Bunker busting

[FM Paul Heinrik]

I'm trying to assess this German army tactic on bunker busting. This excerpt comes from this website on various military strategies http://etloh.8m.com/strategy/offense2.html

"In attacking enemy pillboxes, the Germans use combat groups consisting of tanks, infantry, and engineers, assisted by artillery. The normal composition of a combat group attacking one bunker is one platoon of tanks and one platoon of infantry reinforced by one squad of engineers. Before the combat group is committed against the enemy pillbox, artillery fires high explosives and smoke shells at the neighboring pillboxes to isolate them, shells the terrain between pillboxes, and conducts counterbattery fire. Under the protection fof this fire, the combat group advances close to the pillbox while other infantry units attack the enemy in the terrain between the pillboxes.

One tank squad covers the advances of the other tank squads and the infantry platoon by direct fire against the pillbox, particularly against the observation and weapons' openings. The first tank squad halts under cover whenever possible and covers the advance of the second tank squad.

When the combat group reaches a barbed wire obstacle surrounding the pillbox, the two tank squads have different missions. One tank squad remains in front of the pillbox, and it's tanks are driven into a position from which they can overlook the terrain, and watch out for antitank guns and machine-gun emplacements, while the other tank squad (the pillbox tank squad) rolls across the obstacle to enable the infantry and engineers to get close to the pillbox. The pillbox tank squad then fires on the pillbox at close range. The infantry squad meanwhile takes the surrounding terrain and covers the engineers who blast the entrance of the pillbox with TNT."

I don't think this tactic is feasibly applicable to CM. It utilizes way too many resources to accomplish the task with in the frame work of CM combat. From the description it sounds like a scenerio inwhich an infanty platoon supported by arty, pioneers, and a tank platoon assault a single enemy concrete bunker that has a few items providing covering fire for it. From the article it makes bunkers sound a lot tougher than they are in CM. Thoughts?

[Tifosi]

This could be referring to bunkers such as those found on, for example, the Maginot Line - not dinky little concrete match-boxes with a single MG, but mini-forts in their own right. These things were made of reinforced concrete, and chock full of weaponry, and in any case, a ferro-concrete pillbox would be ideally several inches thick otherwise you might as well use wood and save a wad of money.

Anybody who grew up reading Warlord will know that "Union Jack Jackson" could kill a Jap pillbox with a single well thrown grenade, but generally I think the more stuff you could throw at one, the better.

Remember also that U-Boat bases were given ferro-concrete roofs (admittedly feet as opposed to inches thick) which were unbreakable until the RAF developed the 22,000lb (no that´s not a typo, it really weighed 22 thousand pounds!) "Grand Slam" bomb, but even a foot or so should cause major headaches for all but the heaviest tank guns.

I think it´s fair to say that for gameplay´s sake, the strength of ferro-concrete has been toned down in CM!

[FM Paul Heinrik]

I should have clarified that these bunkers in question were on the East Front. While reading that excerpt I did not get the impression that the Germans were assaulting major concrete pill boxes, nor was that their style. Did the Russians employ such bunker complexes as the Maginot Line? I know that they had some well protected fortifications around, well, their forts like in the Crimea. I thought all they had was a bunch of log op bunkers/mg nest along the Bug.

[YankeeDog]

I don't think ferro-concrete has been deliberately 'toned down' in CM for gameplay reasons. BFC, generally speaking, detests gameplay adjustments. Besides, actually penetrating the ferro-concrete of a bunker is extremely difficult in CM -- only really big stuff like the petard mortar on the British AVRE can do it. By and large, you KO a bunker in CM by firing slit penetration, or by penetrating the rear bunker door with some weapon -- satchel charge, flamethrower, bazooka, etc.

I do think that concrete pillboxes are not as tough in CM as they were IRL for a variety of reasons. I doubt this was done deliberately by BFC, but IMHO some of the mechanics of how the game models gun accuracy, firing slit penetrations, and bunkers in general are a bit off. I think the root cause is that bunkers are basically modeled as stationary AFVs in CM with a couple of "weak points" (i.e., the firing slit and the rear door), rather than having their own distinct modeling. One of the most important problems of this approach is that high ROF autocannon are inordinately effective at scoring firing slit penetrations and KOing bunkers. IMHO, direct fire from autocannon or any other weapon probably should be fairly effective at supressing bunkers (i.e., driving the soldiers inside away from the firing slit and/or forcing the bunker to close its embrasures), but would only very rarely actually manage to completely KO a bunker -- someone would still have to get up close to finish the job with explosives or a flamethrower or something.

However, even given the inaccuracies of the current CM model, the plan in the above quote doesn't seem all that unreasonable to me, assuming that you don't have/choose not to use any of the less realistic methods of attacking bunkers that CM currently allows, like autocannon. As I read it, the total commitment of forces in the above example is arty support, one infantry platoon, one platoon of tanks, and one engineer squad.

Note that, for the most part, the job of the artillery tanks and engineer squad is to supress the bunker(s) and guard the advance of the engineer squad. IOW, the above plan is for the knocking out a *supported* bunker, and much of the committed forces are there to supress or knock out enemy assets other than the bunker itself.

In CM terms, think of a small scenario, with an attacking force of infantry platoon, an engineer squad, a platoon of tanks and an FO or two against a defensive force centered around a concrete bunker, but also including a couple of MGs or log bunkers, maybe an infantry squad or two, possibly a couple of other weapons teams like ATRs or on-board mortars, and some obstacles like wire and AT mines. While the engineers may be all you need to actually KO the bunker, you need the rest of the stuff to actually get the engineer squad there to do the job.

Cheers,

YD

[FM Paul Heinrik]

One of the main reasons I posted this question was to help me in designing my own scenerio depicting said operation. But, as it stands the bunkers get ko'ed before any infantry/pioneers reach it. The tank platoon gets a firing slit hit fairly often and takes it out. I want the terrain to allow the tanks and FO's to see the bunkers so they can provide support as the infantry advances. I'm trying to make all the Russian units fairly static (no afv). This scenerio is obviously tilted toward the Germans because if pt. balance were used the Russians would have a lot of AT guns available. I want the bunker to be the focal pt. not the more deadly ATGs.

I think I'm just running into problems with play balance. Maybe I should post this in scenerio section.

[YankeeDog]

One tip on bunker deployment in general in CM:

They're a lot more effective if you face them sideways. This way, enemy tanks have to advance pretty far forward, and then turn sideways themselves in order to engage the bunker. As previously mentioned, only the very biggest direct fire HE has any hope of damaging a concrete bunker from the side.

In fact, the combination of a sideways-facing bunker with a couple of AT guns 400-800m farther back protecting the bunker from tanks can be really effective -- the tanks have to expose their flanks to the AT guns in order to fire at the bunker.

If you're actually designing a scenario and want to make the bunker especially hard to take out, put it in a small, 3-sided depression so that the rear facing is more protected from direct fire.

You can actually put two bunkers back-to-back and create a sort of super bunker this way.

Of course, you need other assets, or favorable terrain, to protect the bunker from the front in this scenario -- otherwise, enemy infantry can simply march right up to it and take it out at close range. But as a scenario designer, you have the freedom to tweak the terrain and elevations to favor the bunker. It's especially effective if you can put the bunkers behind a reverse slope or other blocking terrain -- a relatively small group of squad infantry can hold the reverse slope, or patch of trees or whatever, while the two bunkers prevent flanking maneuvers.

You can also use wire and/or minefields to make approaching the bunkers by the "front" (i.e., the forward-facing side) much more difficult.

Cheers,

YD

[dieseltaylor]

I have used them in a fashion suggested above where in aa assault there was a large hill in the centre in NA, so two 75mm pillboxes pointing along the reverse slope and a MG Pillbox,infantry and three MKiii's to kill something coming across the bald top. Lots of MG's to sweep the hill and mortars.

Ended as a draw as Mk111 are pants against Churchills. My first use of ATG pillboxes .. very impressed.

[Carl Puppchen]

One question - if you face the pillbox sideways, they must be targeting an area that the enemy has to take, else they will just bypass the pillbox entirely. The best way to deal with a pillbox is to avoid its covered arc entirely, especially if it is a 75mm AT gun or the dreaded 88mm AT gun.

The 88mm gun is a serious killer of AFV's, and if you are on the attack often it is difficult to drag forward the 20mm cannons that are so effective against them. A dangerous opponent will also "keyhole" the pillbox so that you have to battle them but you can't shoot it with all of your weapons from far away (a reverse slope defense also accomplishes this). It is true that there are armored cars with 20mm guns or even the grey hound with 37mm guns that can "ping" the boxes but in general those types of vehicles are "rolling, on fire" if they drive into a hotbed of AT weaponry typically found near an 88mm AT gun pillbox (i.e. I am assuming no one would leave such a lynchpin of the defense unsupported).

[FM Paul Heinrik]

What I'm finding is that the pillboxes are moot. It is the support stuff that hinders the advance not the pillbox itself. Therefore, if you forgo the pillbox and just have the other support stuff your defense is none the weaker.

I don't know, it is just that pillboxes don't seem to play out like I wanted them to. I think the high rate of firing slit penetration thing is ruining them.

[Joachim]

An immobile (dug in) StuG or SU might better represent a bunker.... gun damage vs firing slit pen. What's more frequent?

[Akula2]

Originally posted by FM Paul Heinrik:

What I'm finding is that the pillboxes are moot. It is the support stuff that hinders the advance not the pillbox itself. Therefore, if you forgo the pillbox and just have the other support stuff your defense is none the weaker.

I don't know, it is just that pillboxes don't seem to play out like I wanted them to. I think the high rate of firing slit penetration thing is ruining them.

They are a disappointment indeed. <--my understated tip of the day.

[YankeeDog]

IMHO firing slit penetrations are definitely overmodeled in some way. I would guess it's more that especially small caliber slit penetrations have an inordinately high chance of scoring a knockout, rather than the % chance of getting a slit penetration per se. In any case, the net effect is the same -- small, high ROF guns easily KO pillboxes.

I think another big part of the problem is that pillboxes have zero stealth once they open fire. IRL, pillboxes could sometimes be quite well concealed and integrated into the surrouding terrain; an MG pillbox placed in a tree line should be only marginally easier to spot than an MG. This goes for log bunkers, too.

It is worth noting, though, that historically pillboxes didn't seem to last for long once taken under strong direct fire by AFVs. By all accounts I've read, the DD tanks that got ashore on D-Day made quick work of pillboxes firing on the beaches. And the Sigefried line pillboxes didn't hold out long, either.

In these accounts, though, it's generally a 75mm or larger gun firing at the pillbox, and often a final coup de gras still has to be delivered by flamethower or demo charge. Therefore, it seems to me that direct fire HE should be most effective at driving the pillbox crew away from the firing slit, not KOing it completely.

So for CMX2, IMHO direct fire should remain fairly effective at *temporarily* silencing pillboxes, but they should probably have the nasty habit of "reawakening" if the fire is lifted. SOP for taking out pillboxes should therefore probably involve maintaining supressive fire on the firing slit for an extended period of time, while maneuvering a FT or demo charge-equipped unit close enough to deliver the knockout blow. Obviously, this would make pillboxes much more costly in terms of ammo and time to take out than the current modeling.

Really big HE, like the AVRE's petard, and possibly even DF from guns in the 150-155mm range, should remain effective at taking pillboxes out quickly. From what I've read, a direct hit from really big HE can effectively KO a pillbox simply by stunning the crew inside -- it doesn't need to actually completely penetrate. If anything, I think this effect is undermodeled in CM right now -- I've seen pillboxes take near direct hits from 1000 lb. bombs (less than 20m away) in CM and keep right on firing without a pause. I'm not sure the soldiers inside the pillbox would be good for much after such an impact. At the very least, I would expect a momentary pause in the firing. . .

Cheers,

YD

[Paco QNS]

FWIW

According to the Parodi Formulae:

x= C * K * A

x= penetration, in meters

C= W / 1000 * ( a * a )

W= Weight of shot, in kilograms

a= caliber of shot, in meters

K= 0.43 for very hard rock; 0.88 for concrete; 1.63 for bricks; 3.44 for compact earth; and 5.84 for removed earth

A= a logarithmic function of speed in meters oer second = 0.18 for 100 m/s; 0.3 for 140 m/s; 0.46 for 195 m/s; 0.59 for 240 m/s; 0.69 for 280 m/s; 0.76 for 310 m/s; 0.95 for 400 m/s; and 1.13 for 500 m/s

- - -

There is another formulae, by Nobile di Giorgi, but it is more complicated, and only give results for concrete and removed earth.

- - -

For the explosion effect:

Bombs, kilograms: 50; 100; 300; 1.000; 1.800

Explos.charge, in Kg: 26 ; 55 ; 165 ; 550 ; 1.000

Penetration of

Concrete, in meters: 0.6; 0.75; 1.1; 1.65; 2

Armoured concr., mts : 0.45; 0.55; 0.8; 1.25; 1.5

- - -

For airplane bombs, dropped from a height of 4.000 meters in a medium consistency earth terrain:

Weight of bomb, in kgs: 45 136 272 500 907 1.814

Depth of crater, in mts: 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.3 5 5.6

Diameter crater, mts: 7.6 8.8 10.6 12.4 14.6 17.8

---------------------------------

Source:

Review "Ejercito" nº22 "El hormigón en las fortificaciones", Tte Cnel José Pérez Reyna, November 1941

[Leopard_2]

...absolutely ignoring fuse setting and material of shell, and possibly several other factors...

Nope, doesn't make it in the Rolemaster rulebooks. :-D

[Paco QNS]

I concur, those formulae always made my head fuzzy. Must be said, though, that the fuze type is a superfluous one. By default, to kill shields always were used delay ones -if available-.

And the shell brinell was, well, the better you could built for that kind of shot.

That is a pre- WWI formula, and it was infered from experiences with real fire. Since the article gave no data on that experiences, I searched,

and found this brief article, unrelated .

Yes. I prefer the empiric method, if possible:

- - -

Magazine "Ejército" Year XV nº 176 Sep 1954

CAMPAIGN FORTIFICATION. TEST OF a SHIELD WITH REAL FIRE (from the North American publication Combat Forces Journal.). -

It is known that a protection cover in Korea, with tree trunks and earth, had resisted the direct hit of the 122 mm caliber without even throwing dust on the occupants of the protected shelter; but was not known if the grenade had instantaneous fuze or delayed. In order to determine the effect of American projectiles on this type of shield, the School of Application of Artillery of Fort Sill has made a series of experiences recently, using, since it does not have howitzers of 122 mm, the one of 105 with delay fuze and the one of 155 with instantaneous fuze. The shots were done on a cover (see figure) formed by one layer of tree trunks, about 8 centimeters of diameter by each meter of light or length nonsupported, on it was piled and compressed earth in a thickness of 1,60 meters, crowned by a layer of explosion and a sand-bag revetment. The cover was the same one for the different phases from the tests, varying only the layer of explosion, formed with a material whose object was to cause the fast performance of the fuze. The first experience was made with 105 mm and the ballistic data for final speed and angle of impact were such of that corresponding to charge 7, at a 6.750 meters of range. One of the layers of explosion was formed by slabs of stone of 7,62 centimeters, and the other by metallic cases, full of earth or stone. In this test, a projectile of 105 mm, with delayed-action fuze, dismantled a great amount of earth tamped, but the paper leaned to the inferior layer of tree trunks did not suffer any damage. For the second experience ( 155 mm) it was calculated that charge 4 at 721 meters would provide approximately the final ballistic data of the indirect shot with charge 6 at 9.140 meters.

Three classes were used of explosion layers: full gabions of earth, stone crushed with thickness of 7.62 cm. and this same one of slabs of stone. The results of this second experience were similar to the obtained with 105 mm:

considerable external in the cover and very small effects in the interior; only, initiation of cross-sectional cracks in some of the driest tree trunks and old and longitudinal fissures in one or two tree trunks (the projectile of 105, no it affected the tree trunks). It was not proven 155 with delayed-action fuze, with the absolute certainty that it would perforate or squash the tree trunks and because it is not probable that the Communists use delayed-action fuze in counterbattery fire shot without observation. The layer of explosion more favorable turned out to be the one of slabs of stone; the one of metallic gabions and crushed stone, inferior to the first were equivalent to each other.

The consequent modifications has been recommended for the Manual of Campaign 5-15 (( FM 5-15 )). - ((Translated by)) Lieutenant Colonel Casas ((and retranslated by babelfish and me)).

((My Description of the figure: Trench of 2 meters approx. of wide, with cover

of 2.24 ms wide, formed by - down to above -, layer of tree trunks, earth cover

tamped of thickness 5´ with lateral and sides of sand-bags, layer of explosion, also covered of sand-bags. It forms a sloped triangle, with angle of 21º with land line, 5.14 meters of length measure the cover, covering 4.80 trench meters, that it opens by his end with an exit slit. )) (( BTW, yes, the figure mixs measures, or it seems. ))

-----------------------------------------------

Revista "Ejército" Año XV nº 176 Sep 1954

FORTIFICACION DE CAMPAÑA. PRUEBA DE UN BLINDAJE CON FUEGO REAL (De la publicación norteamericana Combat Forces Journal.).-

Se sabía que en Corea la cubierta de protección, a base de rollizos y tierra, había resistido el impacto directo del calibre 122 mm., sin arrojar siquiera polvo sobre los ocupantes del abrigo protegido; pero no se sabía si la granada llevaba espoleta instantánea o de retardo. Para determinar el efecto de los proyectiles americanos sobre dicho tipo de blindaje, la Escuela de Aplicación de Artillería de Fort Sill, ha realizado recientemente una serie de experiencias, utilizando, puesto que no dispone de obuses de 122 mm, el de 105 con espoleta retardada y el de 155 con espoleta instantánea.

Los disparos se hicieron sobre una cubierta (veáse figura) formada por una capa de rollizos, de unos 8 centímetros de diámetro por cada metro de luz o longitud no apoyada, sobre la que se apisonó tierra en un espesor de 1,60 metros, coronado por una capa de explosión y un revestimiento de sacos terreros.

La cubierta fué la misma para las distintas fases de las pruebas, variando sólo

la capa de explosión, que como es sabido, se forma con un material duro, cuyo objeto es provocar la rápida actuación de la espoleta.

La primera experiencia se realizó con el 105 mm y los datos balísticos finales -velocidad y ángulo de arribada- fueron los mismos que los correspondientes a la carga 7, a 6.750 m. de alcance. Una de las capas de explosión estaba formada por lajas de piedra en 7,62 centímetros, y la otra por cestones metálicos, llenos de tierra o piedra. En este ensayo, un proyectil de 105 mm, con espoleta de retardo, desmanteló una gran cantidad de tierra apisonada, pero el papel que se había adosado a la capa inferior de la capa de rollizos no sufrió daño alguno.

Para la segunda experiencia 155 mm se calculó que la carga 4 a 721 m., proporcionaría aproximadamente, los datos balísticos finales que cabría esperar del tiro indirecto, con la carga 6 a 9.140 m. Se utilizaron tres clases de capas de explosión: cestones llenos de tierra, piedra machacada con espesor de 7,62 cm. y este mismo de lajas de piedra. Los resultados de esta segunda experiencia fueron parecidos a los obtenidos con el 105 mm.: considerables efectos externos en la cubierta y muy pequeños en el interior; tan sólo, iniciación de grietas transversales en algunos de los rollizos más secos y viejos y fisuras longitudinales en uno o dos rollizos (el proyectil de 105, no afectó a los rollizos). No se probó el 155 con espoleta retardada, por contar con la seguridad de que perforaría o aplastaría los rollizos y porque no es probable que los comunistas utilicen espoleta retardada en tiro de contrabatería sin observación.

La capa de explosión más favorable resultó ser la de lajas de piedra; la de

cestones metálicos y piedra machacada, inferiores a la primera, resultaron

equivalentes entre sí.

Se ha recomendado la consiguiente modificación de las cifras que figuran en

el Manual de Campaña 5-15 .- Teniente Coronel Casas.

(( Datos figura: Trinchera de 2 metros aprox. de ancho, con cubierta de 2,24 metros formada por -de abajo arriba-, capa de rollizos, cubierta de tierra apisonada de espesor 5´ con laterales y lados de sacos terreros, capa de explosión, a su vez cubierta de sacos terreros. Forma un triángulo, con ángulo de 21º con el terreno. Mide la cubierta 5,14 m de largo, cubriendo 4,80 m de trinchera, que se abre por su extremo con una salida. )) (( Ah!, por cierto, Sí, el dibujo mezcla medidas )).

(( Edited for vs spelling ,

to correct "tested on", must said "infered from"

AND, to give a caution note, for there is a catch ... ))

[ November 06, 2004, 01:40 PM: Message edited by: Paco QNS ]

[Bannon DC]

I too was wondering what it would take to knock out a pillbox. As with the rest of you, taking them out an AFV is a bit too easy.

I designed a scenario that would include no AFVs, no artillery, no smoke, etc. Just infantry and their support weapons. I was thinking of the battle of Kursk where the Russians had 5-6 heavily defended lines. What would it take to fight through these lines, one at a time? Scary.

My scenario was a test case for one day designing a much large fortified zone. The goal is to take out one wooden machine gun bunker.

In CM, the best infantry support weapon for taking out bunkers is by far the ATR. It can do it within 10 shots. Same disappointment as the AFVs. (So I did not include any).

As a suggestion for you to include tanks, but not have them be able to fire directly on the bunker... maybe you can keep them back by placing a river in between them and the enemy line. You can narrow their field of fire with trees or "rough" terrain. Infantry can cross a river at a "deep ford" but tanks can not. For set up, you can place the infantry much closer than the tank which would be far to the rear. Yankee Dog's suggestion of protecting the bunker with AT guns works of course. (Might make for a very deep map with both the river and the AT guns in the rear though :eek: )

Please pardon a little self-promotion. Here is my infantry only bunker attack if you want to take a look -- Steppe Pillbox. Hosted at The Proving Grounds.

http://www.the-proving-grounds.com/scenario_details.html?command=search&db=scenarios.db&eqskudatarq=527

[Paco QNS]

Iam Ishora. Outskirts of Leningrad, between Kolpino and Krasny Bor.

The Spanish Volunteers Division (also known as 250 Division and "Blue Division") arrived to this front on September 1942.

The russian have been advancing with sappers works, until on 27th December they occupy Iam Ishora. They take two bunkers, one on each side of the road, and parallel to the old tank ditch, a chain of several others.

"" 29 December ((1942)):

Continue the same works and detachments.

A reinforced platoon of 1st Company formed by Lt D. Andres Eloy Muro V. four sergeants and eighty one sappers acted like Combat Engineers of Assault, with the mission to blast the wire fences, open minefields and destruct with explosives various defensive elements (bunkers and weapons emplacements); a infantry force with mission of assault and annihilation of enemy combatants were constituted by 6th Company of 2nd Battalion of Regiment 262 of whose forces one platoon was located between both wire fences to support the action if it had, the other two platoons of infantry fulfilled their mission of annihilation. The infantry was preceded by combat engineers up to the enemy parament, to open breach in the minefield, located between the wire fence and the dig in enemy.

The force of the battalion fulfilled magnificently its mission, organized into three squads it burst in along with those of infantry in position blowing the indicated objectives the left and center squads, not having necessity to carry out no blast the squad of right verifying that the fire of artillery that preceded the attack had destroyed the targets assigned to them. This successful op by the battalion deserved the congratulation of the General of the Division that ordered the concession of seventeen Iron Crosses in order to compensate the brave combat engineers; our sensible losses were five dead among them the official who passed away a few hours after being transferred to the hospital and twelve wounded ones.

Died: Lt D. Andres Eloy Muro V., Corporal Jose Rodriguez M., soldiers Enrique Larfeuil L., Feliciano Moreno P. and Teodoro Domingo S.

Wounded: Corporal Lucio Herranz M. and the soldiers Angel Iglesias S., Eladio Lopez L., Francisco Cornejo M., Francisco Samaniego V., Eduardo Veiro M., Toribio Lorenzo M., Arturo Menéndez O., Mariano Leon C., Guillermo Gutierrez G. and Julian Carrasco H. .-

Incorporated to service from the hospital soldier Raimundo Couto G. ((unrelated)). ""

(( and, only a few days later ... ))

"" 15 January ((1943))

Same situation and works.

Today, at fifteen minutes past six a platoon of the 1st Company commanded by the Lt D. Emeterio Blanco S., verified at the sector of the 5th Company of the Grenadeirs Regiment 263, an operation of assault and destruction in enemy lines. This assault was done with complete success, accomplishing the Sappers the mission encomended: open breach in wires and destruction of enemy defensive organizations, resulting in nine wounded, of them: two non-evacuated. ""

Source: "Soldado en tres guerras" Alfredo Bellod Gómez, Editorial San Martín, Madrid 2004

Comandante (( Major)) Bellod was the CO of the 250 Assault Sappers Battalion, divisional unit.

- - -

According to the book "Nieve roja", the death of Lt Muro was caused when returning to own lines, observing a new type of russian mine, he tried to recover it for study, but the mine was trapped and it blasted inflicting him grave wounds. He later died in the hospital, and was buried in Mestelewo.

Also, in other parts of the book, the op beginned at twenty five minutes past one, with a fire barrage with 36 guns. The sappers advanced on the minefields, and a quarter of hour later they entered the enemy parament and fight in close combat. Forty minutes after the beginning of the op, it was a success and the sappers returned.

"Nieve roja", Fernando y Miguel Angel Garrido Polonio, Editorial Oberon, 2002.

((As teenagers Fernando and Miguel Angel promised to their granny to rescue the remains of her brother, killed in Russia. The book tells how years later they fulfill their promise.))