opinions on mark clark?

[JonS]

True, and I agree that Lucas could have - and probably should have - advanced further than he did in the first days. However, to say that he had sufficient force in the first wave to do anything more than establish a credible beachhead is, I think, fanciful.

Where the beachhead line should have been established could be a fruitful debate, but talk of Rome, Frascati, Routes 6 & 7, etc, are silly. I think.

BTW, your example of '51 minutes by car from Frascati to Anzio' is equally silly, as you well know

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

Keep in mind that with each mile of advance, 7 miles is added to the perimeter.

I've already challenged a statement like this. Would you please be so kind as to explain by what mathematical means you derive this notion?</font>

[Robert Isenberg]

I was thinking more of a radius effect

from the landing point you force would radiate out covering all terrain 1 mile from the beach since no major German force would attempt to counter attack from sea(too many ships in the area)so this becomes a pi equation

with a 1 mile inland beach head producing a 3.14 mile perimeter,2 miles in a 6.28 mile perimeter and so forth

Of course this assumes the beach head is a straight line and you are able form your perimeter with no bulges or alcoves

Originally posted by Dook:

Guys, I'm no mathematician, but it seems to me that some additional information is needed to get definitive answers to your questions regarding how much the perimeter increased for each mile of advance. The most obvious bits of info lacking is the width of the beachhead and the width of the advance.

If you assume the beachhead is 1 mile wide (picked for mathematical convenience) and the initial advance is straight inland from the center of the beachhead, you could think of the perimeter as a triangle with a base of 1 mile and a height of 1 mile. The length of one side of the triange would be the square roote of two (1.414). The perimeter, not including the beach behind you, would be 2 x 1.414 = 2.828, or pretty close to three.

Things get a lot more complicated after that depending on the width of the frontage and the evenness of advance.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

BTW, your example of '51 minutes by car from Frascati to Anzio' is equally silly, as you well know

Just an attempt to make sure everybody is clear about the distances involved. I was very surprised when I actually took the train to Anzio for the first time (my girlfriend's mother has a villa in Nettuno, and she lives in Rome), that it really is no distance at all.

Regarding the forces in the area, on Monday I get back to my sources (Ellis and this German write-up, the latter is quite detailed), and post them here.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Just curious, how did you get the 1 mile advance = 3 miles of perimeter?

Simple rule of thumb. The perimeter at Anzio was roughly (alright, very roughly) semicircular. So the formula for finding the perimeter of a circle, suitably modified, would apply. The perimeter of a circle is found by multiplying the diameter by pi. Thus, the length of the arc of a semicircle (which is what we are talking about here) can be found by multiplying the radius (half of the diameter) by pi. So, if the radius of the perimeter was 1 mile, the defended perimeter would be 3 miles (imprecise, but close enough for our purposes I trust). If you expand the front outward by one mile all around to 2 miles, the defended perimeter becomes 6 miles. And so forth. Feel free to draw yourself a diagram if it will help and measure it all off.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Dook:

Guys, I'm no mathematician, but it seems to me that some additional information is needed to get definitive answers to your questions regarding how much the perimeter increased for each mile of advance. The most obvious bits of info lacking is the width of the beachhead and the width of the advance.

If you assume the beachhead is 1 mile wide (picked for mathematical convenience) and the initial advance is straight inland from the center of the beachhead, you could think of the perimeter as a triangle with a base of 1 mile and a height of 1 mile. The length of one side of the triange would be the square roote of two (1.414). The perimeter, not including the beach behind you, would be 2 x 1.414 = 2.828, or pretty close to three.

Things get a lot more complicated after that depending on the width of the frontage and the evenness of advance.

I think this gives an even better approximation of the actual case than my answer, which assumed that the perimeter was expanded evenly in all directions, which wasn't historically true.

BTW, it can be mathematically demonstrated that the increase of perimeter can in no case be less than 2 miles for every mile advanced. Proof left to the student.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

Hmm. Well, I must be mistaken about that then (IIRC, I got the larger figure from Ellis, Cassino). My apologies.

No apology required, but I wonder how Ellis arrived at his figure.

:confused:

Michael

[dieseltaylor]

Fascinating mathematics. So with 2 Divisions the population density must have been quite high.

A few thoughts spring to mind

Hard to set up any defence in depth with a restricted area.

I assume that the naval forces present had no trouble shooting beyond the perimeter and then the air power to interdict moving columns reacting to a foray into the rear of the Germans.

Reliable information from the Italians available?

It does appear that gaining [some]the overlooking hills at least would have been a smart move.

I am with Andreas and Michael on this one.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Fascinating mathematics. So with 2 Divisions the population density must have been quite high.

I recall one of Churchill's gripes was that there were an ungodly number of trucks in the lodgement, especially in light of the fact that they weren't going anywhere.

Michael

[ August 01, 2003, 08:59 AM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

Where the beachhead line should have been established could be a fruitful debate, but talk of Rome, Frascati, Routes 6 & 7, etc, are silly. I think.

Jon, have a look here and here. These are the official maps from the US history available online at CMH. The first map is dated 22/23 Jan. and shows the weakness of German forces. The second is from 29 Jan, and still shows only weakish forces (note all the battalions are "(-)").

I think it should be clear that occupying the road centres 'Junction NE of Ardea', Campoleone/Osteraccia and Cisterna was not a 'silly' or fanciful proposition, and would at the very least have created serious problems for a defensive perimeter to contain the bridgehead later. Highway 7 was certainly within the reach of the landed forces. Cisterna appears to be about 23km from Nettuno, all on decent roads.

[ August 01, 2003, 12:44 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Kingfish]

A couple of interesting quotes from this site

The assault plan assumed the possibility of initial heavy resistance on the beaches, and the certainty of heavy counterattacks once the enemy was fully aware of the extent of the landing. Consequently, VI Corps held out a strong reserve and placed great emphasis on digging in early at initial objectives to repel armored counterattacks. The bulk of the 1 Division, with the 46 Royal Tank Regiment, the 24 Field Regiment, and the So Medium Regiment attached, was to remain on shipboard as a floating reserve.

Farther down the page it states:

By 24 January the 3d Division had occupied the right sector of the initial beachhead along the Mussolini Canal. The 504th Parachute Infantry held the right flank along the main canal; in the center the 15th Infantry, and on its left the 30th Infantry, faced Cisterna along the west branch. Ranger Force relieved all but the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the division left in the quiet central beachhead sector. Meanwhile the 2 Brigade of the 1 Division, under the command of Brig. E. E. J. Moore, rounded out its sector of the beachhead by advancing to the Moletta River line. The remainder of the division was held in Corps reserve in anticipation of an enemy counterattack. In two days VI Corps had secured a beachhead seven miles deep against only scattered opposition.

Thats a sizeable chunk of the British contingent. No doubt that had an effect on the drive to Campeleone. One thing it does point out, VI Corp anticipated a strong German response within days of the landing, and was focused more on defending than exploiting.

Overly cautious? Maybe, but according to Allied intelligence:

From the latest intelligence available on enemy troops in the Rome area, Army G-2 estimated that VI Corps could expect an initial D Day resistance from one division assigned to coast watching' four parachute battalions from Rome, a tank and an antitank battalion, and miscellaneous coast defense personnel, totaling 14,300 men. By D plus 1, another division, an SS infantry regiment from north of Rome, a regimental combat team from XIV Panzer Corps reserve, and perhaps elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division could arrive. By D plus 2 or 3 the enemy might have appreciated that the Allies had weakened the Eighth Army front; if so, he could bring the 26th Panzer Division from that sector to produce a total build-up of 31,000 men.

[Andreas]

Yep Kingfish, and all that Intel was, well, bollocks. There was no heavy resistance on the beaches, there was no division assigned to defending the area. Now, if the first five minutes of your landing show you that one part of the intel is seriously flawed, would it not be a good idea to test whether the rest of it is correct? Which could have been done by immediate aggressive reconnaissance. Instead what seems to have happened is that the forward detachments were pushed out just as far as was planned under the flawed intel and no further, even when they did not meet any resistance. All this when this intel had been shown to be false already. It was the most conservative option possible - well, short of re-embarking. The point is that a less conservative action would in this situation have been justified by the new intel gathered after the landing - there is next to no-one here.

The approach march of 26th Panzer would have taken days (and actually did), which you need to add to the D*2-3 estimate for actually releasing it from the front. The same goes for a lot of other forces. Also note that the CMH report does not seem to even mention the controversy about Lucas ignoring Alexander's intent, if not orders, and seems designed to just gloss over it.

It does say this though, which I note you forgot to quote, although it follows one of your quotes: If the Fifth Army attack in the south were sufficiently powerful and sustained, it should pin down all enemy reserves in that area. G-2 did not believe that the Germans could bring down reinforcements quickly from northern Italy, especially in the face of overwhelming Allied air superiority. Probable build-up from north of Florence was estimated to be not more than two divisions by D plus 16. The final summary by G-2, Fifth Army, on 16 January pointed out the increasing attrition of enemy troops:

Within the last few days there have been increasing indications that enemy strength on the Fifth Army front is ebbing, due to casualties, exhaustion, and possibly lowering of morale. One of the causes of this condition, no doubt, has been the recent, continuous Allied attacks. From this it can be deduced that he has no fresh reserves and very few tired ones. His entire strength will probably be needed to defend his organized defensive positions.

(bolded by me).

[Kingfish]

Hehe, why do I get the feeling we are talking about two different things here?

First off, I will agree with you 101% that Lucas should have advanced farther with the first wave. At the very least he should have secured the hills astride route 7, so as to prevent observation of the invasion beaches. Land the remainder of Brit 1st div and push to Campeleone, while the US 3rd goes for Cisterna, all within the first two days. Then hunker down and await the US 45th and 1st armored to continue on to Route 6. So far so good.

What I do not agree with is that Lucas should have pushed as far as Route 6 with the force he had at the time, and that is exactly what Alexander was calling for. I do not believe he was adequetely equipped for such a deep thrust, regardless of whether or not there were any Germans.

This is what I've been arguing all along.

[Andreas]

KINGFISH:

How far? Quick.

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

What?

KINGFISH:

I say he has to take account of the reserves.

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

Oh. Uhhh, Highway 7?

KINGFISH:

Right.

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

What?

KINGFISH:

There you are.

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

Wait a minute.

KINGFISH:

What?

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

Well, we're-- we're supposed to argue.

KINGFISH:

No, no. I agree--

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

What do you mean, 'no, no, no'?

KINGFISH:

I haven't time. I agree--

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

Well, say something else, then.

KINGFISH:

No, no, no. I just agree with you.

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

Jon!

JON:

Yeah?

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

This bloke won't argue.

JON:

Won't argue?!

KINGFISH:

All right. Do we have to?

ANDREAS THE ARGUER:

Now, look. I say they should have gone for Highway 7.

KINGFISH:

I-- I just agreed with that.

etc. (With apologies to Monty Python)

[JonS]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Fascinating mathematics. So with 2 Divisions the population density must have been quite high.

Diesel,

the beachhead overall was quite crowded, but during the critical battles in February there wasn't an excess of combat units, which is really what this debate is about.

Your assumption about airpower and naval gunnery is mostly ok, but it wasn't the complete panacea you seem to think it would have been. The smaller ships (destroyers) couldn't reach out to the perimeter line that was established between Campoleone and Cisterna, and only a few heavier ships were available. Had VI Corps advanced further into the hills, even this support would have been lost.

The closest airfields were back near Naples, approx 100 miles away, which slowed their response time, limited their time on-station, and meant that there was a critical period each dawn and dusk when no air-cover was available. These time periods are when most of the Allied shipping casualties occurred.

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

I recall one of Churchill's gripes was that there were an ungodly number of trucks in the lodgement, especially in light of the fact that they weren't going anywhere.

Michael,

that is just Churchill showing his traditional ignorance of matters logistical.

The supply services for VI Corps set up a shuttle service with three groups of 500 trucks. One group would be in Naples loading stores, the second would be on the LSTs either heading to Anzio with fresh supplies or returning with salvage, and the third would be in the beachhead unloading their stores and getting ready for the return trip. When an LST from Naples landed at Anzio the trucks on board simply drove off to their assign stores dump, and the empty trucks in the beachhead would drive onto the LSTs.

In this way the turn-around time for the LSTs on the beach was reduced to just 1 hour - down from about 24 hours using traditional methods. It was a very inefficient way to use trucks, but a very efficient way to use the LSTs. And guess which was the limiting factor?

The problem was that in March, Churchill was told that 25,000 trucks had been landed at Anzio - each with a two man crew - and did his prunes. What he wasn't told was that of those 25,000, the vast majority were multiple appearances of the same trucks as part of the shuttle service round-a-bout.

BTW, IMHO, one of the sillier aspects of Op SHINGLE was have a force made up of two nationalities (UK & US). From a logistics POV this was senseless, but the decision was taken to do it that way for a number of political reasons.

(FWIW, I wrote a logistics paper on Op SHINGLE last year. If you are interested, email me for a copy)

Andreas,

I've seen the maps, and plenty of others of a similar ilk. It doesn't really matter what we know now - what matters is what Lucas believed at the time.

1) Was Lucas too passive? Probably.

2) Could Lucas have pushed out further in the first couple of days? Against what we now know to have been the opposition - definately. Especially considering there was no contact to speak of from the afternoon of D-Day till about the morning of D+2.

3) Could Lucas have pushed out too far and endangered the security of the beachhead? Definately.

4) Did Lucas' decisions, flawed though they may have been, provide for the security of the beachhead? Yes - despite what the Germans threw at VI Corps, they were never able to eliminate the beachhead.

The debate here seems to be revolving around how much emphasis to give to each of the above factors, paticularly #3. I think he did a fair (not great) job with the forces he had on hand.

Regards

JonS

P.S. I thought we were bagging Clark, not some underling on a hiding to nothing?

[ August 01, 2003, 10:05 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Breakthrough]

Clark was certainly no worse then the other US commanders when confronted with Germans in strong defensive positions (Bradley in Normandy, Patton at Metz). Patton would surely have been wasted however in a secondary theatre where the US Army sent every square peg outfit. Granted, there were some very good square pegs (10th Mtn, 442 RCT). A great opportunity was missed not bagging the German forces south of Rome in June of 44, but a southern offensive by the end of that year was no certainty. The US command was committed to Overlord as the main thrust in to Europe.

[sonar]

Someone was excusing Clark with the reasoning that he was trying to establish a bridgehead,but a bridgehead and a toehold are a world away.

Clark stood with one foot on the sand and one in the sea.I don't profess to know a great deal about the man but he seems to have had no real grasp on the situation and it looks to me that he had no real plan after the initial assault which was virtually uncontested if I remember.Alexander told Lucas to"get on with all speed"kind of thing"Clark's advice to Lucas was and I Paraphrase{I think} "Don't stick your neck out I did and nearly got it bitten off".There was only one man capable for the job and that was Patton.He was the only allied general who had a total grasp on favoured Blitzkreig tactics that the Germans had emloyed.Patton whould have attempted the breakout with whatever he had at hand and if he hadn't slapped those two wounded men around,untold numbers would have been saved.Churchill's remark about the whole Anzio Affair was(Para again sorry}"I thought I had a wildcat on my hands but ended up with a beached whale"As for the whole liberation of ROMA thing ..well who can count the cost in life lost?

The German army after making the Allies pay in blood and suffering for every yard of Italian soil were now finally in a position where they could be swiftly cut off and another of Hitlers armies would fall like the 6th at Stalingrad and the Afrika Korr in The Tunisian desert.How much of a morale boost would that be for the Normandy boys?Yet what does Clark do?He takes the cake..the carboard display one that bakers put in their window displays that is,the glitering hollow prize.So if you haven't guessed already I for one am not a huge fan of the man no.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Originally posted by JonS:

Diesel,

the beachhead overall was quite crowded, but during the critical battles in February there wasn't an excess of combat units, which is really what this debate is about.

Leave us not forget the 1st Special Service Force held down a frontage far out of proportion to the size of the unit - This features prominently in 1 SSF histories; let me see if I can find the figure.

D-Day Dodgers by Dancocks says this (emphasis added in case it actually helps with any debate on the length of the perimeter):

...the Force promptly took over one-quarter of Anzio's thirty-mile-long front.....The Force was spread dangerously thin. Its front line was held by an average of only one man per twelve yards.

This was at the start of February.

[ August 01, 2003, 11:01 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Leave us not forget the 1st Special Service Force held down a frontage far out of proportion to the size of the unit - This features prominently in 1 SSF histories; let me see if I can find the figure.

D-Day Dodgers by Dancocks says this:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> ...the Force promptly took over one-quarter of Anzio's thirty-mile-long front.....The Force was spread dangerously thin. Its front line was held by an average of only one man per twelve yards.

</font>

[Michael Dorosh]

The Hermann Goering was not an inconsiderably skilled opponent; I'd say tying them down was not unlike the British in Normandy tying down SS panzers in the same way, on a larger scale.

The HG actually calculated that the 1SSF was an entire division since they knew that their OOB was made up of 3 "regiments" - not knowing the term was used deliberately to fool German intelligence.

Nonetheless, the suggestion was made earlier that it must have been a "crowded bridgehead"; certainly 12 men per yard in at least one sector of the front is evidence that it was not thus all over...

[ August 01, 2003, 11:15 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

The problem was that in March, Churchill was told that 25,000 trucks had been landed at Anzio - each with a two man crew - and did his prunes. What he wasn't told was that of those 25,000, the vast majority were multiple appearances of the same trucks as part of the shuttle service round-a-bout.

Ah! That goes a long way towards explaining the matter. But...one might be excused for thinking that by the time he got around to writing his memoir he would have learned of and corrected his mistake. But then this isn't the first time I've come across Churchill living up to his boast that history would be kind to him because he would write it.

Michael

[Andreas]

I would not give a lot on what Churchill said about operations in the Mediterranean from Italy onwards. It appears to me he checked in his brain at the door whenever he went to a meeting about it. In autumn 1943 he was perfectly happy to waste quite a large force (at least a brigade+ of infantry, the LRDG, a couple of destroyers and a squadron or so of Spitfires) in the ill-advised Dodecanese venture. They might have come in handy at Anzio, or anywhere else for that matter.

Michael, I have to agree with Jon - while HG was a skilled opponent, where SSF was sitting not a lot did happen. The Mussolini channel combined with the Pontine Marches was a very good protection - also, for much of that line most of the ship's artillery could work quite well, even on the smaller units. This is IMO confirmed by the fact that the main fighting went on in the other areas, notably Aprilia 'The factory') and in the general direction from there to Cisterna, east of Padiglione wood. Seems to me that maybe the unit history is out to make things a bit more glorious than they were.

As for dissing Clark - well yes, he gave Lucas that stupid advice, didn't he? In best Teflon-management manner, Lucas than had to go.

[Andreas]

BTW - while googling for the Leavenworth Paper on Petsamo-Kirkenes, I found this one on the Rangers at Cisterna. Quite interesting and topical. While on a different site, this appears to be Chapter 4 of a Leavenworth Staff College paper on Ranger missions in WW2.

Rangers at Cisterna

Does anyone know if Leavenworth papers are still accessible from outside the US post 9/11? If so, can someone email me the link please?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

BTW, IMHO, one of the sillier aspects of Op SHINGLE was have a force made up of two nationalities (UK & US). From a logistics POV this was senseless, but the decision was taken to do it that way for a number of political reasons.

(FWIW, I wrote a logistics paper on Op SHINGLE last year. If you are interested, email me for a copy)

Jon, I forgot about this one. I am not sure (but you certainly know more about it than I do) this was so silly given that the initial planning was not "and we will get ourselves hemmed in and stay here for four months, not going anywhere.", but rather expected a quicker link-up. IIRC most of the landings of multi-divisional size (with the exception of TORCH and DRAGOON), were combined landings. HUSKY, AVALANCHE, SHINGLE, OVERLORD certainly were. In all of these cases, a quick progression away from the beaches presumably brought bigger benefits of having two forces available, outweighing the problems created initially in the logistics department. The failure to get out of the beachhead at Anzio however did not bring that benefit.

Now, since we are rubbishing Clark, how about his interference in the break-out battles. Was that the cause for the escape of the Germans, or do inepet staffers of the British forces, and German Überingenuity have something more to do with it? ISTR Ellis is very generous in rubbishing everyone involved, except (surprise!) Juin and the CEF. I also seem to remember that there was a third way out through the mountains apart from Highways 6 & 7.

BTW - regarding Ellis, his lofty statements about the inability of Allied airpower to threaten German LOCs (in particular his calculation about the required tonnage of supplies and the capacity of the rail network) do not seem to be confirmed by German sources, who e.g. felt that at Anzio they really did not have enough artillery ammunition to deal with the Allies.

[Ex Bellator]

Another good link - well worth a read. For example:

Shortly after noon, enemy paratroopers supported by armored personnel carriers began marching about a dozen captured Rangers toward the center of the 1st and ad Ranger Battalions' position in an attempt to force an American surrender. Ranger marksmen shot two German guards, but the Germans retaliated by bayoneting two of the prisoners and continued to march the rest forward.

The same sequence was repeated a second time- two Germans were shot and two prisoners were bayoneted. This time, however, more Rangers surrendered. The Germans continued to march their captives, now numbering about eighty, toward the center of the Rangers' position shouting that they would shoot the prisoners if the remaining Rangers did not surrender.

For a third time, the surrounded Americans opened fire, but when several prisoners were accidentally killed along with one or two Germans, a few men "who were evidently new to combat got hysterical and started to leave their positions and surrender." They were ordered not to give up but continued to do so, and the piecemeal surrender continued. Even an attempt by the more determined Rangers "to stop" those who wished to surrender "by shooting them" failed.

War is hell.