How Common Was Armor?

[JasonC]

The bulk of Russian armor was concentrated in the mobile formations, which became larger and got more combined arms as the war progressed. The two standard types became the mech corps and the tank corps, each really a large division sized formation of 4 maneuver brigades.

Then the infantry divisions were supported by independent brigades and regiments - which were about the size of German AFV battalions. Cavalry formations had a small amount of organic armor, but infantry divisions did not.

When infantry divisions had an assault role, the army commander would assign a tank brigade to support a single division. At TOE that meant around 60 tanks in support of 3 regiments of infantry. Counting 2 up 1 back practices, the result could be a company of armor per attacking infantry battalion. Since they typically weren't at TOE except at the start of an operation, though, that could vary again.

An independent brigade to 1 rifle division was a high level of support by independent armor, and army commanders could only get it at select points. They could more readily assign a single independent regiment (TOE - 30 tanks or 20 SUs) to support a rifle division. That winds up giving a low level of AFV support, like attached StuGs or Marders for German infantry divisions. Up front that will mean a platoon of T-34s or 4 SUs in support of each front line battalion. Or a single attacking regiment within the division could have the same level of support a brigade would give to the whole division.

In CM terms, Russian infantry division type combined arms allows the higher level of armor support, if you max out the armor budget. That is, it is the appropriate level of armor support for a rifle division with independent brigade attached, or a independent AFV regiment supporting a single leading rifle regiment.

Operationally, the Russians tended to consider independent armor "stiffeners" of the infantry as alternatives to supplimental towed ATG regiments, particularly in the mid war. (By late war, there were enough SU-76 regiments running around that attacking divisions could often get one of those). A rifle division would tend to get one or the other, not both. With a tactically offensive mission and enemy armor expected, they'd get armor. With a tactically defensive mission, towed ATGs. With only enemy infantry expected, neither.

There weren't enough independent brigades or regiments for all rifle divisions to get one. It was not like the US army, where an attached armor or TD battalion was practically part of the standard division TOE. It was a matter of "tasking" above the division level.

The independent formations were "owned" at the army level for the length of an operation, with the support given to this or that army determined by its expected role in the mission or its expected opponents. Higher echelon AT and arty were assigned on the same system.

So for example, a late war army expected to face mostly infantry opponents might have only 1 regiment of SUs, for 9 rifle divisions. Its armor support would be effectively nil in CMBB terms. But it might have 8 higher echelon arty regiments attached (3 mortar and 5 tube), doubling its heavy anti infantry firepower.

Another army with an AT defensive role might have 3 regiments of SUs and 1 of towed AT for 6 RDs. All the front line divisions would have AT stiffening, by 20-24 extra 76mm guns, most of them SP. You get the idea. If the Russians are defending or the Germans have no armor at all, "infantry" force type should be the most common. If the Russians are attacking and the Germans have any armor, "combined arms" is more realistic.

The armor to infantry mix in the mobile formations was higher. In the cavalry, you'd see about the level of a supported infantry division. The tanks corps would have 60 tanks to 1-2 infantry battalions, depending on how it "tasked" its motor rifle brigade. The Russians used the organic brigades of their mech and tank corps much as Germans used KGs and the US used combat commands.

But for the tank corps you'd still see a company of armor, sometimes 2, to a single SMG or rifle company - very armor heavy, an "armor" force type in CMBB terms, with the bulk of the points spent on armor. Limited amounts of tank riders and FO support. The combined arms setting with mech division type, which gives a larger role to infantry, is more appropriate for the mechanized corps than for the tank corps.

In practice the ratio could fall over the course of an operation, even in the tank corps. After a month or two, a tank "brigade" could be reduced to 15-20 running tanks, and you'd could be down to the "combined arms" level of support (still mobile division unit type). But initial breakthrough fights, or deep meeting engagements after a successful breakthrough, should give the Russians an armor force type in addition to a mech parent unit type.

I hope this helps.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by manchildstein II:

overall they had very high production numbers, and on paper their infantry - at least at some level - had organic armor support, even if just t-60, t-70, or su-76...

I am not certain if Soviet infantry ever had organic AFV support. AFAIK attachments of armour were made on the basis of need, and were always temporary in principle, although they could be long-lasting in practice.

The high production numbers came along with very high losses, and AIUI in 1943 there was actually a net loss in available AFVs. At the same time, tank corps were extended to full-blown tank armies.

There are plenty of actions where neither side would have had AFVs, from 1941 to 1945. Most of these are eminently suitable for CM battles. They are just not written about very often I guess, because people get so infatuated with Panzers. </font>

[manchildstein (ii)]

oh so the soviet infantry regiment did not have a 'permanent' detachment of su-76 or t-70 or whatever? so it was on more of an 'as-needed' basis as determined by army hqs?

interestink

[JasonC]

Permanent armor in a rifle regiment? No, certainly not. Infantry guns, sure. Not tanks. Cavalry had a small amount of armor organic, at the division or corps level depending on the date, not down at brigade or regiment. Tank corps and mechanized corps had a lot organic, naturally.

Everyone else got AFV support from independent regiments or brigades. Regiments were 16-24 SUs (20 being typical - 5 batteries of 4 each, with SU-76s the most common vehicle), or 30-40 tanks (3 companies of 10 T-34s, or 1-2 of 10 T-34s and 1-2 of 15 T-60s or T-70s). A "regiment" was thus a small battalion in German terms, the size of a StuG or PzJgr unit or a little smaller.

An independent brigade was 2 tank regiments with organic tank riders (typically SMG armed) - roughly the size of a western tank battalion.

These were army level formations, assigned to a given army for the length of an operation, and then attached to whatever rifle division needed that sort of help the most at a given time.

They were part of a "pool" of army level "heavy weapons", including lots of motorized ATGs (mostly 76mm), extra 120mm mortars, heavy artillery (122mm and 152mm), and rockets. The army commander (or his staff) doled these out flexibly, "topping off" "vanilla" rifle divisions to get the right mix of weapons for this or that job.

The organic weapons of a Russian rifle division were what it needed to defend its frontage against an infantry opponent. For anything else, it wanted extras. To attack infantry, added artillery. To defend against armor, added ATGs or SUs, etc.

Not that these were always available, but that was the organizational idea. Decisions about combined arms tasking that would be made by fixed TOEs combined with decisions at the division staff level in the German army (who gets Pz Jgr support? who gets 150mm fire support? etc) were made up at the army level, for the Russians.

[Andreas]

In reality, you could be an infantry commander going for months without ever seeing a friendly tank close by, let alone attached to you. The same goes for actual personnel replacements - despite the numerical superiority.

I have a memoir by the CoS of a Guards infantry regiment that fought with a single battalion instead of three for a long time. That is attacking or defending, just not on the main axis. So they had to make do with what they had.