Andreas Posted December 9, 2002 Share Posted December 9, 2002 Panzerlage 12. PD 1.7.43 (from Niepold's history of the 12.PD) - 12. PD was slated to go in at the northern shoulder of the Kursk bulge, but that did not happen. It had already concentrated near Tagino (35km SW of Kromy) to support the German attack. It was then needed to fight against the Soviet attack near Orel however, where it suffers very heavy losses. Total 73 15 III(kurz - 50L42 quite amazing these were still around) 15 III(lang - 50L60) 6 III(75L24) 2 PzBefWg 2 III(kurz) PzBefWg 32 IV(lang) (36 on strength) 1 IV(kurz) 0 VK1801 (3 on strength) - these are II w/80mm frontal armour AT 15 Marder (7.62r) (16 on strength) 4 towed 7.5cm 4 towed 5cm 1 towed 7.62r Recce 15 PSWs (light) 8 PSWs (heavy) Armoured (yeah right) infantry 8 SPW Pioneers 5 PPW (Sdkfz. 251/X for pioneers) Artillery No SP artillery 24 towed lFH18 6 towed sFH18 4 towed K18 AA 6 towed 8,8cm 1 SP 2cm 1 SP 2cm (Quad) 2 towed 3.7cm It is interesting to note that almost the whole division was at 100% personnel strength, and that also technically it was very well equipped. And then what happened.... The combat strength (Gefechtsstaerke) of the division on 05. July 1943 was 229 Officers, 1,106 NCOs and 6526 ORs. It had 49 tanks ready for combat, 20 of those IV(lg). The division enters combat 8 days later, in a counter-attack against an enemy penetration across the heights on both sides of Chmelewaja, west of the Oka river. The attack fails in the face of strong opposition by 2-3 Rifle Divisions supported by 1 Tank Brigade. The next days are a see-saw battle. During the night 16/17. July the Pz.Pi.Btl.32 is smashed up, only remnants can rescue themselves. A last attack fails on 19. July, and the division is taken out of the frontline and sent to Orel. Losses by day (altogether WIA/KIA/MIA): 13 July 17 Off 306 OR 14 July 18 Off 257 OR 15 July 18 Off 269 OR 16 July 26 Off 580 OR 17 July 8 Off 478 OR 18 July 11 Off 217 OR 19 July 15 Off 181 OR At the end of the period the combat strength (Gefechtsstaerke) of the division is 97 Off, 599 NOC and 3720 OR. Losses respectively are: 57% Off, 46% NCO, 43% OR. 20 tanks (60% lower) (of these 10 IV(lg) - 60% lower) and 10 ATGs are still combat ready (70% lower compared to 1.July). It goes on like that - 04. August during the retreat battles in Orel, 277 men lost, for no purpose. 09 August - 288 men lost in defensive battles. It is finally taken out of the line on 16. August. The combat strength of the line units is given in the first column (Off/NCO/OR), and the Grabenstaerke (real frontline strength, probably infantry, including heavy weapons) in the second column in brackets: PzGrenRgt 25 - 23/83/775 (15/55/447) PzGrenRgt 5 - 23/84/608 (12/58/346) Pz.AA 12 - 12/48/408 (7/19/113) Pz Pi 32 - 11/29/316 (7/19/209) Tanks - 38 (23 IV(lg)) I.e. after six weeks almost permanent heavy defensive combat (with heavy unsuccessful counterattacks carried out), the division had a strength of about one Abteilung of tanks, and a weak regiment of infantry. [ December 09, 2002, 03:36 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bastables Posted December 9, 2002 Share Posted December 9, 2002 Sort of shows how the heaviest loss for the Germans was in defensive fighting, or versus Soviet attacks. None of the Attacking PZ units suffred such losses during the German attack. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Andreas Posted December 10, 2002 Author Share Posted December 10, 2002 Originally posted by Bastables: Sort of shows how the heaviest loss for the Germans was in defensive fighting, or versus Soviet attacks. None of the Attacking PZ units suffred such losses during the German attack.Hmm, not sure if I would draw such a general conclusion from it. From the narrative it sounds as if 12.PD was thrown into a fight with superior attackers, without preparation, and at very short notice. It then had to continuously counter-attack. I'll post something on Soviet defensive tactics in the next few days relating to that. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
kipanderson Posted December 10, 2002 Share Posted December 10, 2002 Andreas, hi, Great post . It is a very good example of what life, and death, was really like on the Eastern Front. In real wars, when there is something approaching similar technology on both sides, a very good rule is “if you use it, you lose it”. The above shows this only too clearly. All the best, Kip. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Andreas Posted December 12, 2002 Author Share Posted December 12, 2002 Originally posted by kipanderson: Andreas, hi, Great post . It is a very good example of what life, and death, was really like on the Eastern Front. In real wars, when there is something approaching similar technology on both sides, a very good rule is “if you use it, you lose it”. The above shows this only too clearly. All the best, Kip.It is interesting to compare the lack of success of 12. PD with the fairly similar undertaking of 6.PD against the outer encirclement ring of Stalingrad (Akksaj battles Dec 42 'Winterstorm'). If the assessment of the Soviet strength is correct, 12.PD should have had at least even strength, and probably tank superiority. Is there a good study of the battles for Orel available somewhere? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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