CMAK effect on German defense

[JonS]

I get the joke, so why the roll your eyes?

Still, you may have gone just a touch overboard when you indicated that German doctrine was predicated on using the (largely illusory) cover from vehicles, and not on covered approach routes, smoke, and firepower. I mean, it's just so obviously tongue-in-cheek. And of course having a game that forces you to carry out the latter rather than giving you the crutch of the former, well that's clearly preposterous too.

Right?

[dieseltaylor]

It is possible, depending on terrain, to launch local counter-attacks within the game. As it is a tactic I intend to use again, and one I would hate to have used against me, I will not be too specific.

Broadly then is that you actually earmark some force to be be active late in the game. It does require suitable terrain for best effect and sufficient defence force but I have done it two or three times. The best was I once an infantry squad/section to get 22 casualties for no loss. On a points basis very satisfying as it created a draw from a lost game.

[Steiner14]

@JonS:

Seems you have no imagination, how important a moving cover like from a vehicle was for fast counter-assaults, don't you?

Now you can't either move over open terrain, nor you can't move with SPWs against light AT-fire.

You have to compensate either by using terrain, smoke or firepower.

Vehicles providing cover would not only finally allow to play real Blitzkrieg tactics, which isn't possible right now.

I don't understand, why it would be unrealistically, if infantry (edit: and SPWs) would be allowed to move quickly in the fire-shadows of tanks or can be transported through enemy firelines to be positioned behind enemy positions?

Did you get it now? If not, i also can explain it in German to you, if you are willing to understand that better.

[ January 09, 2005, 03:50 AM: Message edited by: Steiner14 ]

[Sergei]

And exactly how much cover would a tank give to a squad if there was fire coming from sides? Packing so tightly in the open, standing, would not be wise during combat, anyway. According to what evidence is this a real "Blitzkrieg tactic" (I wonder if you even know what Blitzkrieg really means)?

[Steiner14]

Originally posted by Sergei:

And exactly how much cover would a tank give to a squad if there was fire coming from sides?

Even a bit more, as if the fire would be coming from the front and the squad were behind the tank.

I'm keen to hear explanations, how the german counter-assaults were conducted.

Oh let me guess, why the german counter-assault wasn't what it was but was like that: full arty support was ordered, full air-support, then a company of tanks arrived and advanced, while the infantry in 10 minutes brought up the support weapons and placed them on the right positions and advanced over the best terrain, hundreds of meters away, right?

No? Oh, then maybe rushing in hordes over open terrain like the Red Army?

Packing so tightly in the open, standing, would not be wise during combat, anyway.

I'm not talking about packing infantry platoons behind single tanks.

I'm talking about german counter-assaults and tactical Blitz-attacks, which heavily rely on fire-shadows for infantry and SPWs.

I.e. SPW-drivers oriented on the leading tanks gun direction showing the direction of the fire-shadow in case of gunfights.

Another example: in CM, a few 20mm AA-guns, make a typical combined arms tactical Blitz-attack impossible, because they knock out the SPWs with ease or shoot down infantry from the tanks in seconds and with a few MGs a minute later, you can easily route them, before the MGs are taken out.

This forces to way slower and more cautious advances, even against weak enemy resistance.

Another example?

A tank-platoon with an order to secure a street-crossing, while the enemy already controls the area.

Now you simply can't bring any infantry there, without fighting down all enemy resistance torwards there.

In reality?

Infantry was transported with the tanks with enough partial cover behind the turret, to get there (if not a direct arty-shower goes down on the at full speed moving tanks).

[ January 09, 2005, 10:43 AM: Message edited by: Steiner14 ]

[flamingknives]

First Lieutenant Benjamin A. Blackmer, Company Commander, Infantry, ITALY: “Usually

the Germans counterattack in not over three hours after you capture an objective: his counter measure may come in as little as one-half hour. On the heights above VENAFRO we captured a ridge at 0330, the Germans counterattacked at 0620 and pulled eight more counterattacks during daylight that day. You had better in half an how to meet a counterattack or you'll have trouble.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />First Lieutenant Benjamin A. Blackmer, Company Commander, Infantry, ITALY: “Usually

the Germans counterattack in not over three hours after you capture an objective: his counter measure may come in as little as one-half hour. On the heights above VENAFRO we captured a ridge at 0330, the Germans counterattacked at 0620 and pulled eight more counterattacks during daylight that day. You had better in half an how to meet a counterattack or you'll have trouble.

</font>

[JonS]

Oh dear. You were serious

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JonS:

Oh dear. You were serious

psssst...Jon....he's the one who removed his sig line. I rather expect if you goad him enough, we'll be subject to a treatise on Teutonic Superiority next. Let's let sleeping dogs lie.

[Alkiviadis]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...I thought the comments earlier about mistaking operational counter attacks with tactical ones a bit misinformed also. Reading Dancocks' book about the Canadians in Italy suggests that even at the battalion/regimental level, immediate counter-attacks were not uncommon.

I suggest that you are the one that is perhaps misinformed.

From W. Schneider's "Panzertaktik", pg98: "...Gegenangriffe... When possible

counterattacks should be planned in advance & launched when the situation develops favorably. Such counterattacks must be painstakingly planned & reconnoitered so that they can be carried out in a manner of minutes. The counterassault (gegenstoss) offers a contrast to the counter attack (gegenangriff). It differs from the counterattack in that it is not planned ahead. It is, instead, frequently carried out with available forces on the initiative of the local commander...The use of the Gegenstoss in defense was always a particular strength of German troops in combat..."

Also see relevant sections of "Panzer Battles" by von Mellenthin and "The Rommel Papers" by E. Rommel.

[ January 09, 2005, 05:38 PM: Message edited by: Alkiviadis ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Alkiviadis:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...I thought the comments earlier about mistaking operational counter attacks with tactical ones a bit misinformed also. Reading Dancocks' book about the Canadians in Italy suggests that even at the battalion/regimental level, immediate counter-attacks were not uncommon.

I suggest that you are the one that is perhaps misinformed.

From W. Schneider's "Panzertaktik", pg98: "...Gegenangriffe... When possible

counterattacks should be planned in advance & launched when the situation develops favorably. Such counterattacks must be painstakingly planned & reconnoitered so that they can be carried out in a manner of minutes. The counterassault (gegenstoss) offers a contrast to the counter attack (gegenangriff). It differs from the counterattack in that it is not planned ahead. It is, instead, frequently carried out with available forces on the initiative of the local commander...The use of the Gegenstoss in defense was always a particular strength of German troops in combat..."

Also see relevant sections of "Panzer Battles" by von Mellenthin and "The Rommel Papers" by E. Rommel. </font>

[Alkiviadis]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...Which only proves my assertion that local counterattacks (this is what the Allies called them; counterassaults, the direct translation, is not a commonly used word in English) did in fact happen at the tactical level. The fact that they prepared to do so at a moment's notice goes to that fact.

The supposition a page ago was that "counter attacks" only happened after deep penetrations by the allies.

Nonsense.

The chief critique, certainly of the Canadians, but also to a degree of the British and perhaps the US, was that they weren't aggressive enough and all too often stopped after reaching a short term objective. Thus, if the Germans waited for the Allies to break through 20 km at a time before counter-attacking - they'd be doing very little of it. I am thinking in particular of Normandy here though I am sure the same can be said for other areas of conflict; Italy, Netherlands, etc. Again, most certainly with the Canadians in mind.

Which evades my point, that the Germans differentiated between the 2 & as this thread is about GERMAN defensive doctrine the diff between the two must be noted. Further I am not talking about a 20 km thrust but more like 5-10 km.

Example: in say a CMAK op, a Gegenstoss would come from on map formations, a Gegenangriff from reinforcements entering the map. Additionally Normandy & to an extent Italy were really WW1 type battles fought with WW2 weapons.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Alkiviadis:

Which evades my point,

Yes, and rather deftly, I might add.

that the Germans differentiated between the 2 & as this thread is about GERMAN defensive doctrine the diff between the two must be noted.

I agree.

Further I am not talking about a 20 km thrust but more like 5-10 km.

Whatever. I think it suffices to say that there is a difference between the strategic and the tactical, as you point out. The fact that the Germans had different words for them is icing on the cake from an evidenciary standpoint.

Example: in say a CMAK op, a Gegenstoss would come from on map formations, a Gegenangriff from reinforcements entering the map. Additionally Normandy & to an extent Italy were really WW1 type battles fought with WW2 weapons.

So were Poland 1939 and France 1940.

Umm...weren't all the battles in WW II really just an extension of WW I, in terms of tactics, operations and strategy?

[Alkiviadis]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Alkiviadis:

Which evades my point,

Yes, and rather deftly, I might add.

that the Germans differentiated between the 2 & as this thread is about GERMAN defensive doctrine the diff between the two must be noted.

I agree.

Further I am not talking about a 20 km thrust but more like 5-10 km.

Whatever. I think it suffices to say that there is a difference between the strategic and the tactical, as you point out. The fact that the Germans had different words for them is icing on the cake from an evidenciary standpoint.

Example: in say a CMAK op, a Gegenstoss would come from on map formations, a Gegenangriff from reinforcements entering the map. Additionally Normandy & to an extent Italy were really WW1 type battles fought with WW2 weapons.

So were Poland 1939 and France 1940.

Umm...weren't all the battles in WW II really just an extension of WW I, in terms of tactics, operations and strategy? </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Alkiviadis:

You've conceded all my points, thank you.

Only because you began by conceding mine. It IS so terribly hard to argue when you both hold the same viewpoint, isn't it.

Poland 1940 was a WW1 EAST front campaign, i.e. low force densities. France '40 A WW1 1918 campaign, as it was only in 1918 that the Reichsheer introduced "Stoss" tactics on a wide scale. Incidentally the verb, 'stoss' means thrust in German fencing parlance. Stosstruppen = thrust or penetration troops. Sturmtruppen = Assault troops.

Does this mean you are conceding my points, or just deftly evading them?

Evading a point "deftly" is conceding it.

Unless I simply think you're a complete boob who isn't worth my time. Considering we were both saying the same things, that isn't the case here?

How important is it for you that I be wrong? Cause I can, like, post that you are, in fact, a complete boob and then you can fall back on your rather well constructed posts in this thread to prove otherwise.

[Alkiviadis]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Alkiviadis:

You've conceded all my points, thank you.

Only because you began by conceding mine. It IS so terribly hard to argue when you both hold the same viewpoint, isn't it.

Poland 1940 was a WW1 EAST front campaign, i.e. low force densities. France '40 A WW1 1918 campaign, as it was only in 1918 that the Reichsheer introduced "Stoss" tactics on a wide scale. Incidentally the verb, 'stoss' means thrust in German fencing parlance. Stosstruppen = thrust or penetration troops. Sturmtruppen = Assault troops.

Does this mean you are conceding my points, or just deftly evading them?

Evading a point "deftly" is conceding it.

Unless I simply think you're a complete boob who isn't worth my time. Considering we were both saying the same things, that isn't the case here?

How important is it for you that I be wrong? Cause I can, like, post that you are, in fact, a complete boob and then you can fall back on your rather well constructed posts in this thread to prove otherwise. </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Alkiviadis:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Alkiviadis:

You've conceded all my points, thank you.

Only because you began by conceding mine. It IS so terribly hard to argue when you both hold the same viewpoint, isn't it.

Poland 1940 was a WW1 EAST front campaign, i.e. low force densities. France '40 A WW1 1918 campaign, as it was only in 1918 that the Reichsheer introduced "Stoss" tactics on a wide scale. Incidentally the verb, 'stoss' means thrust in German fencing parlance. Stosstruppen = thrust or penetration troops. Sturmtruppen = Assault troops.

Does this mean you are conceding my points, or just deftly evading them?

Evading a point "deftly" is conceding it.

Unless I simply think you're a complete boob who isn't worth my time. Considering we were both saying the same things, that isn't the case here?

How important is it for you that I be wrong? Cause I can, like, post that you are, in fact, a complete boob and then you can fall back on your rather well constructed posts in this thread to prove otherwise. </font>

[Steiner14]

Dorosh,

despite your ad hominin attacks, ridiculous and evasive replies, you now suddenly acknowledge that the Wehrmacht launched instant improvised local counter-assaults (Gegenstösse) in addition to preplanned counterattacks (Gegenangriffe), quite an about face & retreat on your part. Most gratifying even if you can't/won't explain your changed viewpoint (embarrassing isn't it?)

Perhaps too embarrassing for you to justify, so to my next point...

There are plenty 1st hand accounts and photos from the Ostfront showing infantry from both sides using tanks and SPWs for cover (fireshadows) against hostile direct fire. There was less smoke available than one thinks, especially on the Russian side and the terrain was frequently as flat as a billiard table with little cover, surely Mr. Dorosh must be familiar with flat terrain being from Canada.

Joachim Peiper was famous for using this sort of high speed charge and von Ribbentrop specifically with his PzIV company during the battle of Prokorovka on 12 July 1943.

And Dorosh, this has nothing to do with your complexes about 'Teutonic Superiority' (the Canadians were respected as tough boys and good knightly fighters, except the 'strange' behavior to use German POWs as protecting-shields for their vehicles), but is simply a matter of hard facts, that only good soldiers with highest trust in their NCOs and leading officers like it was very common in the Wehrmacht, are capable to immediately attack without any preparation out in critical defensive situations.

This was indeed an extraordinary soldierly performance of the German soldier.

This was because in the Wehrmacht NCOs and officers were promoted from the ranks to leadership positions only after having proven their bravery, leadership and tactical skills, what is known in German as battle strength (Kampfkraft). The Western Armies by and large commissioned their officers before they proved themselves.

But in CMx1 we have the situation, that even a single MG 1km away can bind whole platoons in the trenches and counter-assaults out of the battle, are mostly impossible.

[ January 10, 2005, 07:32 AM: Message edited by: Steiner14 ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Steiner14:

[QB] Dorosh,

you now suddenly acknowledge that the Wehrmacht launched instant improvised local counter-assaults (Gegenstösse) in addition to preplanned counterattacks (Gegenangriffe), quite an about face & retreat on your part. Most gratifying even if you can't/won't explain your changed viewpoint (embarrassing isn't it?)

Perhaps too embarrassing for you to justify, so to my next point...

About face from what? I was the one who suggested that whoever said they didn't seemed uninformed...

My exact words: "I thought the comments earlier about mistaking operational counter attacks with tactical ones a bit misinformed also" referring to the thought that counter-attacks were not done at the tactical level. I made no judgement about what was done at the operational level; if that is implied in my words, it is unintentional.

And Dorosh, this has nothing to do with your complexes about 'Teutonic Superiority' (the Canadians were respected as tough boys and good knightly fighters, except the 'strange' behavior to use German POWs as protecting-shields for their vehicles),

Sven Hassel books don't count as historical sources....

This was indeed an extraordinary soldierly performance of the German soldier.

Really? How often did these local counterattacks work? I should have thought withdrawing to the next bit of defensible terrain would have been in order...wasn't this really a costly way of doing business, especially for an army on the defensive?

what is known in German as battle strength (KampfKraft). The Western Armies by and large commissioned their officers before they proved themselves.

German officers didn't serve as "battle hardened veteran NCOs", they were offizieranwärter, which means part of their training was service as an NCO in a troop unit. This was, as you point out, different from the Allied system - I wouldn't confuse it with commissioning long service NCOs - all armies did the latter, and I wasn't aware the Germans did it more, or less, often than the western Armies, as you call them. In fact, since being an NCO was part of the normal progression of officer training, one wonders how often it was actually done in the German Army.

If the information on my own website is any indication, It would appear that the time spent as an "NCO" was mainly spent in classrooms and academies - and that their troop commanding experience was actually done first as a Gefreiter equivalent, which was not an NCO rank, and later for a two month probationary period as an Oberfeldwebel equivalent.

[ January 10, 2005, 09:23 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Sirocco]

I'm not sure about this idea of using tanks for cover in counterattacks. If the ground really was so featureless to provide no cover then surely it makes more sense for the armour to assume forward positions and cover the infantry following on.

German doctrine seems to have been to throw whatever was at hand to deal with penetrations on the local level. Their anti-paratroop doctrine springs to mind in particular.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Steiner14:

The Western Armies by and large commissioned their officers before they proved themselves.

By and large, you're full of it. As Michael said, Hassel and Kessler don't count as sources.

What year - in WWII - do you think the last time, an Arms officer in the British or CW armies was comissioned 'off the street' as a matter of policy?

[ January 10, 2005, 11:40 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Michael Dorosh]

While Canadian and British officers may not have been normally commissioned from the ranks (though in many cases they were - one Sergeant from my own Regiment won the Sword of Honour at Sandhurst after being selected for officers training; he had won a Mention in Despatches at Dieppe), they certainly did, by 1943, attend not only officer training, but more than likely a full-on Battle Drill School. Farley Mowat describes as much in his autobiography - he was a replacement officer in the First Canadian Division.

Incidentally, he also served in the ranks, but only very briefly, and only in Canada. I think Mowat represents the "normal" officer commissioning stream of the early to mid war period.

The Canadians had so many trained officers, they loaned out several hundred to the British Army, where they won many decorations for gallantry and by all accounts served well; see CODEWORD CANLOAN for a full accounting of their experiences.

Canadian officers also went to England to gain battle experience in North Africa in early 1943; similar exchanges were made between the Third Canadian Division in England waiting for D-Day, and the First, once they were in Italy.

As an example Strome Galloway of the Royal Canadian Regiment commanded a company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers (IIRC) in Tunisia, before coming back to the Canadian Army where he served throughout Sicily, Italy and NW Europe, as company commander, battalion 2 i/c and often as acting Battalion CO. He was not the only one to have battle experience before going into action with his own battalion, though he doesn't represent the majority, either.

[ January 10, 2005, 11:30 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]