Cabron66 Posted September 19, 2003 Share Posted September 19, 2003 First of all, due to the outcome of my first attempt at a discussion of this topic I would like to clearly state that my initial intentions have remained unchanged. However, I am limited by time. I will make a serious effort to read any and all documents suggested to me, but of course, am capable of only so much. Furthermore, I will not respond to an argument until I have checked my own resources or those suggested by the poster. It is my hope that this thread and all future threads in which I participate become places of open discussion and educated opinion. [ September 19, 2003, 02:14 PM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Becket Posted September 19, 2003 Share Posted September 19, 2003 Originally posted by Cabron66: It is my hope that this thread and all future threads in which I participate become places of open discussion and educated opinion. I like grapes. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 19, 2003 Author Share Posted September 19, 2003 Note: This is a copy of my original statement made to present my argument. It is unchanged. However, due to points made in the previous thread I have made changes to it which can be found in the following post. It is my intention to use this thread as a means of presenting documentation and evidence which will help resolve the current debate centered on the inclusion of an improved close air support model in future versions of Combat Mission. It is also my intention to invite any and all participation, of any kind, in the discussion. My ultimate goal is to present the results of this argument to the designers of the aforementioned game. Personally, I do so, for three reasons. First, the manner in which this debate has been handled has included little or no valid evidence for either argument except for limited references to isolated occurrences. Second, I believe the designers of CM are dedicated to producing a quality product. Third, in all honesty, to improve upon arguments I previously made and was unable to support in any credible manner. It is not my intention to prove myself correct, but rather to arrive at an informed conclusion. The most impressive works dealing with this topic, close air support in WWII, are worthy of praise for their in-depth and honest assessment of the effectiveness of doctrine concerning allocation of these assets. I relied heavily on them when forming this argument. Richard P. Hallion’s “Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911-1945”, Daniel R. Mortensen’s “A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support in North Africa”, and Peter C. Smith’s “Close Air Support: An Illustrated History, 1914 to the Present” are the most complete texts I have found. In addition, I had the pleasure of speaking to a Dr. Jim Kitchens, historian with the US Air Force Historical Research Agency and with Mr. Mortensen, author of the aforementioned text. Unfortunately, my investigations into the doctrines and operations of the RAF and RCAF have not been as successful. Any information regarding the actions of these two branches of the Allied forces would be much appreciated. Based on a number of articles made available by the USAF Air University, especially the lengthy work of Peter A. Costello, I would like to make the following assertions. 1. The evolution of CAS (and all other roles played by air assets), changes dramatically in the 1950’s as a result of the nuclear arms race (and in no small way to the advent of rotary-wing aircraft). Therefore, I will attempt to confine any arguments to matters concerning the three wars most directly related to Combat Mission: WWI, WWII and Korea. 2. The debate surrounding the most effective use of airpower is as old as airpower itself. Traditionally, there are two schools of thought concerning the most effective use of aircraft in achieving the goals of any military campaign. According to Peter A. Costello: the traditional land power advocates wanted the continued subordination of airpower to the will of the ground force commander (while) the airpower zealots sought its freedom from such tethers to conduct independent and war-winning operations. 3. American doctrine concerning the proper allocation of air assets changed greatly between the two wars, but by the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, had really only managed to produce effective means for the use of large numbers of aircraft in a strategic role. The role of CAS was largely ignored despite what Hallion referred to as “an element of combined arms warfare (which) displayed a flexibility of application, a degree of mobility, and a psychological impact that surpassed the expectations of even its prewar supporters.” 4. Shocking German successes in their initial campaigns forced this doctrine to be modified when Allied commanders, seeing the astounding impact of Luftwaffe attacks, were forced to soften their views. Air Corps Field Manual FM 1-5, published in 1940, stated “Fighters were not suitable for ground attack other than on personnel or light material except for temporary employment during emergencies” and “Support aviation is not employed against objectives which can be effectively engaged by available ground weapons within time required.” However, a later version of that manual (FM 1-10), published the same year, advocated “the importance of command, control and communications, particularly with friendly armoured forces, using prearranged signals, pyrotechnic devices, and panels.” It also emphasized greatly the need for direct radio communication between armour and air units. However, according to Costello, these ideas were not implemented either quickly or effectively until 1942. 5. American operations in North Africa proved to be the testing/proving grounds for the AAF and its new doctrine regarding CAS. By 1942 the Air Corps Field Manual included a detailed plan for the organization of air support (but unfortunately not much in the way of actual techniques) consisting of a complex network of “Air Support Parties, Air Support Control Centers and an Air Support Command.” According to Mortensen (and paraphrasing Costello), this system allowed for the Corps commander and staff to have their own “mini” air force on call for their use. The results of which were, according to Hallion, “a built-in tendency to try to stem enemy air and ground attacks at the FLOT, instead of striking deeper and more effectively at the enemy’s rear.” 6. As a result of the lessons learned in North Africa, Allied doctrine on the subject was changed dramatically leading to a highly visible change in the usage of CAS in the MTO and later in the WTO. William M. Momyer states, in his book “Air Power in Three Wars”, in the beginning stages of the North African campaign, “Tactical airpower was adapted to the demands of ground battle. As such there was no concerted effort to gain air superiority over the theatre of operations.” The campaign culminated in a very different Air Corps Field Manual now featuring a remarkable addition written in bold text. “LAND AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDANT FORCES: NEITHER IS AN AUXLIARY OF THE OTHER.” It further stated that all air campaigns should consist of three stages. Attain air superiority, prevent movement of hostile troops and supplies into the theatre of operations or within the theatre, and participate in a combined effort of the air and ground forces, in the battle area, to gain objectives on the immediate front of the ground forces. 7. Finally, this new doctrine, further improved from lessons learned in the direct support given to amphibious landings in both Sicily and Italy (and lessons learned throughout the Italian campaign) led to the final overwhelming effect of CAS witnessed in the Normandy Campaign. Quoting Costello, “Even though CAS was still a tertiary mission, the numbers of fighter-bombers available led to de facto OPCON of a tactical air command by each field army. CAS was “pushed” forward and made continuously and immediately available to the ground manoeuvre units. Many times more sorties were available than targets, with the excess released for “armed reconnaissance.” Above all I found the comments of Dr. Jim Kitchens fascinating. Dr. Kitchens felt the obvious wealth of available material concerning strategic airpower in WWII leads to a tendency to omit the important role of CAS from many discussions, but that the ultimate proof of its importance was the amount of resources allocated to it. He stated that Allied commanders would most likely have used those aircraft in other ways if they believed it more beneficial to their ultimate goal. The fact that they did not is evidence in itself. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 19, 2003 Author Share Posted September 19, 2003 Assertion #4 It has been difficult to find concrete evidence of the effectiveness of German close support in the early years of WWII. In fact, despite my best efforts I have been unable to find any detailed information on the topic. What I have found is frequent reference to the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe in an interdiction role and the psychological impact of the Stuka. Although I have found evidence of German CAS in the form of radio operators in AFVs operating in battle areas and am quite sure an organized attempt at CAS was made (through the work of Wolfram von Richthofen) I am not sure how extensive that program was or how effective it might have been. In fact, it has become and has been the focus of my investigation to answer these questions. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jim Boggs Posted September 19, 2003 Share Posted September 19, 2003 Originally posted by Becket: </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Cabron66: It is my hope that this thread and all future threads in which I participate become places of open discussion and educated opinion. I like grapes. </font> Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Dorosh Posted September 19, 2003 Share Posted September 19, 2003 Cabron66 - thank you for that long and detailed post. Your assertions regarding CAS are completely correct. You're a credit to the CM community. I hope the changes you suggest are implemented in the next version of CM. I am sure the Battlefront staff will be in touch with you privately to ask your advice in implementation. Thanks for helping CM to evolve into the best tactical simulation game on the market today. Admin - we can probably lock this one up, I think Cabron has nailed it. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Soddball Posted September 19, 2003 Share Posted September 19, 2003 ARRggghhh!! It be Talk Like a Pirate Day! Avast there, Dorosh! Talk Ye Nicely like a good sea-dog, not the scurvy landlubber that ye are! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Cabron66 Posted September 19, 2003 Author Share Posted September 19, 2003 Can I fairly assume this to be an example of your suggestion that we "ignore" each other or "respect each other's space"? I now see the overwhelming logic of your argument. [ September 19, 2003, 02:55 PM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Dorosh Posted September 19, 2003 Share Posted September 19, 2003 Originally posted by Cabron66: Can I fairly assume this to be an example of your suggestion that we "ignore" each other or "respect each other's space"? I now see the overwhelming logic of your argument. This isn't your space, remember? Your contention in the last thread was that Battlefront pays the rent here and the posters have no claim to it. You have no space here to respect. BesidesARRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR it be talk like a pirate day! SHIVER ME TIMBERS but it's good to feel the salt breeze in my face! Ye scurvy land-lubbing dog! <font size=1 font color="gray"> Aside to Becket - AND YOU KNOW WHAT YOU CAN DO WITH THE GRAPES YOU RAPSCALLION!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!</font> Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Tero Posted September 19, 2003 Share Posted September 19, 2003 http://www.johnston.ca/tacair/index.html Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Madmatt Posted September 19, 2003 Share Posted September 19, 2003 I am too busy to research why the original poster had to put such a lengthy disclaimer to his post or why he got the responses he got but I have my suspecions. Regardless, Airpower in CM has always been tertiary to the main thrust of the game. It is Combat Mission, not Close Air Support Mission, and that will not change in CMAK. In the CMX2 engine it is more than likely the role and modeling of aircraft and how they are used will get overhauled, as will everything else but that is a long ways off still. Since, this issue is not going to get changed in CM, I am going to lock this thread up. Madmatt Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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