Operations Orders - How to Plan a Company Battle Like a German

[Michael Dorosh]

As promised in a recent thread, here is a look at a sample of a German operations order. Hopefully it will shed some light onto how they planned things "for real". Should generate some thinking for scenario designers, CM players, and perhaps even get us thinking about what is important enough to put into CMX2. Ammunition, motorcycles w/sidecars, disposition of wounded men - all seem to be of some importance in these company orders.

Any comments, curiousities?

If anyone can enlighten me on what a "Gustav" device is, I'd be obliged.

If anyone also knows what the levels of illumination were in the German Army at the time, that would be great. Dandelion? How does the terminology and layout match what you were taught during your days in the German military?

[Michael Dorosh]

[Hans]

Hi Michael

This map is from the Handbook on German Military Forces, 15 March 1945, TM-E30-451

It might be of some help

[ August 29, 2004, 09:58 AM: Message edited by: Hans ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

If anyone can enlighten me on what a "Gustav" device is, I'd be obliged.

Could not find it in the text but off-hand I would hazard a guess: the only Gustav Gerät I know is the 800mm railway gun.

[Sergei]

Please Hans, just provide the URL instead of the picture! It's too wide... :mad:

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Tero:

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

If anyone can enlighten me on what a "Gustav" device is, I'd be obliged.

Could not find it in the text but off-hand I would hazard a guess: the only Gustav Gerät I know is the 800mm railway gun.

Since it is about communications and supposed to be given to battalions, I doubt.

Maybe Gustav just stands for letter G and so it is something beginning with that. A radio of some kind, most probably.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Sergei:

Since it is about communications and supposed to be given to battalions, I doubt.

As I said I did not find it in the text.

Maybe Gustav just stands for letter G and so it is something beginning with that. A radio of some kind, most probably.

Here is one I found off hand:

http://www.radiomuseum.org/dsp_modell.cfm?model_id=15817

[Hans]

Originally posted by Sergei:

Please Hans, just provide the URL instead of the picture! It's too wide... :mad:

http://www.mydocsonline.com/pub/Cmbattles/scanmap1.JPG

[Dandelion]

Hi there Michael

The visibility ratings used were I-X (Arabic numbers 1-10 used by the Navy, and in fact also often by the army artillery) corresponding to the standard Meteorological scale in use at the time. And maybe still is in use? Anyway it's measured in nautical miles (seemeile or sm in German) and the scale goes:

X. 25sm (about 50 kilometers)

IX. 10 sm (about 20 km)

VIII. 5sm (about 10 kilometers)

VII. 2sm (about 4 kilometers)

VI. 1sm (about 2 kilometers)

V. 0,5sm (about a kilometer)

IV. 500 meters

III. 200 meters

II. 50 meters

I. Anything less than 50 meters.

Thus the officer has been informed by the VM (Verbindungsmeteorolog) that visibility will probably be about the kilometer. Or more probably he just read it on the Wetterlage sheet at Battallion hq. It was supposed to be spread on a wall there at all times. Rumor has it, the really interested would go to the artillery regimental Hq instead, for better weathermaps. It's not a pointless anecdote, recon groups often really needed to know.

The Gustav device will be a radio. Gustav is used for G, you know as in Anton, Berta, Cäsar, Dora, Emil, Friedrich, Gustav. In this case it will be the letter of a a model. Normal line from battallion to company would be a doublet of wire and wireless, i.e. two of each. The normal wireless connection would be established by two teams with "Tornisterfunkgerät d" - called "Dora". Or "Dora Gerät". Apparently, these guys have been able to come by a later model of radio, "Tornisterfunkgerät g". And this officer either does not trust wires will be intact after the battle is engaged, or he presumes his unit will be too mobile to use stationary communication posts.

A note of particularly esoteric character on the article footnote 2;

Common practice was in fact to write "J" for both "I" and "J", when handwriting on overlays and maps. This was only partially due to the German handwriting fonts used at the time, according to which these two did not differ in shape but in position. You'll find it here in a site I found just now. (It was taught in schools until the fifties. As all handwritten German WWII documents are written in this, I had to learn it too). Motive was also to not confuse roman letters, using the "I" pretty frequently. So, it would normally read "JR1" on a map, for both I.R.1 and J.R.1... This can be a bit frustrating.

The Wehrmacht management doctrine forbad detailed orders. The prime initial reason being time. More precisely, shortening the time between decision and action. Not just time to write and read orders, but also the leaving out of enough detail to allow local command to act on events and adapt to circumstance. In order for it to work, lower command had to display quite a degree of initiative and imagination. Thus the emphasis on training junior officers and NCOs in the Wehrmacht, often mentioned in literature.

The orders of this officer strikes me as somewhat modern, insofar that they are a bit talkative and vague - orders were usually just a series of laconic imperatives - but that's reasonable as he is writing to people he knows well and will probably have adapted to the specific needs of his subordinates.

The order style adopted by the Bundeswehr was copied from the US Armed forces and adapted to NATO standards. Thus bear only some resemblance to former German such.

Interesting thread Michael. Are you part of a reenacting team?

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Sergei:

Please Hans, just provide the URL instead of the picture! It's too wide... :mad:

Hans, please go back and edit your post to remove the picture, I can't read Dandelion's response without scrolling back and forth. I have a copy of the handbook and have seen the map before, thanks. It is quite interesting, isn't it! The map symbols bear little resemblance to German ones, though.

[ August 29, 2004, 08:23 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

[QB] Hi there Michael

The visibility ratings...

Excellent information, thanks very much!! I am going to add the info your provide to my webpage (http://www.deutschesoldaten.com - under procedures/operations order). How can I credit you for this?

Interesting that they would use nautical miles. Just reinforces the idea that if the Germans could possibly do something differently than anyone else, they would. I thought they were nuts for not putting names on their dogtags...translating from nautical miles when they used metric for (almost?) everything else is an interesting choice.

Thus the officer has been informed by the VM (Verbindungsmeteorolog) that visibility will probably be about the kilometer. Or more probably he just read it on the Wetterlage sheet at Battallion hq. It was supposed to be spread on a wall there at all times. Rumor has it, the really interested would go to the artillery regimental Hq instead, for better weathermaps. It's not a pointless anecdote, recon groups often really needed to know.

Very interesting here, as well. I wonder if Andreas' opa would have any weather stories being an old Beobachter himself...

The Gustav device will be a radio. Gustav is used for G, you know as in Anton, Berta, Cäsar, Dora, Emil, Friedrich, Gustav. In this case it will be the letter of a a model. Normal line from battallion to company would be a doublet of wire and wireless, i.e. two of each. The normal wireless connection would be established by two teams with "Tornisterfunkgerät d" - called "Dora". Or "Dora Gerät". Apparently, these guys have been able to come by a later model of radio, "Tornisterfunkgerät g". And this officer either does not trust wires will be intact after the battle is engaged, or he presumes his unit will be too mobile to use stationary communication posts.

Thanks to all for answering this question. Being a motorized unit, as mentioned in text, I think your final sentence is probably quite accurate.

A note of particularly esoteric character on the article footnote 2;

Common practice was in fact to write "J" for both "I" and "J", when handwriting on overlays and maps. This was only partially due to the German handwriting fonts used at the time, according to which these two did not differ in shape but in position. You'll find it here in a site I found just now. (It was taught in schools until the fifties. As all handwritten German WWII documents are written in this, I had to learn it too). Motive was also to not confuse roman letters, using the "I" pretty frequently. So, it would normally read "JR1" on a map, for both I.R.1 and J.R.1... This can be a bit frustrating.

Not as frustrating as trying to read Sütterlin...but yes, I have been noting this for some time. On the handdrawn map you will see that the Infantry Division is notated as JD - I did manage to catch that one when I translated the map. However, I shall amend my text with your notes on the use of J - I had no idea it was so universal, thanks.

The Wehrmacht management doctrine forbad detailed orders. The prime initial reason being time. More precisely, shortening the time between decision and action. Not just time to write and read orders, but also the leaving out of enough detail to allow local command to act on events and adapt to circumstance. In order for it to work, lower command had to display quite a degree of initiative and imagination. Thus the emphasis on training junior officers and NCOs in the Wehrmacht, often mentioned in literature.

The orders of this officer strikes me as somewhat modern, insofar that they are a bit talkative and vague - orders were usually just a series of laconic imperatives - but that's reasonable as he is writing to people he knows well and will probably have adapted to the specific needs of his subordinates.

The original translator does mention this in the footnotes, likening it to a sports team who has several "plays" rehearsed. One can see the essentials are spelled out concretely - get your ammo here, move your wounded and prisoners to here and here. I was surprised at the reference to a KIA collection point; I guess I've always just presumed they stayed where they fell and that the graves registration units (did the Germans have them?) collected them, but this order implies that the company itself was responsible for relocating their fallen. Was this normal?

The order style adopted by the Bundeswehr was copied from the US Armed forces and adapted to NATO standards. Thus bear only some resemblance to former German such.

Interesting thread Michael. Are you part of a reenacting team?

On and off - last weekend I spent in a hole in the ground. Getting long in the tooth to portray a frontline infantryman; for this show we did a company headquarters (I am on the right). I may go to the VE Day commemmorations in Ottawa as a kriegsberichter - there was a sizeable German contingent at the D-Day commemmoration this year.

Coincidentally, you mention the "Tornisterfunkgerät d" - called "Dora". For our display, we have a Canadian field phone called the "Tele D", presumably also the D model, which was used up until the 1980s in some cases. Many vets have commented with affection on the "Tele D".

Thanks again for your interesting and insightful comments.

[ August 29, 2004, 08:44 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JasonC]

What is noteworthy is (1) actually this map shows the entire regimental attack sector, not the company. The regiment is attacking with 4 companies up. 2 battalions side by side, each with 2 companies forward and a third in reserve.

The leIG platoon mentioned as attached to the company would be 2 75mm IGs from the regimental IG company.

The company MG platoon and one other platoon occupy the jump off positions the night before. They are responsible for night security (especially the MGs). Then the rest of the company moves up behind them and digs foxholes. Notice, the idea is to cover part of the distance from prepared German positions farther to the rear, and the actual Russian position, during the night, when ranges are less. This will allow the attack to be made from within visible range. The Russians have "firepower" out to a kilometer probably, but won't have night security beyond a few hundred meters. So they close to ~400m or so before the actual attack, in the dark.

The company commander plans this approach movement. He designates missions for the platoons, not in terms of locations in the enemy position but basically just deployment order and assigned weapons. And he explains the fire plan in detail, as to timing.

The platoon designated as the first in, security, also has the mission of battlefield recon from 1.5 minutes after the opening of the barrage, to 4 minutes after, when the first arty shift occurs. They can't approach before then because rockets will be fired at the wire at 1.5 minutes after the overall barrage starts. Rockets aren't that accurate.

They do their recon after the rockets because part of the idea is to find gaps they left in the wire. They are supposed to locate the wire and any gaps, and to pinpoint the Russian bunker. Notice, they know there is a Russian bunker - they have probably taken fire from it - but they do not know its precise location. In CM terms, think trenches and MG sound contacts.

The demo teams from the pioneers are meant to cut wire and blow the bunkers if they can get close enough.

The recon platoon is not given an attack mission. Its "night before" mission still holds - protect the German lines. The assault platoon passes through them to deliver the actual attack and get the pioneers to the target. Why? Because the recon and own-line security missions need a wide front, thin, linear deployment. Not good for attacking. In CM terms, think half squads across the frontage. They do not try to get through the wire, just spot things. They creep out for ~3 minutes under the cover of the barrage.

A typical point here - spotting differential created by fire suppression. The Russians are supposed to be head's down from H hour to H+5 minutes. The recon is therefore done in the middle of this. From 400m to the wire, perhaps 100m. But no attack by these guys. They just figure out where the attack will go. Thus the lack of an operations order directing the actual attack. The exact route depends on intel (wire location and gaps) that will be gained only several minutes after the shelling starts.

The assault is delivered by a minimal sub-element - a platoon with one pioneer team attached. Tiny. Nothing to do with massing rifles on the objective. Instead it is all about getting the right weapon to the right spot as cheaply as possible.

The reserve platoon has the company's 2 81mm mortars. These are given suppression fire missions during the prep. They also have ammo carriers designated. They are undoubtedly meant to continue their support, to pinned any MGs that reveal themselves after the arty lifts.

The 2 assault guns - at this date, StuG IIIs with short 75mm guns undoubtedly - have to get a single platoon and pioneers to and through the wire as rapidly as possible after the arty lifts. By outshooting MG nests that try to stop them. The leIGs aren't mentioned further but, along with the HMGs, are obviously overwatching from the start line.

The reserve platoon can add rifleman depth to the assault if necessary. But they are with the mortars initially, which means supporting by overwatch. They are probably meant to move onto the objective if and after it is taken, to hold it against any counterattack. Rather than being part of some charge. If they do engage it will be in column behind the assault platoon, not directed at another position or on line beside them.

Notice, this means the actual infantry force sent into the Russian position if all goes well, is incredibly small. It is meant to create a *threat* and force the Russians to fire. If you do nothing and stay in your holes silently, this platoon with hand grenades along with a demo team with serious explosive charges, will crawl right up on you and blow you out of your holes.

All the serious heavy lifting if the Russians do fight back is on the overwatch elements. Tons of fire support for a single attacking platoon. Div arty plastering the area for 4 minutes then lifting a few hundred yards and still firing (though probably less intensely - they are isolating the forward position). 2 75mm assault guns with direct fire from up close. 2 leIGs from the start line. 2 81mm mortars with the reserve platoon, also around the start line. In support of a single platoon up at the pointy end.

Overall, the idea is (1) div arty keeps their heads down and reduces them (2) 75mm direct fire KOs anybody who fires back and (3) demo charges at point blank KO anybody who hides instead.

All HE methods. No massing.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

What is noteworthy is (1) actually this map shows the entire regimental attack sector, not the company. The regiment is attacking with 4 companies up. 2 battalions side by side, each with 2 companies forward and a third in reserve.

Just a word of caution, which probably doesn't interfere with your analysis - the map diagrams are hypothetical only, they are not the maps included in Michael's original attack order (as pointed out).

[Dandelion]

How can I credit you for this?

You needn't, happy to oblige.

Interesting that they would use nautical miles. Just reinforces the idea that if the Germans could possibly do something differently than anyone else, they would.

Its not us, it's you all who are different... The nautical mile is logical in this particular use, as it is a precise division of the earth cirumference relative to that measure. Is it spelled like that? I mean the distance around the globe. That way, you need never bother about visibility ranges that would be obstructed by the horizon anyway. You see it all makes perfect sense.

I wonder if Andreas' opa would have any weather stories being an old Beobachter himself...

Very probably.

The original translator does mention this in the footnotes, likening it to a sports team who has several "plays" rehearsed.

Yes, I often find similarities with choreography (spelling?). A set number of brief words release a whole series of carefully rehersed movements.

I was surprised at the reference to a KIA collection point; I guess I've always just presumed they stayed where they fell and that the graves registration units (did the Germans have them?) collected them, but this order implies that the company itself was responsible for relocating their fallen. Was this normal?

The company was part and took part in the... people relocation chain. In a battle order like this one however, I think he must be referring not so much to the men lying obviously dead in the terrain, but more to men dying in medical care or transport, which most dead did. The dead would be removed from a Verwundetennest with some urgency, if possible. They'd not be found in the HVP at all except those actually dying there.

But sure enough, it was the task of the "Truppen-Sanitätsdienst" - i.e. in effect Battallion using mainly Company personnell - to track down the dead after a battle, with or without aid from "Sanitätsdienste der Division" - the latter usually the indomitable 1st platoon of either of the two divisional Sani companies, units that would normally collect wounded alongside company troops in the middle of battles too. If possible they'd bring along dogs and Sankas. But there was a shortage of dogs by the end of the war. And shortage of Sankas from day one.

The same guys dealing with acute cases in the engagement would then have to scan the battlefield and collect the dead after it. Bearing in mind that the majority of dead in a standard WWII battle would be lying in field dressing stations or field hospitals. The "same guys" being the group around the Bataillonsarzt, i.e. the three company Sanitätsunteroffiziere, their Sanitätssoldaten and Hilfskrankenträger (more than less a penal duty), and if no active contact was unterwegs most probably the platoon medics would be thrown in too.

In highly mobile scenes, another unit coming up would have to do it, using the same category personnel (if German, not sure how the Italians did it in Africa), and in cases of mass death of unusual proportions (WWII standards) they'd use specially formed units with Grabendienst, anything from POWs and HiWis to penal units, or indeed just ordinary guys.

Grabendienst (for enlisted men practically always meaning the digging of graves), like the Streifendienst (in this case referring to MP helpers), were common but extremely unpopular penal assignments, used as punishment by the Spiess when you had been seriously misbehaving. But you could get unlucky and get such assignments just for being on sick roll.

The fallen were collected in registered preliminary wargraves, and in the burials proper the buddies from company would take part if possible.

Of course, realities of war had a say. If a squad found a corpse, and had the time, they'd bury it on the spot. They had instructions to do so, hygiene regulations. They'd report it and hand in dogtags to Company, registering the site using minelaying measures and marking the grave in the most obvious way prudent - Germans often used makeshift crosses crowned by helmets.

The Sanis would then have to dig it up and relocate it, with or without help from other units.

For regulation war cemetaries - the temporary ones - there were standardised coffins and crosses to use. If no corps was found, but death ocularly confirmed, they'd bury an empty coffin.

My grandfather was buried in an empty coffin as nothing much remained of him, temporary regimental cemetary at first and then they (the State of Poland) relocated the empty coffin to a huuuge war cemetary in Poland, then on to Germany quite recently.

There was a graves registration department. The WASt, as it was (and is) called, had no field service but passively collected data from the regular OKH chain of command. The intention being to collect all men lying in (hostile) foreign soil, to war cemetaries of permanent nature at home.

On and off - last weekend I spent in a hole in the ground. Getting long in the tooth to portray a frontline infantryman; for this show we did a company headquarters (I am on the right). I may go to the VE Day commemmorations in Ottawa as a kriegsberichter - there was a sizeable German contingent at the D-Day commemmoration this year.

My contemporary English fails me again, what is the meaning of getting long in the tooth?

I've seen Americans re-enacting their Civil War as part of municipal traditions when I was there, they'd stage a battle and then eat and drink a lot, chili as it was (South). And aerial re-enactors flying WWII planes. But never groundtroop WWII so far. Of course modern production films contain large amounts of reenactors. Saving Private Ryan springs to mind. Is this a way of financing the activity? I've seen homepages with people that own a complete SPW 251/1! That'll not be a small individual investment.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Michael Dorosh]

Thanks for the info once again.

WW II re-enactment is a bit of a joke. It is primarily supported by the participants themselves. Whereas Civil War re-enactment, as you mention, is primarily a public education spectacle, WW II re-enactment is as often as not simply a way for adult men to "play guns in the woods." The events are sometimes not even open to the public.

I divide "re-enactment" into two parts - battle re-enactment (which is really impossible to do correctly for WW II because of the artillery-dominated doctrine of the combatants and the nature of modern warfare) and Living History. I do living history - static displays in which we can interact with the public, be they small children, students, relatives of veterans, veterans themselves, or simply interested members of the public encompassing some or none of the other categories.

WW II re-enactment was an offshoot of Civil War re-enactment, I think, and first got rolling in the US in the 1970s. Unfortunately, the kit is so expensive that by the time you can afford to participate in the hobby you are long in the tooth (too old ) to be a convincing participant! Most North Americans are too well fed, yours truly included, to portray a gaunt 22 year old fresh from the horrors of Omaha Beach or the Scheldt.

Some groups do participate in film work, but there is little money in that, nor is the work regular for anyone but a select few such as Dale Dye and Warriors Inc.

My film work includes being cadre for the extras on Legends of the Fall - there were over a hundred of us "cadre" for the roughly 1000 extras employed - but it had no direct relation to my re-enactment activities at that time, which was as der Spiess for a Füsilierregiment "Großdeutschland" re-enactment unit(!)

There are re-enactors in the States with running T-34s, Hetzers and Shermans, also, plus a dizzying array of softskins and halftracks. The largest annual event this side of the Atlantic is Fort Indiantown Gap, which I've never been to, but which attracts WW II re-enactors in the thousands. My understanding is it is mostly a drinking get together and swap meet, with something laughingly called a "tactical event" where re-enactors run around shooting blanks in a grown up version of a playground round of "cowboys and Indians".

Some tactical events appear to be getting better, with simulated barrages and realistic tactics, but I suspect it still bears little resemblance to WW II, which was famous for its participants not being able to see each other during the fighting. Makes for poor public entertainment, which seems to have rarely been the point.

I do read of some re-enactment units doing battle re-enactment well, but for now, I'm happy to stick to Living History.

[Breakthrough]

Getting long in the tooth to portray a frontline infantryman; for this show we did a company headquarters (I am on the right). I may go to the VE Day commemmorations in Ottawa as a kriegsberichter - there was a sizeable German contingent at the D-Day commemmoration this year.

You can go as Heinrich Himmler! The resemblence is uncanny and you already have the personality down pat..... :eek:

[Michael Dorosh]

[ August 30, 2004, 10:35 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Runyan99]

I notice that the written plan covers everything that can be anticipated BEFORE the battle, but gives no guidelines as to how the battle will actually be fought. Everything after the jump off is left open to improvisation.

Specifically, there is no guideline as to how long it is going to take to reach the objectives. The reason, I think, is that they just don't know, and they realize it is folly to guess.

Sorry if I'm beating my favorite dead horse, but I am really interested in how long these kinds of things took.

The bit about the ammunition carriers is interesting. Apparently ammo is going to be available, and mobile, in trucks and motorcycles. Not sure exactly how or when they plan to distribute it.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

I notice that the written plan covers everything that can be anticipated BEFORE the battle, but gives no guidelines as to how the battle will actually be fought. Everything after the jump off is left open to improvisation.

That would be training, not improvisation, actually.

Specifically, there is no guideline as to how long it is going to take to reach the objectives. The reason, I think, is that they just don't know, and they realize it is folly to guess.

Breakthrough is projected at X+5 when the objective 1 (crossroads has been reached and the bunker taken out) is complete. The fate if objective 2 is not clear from the orders but IMO it is the purpose of these types of orders to leave the time table for the second objective unspecified so that the developing situation does not hamper the carrying out of the orders.

The bit about the ammunition carriers is interesting. Apparently ammo is going to be available, and mobile, in trucks and motorcycles. Not sure exactly how or when they plan to distribute it.

As needed propably. I'd expect runners would be used to fetch ammo from the supply train if and when the need arises.

[Runyan99]

Originally posted by Tero:

Breakthrough is projected at X+5 when the objective 1 (crossroads has been reached and the bunker taken out) is complete. The fate if objective 2 is not clear from the orders but IMO it is the purpose of these types of orders to leave the time table for the second objective unspecified so that the developing situation does not hamper the carrying out of the orders.

No, that's not how I read it at all. Breakthrough battle STARTS at X+5, after the barrage has lifted. Assault guns jump off. That isn't the schedule to capture the objective.

Hell, the artillery shifts to the rear at X+4. You think the Germans are going to breakthrough in one minute after their own artillery lifts?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

I notice that the written plan covers everything that can be anticipated BEFORE the battle, but gives no guidelines as to how the battle will actually be fought. Everything after the jump off is left open to improvisation.

Specifically, there is no guideline as to how long it is going to take to reach the objectives. The reason, I think, is that they just don't know, and they realize it is folly to guess.

Sorry if I'm beating my favorite dead horse, but I am really interested in how long these kinds of things took.

LOL - I was tempted to mention you in one of my posts, actually, until I realized what you already twigged to - the start of the battle is given a time, not the end. I would love to see the After Action report of this battle, to see how things actually developed. Unfortuantely I am no longer in contact with the original author of the piece.

As for Tero's comment re: training rather than improvisation - yes, but that also encompasses experience, if that's not what you meant. Training plus the experience of having done similar ops many times before would lessen the need for explicit orders (which as Dandelion points out, wasn't the "German way" of doing things in any event.)

[JasonC]

I read "breakthrough" not as referring to the battle but to passage of the Russian wire.

There is nothing about the fight by the maneuver arms, proper. All that is out of the company commander's hands. His assault platoon does the job, the gunners see their targets and take them out, or not. The only thing he is going to decide after the "go" is given is whether to release the reserve platoon, and if so when and directed at what.

As for the ammo op, there are carriers (that means men) specifically detailed to bring forward additional mortar ammo. No other details are mentioned. I suspect the rest are supposed to get through the fight with what they have, then resupply in the next lull (e.g. to deal with any counterattack). Ammo loads were not expended entirely in single actions, not on average anyway. You can tell, because overall ammo expenditure is too low for that. A basic load lasted about a week. In heavy action it would clearly melt faster than that, but it is not (remotely) like they are firing as fast as they can pull the triggers.

They don't have targets, anyway, or expect them. The real kill plan is, as I mentioned, all HE (arty and mortars prep, direct assault guns IGs and mortars during the approach, demo charges and hand grenades up close). The MGs are mentioned as protecting against any Russian attack, but if they stay on the defensive (read, in their holes) nobody is expecting mere bullets to do a gosh darn thing.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

No, that's not how I read it at all. Breakthrough battle STARTS at X+5, after the barrage has lifted. Assault guns jump off. That isn't the schedule to capture the objective

Hell, the artillery shifts to the rear at X+4. You think the Germans are going to breakthrough in one minute after their own artillery lifts?

The first obstacles are to be taken down at X+1-1½. I would not put it past the commander on the spot to start moving his troops out at that time or soon after that. After all only the start off of the Stugs is specified, not the start off of the infantry apart from the Brakebusch platoon.

I presume they are hugging the barrage since once the barrage lifts the defenders will swarm the defensive position so if the plan is to succeed they need to overcome the defenders before they man the positions and cut down the attackers when they are going over the top.

BTW: the end of the battle IS specified in the orders. It is a bit vague but still: "after closing by 2300hrs".

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

As for Tero's comment re: training rather than improvisation - yes, but that also encompasses experience, if that's not what you meant.

That is what I meant.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Tero:

BTW: the end of the battle IS specified in the orders. It is a bit vague but still: "after closing by 2300hrs".

No, this is the closing of the assembly period - the attack goes at X Hour, to be determined but supposedly at first light the next day.