Tiger Doctrine?

[Aco4bn187inf]

A few Tiger questions for you grognards out there-

What were the German policies for the use of heavy tanks? In other words, given a choice, where and when would the Germans use them instead of medium tank units?

Was there a specific doctrine on how to mix them with other types of units?

Were there historical 'textbook examples' of this, or did the Tigers mostly just end up being thrown in on an ad hoc basis.

I'd be interested to know about this on the tactical level as well as on the level of the heavy tank battalion.

[Blue Streak]

Try this link

http://www.fprado.com/armorsite/tigers.htm

Some helpful information

[Aco4bn187inf]

Thanks, Blue Streak! Looks like great stuff on that site!

[Andreas]

You can check this paper for some info as well:

https://calldbp.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/2003011508525769/wilbeck/wilbeck.pdf

It is now a very affordable book by Aberjona press. Take the conclusions on numbers with a grain of salt however, they are overstated, in my view.

As an aside, the level of the Heavy Tank Battalion still qualifies as tactical. I guess what you may mean is tactical, as well as small unit level?

[Aco4bn187inf]

Thanks, Andreas

That's exacly the kind of info I was looking for. Yes, I meant tactical as well as small unit. (Higher context, and typical CM scale actions.)

There is a lot of good inspiration for designing scenarios in those documents!

[sztartur]

Excellent document!!!

Artur.

[JasonC]

My highlight reel of the documents. Which do not appear to me to say what some here seem to think they are saying...

"The unit never had more than four

operational Tigers at the same time during this entire period.

The unit’s diary is filled with entries about pulling out “bogged” Tigers

Combat actions usually involved elements of the battalion no larger than a

company. One of the largest consolidated actions of the battalion occurred during

Operation SPECIAL MESSENGER I, when the battalion fielded thirteen Tigers,

although they were attached to two separate units in three groups.

this unit was plagued by a low operational rate

The 1st Company attacked frontally with the battalion of

panzer grenadiers, while the 2d Company attacked from the left flank. Altogether, the

battalion fielded seventeen operational Tigers

The battalion fielded eleven operational Tigers and twelve

Panzer IIIs and was again supported by the 2d Battalion of Panzer Grenadier Regiment

128 as well as by a battery of light howitzers..

German forces made three attempts to achieve their objective during the

day but the Soviets repulsed all attacks. The battalion managed to destroy eight T-34s

during the attack but also lost two Tigers and one Panzer III to enemy fire. In addition,

the nine other Tigers were so badly damaged that the battalion only had one operational

Tiger at the end of the day.

The battalion participated in many small local counterattacks that forced it to operate

in company and platoon sized units. These elements operated with a wide variety of

other units, usually in a subordinate role.

the light company, starting with eight

Panzer IIIs and two Tigers, conducted local counterattacks and occupied covering

position

Diary entries are filled with examples of operational

vehicles towing damaged vehicles back to the maintenance platoon to be repaired.

On average, the battalion only maintained

around 35 percent of its Tigers operational.

the III Panzer Corps initially

attached one heavy tank company to each of its panzer divisions

filled with accounts of Tigers being halted

by minefields, tank ditches, and streams and rivers.

On the first day of the attack, the 2d

Company had thirteen of its fourteen Tigers disabled by a minefield.

At the

start of the battle it fielded twenty-six Tigers, but by the end of the second day of

fighting, it only had six operational Tigers remaining

the heavy tank battalions were not employed

according to the doctrine established for them, specifically, they violated the concept of

concentration...

the doctrine for the

employment of the heavy tank battalions did not change to reflect this new, primarily

defensive role

Another common experience among these battalions was that

of piecemeal employment

Panzer Corps transferred them back

and forth across the front to the most threatened sectors. This did not allow much time

for maintenance of the Tigers and their report states that they barely had time to refuel

and load available ammunition

within seven days the battalion was reduced from forty-five new,

operational Tigers to zero ready for combat.

Only six of these Tigers were totally

destroyed, all from direct hits in combat. The unit after action report, however, contained

a complete accounting of the damage to the other Tigers of the battalion. This report

made it clear that there were many other Tigers that were very badly damaged from

combat.

A common theme

throughout this report is that this battalion was a victim of the propaganda concerning the

Tiger tank... "the higher command as well as the simple infantry

soldier believes that they can continuously accomplish everything"...

"continuously employed as mobile bunkers."

thirty- four Tigers of s.Pz.-

Abt. 503 with the 2d Battalion of Panzer Regiment 23 and several support units...

The attack began on 11 February 1944...By 17 February

1944 when German forces linked up, Heavy Panzer Regiment Bake only had eight

operational Tigers and six Panthers

Issued with 45 Tigers between December 1943 and January 1944,

the 508th was ordered to Italy to attack the Allied bridgehead

at Anzio. Unloaded at a railhead 200 km from the bridgehead,

about 60 per cent of the Tigers suffered mechanical failures

negotiating the narrow, sharply curved mountain roads.

it was employed along the front in small groups, down to

individual tanks. Although it is not clear why, on 11 April 1944, the unit’s log recorded

an entry that became familiar with Tiger units in Italy; “several tanks are employed in an

artillery role.

three Tigers broke down crossing the line of departure, a

railway embankment...One Tiger was damaged when an artillery round destroyed its radiator,

forcing it to limp back

During the three day period from 23 May to 25 May 1944, s.Pz.-Abt. 508 lost

twenty-two Tigers.

what was extremely difficult to overcome

tactically or frontally, could be overcome rather easily operationally and strategically by

forcing the heavy tank battalions to move over long distances in a short amount of time.

During this withdrawal, another thirteen

Tigers were lost on 13 June 1944

During a ten day period, from 22 June to 1 July 1944, this battalion lost twenty-eight of

its forty- five Tigers. (Most) broke down during roadmarches, broke

through bridges, or slid off the sides of roads.

the battalion lost a

further eleven Tigers during its retreat to the Gothic Line

they were not

employed as a battalion, or even as companies and platoons...

they were widely dispersed, often using single tanks.

Tiger crews were so confident in their

vehicle that they did not adhere to the same tactics that more lightly armored tanks did.

This was beginning to cause losses from a general lack of care in adhering to such basic

tactical principles as overwatch, use of terrain, and proper reconnaissance.

501 in Bagration - starts with 20, only 6 after a week, +5 new, only last two days including

the remaining older ones.

505 lost 21 Tigers in 11 days during Bagration. The battalion was sent to Germany to re-equip.

507 lost 10 Tigers in 18 days and remained intact.

(Normandy)

All three heavy tank battalions were employed primarily as mobile reserves,

countering enemy penetrations. They accomplished this by counterattacking to defeat the

enemy so that the old front line could be re-established. It was not uncommon for a

battalion to array its three companies in a dispersed pattern behind the front of the

division or corps it was supporting, so that each could react quickly to enemy

penetrations.

S.SS.Pz.-Abt. 501 lost 15 Tigers between 13 June and 8 July 1944.

37 more in all 3 through August 20.

(Bulge)

Peiper put his Tiger IIs at the rear of his column (due to speed and road issues).

All his Tigers were lost (one company). 8 others were lost elsewhere.

At the end of Operation SOUTHWIND, s.SS.Pz.-Abt. 501 only had four

Tiger IIs operational out of thirty-six on hand.

These eight tanks were split apart, with one or two Tiger IIs operating with other types of

tanks...

lead elements of III Panzer Corps encountered twentyfour

SU-152s in prepared defensive positions protected by a minefield. During the

battalion’s attack on this complex, every one of the sixteen operational Tiger IIs was

severely damaged and three were totally destroyed. After lanes were cleared in the

minefield, two Tiger IIs managed to destroy all of the SU-152s...

(After being cut off, fighting to break out to the rear...) By the end of the day,

the majority of s.Pz.-Abt. 501 was destroyed.

From 19 to 30 January 1945, forty-one Tigers were lost... twenty-two reached the east bank

of the Vistula. However, because ferries were not available, the battalion destroyed them

to avoid capture.

these battalions operated with far fewer tanks than the forty-five authorized and what

tanks they did have were usually employed in small elements.

the widespread employment of mines severely

degraded the heavy tank battalion’s effectiveness in breaking through the enemy’s

defenses.

"One hour of Tiger operation requires ten hours of maintenance."

armies of

all sides extended their defensive depth so that there were many defensive echelons to

penetrate. This extension of the defense was an effective counter to the heavy tank

battalions.

The Tiger helped in penetrating heavy defenses, but never really solved the

problem of restoring offensive mobility.

Bake cites the limited

radius of action as the greatest disadvantage of the Tiger"

Bottom line - they were almost never used according to doctrine. The number of times full Tiger battalions were used concentrated for operational attacks can be counted on one hand. They had tactical but not operational success on those (handful) occasions. Few Tigers were ever still in running order after days in combat, at most a few weeks. Low Tiger loss statistics mostly reflect unwillingness to write off such valuable vehicles, not actual robustness in continued running order in combat. Small numbers of Tigers were able to KO sizeable numbers of enemy tanks on the tactical defensive and that was their best use, in practice. They went into the shop themselves, in response. Final write offs occurred whenever the fronts moved because they were incapable of operational range mobility, breaking down far too frequently to be used that way. Transportable high grade AT defense, attrited out of action like any other weapon system, was therefore their actual tactical effect. Also noticable is the role of mines and obstacles in effective anti tank defenses, and their utter indifference to the kind of tank involved. Likewise, stripped armor formations fail, and stripping them is a matter of arty and overall odds etc, not tank specs. Tactics clearly trump technology throughout.

[JasonC]

And the crickets chirp...

[Bergerbitz]

..I think it's the sound of your readers digesting what you wrote.

...

Man, there's some good meat n' taters in it...

[Kanonier Reichmann]

Very good summary. Thanks Jason C.

Regards

Jim R.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

My highlight reel of the documents. Which do not appear to me to say what some here seem to think they are saying...

Well, you have drawn out just the things I was focussing on as well.

FWIW, I also do think that Wilbeck's kill ratios are upper envelope stuff.

[JasonC]

The numerators are own side claims, which the Germans themselves treated as usually high by a factor of two. But the big one is the denominator. The loss acknowledgement practices for such valuable vehicles were clearly quite different than for the other side.

From the small number running after short periods in combat, it is clear they were not invulnerable to battlefield KO. Those KOs just weren't recorded as losses, and each Tiger was repaired and sent out many times. The high losses in retreats simply reflect tanks effectively KOed already, it being acknowledged that those would not make it out again because there wasn't time to repair them.

So the correct denominator to compare battlefield KOs to battlefield KOs, is something like twice the full loss figure, not the "1/2 KOed in combat". The result is wildly overstated ratios. We know the Allies did not lose 15 tanks per Tiger - numbers like that rapidly account for more tank than the Allies lost. The 7 times over total lost Tigers is still high by a factor of 2-4. (2 for inflated kill claims, 2 more for Tigers KOed repeatedly without being written off).

The uncertainties then become larger than the remaining signal. We don't really know the enemy claims are off by a factor of 2 - if might easily be 1.5 or 1.7. We don't know the own side losses are low by a factor of 2, in battlefield KO terms. It might be a factor of 1.33 or 1.5. In which case the right figures might be 4 kills apiece per trip to the shop, or they might be 2 and change kills apiece per trip to the shop. Then a third of the trips to the shop might just be drive train issues. We get results like "somewhere between 2 and 6", which don't really tell us much of anything.

Clearly they were successful tank killers, that much is obvious from the tactical narratives and the outcomes when a fair number of them were committed together, still in running order. Just as clear, they did not last long enough in action to keep high numbers operating, getting high numbers of kills every day for extended periods. They hit hard when fresh and faded with exposure to combat, like a lot of other weapons, up at the operational level. Trying to be more precise about it than that is looking for more certainty than the messy data can justify.