A ramble....might be worth reading!

[Spook]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Small point - Mars was very early (Autumn/Winter 42), before the Soviet operational art matured. Which thrust are you talking about re: Berlin?

Concerning "Mars," the example may not be appropriate, but I don't know priorhand what is considered the reference timeline as to when the Soviets "integrated" their operational practices. Even so, under Zhukov's eye, one might still have expected better.

As to the latter example, it's something I read of on historynet.com a couple years back, but the battle name eludes me at present; I'll have to check back. But the essence of the battle's start (sometime in Apr. '45) was that Zhukov's force spent a sizable barrage on an "battle area" that the Germans basically evacuated. And when the Soviets moved in, the Germans had read where the advance routes would be, and counter-fire tore up the Soviets pretty badly. My initial perception is that Soviet "reading" of German defenses and countermeasures was less than inspired in this one late-war case.

Comparing the Allied performance in Northern France, I fail to see the integration in operational thinking that the Soviets seemed to possess. There was a lot more opportunism, and while individual operations (e.g. Cobra) went well, their integration (e.g. with Totalize/Tractable/Bluecoat) left a lot to be desired. My understanding of Grisha's line of argument is that in the Soviet case, they would have been properly integrated, with some idea of what to do next - which the western allies certainly failed at, and quite miserably. Just look at the clusterf*ck that was opening Antwerp.

As I've acknowledged, the western Allies had their own missteps, and yep, the delay to getting Antwerp open was one of the big ones. But your note on the "integration" issue helps to what I was leading to. If the western Allies had some repeated problems in their understanding of operational warfare, then I'd like that compared more earnestly with Soviet practice; as well as those parts of UK/US operations that instead may have compared more favorably.

[Spook]

BTW, I couldn't find the article that I had seen on HistoryNet (again, I read it a couple years ago), but I believe now the subject battle was Seelow Heights.

[Shosties]

Re: "Operational Art"... particulary to Grisha for his common prosthelitising on this issue ( keep it up, it's interesting).

If the Germans didn't have it, how do you explain the smoothness with which they carried off Weserubung, esp. since it was a "rush job"?

My impression is that the Generalstab had a pretty clear picture of how the campaign in Russia was going to develop, but Hitler simply could not keep from ordering complete changes in strategic priorities whenever it suited his whim. How do you practice "operational art" in such an environment even if you have the all the other tools at hand?

[ September 12, 2002, 11:05 AM: Message edited by: Shosties4th ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Spook:

BTW, I couldn't find the article that I had seen on HistoryNet (again, I read it a couple years ago), but I believe now the subject battle was Seelow Heights.

That's what I thought you meant. Just wanted to make sure you were not talking about the last thrust in the Vistula-Oder operation.

While Zhukov certainly was left with egg on his face, at the same time Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army, part of Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front was steam-rolling all over the German 9th Army south of Berlin, and into the city. Ergo one could argue that the operational planning was sound - they got into Berlin quickly on one flank, thereby assisting the other one.

Again, I think you are not talking about the same definition of 'operation' as Grisha does. You look at individual operations (e.g. Cobra, Seelower Hoehen), while Grisha's argument as I understand it is exactly that what matters is how you string your operations together to achieve the best outcome. Compare it to playing an instrument, or directing an orchestra.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Again, I think you are not talking about the same definition of 'operation' as Grisha does. You look at individual operations (e.g. Cobra, Seelower Hoehen), while Grisha's argument as I understand it is exactly that what matters is how you string your operations together to achieve the best outcome. Compare it to playing an instrument, or directing an orchestra.

A fair point. But again, concerning late-WWII, was it a case that the Soviets were always "orchestrated" in their operations, one flowing to the next to successfully meet some higher predefined objective, while the UK/US never could in the same timeframe?

Of course, these terms "never" and "always" are absolutes and have to be qualified. That's the essence of relative comparison. And if Grisha's interpreted level of comparison is what you consider as the appropriate one, that's fine. It can be done there.

[Spook]

And to stir things up on how the Germans understood operational warfare in WWII, I think it appropriate to link on Joe Kussey's earlier article for the Wargamer:

Kussey's Article on a German "myth"

It stirred up quite a bit of contention earlier on when it published, and probably still does today. At the least, it's an intriguing article.

[Shosties]

Thanks for that link Spook, I've read that article before, but sometimes you need to do so more than once for some points to sink in.

From Kussey's article:

Halder, the German Chief of the General Staff of the Army during the first half of World War II, was quoted as saying "...our quartermaster service may never hamper the operational concept"

Something you'd never hear uttered in the U.S. Army.

Hey, I think I know this guy! Is he in the history department at Ohio State right now?

[EDIT: Nope, he isn't I think, I ran a search under the name Kussey and got no hits here.]

[ September 12, 2002, 02:47 PM: Message edited by: Shosties4th ]

[Scott B]

Man, this thread is tempting.

For those not as familiar with the origins and broad outline of the development of operational art, I find myself constantly recommending this article by Bruce Menning.

Apologies to those who've had to endure me harping on this in the past.

Scott

[Grisha]

Spook,

Okay, you ask about comparisons between western Allies and Soviet. It primarily has to do with scale and method of execution (Dang, I really wish I had this paper wrapped up, because it's all going to be in there). The Belorussian operation of June 1944 encompassed a frontage that was larger than the entire western front in northern France in Sept.1944. The Soviets were capable of conducting very large operations with complex maneuvering and timing. There was a distinct operational objective to Soviet operations, and every aspect of military art was applied in the successful attainment of that objective. There were few 'blind spots' in their operations, as every phase of the operation, from initial attack to final exploitation moves and consolidations, was planned for and covered. The Soviets understood how each of their services could be best employed in assisting in the completion of an operation, not just an upcoming battle, but the entire operation.

I know people are going to scream when I make this analogy, but think of a 1944-45 Soviet operation in terms of a SpecOps raid from the point of view of planning and execution. This was pretty much how it was, except that the primary players were army and front commanders. Sure, there were mistakes, but that's a given in war. Soviet operations were precise in planning and meticulous in execution in order that the advantages they had acquired through extensive intelligence/reconnaissance and deception were maximized to the utmost. Because of these advantages the speed and effectiveness of their maneuvering was augmented, and the level of complexity was doable. Battles were often decided before they began, and enemy counterattacks were nipped in the bud more often than not. The Germans tactical prowess was formidible, but meant little when entire German formations were being encircled, to be destroyed piecemeal.

I won't lie and say I know a lot about western allied operations, but I've been told by some knowledgeble people that western operations operated on a broad front and tended to the side of caution. There were dynamic leaders in the western allied army, but they were personalities, not a result of overall western military thinking in general. The western allies understood the operational-strategic relationship better than the Germans, but only as an acquired skill from their basic use of operations.

[Grisha]

Shosties,

Regarding German operational capabilities, don't confuse German confidence in their ability to conquer the USSR as a clear understanding in how they were to go about it. There really was no plan other than "you go that way, I'll go this way." When the Panzers ran up against resistance they dealt with it as they were trained to - and excellently trained they were. But German operations were almost done as if the Soviets weren't there. German field officers had a general knowledge of what Soviet units were on the front, and what Soviet units might be in reserve. They would then plan operations taking the worst case scenario that the enemy could realistically present. Hence, they really didn't take operations much above the tactical level. Some commanders were quite knowlegeable with operational aspects of warfare, and faired better than others, but none of this was taught. German operations set obscure objectives, then relied on their ability for tactical improvization to address any unexpected situations.