Thoughts on leadership

[Carl Puppchen]

I am putting this topic here rather than in the main forum because it seems less nuts down here...

I am sure many of the people in this forum played squad leader (SL). One of the most mind-blowing (to me, at least) qualities in this game was how they tried to mimic troop quality overall and show how a well-led and high morale force could defeat a more numerous and potentially better armed rival. I am not just referring to the Germans vs. early war allies, also the British vs. the Italians under O'Connor.

To some extent this was made more generic in battlefront. Squads are squads - if you have a romanian 10 individual platoon w/rifles and an LMG and a german 10 individual platoon w/rifles and an LMG they will play out exactly the same (assuming the level of experience is the same, of course).

The # of leaders is the same for all forces. The # of troops in the HQ varies, which makes the HQ more or less brittle. The US seems to have larger HQ's even than the Germans.

You can change the 0/+1/+2 capabilities on 4 dimensions of leadership, and this does impact the game.

I recently revisited this thought again when I was reading "the blitzkrieg myth" by Mosier. Now this book is controversial - I realize that - but in the end he says the advantage of the Germans over their opponents came down to leadership and a quick reaction time at the front, not weapons or overall tactics.

I realize that I can mimic a more well led German force by increasing the experience level and also by making their leaders more effective, and doing the reverse on the other side. It does not seem to have the same level of impact as the additional leaders did in SL, however. If you make the Germans veterans and the allies regular, you impact the game some, but not a ton.

I am not attempting to open the whole "Germans are supermen" thread - but I do think that their leadership cadre is what allowed them to fight and win especially against the British in the desert and to hold on for so long against the Russians, when the soviets had more and better equipment and the advantage of numbers. It also accounted for their frequent counter-attacks when objectives were taken.

Also perhaps I am trying to rationalize why I play the axis and lose more than I win against the Allies

[junk2drive]

You play the Axis because you like the underdog.

You lose because that was history.

I lose because I suck at CM

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Carl Puppchen:

I am sure many of the people in this forum played squad leader (SL). One of the most mind-blowing (to me, at least) qualities in this game was how they tried to mimic troop quality overall and show how a well-led and high morale force could defeat a more numerous and potentially better armed rival. [snips]

While "a crude model is better than no model at all", the SL-style treatment of "troop quality" as having a single axis is, I think, a very crude model. Likewise, the curious dichotomy of soldeirs into "leaders" (represented individually) and "led" (represented in bunches) suggests a view of human society no more sophisticated than Lucy van Pelt's belief that "babies are born in squads".

It seems to me that "troop quality" can be analysed into at least four dimensions.

"Determination" might be a convenient label for the quality that makes men willing to expose themselves to danger. In game terms, this would map to the ease or difficulty with which troops would be suppressed by fire. Green troops may have more of it than veterans, as they have yet to learn how dangerous modern weapons are. There is evidence to suggest that knowing a bit about weapons capabilities makes men more likely to become suppressed. There is evidence that no phenomenon of "acclimatisation" exists with HE fire, although to the contrary evidence exists that training can reduce fear of flame weapons.

"Resilience" is the label I would choose for the ability to recover from setbacks. In game terms, this would be the ability to recover from suppression. I suspect that it would be strongly linked to

"Cohesion", meaning the social cohesion of the primary and secondary groups. This would depend on the group having a common social background or having trained or fought together. A strongly cohesive group is less likely to fall apart under the stress of battle, but might also care more about the loss of friends, and so be less motivated to do dangerous things, and perhaps ess able to tolerate casualties.

"Fieldcraft" is what I would label the general level of tactical skill a group has. This might result from training, or from experience, or from a talent nurtured by the civilian occupations of the soldiers, who in the 1940s were more likely to have been trappers, woodsmen or hunters than civilians are now. It might be further analysed into skills such as personal camouiflage, marksmanship, proficiency at minor tactics, and so on.

Layered on top of these human factors is the "way of command" an army uses (which I take to include both command control and personal leadership). It might be possible to characterise this on a single axis. The usual division is between "Auftragstaktik" and "Befehlstaktik", but Richard Simpkin (in his "Command and Control of Armoured Forces") identifies I think 5 different steps on the scale between "Forward command" and "Chateau generalship". He makes the point that this is not simply the difference between "leadership" and "drivership", but that each style of command can be made to work, according to the commander's personality. Each represents a different answer to the puzzle Keegan poses in "The Mask of Command": "At the front always, sometimes, never?" Each strikes a different balance, on the principle "Forward to command, back to control". Van Creveld, in "Command in War", distinguishes styles of command by whether they concentrate uncertainty at the upper or the lower reaches of command, and van Creveld clearly differs from Simpkin in thinking that this is a question with a right answer. Under "Auftragstaktik", senior commanders would tolerate high levels of uncertainty themselves while reposeing great trust in their junior leaders. The style of command will dictate the way in which information is handled and shared, and this is in itself an important factor in morale. "Knowledge dispels fear" is the motto on the wall at the School of Infantry; S. L. A. Marshall says more on the matter in the chapter "The multiples of information" in "Men Against Fire".

It seems to me that a good model of troop quality would capture some of the ways all these factors interact. A good model of "Auftragstaktik" would tantalise the player by having the best tactical results happen when he trusts his subordinates to use their initiative and deliberately restrains his "control-freak" impulses. Suddenly, everyone would want to play the Russians, where you get to direct the placement of every weapon in your division...

All the best,

John.

[dieseltaylor]

Well I agree ... partly : )

[Cannon-fodder]

I must admit that I wonder if we'll ever have a flawless leadership/quality system. Such a task will always be open to people saying one aspect is overly important and so on.

Good luck though, anything that increases realism is okay by me!

[Ace Pilot]

Originally posted by Carl Puppchen:

I am putting this topic here rather than in the main forum because it seems less nuts down here...

I am sure many of the people in this forum played squad leader (SL). One of the most mind-blowing (to me, at least) qualities in this game was how they tried to mimic troop quality overall and show how a well-led and high morale force could defeat a more numerous and potentially better armed rival. I am not just referring to the Germans vs. early war allies, also the British vs. the Italians under O'Connor.

Despite questions of how realistic it was, I loved the leadership representation in SL. It worked beautifully, the impact of leaders (or lack thereof) was obvious, and it emphasized the importance of leadership in a military organization. I thought the Designer’s Notes explained the concept rather well, using real life examples of how the death of a single highly respected soldier could bring an advance to a halt.

The Hedgehog of Piepsk illustrated the need for leadership extremely well, with the Germans outnumbered 4 to 1, but still able to put up a good defense because of long-range MG fire and superior leadership.

This leadership aspect really gave SL an almost role playing feel to it (I still remember Lt. Stahler single-handedly manning a MG to drive off a Soviet attack, then grabbing a panzerfaust and rushing a Soviet T-34 that threatened the flank). I wish CM could capture this feel, but it falls short, despite what I see as a propensity for HQ units to make some heroic “last man standing” efforts. I think it is the fact that HQ units are comprised of several soldiers, so you can never be sure whether it is really the LT that is the last one to go down. Hopefully, BFC’s focus on 1:1 modeling in CMx2 can capture this individuality aspect of SL.

To some extent this was made more generic in battlefront. Squads are squads - if you have a romanian 10 individual platoon w/rifles and an LMG and a german 10 individual platoon w/rifles and an LMG they will play out exactly the same (assuming the level of experience is the same, of course).

The # of leaders is the same for all forces. The # of troops in the HQ varies, which makes the HQ more or less brittle. The US seems to have larger HQ's even than the Germans.

You can change the 0/+1/+2 capabilities on 4 dimensions of leadership, and this does impact the game.

One question I’ve always had regarding leadership in CM is whether a leader with no bonuses improves the rallying time of units under fire (i.e., does a unit that is broken recover more quickly if within command range of an HQ, even if that HQ doesn’t have a morale bonus)?

I recently revisited this thought again when I was reading "the blitzkrieg myth" by Mosier. Now this book is controversial - I realize that - but in the end he says the advantage of the Germans over their opponents came down to leadership and a quick reaction time at the front, not weapons or overall tactics.

I realize that I can mimic a more well led German force by increasing the experience level and also by making their leaders more effective, and doing the reverse on the other side. It does not seem to have the same level of impact as the additional leaders did in SL, however. If you make the Germans veterans and the allies regular, you impact the game some, but not a ton.

I am not attempting to open the whole "Germans are supermen" thread - but I do think that their leadership cadre is what allowed them to fight and win especially against the British in the desert and to hold on for so long against the Russians, when the soviets had more and better equipment and the advantage of numbers. It also accounted for their frequent counter-attacks when objectives were taken.

I think that the advantage in leadership that the Germans had over their opponents (especially the Soviets) is not modeled well in CM. I find the command delay differences are hard to exploit effectively. For instance, if a real life German attack found a weak spot in the Soviet lines, the Soviet command structure made for a slow response. But in CM, I can order a couple of Soviet platoons, or an entire company to pull out of the line and counter the attack and the delay is not significantly more than if I had ordered those same units to conduct a leap frog advance over 100m. I think this has a lot to do with the fact that company and battalion HQ have no role in CM, other than as extra infantry units that can also spot and rally. This thread discusses some possible options for modeling the role of company and battalion HQs at the CM level.

[Carl Puppchen]

I am glad someone else is able to share the feeling I had when playing SL and trying to survive an onslaught with my few forces, well led, hanging on for dear life. I also agree that the designer notes for SL were very well written - I kept my old SL manual and still pull it out from time to time. I like the passage where they refer to the commander who was killed by a sniper and his troops just stood by, weeping, because they thought he was immortal.

The concept of the soviets being a brittle, leaderless mob (in the early years) was very appealing and seemed to model real life.

In my opinion, this is the key thing - not the complexity of a simulation, but its ability to show the KEY factors that impacted the real-world. There are a million potential ways to model leadership, but SL took a relatively simple approach, and it SEEMED to model the real world effectively. I am sure many grogs would say that it didn't model the real world effectively, but it is not obvious to me that other models do a better job of this.

I also liked the commisar role, which they get rid of about the time of Stalingrad. I don't know if it was realistic but, coupled with "berserk" status, gave the soviets unique characteristics.

I think that the system didn't model the soviet resolution on defense very effectively. If you look at their performance, they generally fought to the last bullet on many occasions, such as the fortress in Brest early war. Certainly very large forces surrendered in encirclement battles, but elsewhere the common refrain is that the soviets fought to the last.

The Finns were shown to be very independent and well led forces, able to rally without leaders. This was a very important ability and also let their forces fight well against a stronger enemy. This is kind of lost in CMBB, although they are armed with SMG's which gives them a distinct advantage in close quarter combat.

One other force that seemed to be under-modeled in SL / ASL were the US Marines. From Wake Island to Tarawa to Iwo Jima the US Marines were extremely well led and dedicated fighters, nearly fanatic as would be defined in the system. Early war elite Japanese infantry (naval marines, too) would be in the same category. It is one thing to fight to the last bullet from a defensive position, it is another thing to bring the offensive to the enemy in spite of horrendous losses and exercise independent decision power on the battlefield that saves fluid situations.

[Renaud]

I've always thought of the CM leader ratings as not only depicting the real-time influence of the leader on the scene, but also the previous training and experience provided by the leader. Of course when the leader unit disappears so does all the bonus, so that doesn't fly...

re John Salt's troop characteristic thoughts...

I'm hoping for a somewhat more detailed breakdown of troop characteristics. In a thread many years ago I wrote a summary of my ideal troop rating system and Steve said yea they would have loved to do something more detailed but there just wasn't the time. The 4 critical values are Esprit de Corp, Training, Experience and local Morale. Here's a summary (all values rated 0-100):

1. Esprit de Corps: This would be a unit-level rating shared to all squads/teams/vehicles under that HQ. For instance the parent company could have a 60/100 rating, but individual platoons could have their own possibly different ratings. This value more or less combines aspects of J.Salt's 'cohesion', 'resilience' and 'determination' and is fixed (does not vary in the course of a CM battle). The higher the esprit de corp, the harder it is to lower the unit's 'local morale' (below). A unit rated 90/100 would lose much less local morale than a 30/100 unit when subject to the same abuse (losses, friendly losses, etc.).

2. Morale (local unit). This is like the current 'global morale' in effect, but is rated for each squad/team/vehicle with a start value from 0-100 and is moved up or down based on what happens in the course of a CM battle. This would allow a local unit to surrender when their morale reaches a critical low due to local events while the company on the other side of the battle triumphs and their local morale skyrockets. Kind of like 'extreme' or non-borg FOW except for morale.

3. Training: determined by prior training and is fixed during a battle. It affects things like accuracy, firepower, hiding, repair jams, load time, etc. Obviously a critical rating. Troops such as rangers or airborne might have a very high training rating and a very low exp rating (below).

4. Experience: How much combat they have seen. This rating may overlap some in-game effects of both training and esprit de corp. This is a tricky rating because a unit with 90+ experience may well be considered war-weary and unwilling to perform some actions a green unit might perform without question due to ignorance of the likely bad outcome.

With these 4 ratings you could simulate lots of combinations. For instance a unit with very low esprit de corp and very high starting local morale could simulate propogandized troops who start out fanatical but are psychologically fragile and will collapse at the first serious trouble. The reverse could simulate troops who have recently experienced high casualties and are resolved to limit further losses among their beloved comrades.

[Philippe]

I've often wondered how many coherent and comprehenisble tactical orders you can issue in the space of a minute.

And I still remember the day in a Thucidydes course when the professor explained that a Greek General's most important asset was a really powerful set of lungs.

I suspect that the diameter of a sphere of command should have more to do with a commander's pipes and less to do with his talent.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Philippe:

I've often wondered how many coherent and comprehenisble tactical orders you can issue in the space of a minute.

"Follow me!" is probably about the limit of complexity for anything that hasn't been included in the orders group before you crossed the start line.

The whole idea of permitting players to give their troops orders after turn 1 is really pretty unrealistic.

All the best,

John.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Ace Pilot:

I think that the advantage in leadership that the Germans had over their opponents (especially the Soviets) is not modelled well in CM. I find the command delay differences are hard to exploit effectively. For instance, if a real life German attack found a weak spot in the Soviet lines, the Soviet command structure made for a slow response. But in CM, I can order a couple of Soviet platoons, or an entire company to pull out of the line and counter the attack and the delay is not significantly more than if I had ordered those same units to conduct a leap frog advance over 100m. I think this has a lot to do with the fact that company and battalion HQ have no role in CM, other than as extra infantry units that can also spot and rally.

It possibly has more to do with the fact that you are thinking at too low a level. I would posit that what Mosier is talking about is the ability of the Germans to mass battalions, and exploit break-through of same, faster than the Sovs could move reserve bns into to reinforce or seal the breach. Both of which are outside the scale of CM.

Tank combat is a little different, especially in the early war. The Germans had (primitive) radios in every tank, whereas often their opponents did not. This meant that they could perform much more intricate maneauvres on the battlefield, and react to changing circumstances better and faster than their opponents. Interestingly, the RAF held the same advantage over the Luftwaffe during the BoB, and were able to exploit it in the same ways. JasonC wrote some time ago about this, and IIRC, the advantage was non-linear. In other words, A German tank pn against a French tank pn was a reasonably even fight, even given the German advantage in comms. However, a German tank bn vs a French tank bn would see the Germans wipe the floor, and the French take a severe pounding.

Jon

[Bigduke6]

My two cents'- don't underrate the German combat experience advantage throughout most of the war. They started it, they fought longer, and their military was very good at teaching new leaders basic lessons previous ones had learned. Add into that that, generally, when the opposition reached more or less tactical parity (see below) the Germans were generally on the defence, which is the place to be in attrition, and the result is generally combat-experienced German units.

Think about playing against a skilled player and a noobie. My contention is that, for most of the war, the Germans had the skills and the allies were the noobies. So my arguement would be blitzrkieg was the operational/general staff side of this advantage, but also important was things like Germany small unit leaders first learned keeping their heads under fire against mostly disorganzied Poles, French, Brits, and Russians; while allied units typically lost their cherries against German units with a strong leavening of combat experienced regimental leaders, meaning sergeant to major inclusive.

Once the allies spent enough lives and and material to (1) more or less catch up with the Germans on the combat experience front and (2) by attrition kill off a significant portion of the experienced German soldiers, forcing their replacement by relatively inexperenced German soldiers; that was all she wrote.

Glantz in Clash of Titans is outstanding at demonstrating how, by about mid-1944, the Soviets overall were operationally well ahead of the Germans, so for all the German small unit tactical skill, the Red Army smashed the Wehrmacht just about every campaign they tried.

I say campaign not battle intentionally, although I can make a pretty good case if you want to hear it that by mid-44 the German tactical advantage against the Red Army was not too significant.

[ January 28, 2005, 08:25 AM: Message edited by: Bigduke6 ]