Battle of Berlin (Hist.Ch. U.S.) 8 p.m. E/ 7p.m. Central. Sat

[John Kettler]

Saturday evening "History's Undercover" is covering the Battle of Berlin, with particular attention to

coverup of horrific Soviet losses and drawing upon access to long held, highly classified Soviet archival materials recently made available for the first time. Clips showed great combat footage!

Regards,

John Kettler

[ July 19, 2003, 02:51 AM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[John Kettler]

Bump! (so it doesn't disappear before the show, whose first West Coast airing is 5 p.m. PDT).

Regards,

John Kettler

[Screaming Flea]

Bugger BUGGER I missed it! Oh well thanks for the heads up John.

cheers,

Flea

[Grisha]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Saturday evening "History's Undercover" is covering the Battle of Berlin, with particular attention to

coverup of horrific Soviet losses and drawing upon access to long held, highly classified Soviet archival materials recently made available for the first time. Clips showed great combat footage!

Horrific losses? 1,906,200 Soviets and 155,900 Poles participated in the Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation. Total casualties were 352,475 and 8,892, respectively. That's 17.5% of total forces involved. [source: Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, Krivosheev]

I only hope Beevor wasn't narrating.

[John Kettler]

Grisha,

I guess our accounting standards differ. I consider losing a more than a division's worth of tanks (some 400), eight divisions of infantry killed (80,000 men) and some twenty-five divisions (250,000, actually 253,000) wounded, often massively, to be a big deal. Apparently, so did Stalin, for he created a kind of classified hospital Gulag for the mutilated victims of his victory, hiding them from the sight and awareness of his own people, while massively underreporting his actual casualties. If you look at the fraction of usable infantry in the rifle divisions, it immediately becomes clear that the real toll in combat power, expressed in division combat equivalents, is way above what I've listed, yet we're talking about 17.5% of ALL Soviet troops committed. Care to guess what the survival rates were in the line infantry and tank units?

Regards,

John Kettler

[ July 20, 2003, 03:46 AM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[Grisha]

Sorry, John, but I guess our methods do differ. 17% casualties (didn't bother to break it down to KIA/WIA/MIA) is pretty light in my book regardless of historical era, and painting an ugly picture doesn't change those numbers. Heck, wars have been pretty big affairs since the turn of the twentieth century, and WWII was a total mechanized war, to boot. A million man army was small fry in the Second World War. As for political actions taken by Stalin - well, they're political, not military. I think 1937 already proved that one didn't necessarily imply the other.

Addendum: When one considers that the entire AO for the Berlin operation was highly fortified with many urban environments and river/canal obstacles, I'm actually surprised that casualties were at only 17.5%. That's a lower casualty percentage than either the Belorussian or Lvov-Sandomierz operations.

[ July 20, 2003, 04:48 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Andreas]

Grisha, are those irrecoverable losses, or total?

Regarding the loss total - 17.5% is quite high, but in order to compare it, one needs to first understand that Soviet divisions were much 'shallower' than e.g. US or German divisions. A far higher proportion of the chaps would be up front trying to kill Germans.

Kip continues telling me about this Newton book on Kursk. There, apparently, a 7% loss across the whole army translates into 70% or thereabouts for the rifle platoons. As a ballpark figure, I think the effect would be roughly about the same here for 17.5%, if not less (Soviet divisions were only 50% of the strength of a full German division in 1943, and you have to allow for the Soviet love of DF fire support assets, which increases the number of guys being shot at).

High losses - certainly. Horrific - well, I would quibble with the word, on a relative basis. In the context (taking a city from defenders who don't know when they should stop, technical means of the time, assaulting over unfavourable ground at Seelow), I would expect this level of losses. What I find horrific are the civilian casualties in the operation, but they are hardly the fault of the Soviets.

I would be more interested in a comparison of losses between Zhukov's 1st Belorussian and Konev's 1st Ukrainian Fronts, since the latter had a much easier ride into Berlin.

If Model's army had fought it out in the Ruhr pocket, the US Army would have seen similar losses, without a doubt.

[Grisha]

Andreas,

The percentage figure represents those participating Soviet-allied forces who were killed, missing, wounded, or sick during the operation. I don't consider these excessive losses. I don't even consider them considerable. Flashing a number like 400k certainly looks impressive - or ghastly - but it offers no frame of reference. I consider 30% casualties as the borderline into heavy losses. At 20% you need to start thinking of other options.

[Grisha]

I would be more interested in a comparison of losses between Zhukov's 1st Belorussian and Konev's 1st Ukrainian Fronts, since the latter had a much easier ride into Berlin.

Surprisingly, as percent losses, Konev had higher than Zhukov.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Surprisingly, as percent losses, Konev had higher than Zhukov.

By what amount?

If the 17.5% includes all losses, I would also not consider it excessive (let alone horrific) in the context of the Berlin operation. If it was some rinky-dinky operation in the Baltic States in 1945 I would think differently, but for this one, nothing unexpected.

[Grisha]

The Zhukov-Konev thing I just remember from a recent post in the Russian Military Forum, but I can tell you the exact figures when I get off work.

[von Nev]

I would still consider 17% a very high number which from a historical perspective is why it was played down.

Germans historically had 2 support personnel for every 1 man on the line (which is why they were able to field so many divisions even as a small country relative to the US and USSR). The Russians were 3 to 1 (25% front line) and the US was 4 to 1 (20% frontline).

Therefore, a 17% number represents 70% (17.5%/25%) of all Russian front line forces ended up as casualties. Pretty horrific casualties to me.

A point to remember. It is very difficult to wipe out units to the last man. From a tactical perspective it was generally not required. A unit generally becomes combat ineffective when it reaches 30% casualties. Ever tried to service the wounded and continue an attack with 30% of your COMBAT forces laying around dead or wounded? Consider a platoon of 25 trying to keep going with 17 unhurt and 8 dead or wounded are moaning or dead and more than likely part of the 8 was the platoon leadership.

Also, modern tactics (post WWI) generally work in 3's. You have two up and one in reserve/reinforce. You avoid having three on the line with no reserves. This is why you have 3 squads per platoon, 3 platoons per company (excluding heavy weapons), 3 companies per battalion, etc. When you lose 30% you lose effectively that third unit and effectiveness goes down dramatically as you have no reserves to plug the holes or reinforce success.

I would not want 17.5% total force casualties on my resume.

von Nev

[ July 21, 2003, 10:24 AM: Message edited by: von Nev ]

[Grisha]

Germans historically had 2 support personnel for every 1 man on the line (which is why they were able to field so many divisions even as a small country relative to the US and USSR). The Russians were 3 to 1 (25% front line) and the US was 4 to 1 (20% frontline).

I'm curious to know how you came up with the Soviet figure. Generally, Soviet echelons were two units 1st echelon, one unit 2nd echelon. It would breakdown this way all the way to battalion level. As the war wound down to the 3rd period (1944-45) there were occasions of three echelons at division level. However, with such a deep formation the Soviets typically deployed each division as a single echelon, so three divisions back to back, but each one deployed as a single line. Looking at your percentages from the Rifle Corps level, I'd say percentage of front troops to reserve troops was in a range from 30%-33%, or the equivalent of your German figures.

Therefore, a 17% number represents 70% (17.5%/25%) of all Russian front line forces ended up as casualties. Pretty horrific casualties to me.

Given the figures I provided, your final percentage would be 55%, roughly. Still, a large number, no doubt, but such raw results seem to be in ignorance of the 'how' or 'why' of having echelons in the first place. As you yourself have stated tactical formations rarely fight to the man. In fact, morale and unit cohesion degrade at a point well before a unit is in danger of being totally wiped out. When such factors are beginning to take hold of a unit, the next echelon is called up to continue the attack. Considering that echelons exist at battalion, regiment, and division levels shows a fair degree of "turnover," for lack of a better term. This would contribute to diffusing casualties within a group of units.

Yes, infantry take the brunt of the fight, but this is generally the case with every army.

[ July 21, 2003, 07:38 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[von Nev]

Your point is valid about the Russians stacking units. They were more of the brute force army as is basic Soviet doctrine. Their command structure would only allow that type of doctrine. They figured you would run out of bullets before they ran out of troops. I have read reports that the Soviets used the "win at all cost" model up until 1944 when they literally began to run low on reinforcements and official orders to units began to state that "losses should be minimized."

My numbers on the Russian ratios of front line troops (even within front line divisions) were more based on their later war forces where they had more Army and Front support units and deeper support structures built out within divisions than they had in the leaner mid-years when they expected to lose huge percentages through their basic attrition doctrine and did not build out the units to include support elements. Heck, they didn't give rifles to everyone! You were expected to pick that and ammo up from those that fell in front of you.

Still, whether it was 55% or 70% of "trigger-pullers" it is pretty incredible losses. Granted at that point is was generals trying to make history. The human costs were irrelevant to them just prestige. Look at Zhukov at the Seelow Heights. Talk about slaughter. Zhukov also lost huge during Operation Mars but Stalin liked him because he "was a fighter." Problem was he only fought with markers on a big map. When those markers just disappear or were removed there was not a second thought on the "human" impact.

One final point of if 17.5% is bad. How many battles can you do that and still have an army? Less than six times before you have to rebuild and retrain and entire force, every man. The US stopped day-light bombing over Europe and reassessed their strategy when they reached a 10% mission lost rate. Remember that is 10% of "trigger-pullers" not 10% of the total Air force. If you include that number it is probably less than 2%.

I still believe the Battle of Berlin was horrible in terms of human life and military losses.

von Nev

[Andreas]

Originally posted by von Nev:

One final point of if 17.5% is bad. How many battles can you do that and still have an army?

Well, you are forgetting the context. This was the last battle, they just needed to win it, and casualties were almost irrelevant, since there just wasn't another German army they needed to deal with. By the way, there are some US infantry divisions that had 250-300% casualties over the time June 1944 to May 1945 (90th comes out 'top' with 292%, IIRC). That translates into 23% losses per month at the lower end, so for a two-week period (like the battle for Berlin), that is 11.5% on average (90th would have >13%). Across the whole division, not just the rifle platoons. So in a single battle phase running over two weeks (e.g. Normandy, or the Siegfried Line), 17.5% may not have been extraordinary for them as well, but may actually have been at the lower end of things.

This is of course not directly comparable, because it is not at the same level, but should give some indication of the scale of slaughter in modern mechanised warfare. Considering the circumstances of Berlin, the figure does not appear high after all, now that I have thought about it.

Originally posted by von Nev:

I still believe the Battle of Berlin was horrible in terms of human life and military losses.

In absolute terms, no doubt. In relative terms, for the Red Army, I don't think I would agree.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by von Nev:

Heck, they didn't give rifles to everyone! You were expected to pick that and ammo up from those that fell in front of you.

The only time I know this happened was in late 1941, or early 1942. Do you have any info it happened after that?

You may also be interested to hear that the vaunted Wehrmacht did not give rifles to every infantry soldier - in 1945. This would indicate to me that it has more to do with external restraints, than internal doctrine.

[von Nev]

The latest I heard of Russians throwing men into the lines without weapons were the opening stages of Stalingrad in Autumn 1942.

Never heard the Germans didn't issues weapons. It was my understanding that even the Volkstrum had small arms including prolific amounts of Panzerfausts. Ammo may be another story. Although I thought it was more on the larger caliber not small arms (<7.62mm).

von Nev

[Grisha]

Still, whether it was 55% or 70% of "trigger-pullers" it is pretty incredible losses. Granted at that point is was generals trying to make history. The human costs were irrelevant to them just prestige. Look at Zhukov at the Seelow Heights. Talk about slaughter. Zhukov also lost huge during Operation Mars but Stalin liked him because he "was a fighter." Problem was he only fought with markers on a big map. When those markers just disappear or were removed there was not a second thought on the "human" impact.

You seem to have decided to ignore my comments on the whole reasoning for echelons, but nevermind. It appears you may be more interested in propagating old traditional beliefs. As for your comment about “generals trying to make history” it might interest you to know that the average Soviet frontnik, and a huge section of Soviet citizens, were just was eager to see Berlin fall. I know of a few western sources that confirm this, if Soviet sources are unacceptable for you.

One final point of if 17.5% is bad. How many battles can you do that and still have an army? Less than six times before you have to rebuild and retrain and entire force, every man. The US stopped day-light bombing over Europe and reassessed their strategy when they reached a 10% mission lost rate. Remember that is 10% of "trigger-pullers" not 10% of the total Air force. If you include that number it is probably less than 2%.

Air combat and ground combat are somewhat like apples and oranges. I believe the 10% threshold existed because pilots (and possibly other crew) couldn’t be trained fast enough to make up for the losses (it takes a lot more than 3 months to train a combat pilot). Also, this threshold was well known among the public, and given that a bomber tour comprised of 25 sorties, the odds were against any bomber crew not losing their aircraft (and most likely their own lives). This was a very demoralizing statistic for the home front. Such a statistic wasn’t so easily calculated for the average infantryman. Besides, when a B-17 went down you could pretty much write-off the crew as either dead or captured.

Also, armies don’t function in isolation. They are continually receiving supplies and replacements, both in terms of men and equipment. How well an army can sustain itself is dependent not only on the military capabilities of the combat formations, but also on the population and industrial sector of the civilian rear. Another thing to remember is that casualties are not a complete write-off especially for a war that lasts four years. For example, of the 179,490 casualties taken by Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front in the Berlin operation, 141,880 were sick or wounded. How, many of those sick and wounded returned back to health within a reasonable time, say three months?

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Still, whether it was 55% or 70% of "trigger-pullers" it is pretty incredible losses. Granted at that point is was generals trying to make history. The human costs were irrelevant to them just prestige. Look at Zhukov at the Seelow Heights. Talk about slaughter. Zhukov also lost huge during Operation Mars but Stalin liked him because he "was a fighter." Problem was he only fought with markers on a big map. When those markers just disappear or were removed there was not a second thought on the "human" impact.

You seem to have decided to ignore my comments on the whole reasoning for echelons, but nevermind. It appears you may be more interested in propagating old traditional beliefs. As for your comment about “generals trying to make history” it might interest you to know that the average Soviet frontnik, and a huge section of Soviet citizens, were just was eager to see Berlin fall. I know of a few western sources that confirm this, if Soviet sources are unacceptable for you.</font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by von Nev:

The latest I heard of Russians throwing men into the lines without weapons were the opening stages of Stalingrad in Autumn 1942.

Another case where you clearly look at desperation, not doctrine. The Red Army in front of Stalingrad was not exactly in the best shape after being beaten all over the Steppe. I am always marveling at how people equate this sort of action to some sort of doctrine on the part of the Red Army. To compare, it was not doctrine for the Wehrmacht to draft 13 or 60 year olds, but it happened anyway in 1945. It was also not doctrine to randomly hang soldiers behind the frontline, but it happened a lot too in 1945.

Originally posted by von Nev:

Never heard the Germans didn't issues weapons. It was my understanding that even the Volkstrum had small arms including prolific amounts of Panzerfausts. Ammo may be another story. Although I thought it was more on the larger caliber not small arms (<7.62mm).

von Nev

Well, you heard it now. Some of the units fighting in the Harz went into battle with some Panzerfausts, sometimes Italian SMGs with 20 rounds of ammo, not enough personal weapons, etc.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

Now, now Grisha, how come pointing out Zhukov's Mars-defeat, and his overall command style that lead to needless casualties FE at Seelowe Heights, is just "propagating old traditional beliefs"?

Keke, out of interest, what could have been done differently at the Seelower Höhen to reduce casualties? I understand little about the battle, but from what I know the Soviet bridgehead was in a pretty ****ty position, and the Germans were well dug-in opposite it. Were there other approaches that they could have taken? How realistic would gaining another bridgehead with good links into Berlin have been?

No question about Mars, but that happened almost 30 months earlier, and involved a much better Wehrmacht, and a much worse Red Army.

I guess the comment about the generals and history may refer to the 'competition' between Zhukov and Konev. But would it have been any different if just one of them had attacked? The real aim was to get Berlin before the western allies, and that is hardly something you can blame the Soviet generals for. Also, until then the German regime had somehow failed to show an understanding that the game was up, so it was actually necessary to go to the Führerbunker in person to deliver the message by hand. Which involved all that messy fighting.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Keke, out of interest, what could have been done differently at the Seelower Höhen to reduce casualties? I understand little about the battle, but from what I know the Soviet bridgehead was in a pretty ****ty position, and the Germans were well dug-in opposite it. Were there other approaches that they could have taken? How realistic would gaining another bridgehead with good links into Berlin have been?

No question about Mars, but that happened almost 30 months earlier, and involved a much better Wehrmacht, and a much worse Red Army.

I guess the comment about the generals and history may refer to the 'competition' between Zhukov and Konev. But would it have been any different if just one of them had attacked? The real aim was to get Berlin before the western allies, and that is hardly something you can blame the Soviet generals for. Also, until then the German regime had somehow failed to show an understanding that the game was up, so it was actually necessary to go to the Führerbunker in person to deliver the message by hand. Which involved all that messy fighting.

Before we will make an in-depth analysis about the battle of Seelowe Heights, I must say that I won't accept the "who was on the Reichsstag in the end" -argument, which makes every Soviet effort seem to be, if not perfect, then at least efficient enough, and don't leave any room for criticism.

[ July 21, 2003, 06:32 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Grisha]

Now, now Grisha, how come pointing out Zhukov's Mars-defeat, and his overall command style that lead to needless casualties FE at Seelowe Heights, is just "propagating old traditional beliefs"?

Keke,

Actually, I wasn't referring to that at all. Rather:

... They were more of the brute force army as is basic Soviet doctrine. Their command structure would only allow that type of doctrine. They figured you would run out of bullets before they ran out of troops. I have read reports that the Soviets used the "win at all cost" model up until 1944 when they literally began to run low on reinforcements and official orders to units began to state that "losses should be minimized." ... in the leaner mid-years when they expected to lose huge percentages through their basic attrition doctrine and did not build out the units to include support elements. Heck, they didn't give rifles to everyone! You were expected to pick that and ammo up from those that fell in front of you... Granted at that point is was generals trying to make history. The human costs were irrelevant to them just prestige.

Not sure if von Nev's comments were meant for a specific period, or just a broad stroke meant to represent the entire war, but since no dates were given I can only assume the later. And with no knowledge into the military reasons for many Soviet actions, most people just assume that German assumptions are adequate.

[Andreas]

Well, as long as you show an alternative solution that gets the Red Army to the Reichstag before the Americans do get there, I think that will do. If you thought that this time pressure was not a valid argument at the time, then I would be forced to assume that you believe that the final military operations in 1945 happened in some political vacuum. Which is not something I believe.

Just to put the 17.5% into perspective - from 3rd August 1941 to 8th August 1941, during the encirclement battle at Uman, German 4th Mountain Division lost 1,563 all ranks. The division was a two regiment formation, so assume somewhere about 13,000 men at full strength, probably less by this time, since they had already been through the Stalin line (I could not dig out the actual figure they went into battle with on the 21st July).

Thus, in August 1941 at absolute height of German military prowess, a German elite formation managed to lose anywhere between 12-20% of its total strength in six days of very intense combat (4th Mountain had the highest losses of all formations in the Mountain Corps, because it was in the way of repeated break-out attempts). In the previous 13 days, by comparison, 4th Mountain had lost 215 all ranks. That was low intensity combat though for this division, a pursuit during which the division was resting most of the time. I guess few people would disagree that the Berlin operation qualifies as high-intensity combat.

By comparison, 1st Mountain lost 223 during the pursuit and 536 during the encirclement battle; 125th infantry (they had three regiments) 1,178 during the pursuit and 562 during the encirclement battle.

It is well to say that you don't want 17.5% losses on your resume - but I guess that means you would not qualify for even an interview to lead a formation in World War 2.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Keke,

Actually, I wasn't referring to that at all. Rather:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />... They were more of the brute force army as is basic Soviet doctrine. Their command structure would only allow that type of doctrine. They figured you would run out of bullets before they ran out of troops. I have read reports that the Soviets used the "win at all cost" model up until 1944 when they literally began to run low on reinforcements and official orders to units began to state that "losses should be minimized." ... in the leaner mid-years when they expected to lose huge percentages through their basic attrition doctrine and did not build out the units to include support elements. Heck, they didn't give rifles to everyone! You were expected to pick that and ammo up from those that fell in front of you... Granted at that point is was generals trying to make history. The human costs were irrelevant to them just prestige.

</font>