Colorful Story of the Italian Army vs Britsh/Australian troops in North Africa

[William amos]

Well I wasnt trying to give a seminar on Western desert battles but rather just share a story I found interesting on the net. Was meant to be colorful NOT history lesson.

Btw here is an Italian OOB site and info..

North African High Command (Marshal Rodolfo Graziani) - HQ at Cirene

3rd Medium Tank Battalion (M13s arriving)

2 X Paratrooper battalions - Tolemaide

Superior Artillery Command

X Corps Artillery - Soluch

XX Corps Artillery - Bengasi

XXI Army Corps (Gen. Lorenzo Dalmazzo) - HQ at Beda Littoria

61st Infantry Division "Sirte" (Gen. Vincenzo della Mura) - HQ at Beda Littoria

2nd CCNN Division "28 Ottobre" (Luogotente Gen. Francesco Argentino) - at Barta

Colonial Blackshirt Militia Volunteer Battalion - Barce

5th Army (Gen. Italo Gariboldi) - HQ in Tripoli

X Army Corps (General Alberto Barbieri) - SW of Tripoli, HQ Garian

25th Infantry Division "Bologna" (Gen. Mario Marghinotti)

55th Infantry Division "Savona" (Gen. Pietro Maggiani)

XX Army Corps (Gen. Ferdinando Cona) - SW of Tripoli at the coast, HQ Tagiura

17th Infantry Division "Pavia" (Gen. Pietro Zaglio)

27th Infantry Division "Brescia" (Gen. Giuseppe Cremascoli)

60th Infantry Division "Sabratha" (Gen. Guido della Bona)

10th Army (Gen. Mario Berti) - HQ at Bardia

1st Tank Group (Col. Pitassi Aresca) - Buq Buq

1 X medium tank battalion

3 X light tank battalion

2nd Tank Group (Col. Antonio Trivioli) - Bardia

1 X medium tank battalion

1 X light tank battalion

Frontier Guards - Buq Buq

1 X MG battalion of the "LAnciero Vittorio Emanuele II" Cavalry Regiment

18th Libyan Battalion

XXII Army Corps (Gen. Pitassi Mannella) - HQ at Tobruk

4th CCNN Division "3 Gennaio" (Gen. Fabio Merzari) - at El Adem

64th Infantry Division "Cantanzaro" (Gen. Lorenzo Mugnai) - at Gambut

XXIII Army Corps (Gen. Annibale Bergonzoli) - HQ at Sollum

62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica" (Gen. Ruggero Tracchia) - at Sidi Omar - Halfaya Pass - Sollum and along escarpment

63rd Infantry Division "Cirene" (Gen. Allessandro de Guidi) - at Rabit and Sofafi

1st CCNN Division "23 Marzo" (Console Gen. Francesco Antonelli) - between Buq Buq and Sidi el Barrani.

Libyan Divisional Group (Gen. Sebastiano Gallina) - HQ at Sidi el Barrani

1st Libyan Division "Sibelle" (Gen. Giovanni Serio)

2nd Libyan Division "Pescatori" (Gen. Armando Pescatori)

"Maletti" Libyan Group (Gen. Pietro Maletti).

Italian

[ May 08, 2003, 02:47 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]

[JonS]

JasonC,

Dr N.D. Leslie-Piquy asked me to make the following comments.

Originally posted by JasonC:

After the 4th Indian was withdrawn, there was a brief period when the 7th AD was basically alone. That was the period of the Bardia battle. Then the 6th Australian arrived to replace the 4th Indian, in time for the fight at Tobruk.

The Aussies took Bardia.

The standard procedure was for the 7th AB portion of the 7th AD, lead by the divisional recon armor in 11 Hussars, to loop round the desert flank of each successive position and block the route of retreat. The 4th AB portion attacked up the road. If an infantry divison was available, it took the road role, or it and 4 AB took out the forward position from two angles or sides.

A reasonable summary, except I can't imagine where it would apply. There was the initial battle(s) around Sidi Barrani, which were carefully planned and rehearsed. Next was Bardia - a fortress assault. After that was Tobruk - another fortress assault. Then the Aussies went through the mountains around the coast to Benghazi while the armour trundled off across the desert to the climactic battle at Beda Fomm. There wasn't really a situation where they had to fight through successive positions - except for the Aussies' trek from Tobruk to Benghazi. They had tanks with them, but this wasn't 7th Armd Div guys (AFAICT), and the terrain wasn't suitable for 'hooking' anyway.

At the decisive "cork in the bottle" fight north of Benghazi, ...

Make that south of Benghazi

Regards

JonS

[ May 08, 2003, 05:35 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JasonC]

Sorry, south of course. On Aussie at the front before Bardia, thanks. I knew the Indians were pulled after Sidi Barrani and the Aussies were in by Tobruk; apparently they were in a little earlier.

As for the description of hooking, it was not restricted to working with the Aussies, but the whole campaign from Sidi Barrani on. The leading armor drove around each of the coastal fortress positions before they were attacked - Sidi-B, Bardia, and Tobruk.

Each was assaulted (by 4th Indian, in the case of the first by 4th AB, later by 6th Australian), but cut off first (by 7 AB, 11 Hussars, etc). That is why the Italians not only lost each position, but lost 20-40k men at each position. The losers could not get away.

Benghazi - cutting across the desert - was in a way a repeat on a larger scale, except the Italians ran, and then the rest surrendered when they couldn't get out, making an assault on Benghazi proper unnecessary.

I hope that clarifies what I meant to say. If it is still innaccurate, by all means correct me.

[JonS]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I hope that clarifies what I meant to say.

It certainly does. I thought you were refering to a succession of lines in the open desert (eg, at the border, at Gazala, etc, or from later in the war at Mareth , Wadi Akarit, etc). I also see what you mean about looping around Bardsia and Tobruk - I just thought that was kind of an obvious way of doing things, and not really examples of the same thing

Regarding the drive across the base of Cyrencia being more of the same; yes, I suppose it is - but on rather a larger scale than I thought you meant

Still, I wonder if that drive across the desert really did lever the Italians out of Benghazi. IIRC, they (the Italians) didn't know what 7th Armd were up to until it was too late. I thought they were fleeing the Aussies rather than the prospect of another encirclement. I shall look into that to see what I can find.

Regards

JonS

[Tha_Field_Marshall]

What does CCNN stand for when talking about Italian infantry?

[William amos]

Originally posted by Tha_Field_Marshall:

What does CCNN stand for when talking about Italian infantry?

Beginning with the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, Italy raised a number of divisions, using men from the CCNN (Camicie Nere = Black shirts (In Italian abbrevations, the initials are doubled if the name is in the plural)) the fascist militia.

[ May 08, 2003, 10:21 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]

[Newbtler]

Oh please...

Always the same thing repeating all over again.

Graziani's Army wasn't composed of cowards, like ANY army in the world.

Our Army lost the first big battle with the British simply because it was a "Feet" Army, our soldiers called themselves "feet motorized", and in a modern desert war, even a single platoon of tanks can just bypass a large group of infantrymen (equipped with everything you can imagine, light and heavy artillery, supplies, the best troops in the world...) and simply leave them to surrender, since they simply can't do anything else.

Exactly the same thing happened to the British just when the Germans arrived in North Africa, and they were throwed back to Egypt before the Crusader offensive.

In a desert war, when there isn't mobility, you can't do too much. It's a no-win situation for the static defenders.

We had some decent tanks too, like the M13/40, but the crewmen arrived with relatively NO training; only during 1941 and after this was improved.

These tanks were used just as they "were",they attacked with impetus, but without coordination, and were meant to be destroyed just before they started their engines.

Please, so many young guys suffered and died , and they did it believing in their cause, and most of them died embracing their guns, for their country.

The CCNN were used after 1940 even as an added "Regiment" in the standard Infantry Division, to raise a bit its fighting capabilities, since it just has 2 Infantry and 1 Artillery Regiment, after the General Pariani's "re-building" of the Army to be used in an ipothetical future "mobile" war: less men, more artillery.

Of course, this was totally wrong, as the war showed...

---

The German soldier amazed the world. The Italian soldier amazed the German soldier.

Erwin Rommel

[William amos]

I dont think the point was that the Italians were cowards.

I think the point was that they were poorly led, poorly equipted and badly motivated to fight for a regime they didnt like.

I think with a few changes the Italians would have been more victorious. WWII was just not the right time or the right cause.

[rexford]

Originally posted by manchildstein II:

could the m13 'shrug off' the british 40mm frontally?

Italian armor on the M13/40 was very brittle, and penetrations by small rounds usually wiped out the entire crew due to flying fragments of armor on the inside of the tank. Those sand bags were piled on for a reason.

Italian armor was short on alloys.

During the research for our book we were furnished with a report by an Italian tanker who fought the Germans in Rome during September 1943, where he attempted to use the front of an M13/40 for an anvil to straighten a large nail and the nail left a scar in the armor.

After 1941, Italian armor improved and penetration photo's do show clean holes instead of ragged ones although the resistance to penetration appears to have suffered even after the improvements.

I read a small book by a unit using the 2 pdr Portee, where the gun was mounted on the back of trucks, barrel pointing towards the truck rear. GUNS AGAINST TANKS was the title, and I found it at the New York State Library.

The gun crews found that one 2 pdr AP hit on a PzKpfw II or M13/40 was enough to stop the tank, but 2 to 3 were needed with PzKpfw IIIG (30mm frontal armor). 2 pdr penetrations were with 40mm solid shot that could fracture against face-hardened armor.

With regard to small round damage, there is a picture of a Valentine tank that was penetrated about 25 or so times by 50mm AP and the crew had continued to fight on for some time.

[manchildstein (ii)]

at least for armored combat... it sounds like the british 40mm was better than the soviet 45mm... was the main difference between the two ammo quality?

i hope they have 'british 40mm trucks' in cmak

[rexford]

British 2 pdr AP is a better panzer penetrator than 45mm gun up until early 1942 when 45mm guns get APCR.

Penetration data follows:

British 2 pdr AP vs Russian 45mm ammo.

======================================

British 2 pdr AP fired at 792 m/s

Homogeneous armor

82mm at 100m, 63mm at 500m, 46mm at 1000m, 34mm at 1500m

Face-hardened armor62mm at 100m, 50mm at 500m, 38mm at 1000m, 28mm at 1500m

=======================================

Russian 45mm AP fired at 760 m/s

Homogeneous armor

61mm at 100m, 46mm at 500m, 32mm at 1000m, 22mm at 1500m

Face-hardened armor

53mm at 100m, 39mm at 500m, 27mm at 1000m, 19mm at 1500m

========================================

Russian 45mm APBC fired at 760 m/s

(carries better with range due to aerodynamicallyt shaped ballistic cap windscreen)

Homogeneous armor

62mm at 100m, 45mm at 500m, 35mm at 1000m, 29mm at 1500m

Face-hardened armor

55mm at 100m, 46mm at 500m, 38mm at 1000m, 31mm at 1500m

Russian 45mm ammo was softer than British 2 pdr AP and often contained an HE burster, so it penetrated less. Several sources indicate that 45mm ammo was badly manufactured/heat treated and suffered from brittle nose material, which decreased the above penetration estimates by -29% to -50%.

The 45mm ammo penetration problems due to improper heat treatment were supposed to last throughout 1941, although several references say the problems lasted through 1943. See http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Base/1852/57mm.html#24

Some info suggests that 45mm ammo could not penetrate the 30mm armor on PzKpfw IIIG's beyond 500m during 1941 battles.

However, 45mm guns fired cannister and had a very good HE round. 2 pdr fired neither in the desert through much of the campaign.

One disadvantage of 2 pdr anti-tank guns is the shield armoring, where Germans used face-hardened shields which could bounce some bullets, while Brits did not face-harden gun shields based on the limited stuff I've read.

If German tanks put an armor piercing round in their machine gun ammo 2 pdr ATG were in trouble. But even with AP bullets the shields might be too vulnerable.

One other goodie. 2 pdr AP had a shatter gap problem against many panzers, where it would fail if it had too much penetration!

This could result in a discontinuous penetration range, the gun would penetrate to 400m, then fail to 800m, then penetrate again for a further distance. Or the gun would fail from point blank to some close range, and then start penetrating.

In a test against the Tiger homogeneous side armor at 100 yards, 2 pdr AP with 82mm penetration stuck in the side of the Tiger 62mm lower hull side and failed to completely penetrate.

2 pdr AP had many problems that don't show up in the data.

However, I read an account of an Australian unit in the desert where a German armored car was driving away from the Aussies and was beyond the range markings for the 2 pdr ATG (beyond 2000 yards). An Australian soldier aimed the gun using an eyeball estimate for elevation and hit the armored car on the first shot, stopping the vehicle with a penetration of the rear armor.

[ May 09, 2003, 08:38 PM: Message edited by: rexford ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by rexford:

... I read a small book by a unit using the 2 pdr Portee, where the gun was mounted on the back of trucks, barrel pointing towards the truck rear. GUNS AGAINST TANKS was the title, and I found it at the New York State Library. ...

For those who haven't seen them, here are a couple of happy snaps of the 2-pdr in portee.

It may not be obvious from the photos, but it should be noted that the guns weren't permanently affixed to the trucks. It was mainly a way of transporting them around the place, and it just so happened that they could be fired in that position too.

The disciples of maneauver took hold of this idea, and cost the British Army a lot of guns and anti-tank gunners during 1941 and 42. The advantages in mobility were more than offset by the disadvantages in vulnerability. From about mid 1942 (after the first battles at El Alamein), doctrine changed, and the guns were no longer to be fought from portee, rather they were to be dismounted and dug in.

With respect to CM:AK, since there are already several AA guns that fire from the back of trucks in CM:BO and CM:BB, it would be rather surprising if the 2-pdr portee wasn't included. IMHO.

Regards

JonS

[JonS]

Originally posted by JasonC:

... By December 7 AD had 167 [tanks], ...

There were 7 battalion sized armor units at the start of the campaign - 3, 7, 8, and 11 Hussars, and 1, 2 and 7 RTR. The average tank strength of these was 40-50, but I haven't seen a detailed breakdown.

7 RTR had Matilda IIs (there were no Matilda Is, those only saw action in France, around Arras) and supported the 4th Indian (infantry) division, until it was withdrawn.

2 RTR was the only other formation with Matildas, at the start anyway. It was part of 4th Armoured Brigade of the 7th AD. But after the first round of fighting, it shows up with Cruisers (A9 and A10) rather than Matildas. ...

The 7th AB portion had Mark VI lights and some Cruisers, which early on were mixed A9s and A10s, and by the end of the campaign had transitioned to the faster A13 model. ...

But the majority of the tanks were Mark VI lights, which are MG only main armament "tankettes". They outnumbered the cruisers by about 2 to 1. ...

Jason & Andreas,

I did some digging and came up with the following, which is far from exhaustive.

There were seven armoured regiments (bns in US parlance), but 11th Hussars were equipped with Rolls Royce armoured cars and thus should not be counted amongst them.

The seven were 3, 7, & 8 Hussars, and 1, 2, 6, & 7 RTR. These regts were distrubuted thus:

* 4th Armoured Brigade (7th Armd Div)

. . 7th Hussars

. . 2nd RTR

. . 6th RTR

* 7th Armoured Brigade (7th Armd Div)

. . 3rd Hussars

. . 8th Hussars

. . 1st RTR

* Corps Troops (Western Desert Force)

. . 7th RTR

7RTR was equipped with 48 x Matilda II at the start of Op COMPASS (Dec 7th 1940). On the 8th they were down to 45, and by the 10th or 11th had just ten 'runners' left. By Jan 3rd and the attack on Bardia they were back up to 22 runners. Their last action in this campaign was the attack on Tobruk on Jan 21st. This was the only Matilda equipped unit for Op COMPASS.

The six armoured regiments in 7th Armd Div were equipped with a mix of 75 cruisers (A9, A10, and small numbers of A13) and 'nearly' 200 lights (Mk II and VI). There were no Valentines - these didn't appear in the Western Desert until around June 1941.

Most of the regiments seem to have had a mixed organisation, with some lights and some cruisers in each unit. Most of these tanks were already pretty well shagged on December 7th, and no new tanks were recieved until after the battle at Beda Fomm on Feb 6th. Some of the originals were destroyed by Italian action, and some by mines, but many more simply fell out for mechanical reasons in the long march from Sidi Barrani. There were very few left at Beda Fomm, and these were throughly worn out.

No tanks went with the 6th Australian Infantry Division through the Jebel Akhdar to Benghazi. 7th RTR had by this time run out of tanks, and the 7th Amrd Div were concentrating at Mechili. From what I can tell the Italians abandoned Benghazi not due to fears about what 7th Amrd Div were up to, but because of pressure by the Aussies and general defeatism caused by their heavy losses to date.

Details cribbed from:

Pitt, The crucible of war: Wavell's command

Chamberlain and Ellis, British and American tanks of world war two

Pemberton, The development of artillery tactics and equipment

Another good source for what each unit was equipped - and indeed for the course of this campaign - with would be the appropriate British Official History, namely

Playfair, I. S. O. et al. Volume 1: The Early Successes Against Italy. London: HMSO, 1954

Oh, BTW, all commentators I have seen remark on the steadfasness and valour of the Italian gunners throughout this campaign, including at Sidi Barrani.

Regards

JonS

[ May 11, 2003, 05:22 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]