Soviet Infantry Tactics

[Chris Jenkins]

At what levels did the Soviets normally assign reserves? Did regiments use a reserve battalion? Did battalions use a reserve company? Did companies use a reserve platoon? How would a Soviet battalion array itself for a typical attack?

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Chris Jenkins:

At what levels did the Soviets normally assign reserves? Did regiments use a reserve battalion? Did battalions use a reserve company? Did companies use a reserve platoon? How would a Soviet battalion array itself for a typical attack?

It depends on the time period to some extent. Are you interested in a certain period, evolution of tactics over the course of the war, or just general principles?

Scott

[Chris Jenkins]

I'm mostly thinking of July 1943.

[Panzer Leader]

Will this help?

[Panzer Leader]

HEre's a battalion defense for Stalingrad, which I think was not too much different. Note, these excellent maps are from the David Glantz pdf "Kursk" available on the net somewheres...

[Chris Jenkins]

Great! Are there any for attack? :cool:

[Grisha]

That's an involved question, Chris. It all depends on the year, since there was so much change in Soviet tactics(and operations) during the war. In 1941, there would on average be 1-2 Rifle Battalions per km, but in 1942 that jumped to 2-4 battalions per km. However, in 1942 Rifle Divisions attacked in single echelon with a single battalion as divisional reserve. By 1943, Rifle Battalions in attack would have a frontage of 500-700m. This didn't change much in 1944-45, but what did change was the overall divisional frontage which virtually shrank by a factor of two. The result was deep attack formations that were given the task of penetrating the entire tactical depths of the enemy.

As for reserves, Soviet combat regulations usually assign 1/9th of the formation as reserves.

Incidently, the smallest formation to be split into fire and maneuver groups was generally the company. Platoon and squad commanders were expected to be within close communication with their entire unit.

One of the things to bear in mind is that a well planned mid to late war Soviet operation might make, at the tactical level, for a very poor scenario. The reasons are:</font>

1. Soviet intelligence was very comprehensive and thorough. Thus, most German positions in the first line of defense would be identified on the map.</font>
2. Soviet deception operations(maskirovka), combined with intelligence, created very favorable conditions for operational planning staffs. This was because though the German OOB for a selected sector was generally known, and positions identified, the Germans themselves were kept guessing by and large, and many times they never detected half, or more, of the actual Soviet force deployed before them. By creating this level of advantage for themselves, the Soviets were able to mass tremendous odds in their favor on a tactical level, anywhere from 8:1 to 16:1 on the level of CMBB.</font>

Still, it would be historically accurate, just very poorly balanced.

[ May 02, 2002, 09:18 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Panzer Leader:

... from the David Glantz pdf "Kursk" available on the net somewheres...

heres ... CSI Publications

Edit: Bloody UBB

[ May 02, 2002, 03:52 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Andreas]

From the Nafziger Collection

SOVIET INFANTRY TACTICS

IN WORLD WAR II

By Charles Sharp

Size: 9" x 11"

Illustrations: numerous black & white illustrations

Pages: 122 pages

$19.95 soft cover

Developed using Soviet tactical regulations, this work examines the tactical employment of the Soviet rifle squad, platoon and company, plus the submachine gun squad, machine gun sections, anti-tank rifle squad, and infantry guns. It contains appendices discussing infantry weapons, signals, target maps, a sample reconnaissance diary, anti-tank defenses, sapper work, and tactical symbols. Range and other details are provided for infantry weapons and there are precise TO&Es for infantry squads, platoons, and companies.

[Andreas]

From the same source:

SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE IN WWII

Shawn Caza

Size: 9" x 11"

Illustrations: numerous black & white illustrations

Pages: 146 pages

$19.95 soft cover

This is a reprint Chapter V of the extremely rare US "Handbook on U.S.S.R. Military Forces TM-30-340. It work is full of diagrams of regimental, corps and army level tactics, supported by dozens of illustrations. The work was prepared by the US War Department using all the information that it could obtain from General Gehlen and his staff of Fremde Herre Ost ("Foreign Armies East"). It is a comprehensive examination of Soviet ground tactics, including the important support elements. Part I covers a number of neglected areas: Soviet tactical command structure, the role of combat intelligence and reconnaissance, the tactical planning process and documentation. Part II is an examination of tactics proper. It covers infantry tactics, a huge and highly detailed examination of artillery support, armored and cavalry tactics, and engineering and anti-aircraft support. Part III covers special operations, including night operations, the use of smoke assaults on fortified or urban areas, river crossings, actions in woods, swamps and mountains, and winter warfare. The emphasis in all sections is on the latter part of the war though much of the material applies throughout the war.

Or you could just try to get the whole handbook (excellent stuff). Good luck with that though.

[Chris Jenkins]

Thanks to all. :cool:

[damixu]

Here's some info: http://www.winterwar.com/tactics.htm

[illo]

Thanks damixu.

This is nice http://www.winterwar.com/Tactics/FINtactics.htm#creatingmottis

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />From the Nafziger Collection

SOVIET INFANTRY TACTICS

IN WORLD WAR II

By Charles Sharp

Size: 9" x 11"

Illustrations: numerous black & white illustrations

Pages: 122 pages

$19.95 soft cover

Developed using Soviet tactical regulations, this work examines the tactical employment of the Soviet rifle squad, platoon and company, plus the submachine gun squad, machine gun sections, anti-tank rifle squad, and infantry guns. It contains appendices discussing infantry weapons, signals, target maps, a sample reconnaissance diary, anti-tank defenses, sapper work, and tactical symbols. Range and other details are provided for infantry weapons and there are precise TO&Es for infantry squads, platoons, and companies.

</font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Scott B:

Just FYI - the combat regulations they use in this book are the late 1942 ones.

Scott

Thanks for the clarification - I had not gotten that book, but am thinking about it. In the second one, I believe Gehlen's data is probably based on late-war Red Army tactics, i.e. 1944-5.

[Skipper]

"Normally" - on defense a rifle company would have a reserve platoon, and on offense batallion would have a reserve company. But this is a rather vague generalization.

[Scott B]

Skipper brings up a good point: the Soviets didn't necessarily do the same thing each time.

Rather, a unit would be organized and deployed according to the task and situation; in a quiet sector a regiment might have all three battalions on line defending an extended front with no more than a company in reserve. At Kursk, a rifle regiment would be packed in tight, with a battalion in reserve and backed up with many more units in divisional, corps, and army lines of defenses, with antitank strongpoints, fortifications, etc. As the war went on, formations got more dense as the Soviets were able to get greater amounts of equipment produced and to the battlefield.

On the attack, larger Soviet formations would commonly commit forces in echelons, and even then keep a reserve or mobile group in addition to this. Echelonment requires a large degree of planning and coordination to accomplish effectively: it involves passing friendly formations through other friendly formations that are engaged in direct combat with the enemy, and the Soviets often had to deal with weak to nonexistant road networks to coordinate resupply over as well. What a Soviet attack would actually look like to a defender on the "pointy end" could totally vary depending on situational factors.

Scott