobile fortifications offered protection of a kind from artillery, and in more recent times advances in technology have made the highest-tech artillery again dangerous to even heavy armor.

Between the two periods, armor could afford greater concentrations on the battlefield than other units could. Artillery firepower was high enough to force widely spread deployments on all other types. This created great opportunities for concentrated armor to employ the so-called "principle of mass", or to fight the enemy in sequence. And a lot of people noticed it, and decided that it was the be-all of modern manuever.

But it only works in the first place because firepower is already there to make people spread out. There are usually two sides of every tactical maxim, so if you apply them mechanically without understanding why they work, you can easily hurt your men quite badly.

There aren't any fixed rules for when and how much you go with this vs. that side of such trade-offs. It is a matter of relating the choice to the enemy and the ground, etc. You get a feel for such things, see opportunities to use now one of them, now another.

For what it is worth...

[cyrano01]

Nathan B. Forrest?

------------------

The British Army always fights its battles uphill, in the pouring rain, at the junction of two map-sheets. (Field Marshal W. Slim)

[Guest Pillar]

Jason,

Thanks for your input. I do disagree with you. However it may seem, the principle of mass is not contradictory with the principle of fluidity and physical dispersion.

While it may seem one must choose between them, often this is not the case. There are two visions of Mass:

1) The view you are thinking of, which is physical mass and is regarding the composition of the attacking forces.

2) Effectual Mass, which I am discussing in that paragraph (though the context is not evident in this preview), is a massing of EFFECT. In this case, FIREPOWER. It takes some more thinking, but one can achieve the same result as one would expect from a physical massing if one keeps firepower concentrated.

One can break this down even to the platoon level. If terrain permits, one can spread out 3 squads enough to render an artillery barrage ineffectual, yet retain a concentration of firepower.

The decision only becomes difficult in dense terrain, where spreading out your force means splitting them. This means they cannot support one another, or can only do so at a limited degree. I don't consider this an option.

If I spread out my forces in terrain that makes effectual concentration impossible, I don't think I have a hope of winning. I'm far more willing to take some artillery causalties than ensure my own defeat by splitting forces to the point where their firepower cannot be cumulative.

So in sum, I believe one can get the effect of "Mass" and not contradict the principles of keeping a force unbunched in many situations. I think that in situations where physical massing is necessary to achieve effectual mass it is a worthwhile endeavor provided you are facing a standard enemy force.

I can think of situations where there might be exceptions, but as a concept "Mass" is definitely the key to stopping an enemy force, be that "Mass" in artillery on a given area or "Mass" in effectual firepower, or if absolutely need be: physical massing.

Much complexity in a simple principle.

EDIT:

Just thought of something you may be interested in Jason. See if you can find some modern Soviet views on handling forces on the Nuclear Battlefield. They go into far more depth than what I have on how to achieve "Mass" without physical concentration. One reference I can think of is "The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver, Spearhead of the Offensive" by David Glantz.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-18-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

I said -

"not only are they not truly contradictory, they only work at all because of each other."

Apparently I have not been understood.

But you still think "mass" can be effected without violating "spread". Well it can't.

Massing of fires on one target or one area of ground is certainly possible, and the latter is a common defensive principle ("kill zones", yada yada). But concentration achieves similarity and overlap in the "sighting footprints" of the elements of the force, and spreading does not do so. And the most important effects of the principle of mass stem from that.

By the sighting footprint of a unit, I mean all the locations that can see that unit at a moment in time. A unit on an unwooded forward slope or "military crest" has an enourmous sighting footprint, for example, while a unit well behind two buldings and looking between them has a very small sighting footprint in that direction.

When a force is concentrated, the sum of the sighting footprints of all of its units, will not be appreciably larger than the sighting footprint of one unit within the formation. There are exceptions to this, and they are key tactical situations to understand when they arise (crossing a crest, aligning along or across a woodline, etc), but the general rule holds.

When a force is more seperated, the sighting footprint of all of its units combined, will generally be much larger than the sighting footprint of a single unit within the formation. Parts of the unit can see the west side of hill xyz. Others can see the adjoining southern slope of the ridge leading to it. Others can see the draw leading off to the east instead. Etc.

The units may all have LOS of one another, and of the areas in the immediate vicinity of the other parts of the formation or at least some of them. That is not the question. The issue is the differential sighting footprints of the sub-units, and the spread or concentration of the formation.

When the unit is deployed in a concentrated enough fashion that its overall sighting footprint is about the same as that of each of its sub-units, then the formation call all put fire on anything that can put fire on a part of the formation. This is the principle tactical reality that gives rise to the phenomenon of "mass". When part of the unit gets into a firefight, the rest of the unit shoots up those shooting at a piece of it.

But unless the ground is very open (and at the limit, even then as I will explain), this overlap of sighting footprints only happens with deployments so tight, that the whole unit makes a fine artillery target. This is especially true for any force with sub-units besides heavy armor, tanks - in the period in question. (These days, it even applies to tanks against high-tech enemies, although still somewhat less than with other types).

I can show why this is so with the marginal case. Imagine the unit is on an entirely flat, open plain with a visibility of 3 kilometers in every direction, ending afterward because of dust or whatever. As often occurs in the desert. Does this mean the force has "mass" in every direction? It depends on how it is deployed.

Imagine the force is deployed in a single line of vehicles stretched out across the direction they are advancing, 2 kilometers long. Then an enemy 2-3 kilometers to the right sees the right half of the unit (and vice versa), while an enemy 2-3 kilometers to the left sees the left half of the unit. The sighting footprints overlap considerably, especially toward the front. But not in all directions equally.

Deploy the unit tighter, into .5 kilometer on a side, and this "edges" sight effect is reduced considerably, so that "mass" will be more likely against enemies encountered from any angle. But, now the entire formation sits in the approximate footprint of a single MLRS strike.

Instead of a modern armor example, take a CM scale infantry one. Suppose you have a force of infantry - a platoon to make it simple - moving through a bodies of woods, with visibility 25 meters. If the squads are "on-line" side by side and 20 meters apart, then enemies encountering the left or right squad will in general not be visible to the rest of the platoon immediately. In a wedge formation, it will be a bit better - 2 squads will typically have or soon get LOS to any enemy encountered.

But the platoon will have to be deployed in an area 50 meters across by perhaps 40 meters deep, to bring about this level of overlap of sighting footprints and so of fire. Any artillery fire will tree-burst over the entire platoon, with tons of room to spare. Indeed, any deployment of an infantry *company* in such terrain, will either be subject to meeting enemy infantry seperated and fighting them with only a small portion of the force, or to concentrated damage from artillery fire, and often both. Incidentally, this is one reason the Hurtgen was so bloody a battle.

Any deployment of men that does not give the enemy fine artillery targets, involves spreading out the sub-units until only a couple are within the footprint of a possible enemy barrage. But such deployments are very loose in all but very open terrain. They will always involve some men passing on this side of a building or wood or hill, others on that side of it. In all but continuous woods (whose problems have already been covered above), there will also be avenues of open ground between the sub-units of any force deployed that loosely.

Now, when there are many avenues of open ground that "bisect" an infantry formation, that means there are many possible locations for enemy MGs that will effectively divide the formation, by preventing anyone from crossing that area of open ground, or pinning or breaking them if they try it. So mutual support, even by fire, often cannot be restored by running people to the direction of the main contact. Sometimes, not always.

Why does this matter? Because a force that is engaged while divided by some LOS-blocking obstacle can only put a portion of its fires on the enemy. Who may be able to put all his fires on only that portion, in return (a few pinning MGs to "disarticulate" the force, excepted).

I am trying to explain some of the effects of being spread out enough to be a poor artillery target. It will always create opportunities for an enemy to engage a portion of your force, only. He can isolate some element by choice of his location and the restrictions on his sighting footprint. If your men are not quite close to one another, he is reasonably assured of chances to do this.

You say at one point "I'd prefer to take the occasional losses to artillery than the effects of being split up". Well, many historical commanders have agreed with you, which is why artillery is still called the King of Battle, and why it caused something north of 3/4ths of all casualties in WW II.

The losses to artillery from being concentrated are not "occasional". Commanders used to modern U.S. fire support dominance in all recent wars often do not understand this, but you can bet our more capable opponents did and do.

But the point is not that "therefore, you must spread". The point is to understand why concentrated deployments employed for "shock" or against thinner enemies can indeed prove decisive, and how - equally - a correctly arranged plan of fire against such a concentrated force can also prove decisive.

These issues will never be understood by anyone who thinks in terms of "concentration - good" or "concentration - bad", by calling the first "mass" and the second "bunching up". It is a question of the situation.

When the enemy is concentrated, one does not try to destroy him with a spearhead. Shoot him with indirect fire, and he will die. Attack afterward; in the meantime avoid losses in dead ground and get closer.

When the enemy is spread out, do not fight 4 small battles side by side and burn your fire support on whatever holds anyone up. Form a spearhead and destroy half the spread-out enemy force in 2 lopsided firefights in sequence, instead. But keep moving rapidly - and spread out the moment the spearhead stalls - you will see it smashed by indirect fire.

They are not rival things true about tactical combat. They are alternate things to do, depending on what is in front of you, on how the enemy decided to deploy.

[Guest Pillar]

Well written. You came across very clearly.

You make me appear a simpleton:

"These issues will never be understood by anyone who thinks in terms of "concentration - good" or "concentration - bad", by calling the first "mass" and the second "bunching up". It is a question of the situation."

And then immediately go on to say:

"When the enemy is concentrated, one does not try to destroy him with a spearhead. Shoot him with indirect fire, and he will die. Attack afterward; in the meantime avoid losses in dead ground and get closer.

When the enemy is spread out, do not fight 4 small battles side by side and burn your fire support on whatever holds anyone up. Form a spearhead and destroy half the spread-out enemy force in 2 lopsided firefights in sequence, instead. But keep moving rapidly - and spread out the moment the spearhead stalls - you will see it smashed by indirect fire"

LOL.

You have good ideas and you are definitely on the right track.

I did give you a rather kind reply, with couteous references to things I thought you might be interested in.

Some things to ask yourself, which I don't think you have:

What do you think I meant by "Mass is the key to stopping an enemy force"?

What do you think I meant by "If your forces cannot act as a unit" ? (Italics added)

How do you think Artillery is best used?

I think once you (or whoever is following along with this) answer these questions you might find that I've already thought about this and have worded my paragraph (as sampled here) very carefully. You may even find that I've already taken into account the factors you described in your book..errr..post.

(It's a joke Jason, sit down)

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-19-2001).]

[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

hehehe I think the green guys are going to win if they go Northeast really fast, while concentrating firepower north. "Mass is the keyto stopping an enemy force" Yeah a Massive amount of lead mass. I've had the pleasure of losing to Pillar. So at least he has proven to me he knows what hes talking about. Of course in battle you have to take risks to get a big payoff. Sometimes you fail, mainly cuz your opponent is doing everything he can to stop you. And of course sometimes you win.

Jason do you use ICQ or the CMHQ for Tcp/ip games? I would love to help you polish your tatics on me. What is your nickname? Or do you go by Jason?

[Armdchair]

Wasn't it Confederate cavalry leader Jeb Stuart that said "Git there fustest with the mostest"?

[Bil Hardenberger]

Pillar,

You are becoming quite the little theorist aren't you?

I agree about massing fires... which really is what you want to do, rather than the massing of forces... however this can be very difficult to achieve in reality and the tendency can be to bunch up your forces to allow you to apply overwhelming fire on a position, which can have dire consequences if your enemy has Artillery or tank support. As Jason so eloquently explained.

Really, how one applies synchronized concentration on a sector is an artform. It can be very difficult to do... damned hard against a good opponent in close terrain, or at night. As the Defender, applying mass depends on a good picket line, to allow you to identify the main attack routes. This also can be very difficult to achieve, especially if the attacker moves in multiple cloumns, with the intent of concentrating at a specific point in time. The key is not to only apply mass on a sector, but to identify where the enemy is weakest and concentrate against that sector. As the Defender this can be very dangerous if you ID one point of your line as the primary attack zone, shift your forces to cover it, only to find out, to your horror, that your enemy had a second attack zone in a different location. There are countless examples of such situations in history.

Good discussion.

Bil

[Hiram Sedai]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Pillar:

"Mass is the key to stopping an enemy force.

Coming Soon to Combat HQ.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I know a Catholic priest who would agree with that statement.

------------------

Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction. - Blaise Pascal

[Guest Pillar]

I pointed this thread out to my friend Fionn, who asked me to add this from him:

"Achieving mass effect is not necessarily incompatible with dispersing one's forces such that an indirect fire mission can only hit a portion of a platoon at a time. You can never prevent artillery hitting some of your force. What is important when attacking or counter-attacking is to ensure that the majority of your force remains unpinned and unattrited by enemy indirect fire assets. By assuring this you assure you bring the majority of your force to bear and inevitable achieve mass effect.

Mass effect is all about putting firepower on target. It does NOT require advancing 100 men shoulder to shoulder to within sight of the enemy. Check out the Bocage AAR for some good examples of platoons several hundred metres from eachother co-operating with eachother to bring fire to bear on specific enemy units. This was a clear example of mass effect, shock effect AND dispersion of forces whilst still maintaining concentration of firepower."

Budda Bing Budda Boom. I love this guy.

[Guest Pillar]

Bil said:

"Really, how one applies synchronized concentration on a sector is an artform. It can be very difficult to do... damned hard against a good opponent in close terrain, or at night. As the Defender, applying mass depends on a good picket line, to allow you to identify the main attack routes. This also can be very difficult to achieve, especially if the attacker moves in multiple cloumns, with the intent of concentrating at a specific point in time. The key is not to only apply mass on a sector, but to identify where the enemy is weakest and concentrate against that sector. "

Beautiful.

[Guest Pillar]

Mr Johnson,

Who do you think has "Mass" (think in terms of effect) in that picture?

[Guest Broken!]

"Wasn't it Confederate cavalry leader Jeb Stuart that said "Git there fustest with the mostest"?

Close. This quote is usually attributed to Nathan Forrest who indeed was a Confederate cavalry commander.

[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

Its quite obvious Pillar. The green guys, depending on the range of the troops. If they concetrate fire power on the Germans in the 12 o'clock to 3 o'clock area while Running in short burst NW they can break out and then use their mass to clean up those closest to them while running away from those Germans in the SE. Ala, Jason's post earlier.

[Guest Pillar]

Believe it or not, the Germans actually have a greater concentrated effort here

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Once again, oversimplifications of trade offs from the "of course I can have it all" crowd, who react that way because they have had drilled into them until the consistency of a brick that "mass is good" because it is a "principle of warfare". Therefore, thou shalt not say anything negative about mass.

Yes, one can arrange to have fires all converge on some small area of ground from forces that are themselves dispersed. That is to say, in my terms describing the mechanics whereby tactics work instead of vague generalities, that the sighting footprint of seperated sub-units can overlap somewhere. That is what kill zones are in ambushes.

But if you deploy in anything but wide open terrain, in such a way as to keep your forces seperated while overlapping sighting footprints on some kill zone, you will also have many other "be-killed zones" in which your sighting pictures do not overlap.

If the enemy obliges by walking into your kill zone, of course things will go well. If he does not, then the seperation of your forces will mean seperation of the enemies each can see, and thus lay your men open to overmatched, high odds fights in sequence.

Nor is the straw man about "100 men marching shoulder to shoulder" remotely connected to any of the above. Nobody is talking about such deployments. But actual infantry deployments in tight terrain get plenty tight.

As an example, consider X-Ray in the Ia Drang in Vietnam, 1965. The entire clearing measured 100 yards by 40-100, narrowing at one end in a mix between a triangle shape and a flattened quadrangle. The men deployed there, when actually fighting for the landing zone, were no more than 50 yards off the clearing - which was widdened somewhat in some places, however. The total area was thus about 10 acres, or roughly two football fields on a side - 300 at the utmost, when most extended into the trees off the clearing. Into that space the U.S. army packed 4 rifle companies, a weapons company, and a headquarters company - somewhat understrength, but amounting to ~600-750 men at various points in the 3-day battle. In a position very much like one fellow on this threads, supposedly laughable, surrounded example.

They were attacked by an entire NVA regiment, plus one VC battalion in support - around 2000 men. In CM terms, the U.S. force would occupy only a small area on a small map, with the NVA having the rest to manuever through. But the NVA had no heavy weapons larger than RPGs - a few mortars but they were soon silenced by vastly superior U.S. fire support, or by expending their available ammo.

And once that happened, the U.S. deployment was entirely correct, because it would prevent the NVA from achieving effective mass. Without access to the areas of open ground across the clearing, fields of fire would be extremely restricted. The NVA could therefore only mass fires by massing men along one section of the perimeter, leaving others thinly covered.

This did allow them to get local odds sufficient to penetrate the U.S. infantry positions on one occasion, practically destroying one U.S. company in the process. But it also meant that to achieve this, they had to present massed targets to U.S. fire support.

Besides intermittment helicopter gunships and a stream of fighter-bombers in the daytime, and a few mortars that could not easily be resupplied, the bulk of that fire support was provided by 4 batteries of 105mm, 24 guns in all, located at a neighboring fire base. Which between them fired more than 18,000 rounds over 53 straight hours at the X-Ray perimeter.

Take the area of a small CM map, and exempt one corner of it. Over the rest of the map, fire 4x105 FO artillery for about 250 CM turns - or use 20 of them for 50 turns in 5 different areas - the idea is to see the size of pattern 4 batteries will create - to see the shell blanket involved. Notice, however, that still involves firing only a fraction of the time, on call - as directed, over a 53 hour period. Now, achieve "mass" under that blanket of fire.

Obviously, the NVA should not have attacked a compact formation like that, in terrain so restricted that they could not concentrate their fires from a distance. The French deployment at Dien Bien Phu was over a larger area, and better dug-in with overhead cover in log-and-sand bag bunkers. But the Viet Minh had the ability to avoid concentrated attack and just plaster them with ranged artillery fire first, for an extended period, and thus easily won. If they had the same capability at X-Ray, and had refrained from massed attack while awaiting the results of using ranged fire, the U.S. would have been clobbered.

Another fellow on the thread made the comment that when to mass and when not to is an art and difficult to specify in advance. Exactly, that is what I am trying to say.

But that "when" can be analysed a bit - not to the point of saying exactly when, and certainly not in any flip and glib "I can have it all, never concentrated but always massed-fire because everyone is always in my ambush zone and no where else" poppycock.

Instead, the factors that go into the trade off can be explained, and then the commander's problem is to assess those in his actual situation (forces, terrain, fire vs. close combat capabilities and vunerabilities, intel about enemy deployments and plans, etc). And to decide how to deploy and how to change deployments with pre-planned manuevers, as the above factors change.

I again specify the factors I am talking about. The overlap or lack thereof of the sighting footprints of the sub-units of one's command, is the principle item that needs to be looked at. Areas in which the sighting footprints of most of the force overlap, one has "effective mass" against. Areas in which the sighting footprints of ones sub-units are distinct, one is "effectively seperable".

Not seperated, because there may be no enemy in the location, or not an adequate force there to overwhelm your units that can see the spot. But seperable, because a concentrated deployment of enemy forces in such a location, would allow him massed fires on your units that can see the spot, with only a portion of your force able to respond.

By putting the issue in terms of the sighting footprints, the way the decision will be effected by terrain or effective ranges of weapons or effective lethality of weapons compared to manuevering speeds, and effectiveness of ranged area fire weapons against one's forces, can all be analyzed properly, which a fixed rule on distances between units (for example) would not do.

Incidentally, the different effects of particular configurations of forces - like a previous poster's surround example - will vary. Contrary to a naive expectation, whether the compact group in the middle or the dispersed ring around them is in the worse position, depends on such factors.

If the scale is tactical, and unit ranges and fields of fire reach clear across the surrounded body, and indirect fires can plaster the entire group, and weapon lethalities are high compared to manuever speeds, then obviously the surrounded men are dead as doornails - which is obviously what the original poster "meant". But if the terrain does not allow such fires across the surrounded group and makes ranges short, and the surrounders do not have effective area fire weapons, while the compact group does, then the guys inside the perimeter may be sitting pretty - as they were at X-Ray.

If the scale is operational, and weapon lethalities are high and effective indirect fire weapons are available, then the surrounders again have the whip hand - as they did in the Kiev pocket, for example. But if weapons lethalities and ranges are low, concentrated forces are needed to fight forces of similar size, and no operational-scale indirect fire weapons exist, then the body in the middle has "central positioning" and can defeat the surrounding forces in detail - like Napoleon marching into Germany territory in 1806, trying to "get surrounded" because that meant a divided enemy before battle.

It is not a question of magic deployment formations of one's own men, or even of magic deployments of one's own men relative to the enemy's. It is not a matter of "concentrated is good", nor bad, nor unimportant because "mass" can magically be achieved without any regard for concentration, which it cannot, against one's entire sighting footprint.

It is a matter of a *trade-off* between vunerablility to *shock* action by the concentrated direct and relatively short-range fires of enemy manuever elements, and vunerability to *fire* action by enemy indirect or long-ranged fires. You cannot be invunerable to both. But you can judge which the enemy is now vunerable to, where, and how to grasp and exploit that.

Last, I would make a point about avoiding question-begging and idea-limiting use of tactical terms, which the idea that "term A" "is good" will always lead to. Any term that has a clear and definite tactical meaning and refers to any variable really in a commander's choice, will have times and situations in which it covers the right thing to do, and times and situations in which it does not. There are only two ways of dealing with this fact, which the complexity of tactical situations will automatically bring about.

Either one retains a word's "desireable" connotation, at the cost of making slippery and indefinite what it means, until it blurs out into "do the right thing whatever that is" - *or* - one retains a word's specific content, in which case there will be cases in which the "principle" it refers to does not apply, and the other side of some trade-off matters more.

Thus, "mass" can mean the clear possibility of giving your units very similar sighting footprints to allow them all to protect each other by shooting anyone who can shoot at one of them. Or it can mean a more nebulous "don't waste forces on frivilous and inessential side-shows", in which the (mis)"use" is defined by its being ineffective, thus conceptually reducing "the principle of mass" to "do the right thing, not the wrong one", and thus making it vague and practically meaningless.

The former choice will involve admitting that mass is part of a trade off, not always and everywhere desireable, but an important principle of limited application in definite situations. Those situations and the reasons it matters in them, can be analysed. The other choice will leave "the principle of mass" always applying and always being "good". At the cost of draining it of clear meaning, ability to be analysed, etc.

It is quite obvious to me that the former procedure is the correct one, and the latter a bit of sophistry. But if one is drilling 10,000 stubborn men in tactical principles, it may be it will stick in their heads more easily if they are given eternal truths, which in reality may be as vague as you please, which they can cling to and reiterate over and over, than if you expect every one of them to understand why it is true, when it is true, and its limits, in purely analytical terms.

If they are all thinking of the issue as one of trade offs, for example, they may all tend, in practice, to an error on the same side. (Diversion of effort, or trying to cover everything, e.g.). Then emphasizing the other side might be more sensible as training.

But that question is seperate from the analytical question, of when closely-overlapping sighting footprints are desirable even at the cost of greater indirect fire vunerability, and when they are not.