Rommel as Military Commander

[Ansbach]

New to the boards and just wanted to add my vote to the "Rommel is overrated" camp.

I thought an old, out of print Osprey book I have hit the nail on the head, in reference to the Africa Campaign: it said something to the effect that Rommel's dashing, aggressive style and the 'bumbling' style of the British just showed a contrast in inefficiencies...

He obviously had moments of tactical brilliance as well, but overall I would take Guderian over Rommel.

[ February 09, 2004, 03:36 AM: Message edited by: Ansbach ]

[Lindan]

A very good battlefield commander and tactician but sorely lacking on a higher level. (strategy)

When Tobruk was taken Rommel went to great lengths to have things his way. Everything was ready for Kesselrings assault on Malta. Rommel even flew to Germanny to personally convince Hitler that his plans to pursue the Brits are right and the supplies and Luftwaffe support for Herkules should go to him instead.

He should have listened to Kesselring, as he was a better strategist.

[Darryl60]

I'd have to agree with Lindan.

Rommel was one of the better tacticians,but he was pretty lousy when it came to strategy.

I always felt his biggest failing was in his constant "having to see what's going on at the front lines" mentality. He would often get himself out of communications with his staff. Sometimes at critical moments.

Fortunately,he had one hell of a staff...many of whom went on to command their own panzer divisions,or panzer corps.

[Mick15]

I have only just read this thread and felt like chipping in.

Originally posted by arax3

I often wonder how well Nazis would have done if Rommel was given the reinforcements sent over for the latter part of the Africa campaign? A3

Probably no different - As already pointed out in this thread Rommel could not assemble the supplies he required for the forces actually at his disposal.

We should not forget that the most significant problem for the axis forces in the Western Desert was logistical. All Rommel's supplies had to come across the med avoiding the surface and submarine elements of a strong Royal Navy. Only the extreme western route to Tripoli had relatively secure sea lanes.

Assume the 10 divisions (Italian + German) in Libya in 1942 require 10000 tons per month that is a total of 100000 tons supplies per month.

These are the values based upon Von Thoma's report of 1940 quoting a requirement of 350 tons per day for a mobile infantry division. Pz divisions would require more - leg infantry less.

Tripoli had capacity of 80000 tons per month but actually achieved 45-60000 tons/month.

Benghazi had a capacity of 60000 tons per month but only ever managed a maximum of 30000 mostly due to the 'Benghazi mail' delivered regularly by the Wellington bombers based on the Nile delta.

If Rommel held Tobruk he might, theoretically, add another 40000 tons capacity but this would be even more susceptible to interdiction from bombers based in Egypt. In fact on 8th August 1942 RAF bombing of Tobruk caused what the Italians called 'irreparable damage'.

Looking at this the axis were coping with 60-70% of their supply requirement and when Rommel was at El Alamein Tobruk was over 300 miles away Benghazi over 600 and Tripoli over 1200. To put that in perspective the drive from El Alamein to Tripoli is London to Gibraltar or for our American cousins Boston to New Orleans. Drive being the operative word here.

Two more Panzer divisions with very limited mobility = very limited use. Swop them for Italian divisions and the political dimension (Mussolini's ego?) becomes a difficulty.

Michael Emrys posted in this thread asking why Rommel stayed at the Alamein line - look at the supply perspective as well and ask that question again. Hard to understand even with hindsight.

As for the original question was Rommel a good General. Well you pay your money and you take your choice.

I am, however, surprised that no 'grog' has yet pointed out that from March 1941 to Autumn 1942 there were no other prolonged land campaigns involving Italo/German and Western Allied forces. The propagandists and pressmen of London and Berlin (until Barbarossa in June '41)had little else to fill the column inches and newsreels. My Gran, renowned for her baking and not her knowledge of military history, knew the name of only one German general - guess who! I strongly suspect that as a result of this high profile she held him personally responsible for the knocking down of her sisters house in Liverpool in May '41.

One other pertinent comment; Rommel was certainly outfaced and/or out planned by the Auk twice.

The first time when Auchinlek relieved Cunningham on 24/25 November 1941 and then had the nerve not to be intimidated by the 'dash to the wire'. As a result Operation Crusader saw Tobruk relieved, Rommel's forces shifted from Bardia back to El Agheila and reported axis losses of 20000 Italian, 13000 German and 340 tanks compared to VIII army losses of 18000 men and 440 tanks. Local tactical successes, and debate over the relevance of equipment quality and doctrinal differences don't change this final result.

The second was when the Auk relieved Ritchie in June 1942 (15th I think). Rommel's first attempt to break the Alamein line on 1 July was defeated comprehensively by VIII army elements under Auchinlek's personal command. Starting on 4 July Auchinlek then put Rommel on the defensive with tightly controlled and limited attacks against the Italians forcing Rommel to use DAK as a fire brigade. The important attack was 10 July - Rommel is quoted in the Rommel Papers as writing at this time "there could be no question of launching a large-scale attack .... I was compelled to order every last German soldier out of his tent or rest camp....the situation was beginning to take on crisis proportions".

The attack of 10 July was the one which overran Seebohm's radio-intercept unit (mentioned in another thread) destroying the unit and capturing a mortally wounded Seebohm. There have been suggestions that the Auk gave the destruction of this unit to elements of the 9 Australian division as a specific objective.

For the little it is worth my choice; I agree with Michael Emrys that Rommel's personal doctrine was psychological domination through the bold stroke.

That principle can be summed up in the words, "Once you get the enemy off balance, don't give him a chance to recover."

Unfortunately Rommel was too much of an impetuous risk taker to be classed even as one of the great tactical captains.

Auchinlek now - there is a general I like to hear opinions on.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Mick15:

Auchinlek now - there is a general I like to hear opinions on.

I think we are likely in agreement here. I think Auchinlek was a great general whose talents were lost to the Allied war effort for the last three years of the war. He and Wavell (who was at least fortunate enough to find employment) represent two outstanding tragedies of the Middle East Command. I guess you could add O'Connor and Gott in there somewhere as well.

Michael

[CombinedArms]

By contrast with Rommel's inability to get essential supplies via various ports in North Africa, consider this passage from Samuel E. Morison's classic "History of American Naval Operations in WWII," the "Sicily-Salerno-Anzio volume," on the speed with which Palermo was converted into a high capacity port after US capture on July 22, despite partial wreckage of port facilities by the Axis and the fact that the city was then without "water, light, power or sewerage."

Commodore Sullivan, the salvage expert, and Army Engineers, sailors, soldiers and civilians set about clearing up the mess, restoring services for the city and armed forces, repairing the drydock, and constructing a staging area for 15,000 troops. Gen. Eisenhower and Adm. Cunningham wished to make Palermo an advanced naval base where troops and supplies might enter directly from the wings instead of from the rear across the island; and already they were planning to mount there a part of the next operation. On 28 July Naval Operating Base Palermo was established, with Cpt. Leonard Doughty in command. By the 30th, half the shipping berths in the harbor were cleared. On 1 August, when transports bearing the 9th Infantry Division entered, twelve ships were able to unload simultaneously. During that month, 44,878 soldiers and sailors, 116,369 long tons of supplies and 6361 vehicles were landed in Palermo.

I think, after reading Mick15's interesting post with its numbers on the limited shipping situation Rommel's forces faced, these numbers ought to make us say "Wow!" One month after taking over a wrecked harbor, the Allies were moving in well over 100,000 tons of shipping, plus massive quantities of men and supplies--and this was obviously key to the planning of the top strategic thinkers in the theatre. I don't think Rommel or the chain of command who supported him were ever willing or able to think or act on this kind of logistical level.

Hitler, talking to Mussolini shortly after the Allied landings in Sicily, was upset at how quickly the Allies had established air bases on and near the island. He said "It's really tragic how the English always get the jump in matters of organization. The prompt activation of the Pantelleria air base, and recent photographs of their fields near Gela and Licata, prove it." But whose fault was that, really? Whose job was it to see that the English and Americans didn't always get a "jump in matters of organization." I think the problem was not limited to Rommel but was endemic to the German war effort, starting at the top with the short guy with little mustache who set the organizational agenda.

[ February 10, 2004, 11:23 AM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[sand digger]

One of the 'Rommel a good tactician and that is about it' ilk. Actually he did also concentrate his forces to often achieve an overwhelming local superiority, while the British, including Auchinleck, dispersed excessively.

Actually Auchinleck was one of the worst for breaking up divisions into Jock columns and other piece meal ad hoc units. Montogomery OTOH recognised the strength of the division, particularly in regard to the artillery force it could bring to bear.

[CombinedArms]

Rick Atkinson makes a similar point about the dispersal of US forces into small grab bag units throughout the early stages of the Tunisian campaign. Parts of the US 2nd Armored were spread out over a 100 miles in small parcels under command of US, British and French officers. The Allied army became a crushing force when it, first of all, got enough units to the front lines and, second of all, concentrated those units into divisions and corps under direct command of officers of their own nationality. Pretty much from then on, the US and Brit divisions fought as units and when French, Polish or Brazilian forces gained sufficient strength, they fought as divisons, too. I guess it took the Allies a while to learn what might seem a basic lesson, but once they learned it, they learned it thoroughly.

[Guest lmgroth]

I just wanted to wish Major General F.W. von Mellenthin a happy 100th birthday today!

He was born on 8/30/1904 and served with Rommel in the Afrika Corps as a Staff Officer as well as other positions throughout the entire war.

I am currently reading his book "Panzer Battles" and am in the 'Gazala Battles' section right now. He mostly praises Rommel, but also points out when and where he feels he made mistakes or missed opportunities.