Close air support?

[Scott B]

I did not see Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II mentioned in this thread. While I have a copy, I have not read it, but it came highly recommended all the same. I will try to take a look at it when I get home this evening.

Scott

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 06:14 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

The Allies, even with their huge strategic air forces, achieved little with them until the last twelve months of the war.

This is interesting. Why do you say this?

Perhaps because its true?

[JonS]

Wah hey! My first snot-gobbling double post in ages! I'm so proud I'd like to thank MrSpkr, Amos, Kettler, et al ...

[ September 16, 2003, 06:00 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 06:15 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Grisha]

Cabron,

You said:

Later in Russia, the Germans realized their mistakes when they lacked the ability to strike at Russian industry and became victims of a war of attrition they could not win.

Actually, the mistake was in believing that they (the Germans) could conduct a successful 3-month-war-on-the-outside against the Soviet Union. The German army, and air force, was predicated on the military doctrine of a limited war footing within a total war setting, and the Germans thought they could get away with it via their new combined arms concept. Fortunately, the Germans got a little too impetuous following their early victories over countries of limited geography/resources, and decided to take on a country that understood what total war required, and possessed the geography and resources to do so. By the time the Germans conceded that it was going to be a long haul, the Allies were already at peak wartime production, and the Soviets were soon to seize the initiative in military operations.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Scott B:

I did not see Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II mentioned in this thread. While I have a copy, I have not read it, but it came highly recommended all the same. I will try to take a look at it when I get home this evening.

Well, I recommended it in the previous thread where this discussion got started. While the book is somewhat short on what you might call hard data, and is focussed on Quesada, it does give pretty good background on the development of tactical airpower in the ETO. AIR, there are a sprinkling of telling anecdotes.

Michael

[ September 16, 2003, 10:12 PM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

They actually took the middle road: lots and lots of fast, medium bombers which, theoretically, would not need fighter escort. This was their "strategic" air force.

No, it was a tactical air force that occasionally struck at strategic targets, just as the US Air Force used tactical fighter bombers to attack strategic targets in Hanoi, for instance.

But the He-111, Do-17, and Ju-88 were designed for the role of striking rail lines and yards, troop concentrations, and other similar tactical targets.

"The Allies, even with their huge strategic air forces, achieved little with them until the last twelve months of the war."

This is interesting. Why do you say this?

Because that is the prevailing impression I have gained from reading books, articles, and posts to internet discussions by people who know more than I do. Why do you ask? Do you entertain a contrary opinion?

There were basically two classes of targets that really paid off being attacked, in that damage to them had serious impact on the German war effort. Those were targets involved in the production of fuels, and targets related to transport of all kinds. There was a third class that would have paid off handsomely, but was not attacked because Allied intelligence misunderstood how vulnerable it would actually have been to bombing, and that was the production and distribution of electrical power.

In any event, both Bomber Command and 8th. and 15th. Air Forces dispersed their attacks more or less randomly across many industries prior to mid-1944 and never did lasting damage to any of them. After mid-'44, they began to concentrate more on the two classes of targets I mentioned above, and stayed on them long enough to create genuine bottlenecks. The pity is they didn't start doing that, plus attacking the power grid, two years sooner. Cést la guerre.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Grisha:

...the Germans got a little too impetuous following their early victories over countries of limited geography...

I've come to think of the German military as basically set up to fight only as deep as 300 kilometers, 500 at the most, from their supply bases/railheads. Within that zone, they were well nigh invincible the first three years of the war. Trouble is, in taking on the USSR, they needed a logistical radius of a minimum of 1000-1200km. Of course, they were counting on winning a decisive victory within their effective radius. Hitler had promised one. And Hitler never lied.

Michael

[JonS]

Michael,

in line with your last post (3-500km radius of action), I've just finished reading Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? by DiNardo, which basically comes to the same conclusion. Interesting book, if you haven't read it, I recommend it.

Regards

JonS

[Michael Emrys]

He's been cribbing my notes.

Is it really worth the price?

:eek: :eek: :eek: :eek: :eek:

Maybe when I finish the five or six books (I've lost count) I am currently reading, I'll ask my local library to hunt down a copy for me.

Michael

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Is it really worth the price?

Oh! Err ... no. It's only about 200 pages. I didn't even look at the price - the copy I read from the Uni library, and was just using Amazon as a reference point.

[JonS]

CAS Bibliography

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 06:16 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 06:17 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 06:17 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Michael Emrys]

Note: I have divided your post into two parts. I will reply to the first part here and the second later when I am less pressed for time.

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Clearly the Germans did not possess a "strategic" air force in the way we now think of the word, but at that time, this is exactly what they believed. Most of high command was hopelessly sold on the idea of what they called "strategic" bombing during the pre-war period and even up to the beginning of the invasion of Poland. In fact, even up to the defeat in the Battle of Britain the majority of them still believed they could beat England with their force of medium bombers and fighters. They were all , with a few notable exceptions, under the influence of a very convincing Fuhrer and a very tricky Goering. The Luftwaffe had planned to defeat England in this way as early as 1938. If they did not have a "strategic" air force in the modern sense of the word, they clearly were under the illusion that they did.

It wasn't just the Germans who were under this illusion. There were many in all the major air forces as well as governments who shared this view. Strategic bombing was vastly over sold between the wars and expectations regarding it were very inflated. In Britain there were grave concerns that German bombing could in fact knock them out of the war, or at least reduce them to near impotence.

It was a widely held view that city bombing would create panic among the civilian populace who would then demand an end to hostilities. In all cases that I am aware of, this proved false, in fact there is some evidence that the general effect was to stiffen morale at home by creating resentment against the enemy.

Be back later for the second part. Bye.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Okay, lunch over. Back to the fray.

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Originally posted by Micheal Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> "The Allies, even with their huge strategic air forces, achieved little with them until the last twelve months of the war."

The Allied bombing campaign hit its stride early in 1943. </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Forgot this part:

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Briefly, Germany was forced to withdraw a large part of their fighters from Russia and was obligated to shift production from bombers to fighters.

The Germans could have gotten along with a more modest defence of the Reich had it not been for Göring's indiscrete boast that not one bomb would ever fall on Germany. Bomber Command was mostly delivering blows that fell on nothing vital and the same for USAAF at that early stage. There would certainly have been political pressure to defend Germany, but that would have required little more than a symbolic effort. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe could have been husbanding its forces, developing new types and bringing them into production and training new pilots. Instead, they made a more intense effort that was still in the final analysis little more than symbolic (it cost the Allies dearly in planes and aircrews lost, but never stopped the campaign), but used up the Luftwaffe in the process.

Michael

[ September 17, 2003, 04:11 PM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[Andreas]

I am not sure the bombing campaign was really that successful in 1943, I have never really looked at that. Just a bit of anecdotal evidence here:

As some of you may know, I studied for my first degree at University of Kassel. The campus is smack in the city centre, on the grounds of Henschel's weapons factory, where amongst other things the Tiger was built. AFAIK, this was the only place where Tiger I were produced (well, they may have produced them at Wegmann 'Im Loch' in Kassel too, but that is also city centre, to all intents and purposes).

On the night of 22/23 October 1943, a devastating attack hit the city. Below the excerpt from the RAF website on the night.

22/23 October 1943

569 aircraft - 322 Lancasters, 247 Halifaxes - to Kassel. The German controller was again successful in assessing the target and 43 aircraft - 25 Halifaxes, 18 Lancasters - were lost, 7.6 per cent of the force.

The initial 'blind' H2S marking overshot the target but 8 out of the 9 'visual' markers correctly identified the centre of Kassel and placed their markers accurately. Although German decoy markers may have drawn off part of the bomber force, the main raid was exceptionally accurate and concentrated. The result was the most devastating attack on a German city since the firestorm raid on Hamburg in July and the results at Kassel would not be exceeded again until well into 1944. The fires were so concentrated that there was a firestorm, although not as extensive as the Hamburg one.

28 Lancasters and 8 Mosquitos of No 8 Group carried out a diversionary raid to Frankfurt. Bombing was scattered. 1 Lancaster lost.

12 Oboe Mosquitos to Knapsack power-station and 1 to Dortmund, 17 aircraft minelaying in the Frisians and off Texel, 10 OTU sorties. 1 Mosquito lost.

It was on this night that an RAF ground radio station in England, probably the one at Kingsdown in Kent, started its broadcasts with the intention of interrupting and confusing the German controllers' orders to their night fighters. The Bomber Command Official History describes how, at one stage, the German controller broke into vigorous swearing, whereupon the RAF voice remarked, 'The Englishman is now swearing'. To this, the German retorted, 'It is not the Englishman who is swearing, it is me'.

Kassel was a late medieval, half-timbered town in the centre, with Gruenderzeit appartment blocks on the edges of it. The firestorm could be seen from towns 60 or 70km away - when I was a taxi driver in Kassel, I talked to survivors and witnesses about it. One of my best friends lost his great aunt and her whole family in the raid.

The figures below are the production numbers for the Tiger I. Month - Year - Plan - Accepted. You will immediately note the very serious drop in October and November and December (39, 33 and 20% respectively; the September figure is ten over plan, but August was ten under).

September 1943 75 85

October 1943 80 50

November 1943 84 56

December 1943 88 67

January 1944 93 93

February 1944 95 95

Just some food for thought.

Doing some extremely crude, very high-level analysis, just for the sake of it. Lets say the average Tiger took out ten allied tanks. This attack therefore at the upper end cancelled (80-50)+(84-56)+(88-67)=79 Tigers (a whole Abteilung) from Production, which would have saved almost three divisions (or a soviet tank army) of Allied tanks from destruction + assorted AT guns and infantry. For the loss of 43 planes. At the absolute upper end.

[ September 17, 2003, 04:41 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Most of high command was hopelessly sold on the idea of what they called "strategic" bombing during the pre-war period and even up to the beginning of the invasion of Poland.

Interesting, that isn't the sense I get at all. AIUI, the GAF high command (OKL) were very much sold on the tactical side of airpower, and worked from that basis throughout the 20's and 30's. Guys like Wever, Milch, and Jeschonnek all bought into this. See, for example, the list of priorities for the GAF detailed in the 1935 Regulation 16, Luftkriegsführung (Conduct of Aerial War). From memory it is

1) acheive air superiority

2) support the army

3) support the navy

4) ?

5) ?

6) attack enemy means of production and centres of government.

As such it was in stark contrast to most of the Air Force doctrines in Europe at the time. Goering, OTOH, was very much in the thrall of Douhet, and wanted to bomb the bejesus out of cities, etc. However, for a variety of reasons his influence in this area was rather muted.

Regards

JonS

* The Luftwaffe and the Battle for Air Superiority Williams (1995)

* A Clash of Military Cultures: German & French Approaches to Technology Between the World Wars Corum (1994)

[ September 17, 2003, 06:52 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JonS]

Andreas,

interesting post, and worthy of a JasonC Gold Star for High Level and Statistical Analysis However, the RAFs own report on the raid says it was something of an outlier, with similar results not to be acheived for another 8-12 months. So, while in itself the loss of 43 bombers for the 'destruction' (or rather, non-production) of 79 Tigers seems good, taken in the context of the whole years operations it no doubt doesn't look quite so good

And that doesn't even taken into account the effort expended to detroy those 79 Tigers.

322 Lancasters @ 7 crew each = 2254

247 Halifaxes @ 6 crew each = 1482

28 Lancaster @ 7 crew each = 196

21 Mosquito @ 2 crew each = 42

10 OTU sorties @ 5 crew each = 20

Total ~ 4000 guys in the air that night (which is about the frontline/bayonet strength of a division) plus all the ground support (which would be at least the support services strength of a division). Worth it? On this raid; probably. On all the others that year; doubtful.

Regards

JonS

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 06:19 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 06:20 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Originally posted by Micheal Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />A fair amount of the shift in production that you list would have occurred in any case even without the strategic bombing campaign, as the overall strategic initiative shifted from the Axis to the Allies. I think that is what you are seeing in the figures for 1943...

This is an interesting theory, but I think you would find it hard to support. It is speculation in an argument which does not require any. The shift did occur and it did occur as a result of the Anglo-American bombing campaign. I am unaware of any arguments to the contrary.</font>