Close air support?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

His views are easily the most controversial I've ever read...

For example, he claimed that the reason the tanks were halted before reaching Dunkirk was Hitler's fear they had gone too far ahead (a scene which I gather was all too common) at the order of the Wehrmacht commanders. This author pointed to a very pronounced tension developing between them and the Fuhrer on this very point. They were so confident in their total advantage that they had little or no fear of sending their tanks out ahead of the troops, bypassing enemy strongpoints or blatantly ignoring heavy fire to reach objectives.

Since this is the presently accepted version of the story—and has been so far as I know for at least the last 30 or 40 years—how is it controversial?

:confused:

Michael

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:55 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:56 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Michael Dorosh]

I'm certainly no expert. I do recommend Cooper's book that I recommended on the first page. I first found it in the University of Calgary library, so maybe you can get it on an inter-library loan if you can't locate it there in sunny NS. I picked up a copy of my own used on amazon.com (you'll love the annoying popup that asks you if you want to use amazon.ca instead).

Cooper argues (and I haven't seen a convincing counter-argument in discussions here and elsewhere) that the Germans really didn't pursue any radical concepts in France, Poland or Russia, though the "armoured idea" - the use of fast moving tank forces, etc. - was supported by several generals and never permitted to be put into practice by the very conservative elements at the top of the chain of command (including Hitler). Instead, Cooper speaks of vernichtungsgedanke, a tried and true German method of waging war, that was used instead.

He explains that the "mystery of Dunkirk" is no mystery at all if put into context; the campaign in France was a constant battle between the generals supporting the "armoured idea", and Hitler and company who were scared white about overextending their reach. Dunkirk was not a sop to the Luftwaffe, it was simple German conservatism.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

[QB] The text he cited is called “Montgomery’s Scientists” and is written by a Terry Copp.

Copp runs the Centre for Strategic Studies or somefink like that out of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. He has been widely published, including the Maple Leaf Route series of WW II histories, several other works, plus battlefield tour guides for WW I and WW II focussing on Canadian battlefields, and has a regular column in Legion Magazine. He also wrote the history of the 5th Canadian Brigade, of which my own regiment was a part in WW II.

However, he held a very different view of CAS effectiveness vs. soft targets. His opinion was that, although casualty figures were sometimes low, the mere presence of the RAF over a battlefield made it extremely difficult for the German officers to command their troops. He suggested that casualty figures could be low because it was rare for a Typhoon pilot to catch infantry in the open. This due to their tendency to flee or dive for cover as soon as enemy aircraft were sighted.

ACHTUNG! JABO!!

I would also add that these attacks seem to have been very commonly mounted against vehicle columns and columns of infantry in the enemy rear areas; again, not true CAS as Berli pointed out.

It goes without saying that German defensive positions would have been very difficult to spot from the air; they were near impossible to spot from the ground!

Even in cases of heavy bomber attacks (Caen, Cobra) that were preplanned, there were serious errors in accuracy (US General Lesley McNair was killed in one such incident, Canadian General Keller (GOC 3 Cdn Div) was wounded in another).

So one can look at CAS attacks by Typhoons and wonder how often they could really identify any kind of worthwhile target during a close-in battle, without any kind of FAC system in place.

Copp might be a good source for info on Canadian FACs; I've read very little and wouldn't be surprised if we really didn't have anything like that.

BUT - given the excellence of our artillery (TOT, Victor Targets, etc.) we probably had little need for FACs either. If you can call down the entire corps artillery in 5 or 10 minutes, you don't need to call down Typhoons all that often.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

My next step will be to determine why the psychological impact of an air strike was so profound when it is clear now that the actual physical damage caused by these attacks was frequently debatable.

Yes, do that. That is clearly a key question and I have yet to find a satisfactory answer to it. It's one of those things that historians just don't seem to write about (though I hope someone somewhere did). I've speculated about it and tried to imagine myself in the situation of a soldier who is experienced in battle yet unnerved by air attack, but of course (and thank the gods!) have never had the actual experience.

Clearly soldiers don't like being shot at at any time, but most especially don't like being shot at, or bombed, from the air. Partly it may have something to do with cover. When shot at, a soldier will try to get something solid between himself and the source of firing, usually with some degree of success. But when attacked from the air, he will find fewer things that he can interpose between himself and the firer. A common comment was "I felt naked."

Of course bombs, artillery and mortar shells all fall from the sky, so even though aerial bombs are usually much bigger, the effects and countermeasures are roughly the same: hug the ground and hope the fragments pass over you. So what makes for the difference? Strafing for instance is something the troops are apt to take more personally. Is it because of intent, there is a pilot up there who is deliberately trying to kill specifically you, whereas the artillery crew is just processing HE to a point on a grid map?

There's a lot more to be said on this subject, but for me it would just be speculation. I hope you can dig up if not hard data, at least informed opinion.

Michael

[ September 10, 2003, 07:21 PM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[JonS]

For a look at German airpower doctrine in the mid-war period, try: Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943

From the editorial review:

"Most accounts of the Battle of Stalingrad have focused on the dismal fate of the German Army. Joel Hayward now chronicles Luftwaffe operations during that campaign, focusing on Hitler's use of the air force as a tactical rather than strategic weapon in close support of ground forces. He vividly details the Luftwaffe's key role as "flying artillery," showing that the army relied on Luftwaffe support to a far greater degree than has been previously revealed and that its successes in the East occurred largely because of the effectiveness of that support."

Regarding the GAF in the early-war campaigns, it is my understanding that they were far from responsive, and their effectiveness was largely due to their novelty (in fact, much like the tank at that time). The Stukas and Heinkels scared the bejesus out of the civilians, and played havoc on the transport routes - but how much effect did they have 'at the coal-face', so to speak?

It is my understanding that - despite all the press - during these campaigns the GAF was very much in Berlis categories "1) Air engageing targets of opportunity" (and especially those away from the FEBA) and "2) Preplanned Strikes". As an example, Guderians' crossing of the Meuse at Sedan was delayed at least 12 hours (actually a lot longer IIRC) while the requisite arrangements were made for air-strikes on the far bank. And this was at the tip of the major operation of the whole campaign, only a few days after it started. Lord knows what the delays were like for units conducting supporting operations, or later on when friction had started interfering with the plan.

Regards

JonS

[ September 10, 2003, 07:45 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

...Rommels crossing of the Meuse at Sedan...

Rommel did not cross at Sedan. I think he crossed at Givet, but I'd have to look it up to be sure.

Michael

[JonS]

Feh. Well, he crossed the Meuse somewhere

reference to Sedan removed ...

Edit2: Ha! I was kind-of right the first time. It was Sedan (Rommel was at Dinant) I was thinking of, but of course Guderian was in command there.

[ September 10, 2003, 07:44 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JonS]

Found a passage relating to Guderians' crossing here:

On May 12, the 1st Panzer Division covered the remaining 20 kilometers to the banks of the Meuse in just 4 hours, and by day’s end, the entire corps had closed on the east bank of the Meuse just opposite Sedan. Although the XIX Panzer Corps had spent nearly five months rehearsing this operation, Guderian insisted on ensuring that his intent was understood:

General Guderian spent the entire morning [of May 13] visiting his three division commanders, conducting face-to-face coordination, and explaining his aims for the upcoming operation.8

The French had not yet panicked. They assumed that the Germans would advance in a manner based on the French experience with logistics. That is, the Germans would have to stop at the Meuse, the first river line defended by a major system of fortifications. There, the Germans would have to consolidate and prepare for the river crossing for several days, perhaps as long as a week. General Maurice-Gustave Gamelin, the French commander, ordered an additional 11 divisions to reinforce the Sedan area. They would arrive during May 14–21. Guderian understood that success depended on the speed with which the panzer forces could get across the Meuse and into the open country on the western side—before the French could identify this threat and take steps to neutralize it. On May 12, von Kleist approved Guderian’s request to attempt a crossing without waiting for heavy infantry reinforcements to arrive.9

Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps crossed the Meuse on the fly, straight from the march. After an intense bombardment of the river defenses by the Luftwaffe, lasting nearly the entire day, elements of the 1st Panzer Division, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Hermann Balck’s 1st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, managed to cross and establish a toehold on the west bank of the Meuse at Glaire, just north of Sedan, during the early evening hours of May 14:

The soldiers of the 1st Panzer Division, main effort of the Panzer Group von Kleist, observed the devastating Luftwaffe attack the entire day. Nevertheless, the situation was chaotic when they began their river crossing, with French bunkers spitting intense fire at them from the far side of the river . . . at 1500 hours, under the protection of the massive air attack and subsequent artillery preparation, infantry and engineers carried their boats to the water’s edge . . . [balck’s boats arrived without operators] . . . Balck had trained his soldiers in the use of pneumatic boats, thus he decided to conduct the assault crossing without the help of engineers. He crossed the river with the first wave and within minutes reached the initial bunker line along the far bank. The advance slowly began to increase momentum. . . . By midnight, Balck had led elements of his regiment to just south of Cheveuges and to the southern edge of the Bois de Marfee. 10

During the night of May 13, Guderian’s engineers managed to erect a bridge across the Meuse, and Guderian pushed more than 150 armored vehicles across the bridge that night. When morning came, he had a coherent force on the far bank and began to push for a breakout. ...

______________

8 Julian K. Rothbrust, Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps, London: Cassell, 1974, p. 66.

9 Liddell Hart, 1970, p. 71.

10 Rothbrust, 1974, p. 74.

Key points:

1) it took about 36 hours (from day's end on the 12th until the morning of the 14th) before the airstrikes arrived - hardly a suitable scenario length for CM

2) the airstrikes continued all day on the 14th - hardly material for a CM battle

3) resistance was still quite heavy - definately material for a CM battle

4) Guderian was the Corps commander at the time - somewhat above the level of the highest commander in a typical CM battle

By-the-by, I hardly consider a delay of ~48 hours for the assault to be 'on the fly'. Perhaps, however, it gives us an indication of just how slowly battles developed if this was considered to be a good example of Bltizkreig rapidity!

Regards

JonS

[ September 10, 2003, 08:11 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:57 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Private Bluebottle]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Also, I have been unable to find Bidwell, but promise I will continue to look for it. Do you remember his/her first name? Not that it matters much, except it makes my little list of books look all the more anal.

As Jon hasn't bothered to answer your request, I called this up on the library catalogue:

Main Author: Bidwell, Shelford, 1913-

Other Author(s): Graham, Dominick

Title: Fire-power : British army weapons and theories of war, 1904-1945 / by Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham

Primary Material: Book

Subject(s): Great Britain. Army

Artillery--Great Britain--History--20th century

Artillery drill and tactics--History

Publisher: London : Allan & Unwin, 1982

Description: xvi, 327 p.

Notes: Army operations by Great Britain.. Army, 1904-1945. Artillery. Tactics (BNB/PRECIS)

Includes index

Bibliography: p. 309-320

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

It was Sedan (Rommel was at Dinant) I was thinking of, but of course Guderian was in command there.

Correct on all points. And I should have remember that it was Dinant. Don't know where I got Givet from. Getting old I guess...

Of course, Rommel was only a division commander while Guderian had a corps. For bonus points, what divisions were in his corps and who commanded them?

Michael

[ September 11, 2003, 09:41 AM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[JonS]

XIX PzKorps (Guderian)

1st PzDiv (General der Panzertruppen Friedrich Kirchner)

2nd PzDiv (General der Panzertruppen Rudolf Veiel)

10th PzDiv (General der Panzertruppen Ferdinand Schaal)

[imported_Wildman]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[QB] From PANZER: A REVOLUTION IN WARFARE 1939-1945 by Roger Edwards (ISBN 1-86019-853-8)

Just the kind of material I was hoping this thread would generate. Just today I was looking at an article that mentioned the same problem. The evolution of radio communications is quickly moving up my list of things to cover.

Sounds like a very logical point. The Blitzkrieg often sped ahead of its own supporting artillery. I can easily imagine the Wehrmacht taking this into account and planning on large scale support from the Luftwaffe. Given the objectives commanders were given in the Polish campaign versus those of the French and Russian campaigns you wonder how long it took them to think of using the air force to fill the gap. Two seconds? Three?

Also, I was using Peter Costello's definition of CAS which is:

"The term "close air support" can be used to include all air attacks that are coordinated with the supported ground forces. High altitude bombing of enemy positions by heavy bombers in advance of friendly forces, or attack helicopter support of troops in contact with the enemy can be fairly called close air support."

He later quotes a Colonel John Warden (as a bit of a joke if I'm not mistaken) who says:

"(CAS is) any air operation that theoretically could and would be done by ground forces on their own, if sufficient troops or artillery were available."

The author was an A-10 jockey before later flying an F-16. I think he might have had to put up with a lot of "Colonel Wardens" before he took up more scholarly pursuits.

I'll check out that book as soon as I can. BTW, Micheal, you're scaring me with all these books. I need to make a long trip to the library (Have you ever been to Nova Scotia?) and have to spend a lot of time looking for them once I'm there. I probably won't be able to keep up with you. Hope you're a patient man. </font>

A couple of things. The Col John Warden talked about was the head of the Checkerboard group in the Pentegon which developed the basic air campaign model used in Desert Storm. While Col Warden and Gen Horner never hit it off, three of the Lt Cols in Checkerboard were pulled to Horner staff. The name that really comes to mind was Lt Col Deptula, now Lt Gen Deputla, ACC/XO (last I looked). Here is the info on Warden's book.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1583481001/qid=1063317207/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/002-4053931-1500045?v=glance&s=books#product-details

Product Info

Product Details

Paperback: 204 pages ; Dimensions (in inches): 0.65 x 9.01 x 5.99

Publisher: ToExcel; Reprint edition (October 1, 1998)

ISBN: 1583481001

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:58 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Micheal Dorosh

Do you think it would be possible to contact Terry Copp directly? He has a pretty impressive knowedge base including two books and several papers on Canadian psychiatrists in WWII. I bet he would be the man to talk to about what I mentioned immediately above. Any ideas?

When researching my first book, I contacted him - he never bothered to write back.

You might have better luck, though. I am sure his mailing address is on the Sir Wilfred Laurier site somewhere...a google search ought to find it for you, or you could write him c/o the Legion Magazine or his publisher.

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:59 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[imported_Wildman]

The one big problem your going to run up against is the concept of Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) and CAS. In WWII, most of the 9th AF sorties would be what we now classify as BAI, but were rolled into a generic "Tactical" catagory.

Reading accounts from pilots, convoys, trains, armored columns were the target for most sorties. I can't back this up with numbers, but I truely belive the USAAF did not have a truely dedicated CAS program. It probably was the FAC on the ground calling up and hoping someone would answer, if they did he could then direct attack points, direction, friendly position, etc.

All friendly fire incidents I've every read about were BAI sorties where the ground unit was farther forward than expected, or the pilot was lost which I'm willing to bet happend a lot more than is ever reported.

The Marines always have and always will excel at CAS because that is a Marine Air Wings primary mission. The Navy and Air Force are tasked Air Superiority, and while the Marines can and do help their priority is Ground support.

You thought it was tough then, even with good communications its still rough out there. For goodness sakes BUFFs are pulling CAS duties out there.

[Private Bluebottle]

Speaking of blue-on-blue incidents, I've never read of a German ones, occasionally of a British one (invariably though of the type in Normandy where Bomber command bombed short) but a very great deal of American ones. Why might this be? Bias? Lack of accounts? Were some airforces better at identifying ground units than others?

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 06:01 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 06:02 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Wisbech_lad]

"Blue on Blue" reports usually come out anecdotally, long after the war. Presumably Luftwaffe CAS became very rare as the war went on - i.e. most blue on blue would have happened 1939-1942. So survivor bias maybe? (many Germans who experienced a blue on blue incident early on, would have copped it before being able to tell their grandchildren).

Maybe also a bias of reserch? Most German vets have been told they fought an wrong war. They don't want to talk about it, and are rarely asked. Compare to Ambrose tracking down all survivors of a company for in depth interviews. You run into the same problem researching battlefield discipline. In a "War of Nerves" the author has good detail on US/UK in WW2, all nations in WW1, but very little on the Germans (or Russians) in WW2, apart from the hazy figure of 10,000 battlefield executions.

As for the effect of air attack on morale, my hypothesis would be that it is related to the perceived ability to fight back or dig in - control of one's destiny. Analogy would be air vs car travel. Air is much safer, many more are scared of air travel, because they have relinquished control to strangers.

Same with an air attack in 1944? Arty strike means you are close enough to front line to be involved, and at least your arty can give back as good as you are getting. And cover is fairly safe. Air attack - you know the Luftwaffe is kaputt, and you have no percieved control of your fate. Even cover could be useless against a 500 lb bomb. That realisation, that death is randomly coming your way, and nothing you can do about it, will break almost anyone.

British troops hated mortars and 88's more than other ways of dying for the same reason - difficult to hit back

[Michael Dorosh]

John D Salt is doing some serious research on friendly fire incidents; you may want to contact him for info.

[imported_Wildman]

A couple of things.

1. A BUFF is a B-52 bomber.

2. BAI is a modern term that describes the "shaping of the battlefield". BAI attrits units well before they enter battle, usually 120KM past the Forward line of battle.

3. My comment of dedicated CAS was not from a ground point of view, but from an aircraft sortie point of view. I just haven't come across any reference to pilots being briefed on a dedicated CAS mission. Ex. Forward edge of battle here, expected run in along XXX degree, etc. That is all a fluid situation and required a concept called ON-CALL CAS. Where aircraft sit an loiter in a holding area waiting for instruction to move to an area and contact a Ground (or Air) FAC. WWII aircraft simple did not have the loiter time for that.

Again the problem will be the post-war analysis and analyzing WWII CAS using modern day concept.

4. Your list looked good, and I'm not sure Warden's book will apply for your scope. His book expound on strategic implecations not tactical ones. Its almost a throw back to the "bomb the cities and the leadership will cave-in" days after WW1.