MG battalions on the attack?

[SteveP]

I guess the real thrust of my question did not come across. There are two possibilities.

1) German MG battalions often fought as infantry, because the weaponry involved could easily be used in that context (or, as a subset of this, it could be that they were only used often in this way by creative commanders like Rommel); or

2) Using an MG battalion in this way at Mersa Berga was very unusual, in which case the tactic was remarkable not only for Rommel's insight into the flanking opportunity, but also to the battalion's ability to execute it.

I'm still unclear as to which is the more correct interpretation.

[JasonC]

Neither.

It isn't normal for German divisions to have MG *battalions* at all. Standard TOEs had a weapons *company*, mostly HMG but also some mortars, in each infantry-type *battalion*.

5th light had only one infantry type *regiment* because it was a light division, not a panzer division. Lights were themselves an unusual and transitional form, and 5th Light became 21st Panzer before the year was out.

It still had an unusual layout, into 1942 - only one, 2 battalion schutzen (infantry) regiment, plus 1 each of motorcycle and armored recon.

While it was 5th light, it was unusual in having MG battalions attached to it in the first place, and the purpose of doing so was to bulk up its infantry defensive power.

It was normal in *Rommel's* practice, to use these special unusual attached MG battalions, as extra infantry, whenever he was attacking, which was often. But by late summer 1941, the division was 21st Panzer with the layout above - so the whole thing was transitional.

Reading any kind of "normality" into the use of German MG battalions assumes it was normal to have such things in the first place, and it simply wasn't.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

just to be clear, my comments were about MGs & mortars and offensive power in general. i wasn't talking about this specific case (which i am not familiar with at all) or the MG Battalions.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by SteveP:

I guess the real thrust of my question did not come across. There are two possibilities.

1) German MG battalions often fought as infantry, because the weaponry involved could easily be used in that context (or, as a subset of this, it could be that they were only used often in this way by creative commanders like Rommel); or

2) Using an MG battalion in this way at Mersa Berga was very unusual, in which case the tactic was remarkable not only for Rommel's insight into the flanking opportunity, but also to the battalion's ability to execute it.

I'm still unclear as to which is the more correct interpretation.

I think what you are missing is that there were hardly an MG battalions.

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/MGBataillone/Gliederung.htm

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

Right, and they were an early war thing. Some of the ones in that list turn into others in the same list, e.g. 55 is 35, 48 is 38. Many are split up after Poland, and end up as infantry or panzergrenadiers or panzerjaegers, as separate companies. Some are in Russian through 1942 or 1943 as army level reserve units, and transition to mortar battalions by then. A few are in Scandanavia on static defense missions; one is folded into a ski brigade toward the end of the war. A couple are in static defenses in the west, one e.g. defends Cherbourg as part of the garrison. But the original third or so, the low numbers, including the ones sent to North Africa, went through Poland and France as MG battalions, and afterward turn into motorcycle or schutzen, in mobile divisions.

The army simply didn't expect, prewar, that there would be as little use for them as defensive specialists, as there was. Remember WW I and the role MG formations had then. Well, in WW II there was more call for motorized infantry and less call for static fortress like MG assets at a higher echelon. Every infantry type formation needed and had MGs, but well interlaced with all the other arms.

[Andreas]

ISTR that one of the earlier small infantry division waves was conceived as primarily static defense, with a large load-out of WW I vintage HMGs (not mobile, but still good firepower).

All the best

Andreas

[abneo3sierra]

Originally posted by JasonC:

More detail for those who can't picture it yet.

Imagine a shoreline along the north verge, with a sharp, rugged bluff rising in open, bare rock formations ("gebel" country) from it up to a plateau. A bit of a bump at the top, meaning a small amount of "down" on the other side, then an endless flat plain of rock and scattered light sand patches extending away to the south. Not far below the bit of "down", a single road running from east to west, paralleling the coast and the escarpment.

Now, position a British 7th Armoured force to block the road. They will be deployed in a line straight across it, stretching south several kilometers to positions that can still see the road, but at long range, and refused back to their left to protect the open, desert flank against any easy turning movement. A couple of kilometers behind the outpost line, itself mixed infantry (not much of it though), a few light guns, and an outpost line of tanks - put the British reserve, with some tanks, whatever larger guns they have, HQs and a flock of soft skin transport. Since they are expecting an armored attack straight down the road intent on opening it rapidly, they have minimal forces on their right or seaward side - a few OPs looking along the bluff, at best. They are somewhat more concerned about a possible wide flanking movement to their south, and have some scouts out to warn of any such, might react along the road themselves or counterpunch with a small body of armor etc.

Now have the Germans pull up before the position and screen it, modest sniping back and forth etc. Meanwhile, a recon battalion in light vehicles heads south and southeast, making lots of dust, threatening the expected turning movement. The German tanks are in fact stationary along the road, mostly, but the Brits may think they are with the southern column etc.

Meanwhile, the Germans debus an infantry type battalion on their side of the skirmishing, and they head north, below the lip of the escarpment and immediately out of view. They then work their way, laboriously, along the face of the escarpment, moving parallel to its length rather than descending or ascending, until well past the entire British position. Then they ascend to the top of the escarpment, brushing aside if necessary a few OPs. Once up, they can see all the mass of soft transport off their right front, can call fire on it, can interdict the first 1-2 km of desert including the road itself with MG and mortar fire, etc.

Once they are detected in place, what are the British going to do? You can't charge with tanks over the escarpment. You might drive the Germans slightly below the crest temporarily, but they will be back as soon as the pressure eases. You can't really hit them with artillery easily, so close by on a reverse slope (though mortars might). They have good rock cover there and will not be directly observed. The Brits have little infantry to just tangle with them and would find it decidedly hot once past the crest, without supporting arms etc.

Nor can the Brits just ignore them as insufficiently armed to hurt them. The tanks might, but the tanks are helpless in a larger sense without the rest of the combine arms force, without their transport and supply elements, etc. The transport is in immediate danger and something must be done right away to protect it. If attacking cannot protect it, then it has to move.

So the Brits plain bug out. They have to swing off the road to get around the German infantry fire - tanks might hug closer and try to suppress them while others pass, to be sure. All the soft elements up at the screened front need to be loaded and brought back, alive.

As soon as they are seen to move, the Germans press them from the front with the main body. After they break contact, the trucks come up the road, reload the infantry force that did the flanking job, and everybody rakes off along the road to catch the flying British. Especially if the Brits had to deviate from the road in the early part of the flight, they are in danger of not getting back to it ahead of the Germans.

Simple, really. The brazen risk in it was simply that it launched unsupported infantry over the most difficult sort of terrain, ending with a need to climb a steep escarpment right into the teeth of a possibly waiting defense. It succeeded because the risk was taken with the correct estimate that the Brits simply would not expect such a thing, and therefore the attempt would be practically unopposed, until the movement was nearly accomplished.

This is actually an excellent CMAK scenario