Close air support?

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:44 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

4. Shocking German successes in their initial campaigns forced this doctrine to be modified when Allied commanders, seeing the astounding impact of Luftwaffe attacks, were forced to soften their views.

The Allies did perceive Luftwaffe support in these early attacks as "astounding" but Matthew Cooper suggests that this is just one of the many myths of "Blitzkrieg". He unfortunately presents no real detailed proofs vis a vis the effectiveness of Luftwaffe support at the tactical level.

I will dig through my copy of The German Army tonight (I am actually just rereading it cover to cover and recently finished the chapters on Poland and France 1940) and see what he says - and which footnotes he presents.

But I think that while the Allies were eyes agog at film footage of Stukas in Poland, the reality was that they may have been effective at point targets (industrial areas in Poland, or airfields in Britain) they weren't well used tactically speaking. It would be far more valuable to examine what the Germans thought themselves of their own air power, rather than what Allied perceptions of German military might were, as this was inflated throughout the war in the Allied press, and even among respected historians who perpetuated the Blitzkrieg Myth well after the war.

That's just off the top of my head, though. But I do think perhaps you're off to a faulty premise if you are relying on Allied reports of German air power rather than actual data from the primary source itself.

I realize this may only be the background to one of your points, but on a less tangential note, I do wonder if you've properly distinguished between close air support and tactical air support, which I think are two different things. Close Air Support, to me, suggests controllers on the ground calling in strikes on specific targets while tactical air support would be aerial interdiction or attacks on non-specific targets. as JonS points out below, this is not really relevent to CM.

Again, I'll see what I can find on German CAS which you suggest shaped the Allied approach (if not the actual German CAS practices, then the perceived ones).

[ September 09, 2003, 09:57 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

7. Finally, this new doctrine, further improved from lessons learned in the direct support given to amphibious landings in both Sicily and Italy (and lessons learned throughout the Italian campaign) led to the final overwhelming effect of CAS witnessed in the Normandy Campaign.

The US Army/AF didn't sort out CAS in an effective way until the Normandy Campaign was nearly over, and even then it was largely due to the efforts of Pete Quesada from the AF side of the house forcing himself on the Army. Read: Doubler Closing with the enemy, and the chapter The Air-Ground Battle Team.

Unfortunately, my investigations into the doctrines and operations of the RAF and RCAF have not been as successful.

As I pointed out in the other thread - and which you blithely chose to ignore - read Bidwell Firepower, in particular the chapter entitled The Cybernetic Solution II: The Artillery of the Air. Do I get a cookie for bothering to mention it a second time?

While a lot of your other assertions may (or may not, it doesn't really matter) be correct, they have VERY little to do with CM. Strategic airpower, air superiority, interdiction, Korea, WWI, nuclear weapons, helicopters, are all outside the scope of a game that is, at its core, a game/simulation of ground combat between approximately battalon sized units. At least I hope it is, and I further hope it remains thus. Oh dear - there I am being all fundamentalist again

Regards

JonS

[ September 09, 2003, 09:26 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Michael Dorosh]

From PANZER: A REVOLUTION IN WARFARE 1939-1945 by Roger Edwards (ISBN 1-86019-853-8)

(p. 114) Directing action against ground targets in Poland, the General gathered Stuka groups into an Air Division 'for special purposes' - the kernel of VIII Air Corps detailed to assist Panzer Group von Kleist in...France. In these campaigns, forward observers were provided with wheeled (and eventually tracked) transport, facilitating mobility in the company of fast troops; ground control systems were further refined and air force tactics for reducing or eliminating ground opposition greatly improved by massed concentration of dive bombers. The technical accomplishments of...joint army-air operations...was most persuasively demonstrated during the Battle of France in 1940; but not to the full - communication between tank and air force commanders remained imperfect and not until 1941...would the technology reach an effective level of clear speech....

(p.119) Another area of co-operation serving the Army advantage in 1939-40 was that of fire-support. The shortage of divisional artillery in the panzer division...and the relatively limited use expected to be made of it, could only be made good by the Luftwaffe, Stukagruppen in particular.

The text goes on and on couched in vague terms like this. The 3.7cm armed Stukas are mentioned, as is the expansion of ground attack aircraft. What is not mentioned is any specific examples of infantry companies or battalions being able to call in specific support. Rudel's own account - STUKA PILOT - suggests free ranging activities against enemy armour.

A specific example of air support mentions three targets given to a Stuka group in North Africa (p. 126); they were given an artillery battery, a tank concentarion on a road, and a bridge as targets.

Close support is discussed in follow up chapters, again dealing with attacks on enemy armour concentrations:

From aircraft operating in small numbers against tanks, more or less at random (emphasis mine) during early campaigns, their employment developed to the stage where they were used en masse (emphasis in original) as a decisive weapon with which to counter superior enemy ground forces.

Again, no specifics are given of co-operation between infantry units on the ground, and air support.

I checked Cooper, he has virtually nothing to say on the subject of close air support, but he is writing at the grand strategic and operational levels.

I would like to see some specific stuff on German close air support; its an interesting question, but lacking any direct mention of such activities it is hard to support any belief that they should be included in CM.

Which isn't to say "tactical" air power wasn't crucial - Cooper's chapter on North Africa makes plain that it clearly was - but most sorties against ground targets seem to have been against logistical targets and not purely "tactical" ones in a CM sense. I would submit that an artillery battery engaging enemy soldiers over open sights would represent a tactical target; a squadron of tanks 3000 metres from the front lined up on a road would be logistical.

[ September 09, 2003, 10:24 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JonS]

Cooper?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JonS:

Cooper?

The German Army: Its Political and Military Failure by Matthew Cooper (Amazon listing)

Obviously not a great source for the kinds of info we are looking for here, but a good book regarding higher level stuff.

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:45 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Michael Dorosh]

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/

0531037339/qid=1063163056/sr=1-8/ref=sr

_1_8/103-6348462-6717421?v=glance&s=books

Hmm, just noticed this....heh heh, maybe we need to read this one!!!

EDIT - NETSCAPE SUCKS. edited at work and the UBB code won't work.

NETSCAPE SUCKS.

IE will wrap this text.

NETSCAPE SUCKS

[ September 10, 2003, 11:44 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:46 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Sounds like a very logical point. The Blitzkrieg often sped ahead of its own supporting artillery.

Did they? There were actually substantial limits imposed on armoured commanders in Poland, France and Russia, and requirements that infantry be able to keep up with the armour.

Also, I was using Peter Costello's definition of CAS which is:

"The term "close air support" can be used to include all air attacks that are coordinated with the supported ground forces. High altitude bombing of enemy positions by heavy bombers in advance of friendly forces, or attack helicopter support of troops in contact with the enemy can be fairly called close air support."

Okay, but what does that have to do with CM? Medium bombers striking an airfield 20 miles behind an expected advance can fit into this category. I think it is the contention of some, certainly me, that the majority of so-called "CAS" attacks were not done near the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area) which is what CM depicts.

I'll check out that book as soon as I can. BTW, Micheal, you're scaring me with all these books. I need to make a long trip to the library (Have you ever been to Nova Scotia?) and have to spend a lot of time looking for them once I'm there. I probably won't be able to keep up with you. Hope you're a patient man.

I have been to Halifax in 1989; I took part in the Nova Scotia International Tattoo. Was there for 3 weeks, stayed at St. Mary's University (on the 13th Floor (!) of the residences there.

Visited Dartmouth one day. That was it.

[Gyrene]

3. American doctrine concerning the proper allocation of air assets changed greatly between the two wars, but by the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, had really only managed to produce effective means for the use of large numbers of aircraft in a strategic role. The role of CAS was largely ignored despite what Hallion referred to as “an element of combined arms warfare (which) displayed a flexibility of application, a degree of mobility, and a psychological impact that surpassed the expectations of even its prewar supporters.”

...If you look at only the US Army in Europe and Africa.

The USMC deployed in the Pacific a CAS system that was arguably the best of WWII and widely copied after the war.

Gyrene

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:48 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Bastables]

Ian Gooderson's 'Air Power at the Battlefront', London 1998, contains

a couple of cases studies.

I. Roncey Pocket.

In the wake of the Allied breakout from Normandy, Operation COBRA

which began on 25 July 1944, large German forces in the Cotentin

peninsula were forced to risk air attack by moving in daylight to

avoid being encircled by American armour. Just south of Coutances,

near Roncey, some six German divisions were cut off in what became

known as the Roncey 'Pocket'. Choking the roads, the German columns

became ideal targets for attacks by Allied fighter-bombers whose

attacks succeeded in preventing any organised breakout [...]

Some indication of the destruction caused specifically by air weapons

is provided by an RAF anti-armour operation on the same day [29 July].

Rocket Typhoons of 2nd TAF were requested by US forces to attack a

concentration of some 50 German tanks observed in the Roncey area,

near Gavray. Consequently Typhoons of No.121 Wing of No.83 Group flew

99 sorties in the area between late afternoon and dusk, and claimed

the destruction of 17 tanks with a further 27 damaged. The pilots

reported that there was little sign of life or movement during their

attacks and the area was littered with damaged and burning tanks,

making target selection difficult. There was no flak, and pilots were

able to attack at very low level. Only one Typhoon was lost, hit by

flying debris and forced to crash-land.

The Typhoon effort had been concentrated mainly against a German

column near the village of la Baleine, and shortly after the air

attacks this area was investigated by the British Army's No.2 ORS. The

column had been a formidable mix of armour and transport, including

Panther tanks. The surrounding terrain was heavily wooded and

dissected by deep, narrow valleys and the column had used a side road

which descended to la Baleine where a bridge crossed the river Sienne.

On one side of this road was a steep, wooded cliff and on the other a

sheer drop to the river; caught by fighter-bombers at this point the

vehicles had been unable to pull off the road. P-47s had attacked the

area with 500-lb bombs before Typhoons had been called for, and the

bridge over the river had been sufficiently damaged by their bombs to

prevent heavy vehicles from crossing. After examining the tanks and

vehicles the ORS outlined the causes of destruction. This is shown in

the following table:

LA BALEINE - LOSSES AND CAUSES

Destroyed Possibly Unknown Unknown Aban-

by Rockets Rockets Shells Causes Crew doned Totals

Panthers 1 - 1 - 3 3 8

Pz Mk IV 1 - - - - - 1

Armoured Cars - 1 - - - - 1

Armd. troop carr. 5 - - - - - 5

75 mm SP Guns - - - 1 - 1 2

50 mm AT Guns - - - - 1 1 2

Howitzers - 1 - - - 1 2

Rocket launchers - - - - - 1 1

Lorries - - - 8 - - 8

Cars - - - 10 - - 10

___________________________________________________________________

Totals 7 2 1 19 4 7 40

The motor transport was so mangled that identification of the cause of

destruction was impossible and the ORS acknowledged their 'unknown

causes' table to be unduly loaded. They suggested that a more accurate

picture would be provided by the motor transport being spread over the

table in the same proportion as the other losses. Although rockets

appear as the biggest single known cause of destruction, the amount

attributed to them is small compared to the relatively high number of

Panthers destroyed by their crews or abandoned intact. How they had

been left suggested abandonment in haste, almost certainly as a result

of air attack or the threat of such attack, and possibly even before

the arrival of the Typhoons. Craters of 500-lb bombs were found in an

orchard within 50 yards of two Panthers; neither tank had been hit but

the crews obviously baled out and later set fire to the tanks, one of

the guns being destroyed by a high-explosive round left in the

chamber.

Although lack of fuel in a retreat could be expected to result in the

abandonment or destruction of tanks by their crews, this was not the

case at La Baleine; near similar bomb craters two Panthers were found

completely undamaged, their fighting ability unimpaired with full

complements of petrol and ammunition. One of the 75 mm self-propelled

guns, its armour reinforced with concrete, was found abandoned

undamaged 35 yards from a bomb crater. As it had not been set on fire

by its crew it was considered more likely to have been abandoned in

haste rather than left as a deliberate roadblock.

Possibly the tanks had been abandoned or destroyed by their crews

because they could not negotiate the damaged bridge. The ORS noted

that the German crews could have forced the river further downstream,

as American Sherman tanks later succeeded in doing, but this ignores

the fact that in their hurry to escape encirclement the Germans

probably had little time to reconnoitre the area. That all the troop

carriers discovered had been destroyed by rockets suggests the

possibility that other similar types may have escaped over the bridge,

not needing to be abandoned like the heavier tanks. At la Baleine the

most significant evidence of demoralisation was that there were no

German graves. Only one German corpse was found and local civilians,

many of whoom were interviewed, confirmed that it was of a sniper

killed after the air attacks, while no evidence could be found that

American forces had removed bodies for burial. This suggests that the

German troops may have dispersed from the column when it became

obvious air attack was imminent, which squares with the Typhoon pilots

observing little German activity during their attacks.

La Baleine was the first ORS investigation of its type, and certainly

reflects the shortcomings of air-to-ground weapons against tanks.

Despite the craters none of the tanks or self-propelled guns had been

knocked out by bombs, and the number destroyed by rockets is

unimpressive. Nevertheless, there was a good deal of evidence

discovered by the ORS at la Baleine to suggest that air attack was

responsible, even if indirectly, for the disruption and abandonment of

the column, and that the German crews preferred to abandon or destroy

their armour rather than invite further air attack by attempting to

salvage combat-worthy tanks.

II. Mortain

Similar evidence of German tanks being abandoned under air attack is

seen in the example of the only large-scale German armoured offensive

mounted in Normandy. Early on the morning of 7 August 1944, the strike

force of XLVII Panzer Corps, the 1st SS, 2nd SS, and 2nd Panzer

divisions, attacked positions held by the US 30th and 9th Infantry

divisions near Mortain with the ultimate objective of reaching the

Cotentin coast at Avranches and cutting off American armoured

spearheads from their supplies. Although tank strength was depleted

after weeks of heavy fighting the Germans mustered 70 Panthers, 75 Mk

IVs, and 32 self-propelled guns for the attack. By noon on 7 August

they were within nine miles of Avranches after penetrating the front

of 30th Division to a depth of about three miles. Having arrived in

Mortain only the day before, 30th Division had nothing but its 57 mm

towed anti-tank guns and 3 inch gun tank-destroyers with which to

engage the German tanks at close range. Despite its determined

defence, the credit for bringing the German attack to a decisive halt

on the afternoon of 7 August is generally regarded as belonging to

Allied fighter-bombers, particularly the RAF Typhoons, which were

called to intervene.

The response of the Allied tactical air forces to the German attack

was swift. The Typhoons of No.83 Group RAF were made available, and

plans co-ordinated directly between the headquarters of No.83 Group

and IX Tactical Air Command. Rocket Typhoons were to engage the German

tanks, while American fighter-bombers were to attack transport moving

to and from the battle area. The Ninth Air Force was also to provide a

fighter screen to intercept German aircraft, a vital task as the

Luftwaffe had planned to make an all-out effort to support the attack

with some 300 planes. The German command had relied upon fog,

prevalent on previous days and which had been forecast for 7 August,

to protect their armoured spearheads from air observation and attack,

but at about 11 am that day the fog over the battle area began to

clear.

At about midday the first Typhoons took off for the American sector

from their advanced landing grounds, and went into action just before

1 p.m. against a concentration of some 60 tanks and 200 vehicles

observed along a hedge-lined road near Mortain. The tanks, some

heavily camouflaged, were grouped closely together as if unprepared

for the rapid lifting of the fog. After overflying at low level to

confirm them as German, the Typhoons commenced dive attacks upon the

front and rear of the column, which was immediately brought to a halt.

The pilots observed that their attacks caused great confusion, and saw

German tank crews bailing out and running for cover regardless of

whether or not their tanks were left blocking the road. Also at this

time the first American fighter-bombers arrived in the area, with

P-47s, including the squadron equipped with rockets, attacking German

transport.

The weather remained clear and between 2 p.m. and 8 p.m. flights of

five or six Typhoons were taking off roughly every 20 minutes to

attack, returning to refuel and rearm before setting off again for

Mortain. As the afternoon wore on the pilots found the task of

locating the German tanks increasingly difficult due to their

dispersion and to clouds of dust and smoke in the battle area, but the

forward movement of the German attack had been halted. By the end of

the day No.83 Group had flown 294 sorties and IX Tactical Air Command

200 sorties in the Mortain area. Three Typhoons and pilots had been

lost. Though the level of flak had initially been light, it had

increased during the day with box-like patterns being put up over the

tanks, and many of the Typhoons were found to have suffered damage

from this and small-arms fire.

German accounts clearly attribute the failure of their attack on 7

August to the fighter-bombers. The commander of 2nd Panzer Division,

von Luttwitz, later recalled that his tanks had made a swift advance

of about ten miles when suddenly the fighter-bombers appeared,

They came in hundreds, firing their rockets at the

concentrated tanks and vehicles. We could do nothing

against them and we could make no further progress.

Hans Speidel, then the Chief of Staff of the German Army Group B,

later wrote of Mortain that

it was possible for the Allied air forces alone to wreck

this Panzer operation with the help of a well co-ordinated

ground-to-air communication system.

The German troops received no air support on 7 Aug. Their aircraft

attempting to reach the battle area were intercepted by strong

American fighter patrols and none reached within 40 miles of Mortain.

Although fighting continued in the area for several days, with Mortain

being recaptured by American forces on 12 August, the Germans made no

further attempt to reach Avranches after 7 August. Typhoons took no

part in the battle after that date, with responsibility for air

support reverting to the IX Tactical Air Command. The claims made by

the Allied fighter-bomber pilots for the period 7 - 10 August are

impressive, and are shown below:

ALLIED FIGHTER-BOMBER CLAIMS, 7 - 10 AUGUST 1944

Probably

Armour Destroyed Destroyed Damaged Total

2nd TAF 8 35 21 140

9th AF 69 8 35 112

Motor Ttansport

2nd TAF 54 19 39 112

9th AF 94 1 21 116

Yet these claims are misleading and cannot be substantiated. During

12 - 20 August the Mortain battle area was examined by two separate

British ORS teams; No. 2 ORS and ORS 2nd TAF. No German vehicles were

missed by the investigation as the areas was not extensive; moreover

the area was examined from an observation aircraft at low level with

no further vehicles discovered. The destruction attributed to various

weapons can be tabulated as shown in the following table, which is a

compilation of both the RAF and Army reports:

DESTRUCTION ATTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS WEAPONS,

MORTAIN AREA, AUGUST 1944

FORM OF DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALISATION

Cannon/ Aband.

TYPE Rockets MG Bomb intact Crew US Army Unknown Total

Panther 5 - 1 6 4 14 3 33

Mk IV 2 - 1 1 - 5 1 10

SP Guns - - - - - 1 2 3

Arm.Troop Carr. 7 4 - 1 - 3 8 23

Arm.Cars 1 - - 1 - 5 1 8

Arm Recov.Veh. - - - - - 1 - 1

88 mm Guns - - - - - 1 1 2

75 mm Guns - - - - - 1 - 1

50 mm Guns - - - 1 - - - 1

Cars 2 2 - - - 4 3 11

Lorries - 6 - 1 1 2 20 30

Ambulances - 2 - 2 - - 1 5

Motor Cycles - - - 1 1 1 2 4

_____________________________________________________________________

Totals 17 14 2 14 5 38 42 132

This shows that a total of only 46 German tanks and self-propelled

guns were actually found in the battle area, and of these only nine

were considered to have been destroyed by air weapons.

It was not possible to discriminate between victims of British and

American aircraft as the latter had also fired some 600 rockets. Many

of the 'unknown causes' were found some distance from any sign of air

attack - such as cannon and machine gun strikes on the ground and

rocket or bomb craters - and could not be considered as possible air

victims. An obvious question is whether the Germans had been able to

recover any of their tanks. The presence of a German tank recovery

vehicle would seem to confirm they had but, while it is likely that

some tanks were recovered, this can hardly be an adequate explanation

for the discrepancy between air claims and the destruction found.

Armoured and motor vehicles destroyed by air weapons were invariably

burnt out, and for recovery purposes damaged and abandoned vehicles

had priority over such. German prisoners, many of whoom were

questioned on this subject, consistently stated that burnt out tanks

were never salvaged. In effect, a tank hit by a rocket or bomb was not

worth recovering and the ORS should have found what was left of it.

Another question is whether German accounts of the fighting can shed

more light on the number of tanks and vehicles destroyed by air

attack. The histories of the German divisions that fought at Mortain,

compiled post-war, stress how decisive the intervention of the

fighter-bombers had been, but are ambiguous with regard to the

question of losses. That of the 2nd Panzer Division states of the

Typhoons that they attacked with great accuracy and succeeded in

knocking out even the heaviest tanks, but the number of tanks actually

lost in this way is not given. The history of the 1st SS Panzer

Division (LAH) is similarly unclear as to the actual number of tanks

knocked out from the air, though it implies that the number was

considerable and quotes an account of the air attacks by a panzer

grenadier who recalled seeing many black oil clouds indicating the

position of destroyed tanks. Also quoted is a panzer grenadier officer

who, after describing how a fighter-bomber shot down by flak crashed

onto a tank and put it out of action, adds that most of the other

tanks and armoured personnel carriers also fell victim to the intense,

hour-long, low-level attacks. Yet such German accounts attributing

heavy tank and vehicle losses to air attack are misleading. They take

little cognizance of the losses inflicted by US ground forces which,

though almost certainly overestimated at the time in the confusion of

battle, were none the less considerable. American accounts of the

fighting indicate that, on 7 August, the forward troops of the US 30th

and 9th Divisions claimed the destruction of at least eighteen German

tanks, fourteen of them by the 30th Division's attached 823rd Tank

Destroyer Battalion alone. Moreover, the ORS confirmed that US troops

accounted for more heavy German armour than the fighter-bombers, the

destruction of twenty of the total of forty-six tanks and SP guns

found being attributed to US ground weapons.

The principal reason why such German accounts should be regarded with

caution, however, is that they provide no explanation as to what had

become of the tanks and vehicles destroyed by the fighter-bombers by

the time the ORS examined the battle area. Nor do they explain the not

inconsiderable number of tanks found abandoned or destroyed by their

own crews. To some extent, German attribution of tank losses to air

attack may stem from the confusion of battle, but it may also suggest

both a reluctance to acknowledge the morale effect of such attack, and

a desire to ascribe the halting of the armoured thrust, which was much

in the nature of a forlorn hope, to Allied air power rather than to

defeat at the hands of US ground forces.

Despite the toll taken of the German armour by US ground weapons, the

commanders of the US units engaged on 7 August later confirmed that it

was the fighter-bombers that brought the German thrust to a halt. At

the time of the ground survey, a member of ORS 2nd TAF visited the

headquarters of the US 9th Division's 39th Infantry Regiment. He was

told by the Commander how the German attack had cut off part of his

regiment from its headquarters and how his anti-tank guns had been

insufficient to halt such a large number of tanks. He also told how he

had remained 'vulnerable and anxious' until Typhoons arrived to attack

the German spearhead. A visit was also made to the Commander of the

30th Division's 117th Infantry Regiment, which had been in the path of

the 2nd Panzer and 1st SS Panzer Divisions on 7 August. He recalled

that when the mist lifted at about 12.30,

Thunderbolt and Typhoon aircraft came in immediately and

attacked, Typhoons attacking for what seemed to him to be

about two hours. This, added to the resistance of the ground

forces, stopped the thrust.

Such appreciation of the close air support on 7 August is significant

in view of the tendency of Allied aircraft to attack friendly

positions inadvertently in what was a very fluid ground battle. The US

30th Division recorded that the Typhoons and P-47s often attacked its

positions, the 120th Regiment alone receiving ten such attacks during

the day.

Given the lack of tank destruction by air weapons, the undoubted

effectiveness of the sustained fighter-bomber assault on 7 August must

have been largely the result of completely disrupting the German

attack by compelling tanks to seek cover or their crews to abandon

them. The level of destruction attributed to air weapons by the ORS is

too insignificant to have been decisive, and even if the unknown

causes for destruction of both armour and motor transport were added

to the air attack totals the number would not be a quarter of those

claimed. Yet no fewer than ten of the 33 Panthers found, or 30 per

cent, had been abandoned or destroyed by their own crews. This was an

important discovery at that time, and a contemporary RAF tactical

study stressing the demoralising effect of the 3-inch rocket (RP)

projectile offered this explanation for the German abandonment of

tanks and vehicles at Mortain:

Interrogation of prisoners has shown without question

that German tank crews are extremely frightened of

attacks by RP...Crews are very aware that if an RP

does hit a tank, their chance of survival is small.

It is admitted that the chances of a direct hit are

slight; nevertheless, this would hardly be appreciated

by a crew whose first thought would be of the disastrous

results if a hit was obtained.

Prisoner of war data further confirmed the demoralising effect of air

attack upon tank crews. German tank crewmen questioned for the later

joint RAF/British Army study of Typhoon effectiveness indicated an

irrational compulsion among inexperienced men to leave the relative

safety of their tank and seek alternative cover during air attack:

The experienced crews stated that when attacked from the

air they remained in their tanks which had no more than

superficial damage (cannon strikes or near misses from

bombs). They had a great difficulty in preventing the in-

experienced men from baling out when our aircraft attacked.

It is certainly plausible that tank crews under a heavy scale of air

attack would be induced to bale out, despite the interior of the tank

being possibly the safest place to be, and in this way the bombs and

rockets did not need to strike the tanks to be effective. When asked

for an opinion by the ORS on the number of abandoned tanks in the

Mortain battle area, an experienced NCO of a US anti-tank unit

replied,

There is nothing but air attack that would

make a crack Panzer crew do that.

III. Falaise Pocket

The retreat of the German army towards the River Seine in order to

escape encirclement in the Falaise 'Pocket' in August 1944 also

provided the Allied tactical air forces with an abundance of targets,

and great claims of destruction were made. On 18 August RAF 2nd TAF

alone claimed 1 159 vehicles destroyed and 1 700 damaged together with

124 tanks destroyed and 100 damaged. On the same day the Ninth Air

Force claimed 400 vehicles destroyed.

During the period of this retreat nearly 9 900 sorties were flown by

the RAF. Destruction was claimed of 3 340 soft and 257 armoured

vehicles or some 36 targets destroyed for every hundred sorties. The

USAAF claimed 2 520 soft and 134 armoured vehicles destroyed during

nearly 2 900 sorties, or some 91 successes per hundred. Overall claims

therefore amount to a successful strike approximately every second

sortie.

SORTIES AND CLAIMS BY ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCES

FALAISE POCKET, AUGUST 1944

RAF 2nd TAF US 9th AF Total

Sorties 9 896 2 891 12 787

MT destroyed 3 340 2 520 5 860

Armour destroyed 257 134 391

____________________________________________________________

Total claims 3 597 2 654 6 251

Claims per sortie 0.36 0.91 0.49

Shortly after the pocket had been closed No.2 ORS conducted an

extensive investigation in the area to determine the German losses

caused by air attack and the effectiveness of air-to-ground

weapons.The principal roads taken by the Germans were patrolled in

three areas; the 'Pocket' itself around Falaise, the area at the mouth

of the pocket near Chambois and referred to as the 'Shambles', and the

area known as the 'Chase' which led to the Seine crossings. The result

of the investigation is shown in the following tables:

GERMAN ARMOURED AND MT VEHICLE LOSSES IN THE FALAISE 'POCKET'

AUGUST 1944

Abandonded/

TYPE Rockets Bombs Cannon/MG Destr.b.crew Total

Tanks, SP Guns, AFVs 11 4 18 100 133

Lorries, cars, mcs 4 43 278 376 701

Guns - - 1 50 51

__________________________________________________________________

Totals 15 47 297 526 885

Percentages 1.7 5.5 33.5 59.5

Of the 133 armoured vehicles of all types located by the ORS in the

'Pocket', only 33 had been the victim of any form of air attack. The

remaining hundred had been destroyed by their crews or simply

abandoned. Air attacks were far more effective against soft-skinned

vehicles. Of 701 cars, trucks and motor cycles found in the 'Pocket',

325 had been the victim of attack from the air, and of these 85 per

cent were hit by cannon or machine-gun fire - a testament to the

effectiveness of this form of attack. The fact however remains that of

a total of 885 vehicles of all types lost by the Germans in the

Falaise pocket nearly 60 per cent were destroyed or abandoned by their

crews rather than as the direct result of attack from the air. The

large number of armoured and motor vehicles abandoned or destroyed by

their crews is hardly surprising in such a retreat, and it was thought

many of those destroyed by air weapons had already been abandoned. Air

attack, though, was considered responsible for much of the abandonment

as a result of causing disorganisation; moreover, destroyed vehicles

had completely blocked roads. Cannon and machine gun attacks had

proved to be extremely effective against the densely-packed motor

transport. Such vehicles hit by cannon or machine gun rounds were

invariably burnt out, and the report noted that where pock marks of

strikes appeared in the roads a burnt vehicle was usually found.

GERMAN ARMOUR LOSSES IN THE 'SHAMBLES' AREA

AUGUST 1944

Ground

Fire Rocket Crew Abandoned Unknown Total

TYPE

Pzkw VI - - 9 3 - 12

Pzkv V 3 - 8 11 - 22

Pzkv IV 2 2 12 6 - 22

Pzkv III 2 - 1 1 1 5

SP Guns 1 - 8 12 - 21

______________________________________________________________

Totals 8 2 38 33 1 82

Percentages 9.7 2.2 46.3 40.2 1.2

In the 'Shambles' so many German vehicles were found that it was

impossible to examine each in detail; they were classes either as

burnt or unburnt as an indication of wether they had been hit by air

weapons or abandoned. A total of 1 411 tanks and vehicles were classed

as burnt, and 1 380 as unburnt. Of the 187 tanks and SP guns found in

this area, 82 were examined in detail, of these only two were

destroyed by attack from the air and eight by ground fire, while all

but one of the remainder were either burnt by their crews or merely

abandoned. There was no evidence - such as rocket craters - to suggest

that any appreciable number of those burnt tanks and SP guns not

examined had been destroyed by air weapons. A sample of 330 of the

softskin vehicles, and 31 of the lightly armoured vehicles, found in

the 'Shambles' were also examined in detail. Of the softskin vehicles,

110 were found to have been destroyed by air weapons and 135 abandoned

intact, while of the lightly armoured vehicles 6 were credited to air

weapons and 13 were found abandoned intact. The effectiveness of

strafing against soft-skin and light armoured vehicles was again

confirmed, this being the greatest known cause of destruction.

GERMAN ARMOUR LOSSES IN THE 'CHASE' AREA

AUGUST 1944

Ground

Fire Crew Abandoned Unknown Total

TYPE

Pzkw VI - 7 4 - 11

Pzkv V 2 23 1 2 28

Pzkv IV 3 16 7 2 28

Other tanks - - 2 1 3

SP Guns 3 9 12 4 28

______________________________________________________________

Totals 8 55 26 9 98

Percentages 8.1 56.1 26.5 9.1

The 'Chase' area yielded a count of 3 648 vehicles and guns, and of

3 332 light armoured and soft-skin vehicles, 2 390 were classed as

burnt and 942 unburnt. The ORS were unable to cover every road in such

an extensive area, so the absolute number of vehicles and guns was

unknown but thought to be less than twice that recorded. Of the 150

tanks and self-propelled guns 98 were examined. None were found to

have been destroyed by rockets, nor were there any craters to suggest

rocket attacks had been made in the area. Most, amounting to some 81

per cent, had been destroyed by their crews or abandoned.

To allow for the possibility of German vehicles and guns being missed

in wooded terrain or along unchecked roads, No.2 ORS estimated that

the Germans had lost some 10 000 vehicles and guns during the retreat,

a figure not thought to be in error by more than 2 000 either way.

This was broken down as 1 500 in the 'Pocket' area, 3 500 in the

'Shambles', and 5 000 in the 'Chase'. As it was estimated that the

Germans must have had a total of some 30 000 vehicles it was

considered that two-thirds, including about 250 tanks and SP guns, had

escaped across the Seine. This was regarded as the result of the air

forces attempting general destruction rather than trying to achieve

interdiction by attacking key 'choke' points, a charge strongly

refuted by 2nd TAF as taking no account of weather, flak levels, or

bomblines set by friendly ground forces. In fact No.2 ORS

overestimated the number of German tanks that had escaped, as on 22 -

23 August the German Army Group B, reporting on the state of its eight

surviving Panzer divisions, listed only some 72 tanks.

The retreat to the Seine clearly reveals the limitations of Allied

air-to-ground weapons against tanks, particularly the 3-inch rocket.

Only ten out of 301 tanks and SP guns examined, and three out of 87

armoured troop carriers examined, were found to have been destroyed by

this weapon - these figures must be compared with 222 claims of armour

destruction made by Typhoon pilots alone. In contrast is the marked

effectiveness of cannon and machine guns, and to a lesser extent

bombs, against soft-skin transport vehicles. By destroying large

numbers of these, thus blocking roads and increasing congestion, the

fighter-bombers indirectly caused the abandonment of many tanks.

Moreover, many of the tanks and SP guns were found abandoned without

petrol, not least because trucks carrying their fuel had been shot up

from the air. German prisoners described how the threat of air attack

restricted movement to the hours of darkness until congestion and

haste compelled movement by day. They also told how whenever aircraft

appeared crews stopped to take cover and vehicles were driven off the

main roads into side roads which in turn became blocked. In effect,

the almost continuous fighter-bomber attacks in daylight, within a

restricted area upon retreating troops, caused a great deal of

demoralization and delay which prevented many tanks and vehicles

escaping.

IV. Ardennes

The influence of Allied tactical air power upon German ability to

carry out large-scale armoured operations was so great by the end of

1944 that the timing of the German Ardennes offensive was dictated by

the occurence of bad weather. In the early stages of the offensive,

which began on 16 Dec 1944, fog and low cloud protected the tank

spearheads from aerial observation and attack. Then the weather

cleared and Allied fighter-bomber pilots were presented with targets

such as they had not seen since Normandy and, as in Normandy, they

made large claims for the destruction of armour. Between 17 December

1944 and 16 January 1945 the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands of the

Ninth Air Force and RAF 2nd TAF claimed a total of 413 German armoured

vehicles destroyed in the Ardennes salient, 324 of which were claimed

as tanks. In early January No.2 ORS began an investigation of these

claims, in the middle of the month they were joined by ORS 2nd TAF and

a joint report was produced.

Although hampered by thick snow which prevented the discovery of

rocket craters and burnt patches caused by napalm bombs, the ORS were

able to examine 101 armoured vehicles - the practice being to search

an area within 2 - 3 kilometres of each claim. The claims for

destruction within the salient are shown below:

ALLIED AIR CLAIMS FOR GERMAN ARMOUR DESTROYED

IN THE ARDENNES SALIENT

IN AREA EXAMINED BY ORS IN WHOLE SALIENT

Armor. Armor.

Tanks Vehic. Total Tanks Vehic. Total

IX TAC 62 23 85 140 69 209

XIX TAC 2 0 2 176 19 195

2nd TAF 2 1 3 8 1 9

_____________________________ _____________________

Totals 66 24 90 324 89 413

The air weapons used were general purpose high-explosive bombs,

fragmentation bombs, napalm fire bombs, and rockets. Many of the tanks

claimed by Ninth Air Force had also been engaged by machine guns, some

only by this means. For the 101 tanks and armoured vehicles examined,

damage was atrributed as in the following table:

Light

Tiger II Panther Mk IV SP Gun Armour Total

AIR

Bomb 1 - - - - 1

Possibly

air attack - 3 - 2* 1 6*

GROUND

AP Shot 1 16 1 9* 8 36

HE Shell - 3 - 1 4 8

Demolition 2 10 1 - 4 17

Abandoned 1 10 - 4 7 22

Other Cause - - 1 1 - 2

Unknown - 5 2 1 2 10

________________________________________________________

Total 5 47 5 18 26 101

Considering that this represents the investigation of claims for the

destruction of 66 tanks and 24 armoured vehicles the effect of air

attack seems unimpressive; a maximum of seven out of 101 vehicles

examined, some six per cent. It was found that fighter-bomber attack

had also involved some wastage, with bombs dropped among tanks already

knocked out by American troops, and it is revealing that even when

these bombs landed within 15 yards of the tanks no additional damage

was done. Not surprisingly, the report concluded that, while the

contribution of the air forces to stemming the German offensive had

been considerable, this

was not by the direct destruction of armour, which appears

to have been insignificant; but rather by the strafing and

bombing of supply routes, which prevented essential supplies

from reaching the front.

V. The Identification of Kills

As regards the reliability of the ORS ground surveys, one may wonder

if tanks attributed to destruction by ground weapons had in fact been

knocked out by aircraft and subsequently used as target practice by

Allied troops. However, such mistakes were very unlikely. Bombs and

rockets were harly ever, if at all, used singly, and near vehicles

destroyed by such weapons were always found the craters of near

misses. Moreover, rocket craters were distinctive, oval in shape and

usually with part of the rocket tube or fins in or near them. Parts of

the rocket were also often found in tanks or vehicles destroyed by the

weapon. In or near tanks and vehicles destroyed by their crews were

often found the metal cases that had contained German demolition

charges, these being placed in a specific part of the tank, such as

under engine hatches. Pock marks on roads or holes roughly six inches

in diameter in the ground indicated machine gun or cannon attacks, and

tanks and vehicles that had been strafed bore holes or dents on upper

surfaces. It is possible that tanks abandoned intact were subsequently

used for target practice, and attributed to a particular ground

weapon, but this has little relevance to the effectiveness of air

weapons.

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:49 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:50 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Berlichtingen]

Dammit... just posted this in the other thread. Here it is again...

Air to ground attack can be broken into three categories.

1) Air engageing targets of opportunity. Planes flying overhead spot a target and enhage. That is what is currently modeled. As it is, it is modeled well.

2) Preplanned strikes. Flight of Stukas bomb village X at 15:00. This would require some form of Air TRP, and should only be available in the scenario editor as the grunts on the ground are not going to have any real control over it. Placed in the editor and locked in place.

3) True close air support. Air dedicated to supporting a specific unit on the ground and directed to targets by that unit. Ok, that ain't gonna happen in the current engine. Originally developed by the USMC in the 20's and 30's (Btw, the USMC still uses the same basic method to this day). Copied by the Germans (though I do not know how completely). Used by the US Army by at least 1944 (again, I do not know how completely). No clue about when and if other nations used it. Here's how it works...

The ground unit has a FAC Team (current Marine practice is 1 team per grunt company in the battalion. IIRC, in WW2 this would be 1 FAC Team per division). Now, the KEY component of the FAC Team is the FAC officer who IS a pilot (best case scenario, he is a pilot of the squadron providing the air support). The reason this is key is twofold... First, the pilots that are dropping the bombs know the guy they might be dropping them on... that makes them a bit more careful. Second... the FAC Officer KNOWS how to talk to pilots (yes, they do speak a different language). He knows exactly how to describe a target in terms other pilots will understand. As a side note, this, in my opinion, is why USAF CAS sucks... no personal involvement. The FAC Team makes requests for air strikes and coordinates target marking. There are three ways to mark a target.

Best... Get mortars or artillery to fire a smoke round on the target. FAC Team tells the incoming planes (via UHF radio) to bomb the smoke (or 100m north of the smoke if the smoke was off target to the south). In CM terms, you would need an Air FO, an Arty or Mortar FO (or onboard mortar), and you would have to code it so the planes would see the smoke as a target. Way beyond what the current engine is capable of.

Next Best... Recognition panels (fires, whatever). In this scenario, the grunts mark their front line in a way that can be seen from the air. This is the most common method in WW2. Planes are informed before taking off where to drop bombs in relation to those ground marks. In CM terms, you need an Air FO, and you need a command available to your squads to 'Mark your position'. Again, this is beyond the capabilities of CM's current engine. NOTE: This method was used my the Marines on Guadalcanal to strike targets as close as 100m from friendly lines. As a formar member of a FAC Team, the idea of calling in air on a target that close scares the **** outta me.

Worst... Use a clearly identifiable landmark as a reference point. Bomb 400m east of village X. Why's this the worst you ask? Because things on the ground look a whole lot different from the air, and this method has the highest chance of mistakes being made. In CM terms, you need an Air FO that targets something like an Arty FO. Bombs drop either on target, not at all (they dropped 400m East of a different village), or randomly off target. This may be within the scope of the current engine, but I'm not stupid enough to argue with Charles on that point.

The panel method would be the best way to model it in CM. Air FOs should be insanely expensive. And it ain't gonna happen before the engine rewrite

[Berlichtingen]

Grog Dorosh!

Would you mind terribly much editing your post to keep this thread from being 4 miles wide?

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:51 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

I don't suppose you could point me at a text or two? Sounds like you've read a bit on the subject.

Point you to texts? Sorry, can't do. I was on a FAC Team in the Marine Corps, and part of the training was learning the history of it. I can't remember what reference works we had in training, or if they are even available to civilians

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:52 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

My initial concern is the effect of radio communications and mobile warfare, which nobody imagined becoming what they did. Undoubtedly the USMC provided excellent CAS (relative to the times) in the PTO, but my question is why did the AAF have so many difficulties in North Africa. If target designation was handled in essentially in a uniform manner, why so vast a difference between the PTO and MTO or WTO? My only guess, at this stage, is that the real difficulty lay in the debate over who was in charge of air assets and the resulting confusion. In the Pacific the debate was not nearly as fierce because the Navy and USMC had (and have) very similar views on the role of CAS. What do you think?

Honestly, the problem in Europe was that the only force that bothered to even pay attention to what the Marines were doing down in Central America during the pre war years was the Germans. The Marine Corps and the Navy always had a good working relationship with one another (probably because the Navy is a sub-branch of the Marine Corps ), but the Army and the Marine Corps did NOT get along. This is largely due to the fact that until Korea, the Army was constantly trying to get the Corps transfered to their control (made part of the Army). The Air Force even as late as Vietnam was still trying to gain control of the Marine Air Wings. There was little cooperation (or love lost for that matter) between the Corps and the Army prior to WW2, and even if there was, I doubt the Army would listen to the ideas presented by the Corps. Also, remember that Marine aviation's sole purpose for existing is to support the riflemen on the ground.

The system developed by the Marines works across Branch lines. As an example, the Army Air Corps Air Cobras (crappy plane) that were stationed at Henderson Field were used almost excusively is a CAS role... directed by Marine FACs, and were extremely effective. This was going on at roughly the same time that US troops were fighting in Africa. So, it isn't a case of the Air Corps having bad pilots, but rather a case of the Army higher ups not wanting to do something that wasn't 'The Army Way'. It wasn't until late in the Normandy battles that they were forced to change. Interestingly, by Korea, the Air Force had scrapped the CAS doctrine that worked in the last years of WW2, so the only effective CAS was again the Marines and Navy... go figure

[Cabron66]

All comments withdrawn.

[ September 21, 2003, 05:53 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

What is it that makes you military types so competitive?

Short answer... because we are better than they are

Seriously, you are trained to BELIEVE you are the best. That is true in the Corps, and somehow, I suspect that the Army doesn't train them to believe they are second rate, incompetent boobs (whether it is true or not is immaterial)

[ September 10, 2003, 04:38 AM: Message edited by: Berlichtingen ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Micheal

This is another point I will now have to add to the list, but my points about the Blitzkrieg come, most reliably, from an account of the war written by a Spanish author (whose name I can't remember but will try to get for you) who made frequent references to this happening in both France and Russia. His views are easily the most controversial I've ever read (and probably would be infuriating to many anglo-saxon historians), but he did back them up with extensive documentation he found while using his time machine. Joke.

For example, he claimed that the reason the tanks were halted before reaching Dunkirk was Hitler's fear they had gone too far ahead (a scene which I gather was all too common) at the order of the Wehrmacht commanders. This author pointed to a very pronounced tension developing between them and the Fuhrer on this very point. They were so confident in their total advantage that they had little or no fear of sending their tanks out ahead of the troops, bypassing enemy strongpoints or blatantly ignoring heavy fire to reach objectives.

These are also Cooper's contentions. Doesn't get any more Anglo-Saxon than "Matthew Cooper."

[Michael Dorosh]

I think Berli has nailed precisely what CAS is, and how best to model it.

Now the question is - how rare would an Air FO be?