Retreating/Escaping from Artillery

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

The worst option of all was simply to lie there and die.

Michael

Omaha Beach, for example.

Good point made by Jason there about the inability of a formation to know how much arty is coming. I can't see it being effective to simply bug out at the first sign of arty. Like he said, you have no idea how much, how long or in what pattern the shells will fall.

I can't see assaulting infantry simply giving up and running to the rear without at least waiting to see what they are dealing with.

Cheers

Paul

[jacobs_ladder2]

I'd like to get your thoughts on this:

After much thought and discussion this is what I have come up with. First, there are a few conditions.

A. Dug-in troops are almost invariably better off staying put and riding out the barrage. If the barrage is big enough to dislodge entrenched infantry it is probably too big to run from. The only exception to this that I have found is the German system of preparing backup positions allowing them to escape the worst of artillery falling in a predictable pattern.

B. Troops assaulting are going to continue to assault unless obligated to stop. Reversing direction is a last resort which can lead to as much trouble as it is trying to avoid.

C. Troops not in close proximity to the enemy are far more likely to try to evade a barrage.

These are the steps that apply to troops not dug in.

1. Troops caught on the move must decide how to deal with every situation as it presents itself. The problem is that you never know what you are facing because arty can come in a hundred shapes and sizes. There is no way to know what direction to run or even if running is necessary until the barrage has started. This fact alone necessitates hitting the ground as an initial response. You get down and, if it is available, get to the best cover you can find.

Incidentally, experienced soldiers hit the ground faster than green soldiers. Inexperienced troops can make the mistake of running to cover or freezing. Lying down reduces the danger by a factor of around ten. The best way to go is to hug the earth and then worry about getting to better cover.

2. The next step is determined by the experience and leadership of the troops and the intensity/accuracy/density of the barrage. Simply, you decide whether or not to bug out, stay put or continue the advance.

Generally speaking, experience can make all the difference. A barrage that seems deadly to a green soldier may not even be taken seriously by a vet. Experience (and morale to a certain degree) will not only determine what decision is reached, but how long it takes to make that decision and how long it takes to get the appropriate orders out.

3. Ultimately the barrage itself is the chief factor. No matter what, the fire has to be violent enough to produce a strong or irrational reaction from the men it is aimed at. The more violent the barrage the more extreme the reaction to it and vice versa. Experience will act as a buffer, but at some point sufficiently dense fire will force any troops to react to save themselves.

Of course, the violence of the barrage is determined by a number of factors including shell calibre, density, duration and accuracy.

4. Reactions may vary, but the single factor governing them all is the degree to which those reactions are controlled and organized. Generally speaking, the more irrational the reaction the more unlikely it is that the unit will recover on its own.

A unit which recognizes the need to bug out and does so in good order will be able to quickly reorganize and get back into the battle. A unit which breaks and routs from the field will probably not return to fighting shape for a long while (if ever).

Similarily, a unit which is overwhelmed by enemy fire, may suffer from battlefield paralysis and simply refuse to move. Generally, the longer a unit remains paralyzed the harder it will be to get it moving again (even after the barrage has ended).

5. Casualties can cause an irrational reaction, but they are more frequently the result of one.

6. Artillery does not need to inflict casualties to be effective. Fatigue and loss of organization can remove a unit from the battle just as easily.

7. Getting up and running is always preferable to staying down and dying.

Cheers

Paul

[Michael Emrys]

Paul,

I can't find anything in your last post to argue with. What are you trying to do to me?!

Michael

[JasonC]

stoat - I went through the first 300 or so pages of the green book volume on the battle of the bulge. Actually that is less material than the number of pages might suggest, because there is a lot of background and set up stuff early, that I was able to skip over.

Michael - My examples included a number of instances of US counterattacks that hit German arty, and others of hasty US defenses where the men were not dug in.

I have not found instances of men shelled in any meaningful fashion while out of cover, just continuing the attack at speed, let alone doing so successfully. There may be some selection bias in that (meaning, arty isn't mentioned at all in such instances) - but not much I think, because plenty of instances of ineffective arty fire occur, where the arty fire is still mentioned. If they get out of the barrage it is by breaking off the attack, often for hours, and trying something else.

Real world combatants do not have the suicidal singleness of purpose our electronic toy soldiers do. Nor do they view the war as an affair of the next 30 minutes, to conquer or die. On the contrary, they are much more willing to break off whenever conditions are against them and try something else, hours later or elsewhere.

Real world combined arms are often applied in sequence rather than with minute, second by second, borg enhanced coordination. Artillery fire often ceases over the whole area before maneuver arms engage, and its resumption frequently means breaking contact between maneuver elements, often for hours, as both sides try to avoid being out of shelter while it is occurring.

Moreover, it frequently lasts much, much longer than we see in CM. And its pinning or deterrent effect is much, much stronger than we typically see in CM. As an example, one battalion fight was effectively halted for hours by the US calling in 81mm mortar fire from their battalion weapons company. Over a period longer than 3 hours, they fired 1200 shells, which means basically a single CM FO of 81mm mortars in each 35 minute period, 6 of them in a row. This was in defense of a weakened line in woods, the Germans in possession of the positions of their old front line companies, in battalion strength.

The Germans refused to attempt frontal attack into such a threat. Try that in CM - even with multiple TRPs and the effect of treebursts. One module of 81mm won't last the whole period. It will be lucky if it breaks a platoon 2-3 times. But in the real deal, a dozen or two mortar rounds every few minutes was enough to deter an entire battalion from getting out of their newly occupied foxholes, along a front of hundreds of yards (typical deployment of a couple US companies).

When you reflect that CM undermodels shrapnel effect of mortars compared to tube HE, that the blast radius of an 81mm round was not much shy of that of a 105mm round, that CM fire effect is about right for men prone but quite understated for the effect on men trying to move upright under shellfire, and that the Germans faced none of our compulsion to win the war right here before a hourglass ran out - it makes perfect sense. But it reflects an unwillingness to rely on dodging (way too easy in CM), or to ride out arty without shelter, either one.

We get away with anti-artillery tactics in CM that did not remotely work that way in the real deal. Julius Caesar said the most powerful thing in war is the unexpected. For ease of programming and use, and by general habits of scenario design, CM arty is so cookie cutter and eyedropper predictable, that its shape and likely effect is almost always miniscule.

About the only experience I've had playing CM that corresponds to what real artillery fire was like for units facing it, has been trying to attack a defender with 150mm arty, who rightly holds it over my head instead of blowing it all early. Walking the aim point every minute, occasionally letting 4 shells fall, occasionally 8, minutes of quiet between and no way of knowing where it will be next. And each impact a life or death matter to a platoon.

You back off, try to get to a spot he can't have LOS to from anywhere, try something else. Now give him a second module you don't know about, so you can't count off the 35 shells and know you will be able to move after them. It is the unpredictable and dominating threat, lingering for long periods and clearly renewable at will, that gives arty its pinning power.

On the other hand, get in a cellar and don't try to move, and you were a lot safer than you are in a CM foxhole in the middle of a tight sheaf 150mm barrage. Because the effect of the mid sized stuff was only that large if you were trying to move around. And the effect vs. a cellar was tiny. And the sheafs weren't so tight. And the shells dribbled in over much longer periods.

I'm not saying CM has to simulate all of that, but people should understand it gives only a cartoon version of what arty did, with almost all of the emphasis on the star player maneuver elements instead.

[JasonC]

Actually, I can find a few occasions when infantry persisted in attack into observed arty fire, 105mm and up and delivered in quantity. The usual descripters of the results are phrases like "crucified" and "literally shredded".

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Paul,

I can't find anything in your last post to argue with. What are you trying to do to me?!

Michael

LOL I'm stunned into silence. This is the BFC forum, right?

Cheers

Paul

[The_Enigma]

counter battery fire will solve the problem

[Other Means]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Actually, I can find a few occasions when infantry persisted in attack into observed arty fire, 105mm and up and delivered in quantity. The usual descripters of the results are phrases like "crucified" and "literally shredded".

I for one appreciate the 3 hour effort.

[jacobs_ladder2]

I'm sorry. I should have thanked you as well Jason. Very interesting post. Much appreciated.

BTW, on your reccomendation I'm reading The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. It's a good read. I have paid money for stuff and not gotten half as much information.

Cheers

Paul

[Aco4bn187inf]

To add to the earlier descriptions of various armies' SOPs under arty fire-

20 yrs ago the US Army's SOP if shelled while moving was for the leader to simply call out a direction and a distance, and everyone would immediately run like hell that way.

Why? I'll take a few guesses-

A.- Being hit by artillery is the equivalent of being in the kill zone of an ambush. If you're there, you're going to die. In this case there's no ambusher to assault, so getting out of the kill zone is the least bad option. (This may be influenced by the expectations about late 20th century Soviet-style artillery.)

B.- If you're facing irregular or light opponents, they may have only a few mortars with limited ability to communicate and adjust fire, so you might just be able to escape by moving quickly. (Perhaps the influence of patrolling experience in Vietnam?)

It's also the SOP, as I recall, to have predesignated Rally Points where men would assemble if the unit gets disrupted by this kind of action. The leader designates the rally point with a simple hand signal while on the move. If you get separated later, you return to that spot. This kind of thing is abstracted in CM and the player never has to think about it.

Of course, if your mission is defense, dug in, especially with overhead cover, running away is NOT the least bad option, and this SOP does not apply.

[von Churov]

One question.

What does SOP really means?

Sorry for my ingorance, but English is not my mother tongue.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by von Churov:

What does SOP really means?

Standard Operating Procedure(s). In other words, standing directives that are to be followed in the specified circumstances.

Michael

[Folbec]

Originally posted by Aco4bn187inf:

To add to the earlier descriptions of various armies' SOPs under arty fire-

20 yrs ago the US Army's SOP if shelled while moving was for the leader to simply call out a direction and a distance, and everyone would immediately run like hell that way.

Why? I'll take a few guesses-

I'm also wondering if modern shells are not different from most WWII shells : more airburst (equivalent of CM VT), making lying prone more dangerous ?

[Aco4bn187inf]

Folbec, I think modern shells are indeed more deadly than those of sixty years ago. There may be something in the Tacops forum to explain what they're like.

[Folbec]

Originally posted by Aco4bn187inf:

Folbec, I think modern shells are indeed more deadly than those of sixty years ago. There may be something in the Tacops forum to explain what they're like.

Then lying prone is maybe no more a viable option for infantry caugth in the open. The drill may have changed since WWII.

[von Churov]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by von Churov:

What does SOP really means?

Standard Operating Procedure(s). In other words, standing directives that are to be followed in the specified circumstances.

Michael </font>