How did DIVISIONS deploy to fight?

[jrcar]

I would agree, in short I think the theory was good (and borne out by experiences in WW1 and in WW2), but a div needs SOME infantry, if only to provide the sensor coverage (when you only real sensor is human eyes and ears). In the end the German inf Divs are used as defensive trip wires with enough combat power to force the Soviets to commit to a major attack to penetrate, but not enough staying power (mainly due to the lack of inf to create the depth) to actually stop the attack. The German mobile units are then used to seal off the penetration (in part because they are the only ones with any real offensive combat power). The German Inf were encouraged to stay in defensive strongpoints and wait to be relived, this continues to slow the Soviet advance (especially the B echelon) making it easier to hit the Soviets.

Is this good doctrine? No its only really a holding pattern, the only force capable of offensive action are the mobile divisions. But given the limitations in manpower, the vastness of Russia and the threat it’s the only option the Germans had. I don’t think having 9 inf Bn’s would have helped much either, and there was no manpower to do it anyway.

Going back to the manpower issue if you have only 9,000 men, can’t have any tanks or vehicles, but have an almost unlimited amount of heavy weapons (even if they are captured weapons with limited support) then what gives you better combat power? Lots of rifle inf and few heavy weapons, or more heavy wepaons and less inf? I would suggest the latter.

On the heavy weapons, in Normandy almost all of the arty in the inf divs is captured or foreign equipment. I have a feeling that the ammo limitations were less to do with a lack of rounds in the ammo dumps, but far more to do with the inability to move that ammo forward to the guns through Allied interdiction and a chronic shortage of transport.

On arty cross training it is my understanding that this would occur for the gun crew to an extent, but most of the people in a WW2 German battery are doing stuff other than manning the guns, handling ammo, driving carts and horses, acting as scribes etc etc. These would not be cross trained, and are all suitable occupations for invalids or the not-so-bright. (I did a quick net search for German arty organisations but couldn’t find the detail).

Cheers

Rob

[JonS]

Originally posted by jrcar:

On arty cross training it is my understanding that this would occur for the gun crew to an extent, but most of the people in a WW2 German battery are doing stuff other than manning the guns, handling ammo, driving carts and horses, acting as scribes etc etc. These would not be cross trained, and are all suitable occupations for invalids or the not-so-bright.

Hey! I resemble that remark!

By-the-by, in the NZ Army, artillery usually has the highest entrance criteria from the entrance testing. W're not talking about a bunch of Einsteins or anything, but they do tend to be smarter than the average grunt. In addition to cross training within the roles of a gun-bunny, they also get trained as sigs, surveyors, OP-Acks, etc. Eventually they get training in all the roles in a gun bty. Not sure how this has changed since WWII, but I expect the general training principles haven't changed all that much.

(I did a quick net search for German arty organisations but couldn’t find the detail).

Try here for details.

Regards

JonS

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

BTW - I completely forgot about the change in the number of sections (not platoons I think).

Yes, you are right of course. I knew better than what I posted, but that particular neuron was asleep or on vacation.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by jrcar:

On the heavy weapons, in Normandy almost all of the arty in the inf divs is captured or foreign equipment.

Can you substantiate that claim, because I'm pretty sure it's untrue as presented? There were several divisions that had large portions of their artillery of foreign origin, but taking the 7th. Armee as a whole that was not the case.

Michael

[Tero]

Originally posted by Keke:

The arrangement of 2 three Bn regiments plus an extra Bn was not satisfactory solution (according to Finnish commanders), and the army had started major reorganization, were divisions would have been eventually replaced by 4 Bn Brigades (like the army today).

True. But the idea was to compare the German division with the Finnish division.

(not jaeger Bn, but Erillinen Pataljoona = Separate Bn)

And so it is. Got entangeled in the company/battalion TOE.

Btw, when it comes to "rather specific circumstances of fighting in Finland", I here this every time when it's pointed out that Soviet operations had more difficulties there than against Germans. I just wonder how "normal" the conditions then were in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation...

Most of the time people forget about AG North and how it performed in the latter stages of the war...

[jrcar]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by jrcar:

On the heavy weapons, in Normandy almost all of the arty in the inf divs is captured or foreign equipment.

Can you substantiate that claim, because I'm pretty sure it's untrue as presented? There were several divisions that had large portions of their artillery of foreign origin, but taking the 7th. Armee as a whole that was not the case.

Michael </font>

[jrcar]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by jrcar:

On arty cross training it is my understanding that this would occur for the gun crew to an extent, but most of the people in a WW2 German battery are doing stuff other than manning the guns, handling ammo, driving carts and horses, acting as scribes etc etc. These would not be cross trained, and are all suitable occupations for invalids or the not-so-bright.

Hey! I resemble that remark!

By-the-by, in the NZ Army, artillery usually has the highest entrance criteria from the entrance testing. W're not talking about a bunch of Einsteins or anything, but they do tend to be smarter than the average grunt. In addition to cross training within the roles of a gun-bunny, they also get trained as sigs, surveyors, OP-Acks, etc. Eventually they get training in all the roles in a gun bty. Not sure how this has changed since WWII, but I expect the general training principles haven't changed all that much.

(I did a quick net search for German arty organisations but couldn’t find the detail).

Try here for details.

Regards

JonS </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks, Rob. That's a good answer (I note that you have now backed off from your claim that "almost all of the divisional artillery was captured or foreign" ). But now I have another question: how much of

GHQ Arty Units

Arty Brig 704 is all German

Arty Abt 101 is All German

Arty Abt 456 is 2/3 foreign (122 and 152)

Arty Abt 457 is 2/3 foreign (152's)

Arty Abt 460 is all foreign (122 and 152)

Arty Abt 555 is all foreign (122)

Arty Abt 628 is all German

Arty Abt 763 is all German

Arty Abt 989 is all foreign (122)

Arty Abt 992 is all foreign (152)

Arty Abt 1152 is all foreign (122)

Arty Abt 1192 is all foreign (Italian 149)

Arty Abt 1193 is all foreign (Italian 149)

Arty Abt 1194 is all foreign (Italian 149)

Arty Abt 1198 is all foreign (Italian 149)

Plus 5 Werfer (Rocket) brigades.

So in the Army arty park over half is foreign.

were devoted exclusively to coastal (i.e. anti-shipping) defense?

Michael

[ August 01, 2003, 09:11 AM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[Andreas]

The Germans did actually manufacture ammunition for the 122mm howitzer, so that should probably count as 'German' to all intents and purposes, since the ammunition could be drawn on in the same way as the one for the lFH andd sFH18. I am not sure about whether they did this for the 76mm divisional gun.

BTW - what do these numbers of foreign guns tell you about the industrial capacity of Germany to equip all these new divisions with heavy weapons?

tero - I never forget about AG North, and I think there are probably interesting parallels between the failure of the Red Army to deal AG North the deathblow they meted out to all other Army Groups, and the Red Army's failure to make short work of the Finns. I would have thought the Arctic theatre is quite different from the rest of Finland though - maybe you can tell me if that assumption is correct.

[jrcar]

G'Day Michael, sorry I did overstate it, but I found it significant when I first read about it so it stuck in my mind as an important factor.

My understanding is that all the GHQ arty was used as field arty in Normandy (ie not in emplacements on the channel coast). All these divs listed contributed forces (some as Kampfgruppen) to the battles in Normandy.

*****

Andreas

On industrial capacity I would include the ability to use, support and sustain captured equipment as an industrial capacity (H'mm maybe capability is a better term). Sure they didn't have to build it in the first place, but they did more than just use the guns until they broke or ran out of ammo.

But the fact that they had all these useful weapons meant that they could carry out the firepower centric approach that was the result (or the driver?) to have 6 Inf bn divs.

Given Germany's situation it made sense.

Cheers

Rob

[Grisha]

Most of the time people forget about AG North and how it performed in the latter stages of the war...

Tero, are you referring to the first AGN that was bottled up in the Courland peninsula, or the second AGN that was formerly AGC which had been isolated along the coast by Danzig? The second AGN did give the Soviets cause for concern during the final stages of the Vistula-Oder operation. However, this last iteration of AGN was reduced to ineffectiveness by March 1945.

[Michael Emrys]

Hmm, I assumed Tero was referring to that part of AGN that retreated into Norway.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Hmm, I assumed Tero was referring to that part of AGN that retreated into Norway.

Michael

That was not Army Group North. I have no idea what they called them, but AG North was (1941-45) fighting in the Baltic states and the Kurland. After it was renamed to AG Kurland, parts of the old AG Centre became AG North, fighting in East/Pommerania and around Danzig.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by jrcar:

Given Germany's situation it made sense.

On that question - has anyone here read Maximilian Fretter-Pico's 'Verratene Infanterie', a book dealing with the infantry divisions in the ast 1941-45? Maybe that could give us some info from the horse's mouth on this question? fretter-Pico started Barbarossa as commander of either 97th or 101st Jäger Division, then became GOC XXX.AK, and ended it in charge of the Harz defense.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

BTW - what do these numbers of foreign guns tell you about the industrial capacity of Germany to equip all these new divisions with heavy weapons?

How does that reflect the fighting capabilities of of the formations ? The Finnish army arty was alomost 90% captured and they did not fare too bad, all things considered.

I think there are probably interesting parallels between the failure of the Red Army to deal AG North the deathblow they meted out to all other Army Groups, and the Red Army's failure to make short work of the Finns.

True. It is funny in a way that the Finnish effort has been regarded as a failure while the AG North effort has been regarded as a success (of sorts).

I would have thought the Arctic theatre is quite different from the rest of Finland though - maybe you can tell me if that assumption is correct.

It is different. But not all of it.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tero:

Originally posted by Andreas:

BTW - what do these numbers of foreign guns tell you about the industrial capacity of Germany to equip all these new divisions with heavy weapons?

How does that reflect the fighting capabilities of of the formations ? The Finnish army arty was alomost 90% captured and they did not fare too bad, all things considered.

How many varieties of guns/HMGs? How many varieties of vehicles? How many of these in total? Relying on captured or self-manufactured ammunition stock? On how many fronts? Over what distance did the logistical system have to support it? It does not reflect directly on the fighting capabilities of these formations whether they are equipped with the German lFH18 or the Soviet 122mm howitzer (indeed, the 122mm is probably the better gun), but it creates a logistical nightmare, one exacerbated by many factors that did not apply to the Finnish army at all.

Another thing I feel has not quite been looked at enough is the shortage of specialists (e.g. radio operators, pioneers, etc.) that also is exacerbated by the creation of additional units. I am still unconvinced about the firepower benefit outweighing the drawbacks of creating the additional overhead within the system. These specialists were in short supply, as far as I know, and their training and their equipment were constantly lacking. Every new division needed a signals battalion to be able to function, plus signals equipment in the sub-formations. The same (although not as critical) for pioneer and transport assets.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Tero:

How does that reflect the fighting capabilities of of the formations ? The Finnish army arty was alomost 90% captured and they did not fare too bad, all things considered.

I think you exaggerating a bit, although it has said that the best supplier for the Finnish Army was the Red Army.

Originally posted by Tero:

True. It is funny in a way that the Finnish effort has been regarded as a failure while the AG North effort has been regarded as a success (of sorts).

Now you got me all confused. Who has regarded Finnish effort as a failure compared to what German AG? :confused:

Edit: After rereading your post, I see you meant the actual AG North. I haven't ever heard such a comparison, and it doesn't sound valid to me.

[ August 02, 2003, 06:57 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

How many varieties of guns/HMGs?

60-odd types of field guns (67 IIRC). 1 basic variant of HMG in the field army (Maxim), IIRC 3-4 subvariants, all with interchangeable ammo. More LMG models, domestic, captured or bought though, only LS-26 and DT in frontline service, both used the same ammo.

How many varieties of vehicles?

Mostly horses.

Motorvehicles were of all makes, mostly civilian vehicles pressed to service.

Airforce flew machines from every major warring nation except Japan.

How many of these in total?

That I have to look up.

Relying on captured or self-manufactured ammunition stock?

Both.

On how many fronts?

Two-three, depends on the time period.

Over what distance did the logistical system have to support it?

Considerable, when you take into account there were not too many motorized vehicles. Also, most of the positions were not along the road net.

It does not reflect directly on the fighting capabilities of these formations whether they are equipped with the German lFH18 or the Soviet 122mm howitzer (indeed, the 122mm is probably the better gun), but it creates a logistical nightmare, one exacerbated by many factors that did not apply to the Finnish army at all.

That is the text book answer. But I have to say the Finnish forces had problems which were solved by using captured weapons and munitions. Also, domestic arms production and selection of weapons for service was geared so that for example the ammunition calibers down to the cartridge casing was identical to the projected major adversary, ie. the Red Army.

EDIT: there were plans to take up the MG-42 by changing the caliber to suit the Finnish supply system. It came to nothing when the Germans could not supply the parts needed.

Another thing I feel has not quite been looked at enough is the shortage of specialists (e.g. radio operators, pioneers, etc.) that also is exacerbated by the creation of additional units.

That is true.

I am still unconvinced about the firepower benefit outweighing the drawbacks of creating the additional overhead within the system.

If there was a firepower benefit ?

Every new division needed a signals battalion to be able to function, plus signals equipment in the sub-formations. The same (although not as critical) for pioneer and transport assets.

How much were they able to cannibalize from the captured equipment or from disbanded units ?

[ August 02, 2003, 05:35 PM: Message edited by: Tero ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tero:

Every new division needed a signals battalion to be able to function, plus signals equipment in the sub-formations. The same (although not as critical) for pioneer and transport assets.

How much were they able to cannibalize from the captured equipment or from disbanded units ?

I was talking of the chaps that did the work, not of the equipment here. Captured kit, maybe a bit in these areas. Cannibalised kit, very little, since most of the disbanded units tended to be disbanded behind Soviet lines, making access to their equipment a tad difficult.

BTW -I would not rate AG North's performance as a success. They just got lucky, and then that luck was wasted because Dönitz wanted to have a training area for his submarines... Gotta love the inter-arms rivalry of the Reich

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

...since most of the disbanded units tended to be disbanded behind Soviet lines, making access to their equipment a tad difficult.

I think you've been living in Jolly Olde England long enough now, Andreas. It's time you moved to the Bahamas!

Michael

[reinald@berlin.com]

My feeling (lacking any documented evidence) is that German ww2 personnel policy was for the best of each arm to go to the Panzer units, followed by the specialist's (radio, mechanics, technical trades, survey), field police, some supply areas (well the bright ones got themselves there!) infantry and arty (with a core of very bright people with mathematical bent).

I'm using the excellent official post-war German history of WWII "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg" (Vol. 5/1) as source.

Contrary to modern armies individual fitness was disregarded by German military bureaucracy. Age was the prime indicator for assessing fitness. The post-WWI years' undernourishment produced a generation that was not as fit as it could have been. Besides that, the average level of physical endurance was higher than today since a majority of the personnel came from a manual working or agricultural background.

Already as early as 1938 the manpower shortage of the Wehrmacht became critical. 3 reasons:

1. The generation that was from the age-perspective most fit for service suffered from low birth rates.

2. Due to Versailles-restrictions trained reserves were hard ot come by, so front line units had to fall back on WWI veterans, retired professional and reserve CO and NCOs. Reserve captains were up to 54 years of age and surely unfit for the mental and physical strain of modern warfare.

3. The person group that was most needed by panzer-forces, young skilled workers in metal and machinery related production, were also most needed by the arms industry and therefore mostly protected from being drafted into the Wehrmacht. Only from 1943 on the Heer began to draft more of these men due to huge personnel losses in the East.

Conclusion: The Wehrmacht, especially the Heer, never had enough men to go round and so they couldn't elaborate much on whom placing where. They had to fill empty slots with the little Ersatz they got, no matter how ill trained or physically unfit.

The Über-Landser beating back hords of Unter-Russians is a myth. IMO the reason why Germany held out so long against superior numbers is that its forces were operationally superiorly led.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by reinald@berlin.com:

The Über-Landser beating back hords of Unter-Russians is a myth. IMO the reason why Germany held out so long against superior numbers is that its forces were operationally superiorly led.

I would agree on both counts, and add that once the Soviets managed to get on a par with that operational capability from 1944 onwards, it was game over for the Germans, with no chance to come back.

Here is (courtesy of Lexikon der Wehrmacht) the makeup of an infantry division of the 3rd Wave, established in 1939/40!

Division personnel

Active soldiers below 1 %

Reserve I 12 % (fully trained conscripts with a minimum of 1 year's service already served)

Reserve II 46% (Conscripts of the so-called "white years" before 1914 with short training of 2- 3 Months)

Landwehr 42 % (older soldiers, some of them trained in WW 1)

In these divisions therefore, 88% of the soldiers were at least 26 years old when war started, and 46% must have been very badly trained.

4th Wave divisions were slightly better:

Division personnel

Active soldiers 9 %

Reserve I 21 % (fully trained conscripts with a minimum of 1 year's service already served)

Reserve II 46% (Conscripts of the so-called "white years" before 1914 with short training of 2- 3 Months)

Landwehr 24 % (older soldiers, some of them trained in WW 1)

Here the age and training situation was considerably better, also because these 14 divisions already 'existed', because they were based on existing replacement formations that had already practiced together. Motorisation levels were comparable to those in 1st Wave divisions.

Now compare the above to the 1st Wave division personnel below:

Division personnel

Active soldiers 78 %

Reserve I 12 % (fully trained conscripts with a minimum of 1 year's service already served)

Reserve II 6% (Conscripts of the so-called "white years" before 1914 with short training of 2- 3 Months)

Landwehr 4 % (older soldiers, some of them trained in WW 1)

As I said, all the data from the goldmine that is Lexikon der Wehrmacht.

It needs to be added though that the high level of active personnel in the 1st Wave formations was quickly diluted, when formations were split off to become part of other, newly established formations. This is all just a paper exercise, but goes to show how far back the Wehrmacht had to reach to come up with personnel even before the war started.

As an aside. My grandfather was drafted into the Wehrmacht at the age of 23, and was a 25-year old private when war started.

[ August 03, 2003, 05:46 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[jrcar]

Thanks to you both, very interesting!

I totally agree on the operational leadership being the determinant, something that we loose sight of in many armies today where individual skills are considered the most important.

Cheers

Rob

[Michael Emrys]

Andreas,

Can you give me some kind of idea how much additional training the Reserve II troops would have received after joining their units but before going into combat?

I have this notion that, at least prior to 1943 the Germans did extensive training within the unit, which would also have helped unit cohesion. And between the war in Poland, and again between the fall of France and Barbarossa they would have had plenty of time for that.

Michael

[reinald@berlin.com]

@ Michael: Allow me to answer your question about the Reserve II personnel:

Those were men belonging to the "White cadres" who due to Versailles restrictions had no military training. They were between 38 and 26 years old in 1939. Due to lack of training facilities only a minority of them received 3 months of reserve training prior to the attack on Poland.

They accounted for 6% of a 1. wave Infantry Division's men, 8% of a 2. wave ID, 46% of a 3. wave ID and another 46% of 4. wave IDs.

Those that could not be included in the 3 months reserve training measures prior to WWII received on-the-job training in 1939 as they were called up.

(Source: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 5/1, p. 708 f.)