Historical Article at www.wargamer.com

[vskalex]

Originally posted by Schoerner:

[sNIP] This is what i mean: everybody believes the extremely primitive propaganda-crap instead of using the own brain and counting 1+1 together with the given, from all sides undoubted facts.[sNIP]

At first I was going to ignore your halfmasked neo-nazi rants, but this is frankly too much.

Could you please enlighten me (and others) how you come to the conclusion that Barbarossa was a pre-emptive strike? What "undoubted facts" are you basing this view on? Can you please direct me towards some sources stating this and I DO hope that it is not some "extremely primitive propaganda-crap"....

[Ant]

As a wargamer everyone should know, what's the difference between classical attack constellations and how defensive positions need to look like (especially with 100+ divisions in such a huge country).

Yes we should. The problem is that we, and some historians who postulate this theory, are looking at the situation with 20/20 hindsight. We know how blitzkrieg works, we know all about modern armoured warfare, we know about fluid defence and attack. The problem is that in 1941 they didn't have that hindsight. Strategists were still trying to analyse and digest what had happened in western europe. A lot of the military thinking at the time still had one eye on the first world war. The soviets had been major innovators in mobile warfare in the 30s but thanks to Stalins purges the red army had gone backwards since then. We know now from history that the Soviet dispositions in 1941 weren't very good for defence.........but did the soviets know that in 1941? especially considering that their best officers were gone and in many cases whole divisions were commanded by men who should only really have been commanding brigades. As far as those inexperienced men were concerned putting as many men on your borders as possible was a perfectly valid defence strategy, we know different now but the point is they didn't at the time, and even if they had who would have voiced his opinion in the climate that prevailed in the red army?

[Sergei]

Maybe you, Schörner, could instead answer this:

Why did Hitler oppress and murder people based on their political stance, religion and race? Why did he plan on destroying Leningrad completely? Why did he plan on enslaving the Russians? If he was just defending Germany, then why all that was needed, instead of just liberating Russians, Ukrainians et al from communism? Or could it be that - oh my goodness! - he was a megalomaniac?!? :eek:

[Panzer76]

I thought it was pretty obvious that Stalin was planning to attack Hitler, eventually. I mean, they are after all arch-enemies. But, Stalin needed another year or so to be ready.

I suspect the Germans also knew, that eventually they had to tackle the Russians. In that sense you coudl argue that it was a pre-emptive war. Which btw, doesnt make it any better.

Does anybody think that Stalins plan was just to sit quietly by the side and watch his sworn enemy grow stronger and stronger?

And to the popularity contest... I think both Stalin and Hitler was megalomaniacs.

[Xavier]

Originally posted by Panzer76:

I thought it was pretty obvious that Stalin was planning to attack Hitler

Was it really so obvious? I mean, is there historical evidences of that?

[Spook]

Originally posted by Xavier:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Panzer76:

I thought it was pretty obvious that Stalin was planning to attack Hitler

Was it really so obvious? I mean, is there historical evidences of that? </font>

[Sergei]

Stalin obviously considered Hitler's Germany as a threat. That's why he made the non-aggression pact with him in 1939. When Hitler was fighting with France and Britain, Soviet Union was safe. In optimal case, all three would be stuck by static war like in 1914, and weakened which would open the door for Red Army. This would not only be to remove the threat of Germany, but to spread the communist sphere of influence. It may be hard to believe, but I think Stalin still was an idealist revolutionary, although he also was the most cynical tactician when it came to maximizing his power in the Communist Party, the state and the army. He must have believed that the victory of Marxism was inevitable.

But he also could be careful. German army was no force to neglect, and it shouldn't be taken as granted that even if Stalin had plans of facing Wehrmacht in 1942, he would automatically have attacked. After WW2 I'd say Stalin had similar plans about the again-hostile Western Europe and USA, but starting that war would have been too risky. Would we call it now as a pre-emptive war if USA, Britain and France had invaded eastern Europe in 1948? Maybe, but now that we know what happened, we know that such an attack would not have pre-empted anything, because Soviets didn't commence any attack. Can we then, absolutely positively, say that Barbarossa prevented Stalin from backstabbing Hitler?

[Spook]

Originally posted by Sergei:

Can we then, absolutely positively, say that Barbarossa prevented Stalin from backstabbing Hitler?

In absolute --- no. Maybe Stalin would've concerned himself more on other matters, or changed his mind about attacking in 1942 or in later years. Much can happen in a year to bring on a change in view.

But neither can it be "absolutely, positively" argued that Stalin would have NEVER attacked first. If events and circumstances existed as that Stalin thought a successful offensive could be done, I think it entirely valid that he would've considered same.

But because Hitler attacked first in 1941, and 1942's setting was radically different from one with the USSR still at peace, what Stalin would have done instead remains forever in the realm of the speculative.

[Panzer76]

Originally posted by Sergei:

Would we call it now as a pre-emptive war if USA, Britain and France had invaded eastern Europe in 1948? Maybe, but now that we know what happened, we know that such an attack would not have pre-empted anything, because Soviets didn't commence any attack. Can we then, absolutely positively, say that Barbarossa prevented Stalin from backstabbing Hitler?

Well, we could use an ever newer example, the war that happens just now. I dont think the war against Iraq premptives any urget dangers, there is no immiated treath. The Barbarossa campaing was a far more pre-emptive war than the Gulf War today. IMO.

[Battlefront.com]

Even if Stalin was planning on attacking in 1941, which is not supported by facts, the attack on the Soviet Union was NOT a preemptive strike. It was part of a continuing program of aggression and enslavement by the Third Reich. I would think all good little neo-Nazis would have read Mein Kampf. If no other evidence were available, and there is plenty of it, it is clear Hitler was Hell bent on taking out Communism and the Soviet Union specifically. Well, unless in 1924 Hitler predicted that in 1941 Stalin was planning a preemptive strike.

As for forces on borders... if I had Hitler on my border, a ruthless and murderous dictator who had just invaded more than a half dozen countries (half of which were neutral), you better bet I would have all my forces deployed to keep that bastard out.

The fact is that the Soviet Union was *NOT* mobilized for war. Stalin specifically avoided this, clearly aware that this was what started WWI. The divisions deployed in the western districts of the Soviet Union were some of the least equipped, most unprepared units in the entire standing Soviet Army. Stalin had listened to the right advisors who predicted that a) Hitler would attack first and the Western districts were not ultimately defendable. Therefore, Stalin ordered a defense in depth with the forces in the Western districts basically being capable of little more than delaying the Nazi advance. And that is exactly what happened.

But these words are only intended for those who have the capacity for reason. People who think that Hitler is a misunderstood pawn in world politics has no ability to discuss these issues rationally.

And the warning on you Schoerner remains. If you start in with your VERY thinly disguised neo-Nazi beliefs, you will be bannished right away.

Steve

[Panzer76]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Even if Stalin was planning on attacking in 1941, which is not supported by facts, the attack on the Soviet Union was NOT a preemptive strike.

I dont think Stalin was preparing for war in 41, as he was, as you and other have said, not prepared for war in 41. But, I think he was planning to attack Hitler on a later date, when, nobody knows.

Soviet union would eventually attack the Germans, their sworn enemy. Hitler wanted to attack Soviet Union, beacue he wanted to enslave them. But I think the Generals saw that it made sense to attack Soviet Union as fast as possible, not because of Hitler's deranged dreams, but because they would have to face Soviet Union sooner or later, and this was their best oppertunity.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The fact is that the Soviet Union was *NOT* mobilized for war. Stalin specifically avoided this, clearly aware that this was what started WWI. The divisions deployed in the western districts of the Soviet Union were some of the least equipped, most unprepared units in the entire standing Soviet Army. Stalin had listened to the right advisors who predicted that a) Hitler would attack first and the Western districts were not ultimately defendable. Therefore, Stalin ordered a defense in depth with the forces in the Western districts basically being capable of little more than delaying the Nazi advance. And that is exactly what happened.

Although there is no evidence for "pre-emptive strike" -theories (such theories are basically crap), it's yet another myth that Soviet Union was not mobilized for war (remember Winter War, Poland, Bessarabia etc?), and armies at Western districts were left just to delay German offensive, almost in sacrificable fashion.

[Xavier]

I agree with Steve. The idea that Hitler was forced to attack USSR just to defend Europe from communism is false. I think that, for AH,the west front was just a waste of time and effort. His main goal was the east.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Xavier:

I agree with Steve. The idea that Hitler was forced to attack USSR just to defend Europe from communism is false. I think that, for AH,the west front was just a waste of time and effort. His main goal was the east.

I wasn't arguing earlier that Hitler was seeking to "pre-empt." Whatever all Stalin could have done bending over backwards to avoid war even on into the following years, I believe Hitler still would've attacked. The role of aggressor meant nothing to him.

Rather, my comments were intended to highlight if Stalin entertained comparable notions of aggression against Germany as did Hitler vs. the USSR, after 1941. At present, I think this is valid to argue.

There's an irony to Hitler's "lebensraum" goal; in an indirect way, he succeeded. Even allowing the postwar German border shifts to the east, it could be reasonably argued that those Germans who survived did have more "lebensraum" by war's end, after losing millions.

[Sailor Malan]

Originally posted by Keke:

Although there is no evidence for "pre-emptive strike" -theories (such theories are basically crap), it's yet another myth that Soviet Union was not mobilized for war (remember Winter War, Poland, Bessarabia etc?), and armies at Western districts were left just to delay German offensive, almost in sacrificable fashion.

Sorry, I have to comment here. Whilst Stalin was involved in Finland, and the troops there were undoubtably 'mobilised', you cannot use this to 'prove' that the whole west of the USSR was 'mobilised'. Similarly the almost unopposed advance into eastern Poland 9 months before is also not evidence.

In fact, Stalin was thoroughly convinced that Hitler would not attack at that time, if not provoked, and (despite increasing evidence to the contrary) was caught completely off balance by the attack. IIRC, he even forbade frontier units from taking precautions such as deploying to war positions.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Sailor Malan:

Sorry, I have to comment here. Whilst Stalin was involved in Finland, and the troops there were undoubtably 'mobilised', you cannot use this to 'prove' that the whole west of the USSR was 'mobilised'. Similarly the almost unopposed advance into eastern Poland 9 months before is also not evidence.

In fact, Stalin was thoroughly convinced that Hitler would not attack at that time, if not provoked, and (despite increasing evidence to the contrary) was caught completely off balance by the attack. IIRC, he even forbade frontier units from taking precautions such as deploying to war positions.

This is pretty much my sum outlook at present too. There was SOME mobilisation and reorganization, but hardly consistent in application, and notional at best for those forces expected to first contact the Germans.

I am similarly not convinced yet that Stalin fully expected a German attack in 1941. If that was the case, the materials shipments could've been stopped sooner. The "defense in depth" planning was IMO an effort to cover the bases. Unless, Steve, you'd like to point out some key references as could help indicate otherwise.

[MickeeMao]

A lot of these points have all ready been addressed by other members, but there's a few I would like to offer my opinions on. If any of these notions are ill-conceived, please enlighten me with your opinions

1. Stopping the panzers at Dunkirk.

*Was this really such a big mistake? Goering said he'd be able to smash the English bridgehead with airpower, and I'm sure at the time it seemed possible. Who knew that the English would send such a huge armada to rescue their troops?

Given the unbroken line of successes for the Luftwaffe at this point, I would think that Goering and his officers would be justified in thinking they could decisively interdict any attempt at evacuation or supply, forcing the trapped Brits and French to surrender without having to expose the precious panzers to a city fight.*

5. Failure to understand the importance that a navy plays in global strategy, as evidenced by Germany's failure to build a navy of any consequence before WWII.

*For Germany, the construction of any surface fleet was sheer folly - given their limited resources, it would have been wiser to build more submarines than was historically the case or more panzers.*

7. Failure to understand the role of advanced technology in his wartime strategy. (He ordered ME-262s to be used as bombers instead of fighters, and directed the V-1 and V-2 missiles at civilian rather than military targets -- imagine the havoc they could have caused had they been fired at the beachheads and vital ports the Allies to receive supplies for the Western Front during the last half of 1944!)

* I'm pretty sure the V weapons weren't accurate enough to be used against specific military targets. Many V-2s were launched later in the war against Antwerp because of its status as a major resupply port - I'm not sure how successful they were. Anyone have any info on this?

I think the potential decisiveness of the ME-262 is overrated - while an excellent anti-bomber weapon, my impression is that allied fighters came up with tactics to counter them*

Cheers! [/QB]

[Keke]

Sorry, I have to comment here. Whilst Stalin was involved in Finland, and the troops there were undoubtably 'mobilised', you cannot use this to 'prove' that the whole west of the USSR was 'mobilised'. Similarly the almost unopposed advance into eastern Poland 9 months before is also not evidence.

In fact, Stalin was thoroughly convinced that Hitler would not attack at that time, if not provoked, and (despite increasing evidence to the contrary) was caught completely off balance by the attack. IIRC, he even forbade frontier units from taking precautions such as deploying to war positions.

This is pretty much my sum outlook at present too. There was SOME mobilisation and reorganization, but hardly consistent in application, and notional at best for those forces expected to first contact the Germans.

I am similarly not convinced yet that Stalin fully expected a German attack in 1941. If that was the case, the materials shipments could've been stopped sooner. The "defense in depth" planning was IMO an effort to cover the bases. Unless, Steve, you'd like to point out some key references as could help indicate otherwise.

My comment was obviously slightly misunderstood, thanks to my hasty writing. I agree wholeheartedly that Stalin was not prepared for German attack in 1941. Otherwise his western armies would not have been going through major reorganization by the time. What I was trying to say was that Soviet Union was not a peacuful nation prior to Barbarossa, with demobilized peace time army (like in democratic countries) with no ambitions to expand its influence in near future. And there is no actual evidence, AFAIK, that Stalin knew or was otherwise predicting that Germany would attack first, and the conflict would be unavoidable. Soviet Western armies' mission, however poor condition they might have been in 1941, was to stop any aggression on the (new) borders of Soviet Union, not just to delay any possible attacks, and most of all not to be annihilated...

There is a myth that the use of western armies, however catastrophic looking, was just a careful plan by STAVKA, but no evidence supports this theory (unless it's based on the ultimate argument "who was on the Reichstag in the end!"... ).

[Keke]

Originally posted by MickeeMao:

7. Failure to understand the role of advanced technology in his wartime strategy. (He ordered ME-262s to be used as bombers instead of fighters, and directed the V-1 and V-2 missiles at civilian rather than military targets -- imagine the havoc they could have caused had they been fired at the beachheads and vital ports the Allies to receive supplies for the Western Front during the last half of 1944!)

* I'm pretty sure the V weapons weren't accurate enough to be used against specific military targets. Many V-2s were launched later in the war against Antwerp because of its status as a major resupply port - I'm not sure how successful they were. Anyone have any info on this?

I think the potential decisiveness of the ME-262 is overrated - while an excellent anti-bomber weapon, my impression is that allied fighters came up with tactics to counter them*

Potential decisiveness of ME-262 has surely been overrated, because German war economy simply lacked resources to produce it in large numbers. I don't have Hannu Valtonen's book "ME-109 and the German War Economy" with me right now, so I can't give accurate enough answer, but i do remember that there were certain specific materials that were not properly available (I'll check this one later).

[ March 21, 2003, 03:35 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Keke]

Although I said earlier that the pre-emptive strike theories are basically crap, Barbarossa in fact pre-emptied one well documented matter: Second attempt by Soviet Union to invade Finland (and make it all-happy bolshevist puppet state ). Prior to Barbarossa, Molotov had frequently asked Germany's approval for "final solution" (not an actual quote ) in the "Finnish problem" (actual quote). These requests happened even after Germany started co-operation with Finland, so it proves also how unaware Soviet Union was about actual German war plans...

[MickeeMao]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by MickeeMao:

7. Failure to understand the role of advanced technology in his wartime strategy. (He ordered ME-262s to be used as bombers instead of fighters, and directed the V-1 and V-2 missiles at civilian rather than military targets -- imagine the havoc they could have caused had they been fired at the beachheads and vital ports the Allies to receive supplies for the Western Front during the last half of 1944!)

* I'm pretty sure the V weapons weren't accurate enough to be used against specific military targets. Many V-2s were launched later in the war against Antwerp because of its status as a major resupply port - I'm not sure how successful they were. Anyone have any info on this?

I think the potential decisiveness of the ME-262 is overrated - while an excellent anti-bomber weapon, my impression is that allied fighters came up with tactics to counter them*

Potential decisiveness of ME-262 has surely been overrated, because German war economy simply lacked resources to produce it in large numbers. I don't have Hannu Valtonen's book "ME-109 and the German War Economy" with me right now, so I can't give accurate enough answer, but i do remember that there were certain specific materials that were not properly available (I'll check this one later). </font>

[Battlefront.com]

keke,

My comments about "mobilization" are in the technical sense. And that being calling up all conscripts within a certain age ranges in order to fully man all planned formations. While the Soviet Union was certainly militarily active, and absolutely aggressive, it was not in a position to attack Hitler in 1941. Or prehaps not even in 1942. This is to counter the historical revisionists who would like people to think Hitler was acting defensively.

Now, is it likely that Stalin would have attacked Nazi Germany at some point in the future? I would not be so sure. Certainly the desire was there, but so in theory was it during the entire Cold War. But that attack NEVER happened. And yes, there were Soviet officials who wanted to attack the Nazis, but that is also irrelevant.

The units in the West were there on purpose. The units lining certain defensive phase lines were also there on purpose. They were to trade space for time. This was a deliberate plan starting to be put into effect at the end of 1940 IIRC. It was a result of a series of wargames where Zhukov, acting as the Germans, "won" quite decisively when playing against the Soviets as they currently planned on doing (i.e. forward defense).

When June 22nd came around the Soviets were still in the process of enacting it. Also, the Germans did a lot more and a lot sooner with fewer losses than anticipated. In short, the brilliant defense in depth plan ALMOST failed. But the lack of a clear operational plan on the German side came to their rescue, along with the worst winter for an enemy that was not prepared for it.

My two best sources (off the top of my head) about this are "Operation Barbarossa" by Brian Fugate and "The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front 22nd June - August 1941" by Glanz.

I think the evidence is quite clear that the defense in depth was carefully planned, if not imperfectly executed.

Steve

[Spook]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Now, is it likely that Stalin would have attacked Nazi Germany at some point in the future? I would not be so sure. Certainly the desire was there, but so in theory was it during the entire Cold War. But that attack NEVER happened. And yes, there were Soviet officials who wanted to attack the Nazis, but that is also irrelevant.

No, the long-feared Cold War era WPO conventional assault never did happen. But I think you would acknowledge that this isn't an apples-to-apples comparison given that Stalin wasn't in charge throughout that entire timeframe.

As I've noted above, I don't buy the "pre-emptive" argument. But I think the "1942" scenario, of the Soviets striking first then if the Germans still hadn't attacked, remains valid. The devil in the details IMO is of projecting some probability beyond just the validity point, to which again I regard as very speculative for now.

My two best sources (off the top of my head) about this are "Operation Barbarossa" by Brian Fugate and "The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front 22nd June - August 1941" by Glanz.

Thanks. On my end for now, I can review Werth again, and now finally have the Glantz/House "When Titans Clashed" for potential correlation to the above.

I think the evidence is quite clear that the defense in depth was carefully planned, if not imperfectly executed.

I think you mean "if imperfectly executed".

From the occasions that I've looked at Barbarossa Soviet army dispositions, I would concur that a "defense in depth" plan was being applied. Actually quite sensible, in hindsight. But I think it was more the case of contingency planning (after all, you noted it being considered since 1940) than it was of Stalin expecting a German attack at a very specific timeframe.

[White Phosphorus]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

keke,

And yes, there were Soviet officials who wanted to attack the Nazis, but that is also irrelevant.

Steve

Tukachevski was one of them, and he was resposible for developing the offensive doctrine, he also got PURGED! If Stalin was so bent on conquering Europe, why would he kill all those Generals that would help him get it? Hitler groomed his army for offense, Stalin butchered it.

Even if the Soviets did consider to attack Germany, who isn't to say that it was a preemtive strike against German aggression. Stalin was aware of German troop concentrations before the attack, he just missed the date of it. By a year or so.

[Potential Italian Player]

Part 3:

http://www.wargamer.com/articles/russo_german_historical_part3/

Part 4:

http://www.wargamer.com/articles/russo_german_historical_part4/