The worst General of the war?

[JerseyJohn]

Blashy

The Generals under Hitler didn't have any choice, if they disobeyed his orders they were accused of TREASON!

Kuni

Regarding Timoshenko, I said he was probably awful and added that it isn't that easy to make such judgements about a commander functioning under the Soviet system. It's even more difficult to judge a general who, as you say, had "ups and downs!" In most lines of work if you try explaining a fiasco by saying you were having a bad day you get fired!

[Kuniworth]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

Kuni

Regarding Timoshenko, I said he was probably awful and added that it isn't that easy to make such judgements about a commander functioning under the Soviet system. It's even more difficult to judge a general who, as you say, had "ups and downs!" In most lines of work if you try explaining a fiasco by saying you were having a bad day you get fired!

Agreed.

[JerseyJohn]

Several Soviet generals were unceremoniously shot, some simply vanished, during the early stages of Barbarossa. Their only offense was following Stalin's instructions, often against their own protests. Stalin was executing them not because they had failed, but to make sure they wouldn't be able to say, later on, that they had been ordered by Stalin to carry out militarily unwise decisions.

I'm glad the American general Lucas isn't included on this list. He is universally blamed for the Anzio beached whale. In truth he didn't have enough to troops to both move inland and protect his beachead, so he chose to protect his base. The troops he did send out, several US Army Ranger battalions, were cut off and destroyed. Somehow this is always cited of proof that he was a poor commander -- I have no idea what he was supposed to have done, and I doubt he did either. The operation was poorly planned. Phase One was perfect but there was no allowance for a Phase Two.

There are instances of generals being inept, of course, but I think the vast majority of incidents are of capable or even good commanders being made scapegoats for the shortcomings of higher officers or politicians.

[xwormwood]

Percival - the guy in charge of Singapore who pointed all his guns out to sea because the 'yellow men' obviously weren't skilled enough to attack by land.

I googled a bit about Percival:

quote from 'Defence Plan for Singapore, Media Master's WW2 Battle Guide: "the Chief Engineer of Malaya Command, Brigadier General Ivan Simson tries to persuade Percival to begin constructing defence positions in Singapore before it's too late. Percival, seemingly over burdened by the awesome resposibilities of the northern campaign that is going so badly for him, is incapable of comprehending the gravity of Simson's urgings. The engineer argues that he has been sent to Malaya Command for the precise purpose of ensuring that adequate defence works are undertaken. He points out that whatever static defences there are - arbed wire beach entaglements, minefields, concrete machine-gun pill-boxes, gun emplacements and the like - are all guarding against a long percieved Japanese seaborne invasion from the south. Clearly this is a major miscalculation that needs rectifying. Simson talks of a crash programme to introduce beach defences along the islands's northern coastline combined with patterns of fixed positions in depth at points considered the most likely targets for Japanese assaults across the Straits of Johore.

Amazingly, Percival is unmoved. Simson refers to fallacious but still widely held views in Britain of "Fortress Singapore" being somehow impregnable [much like today everybody holds 'Fortress England' to have been impregnable in 1940]. He remarks that a fortress without defences represents a dangerous contradiction in terms. Percival's eventual reply stuns his Chief Engineer: " Defences are bad for morale - for booth troops and civilians." So Singapore is deprived of its northern defences.

The defence of Singapore was poorly conceived and conducted. Despite clear indications that the Japanese would concentrate their attack on the island's north west, the British commander Lieutenant General Percival, sought to defend the entire coastline leaving him with little depth and an inadequate reserve. The 8th Australian Division, considerably weakened after the fighting in Malaya, was allocated the vital north-western sector. When the Japanese attacked on the night of 8 February 1942 it was too weak and dispersed to hold them back, initiating a disorganised retreat towards the centre of the island. In succeeding days Percival's reluctance to commit reserves from other parts of the island, and a virtual command breakdown in the 8th Division, lead to the British Commonwealth forces being pushed back into a steadily decreasing perimeter around Singapore city. It was an untenable position. Over 1 million civilians remained in the city, the Japanese had captured its main water supply, and their aircraft were free to bomb at will. At 8.30pm on 15 February 1942 over 130,000 troops, including 15,000 Australians, were surrendered to the Japanese. 1,789 Australians had been killed since the 8th Division had entered the fray in Malaya in mid-January and 7,000 of those captured would die before the war's end.

Japanese General Tomoyuki Yama****a:

"My attack on Singapore was a bluff - a bluff that worked. I had 30,000 men and was outnumbered by more than three to one. I knew if I had to fight long for Singapore, then I would be beaten. That was why the surrender had to be arranged at once. I was very frightened all the time that the British would discover our numerical weakness and lack of supplies and force me into disastrous street fighting. When the message came of the enemy surrender, I was very cautious, I was afraid it was a trick"

Yama****a did not know that Percival's intelligence about the Japanese was so poor it could virtually be discounted.

Yama****a later spoke of the surrender meeting: "I realise now that the British Army had about 100,000 men against my three divisions of 30,000 men. They also had many more bullets and other munitions than I had. I did not know how long we could carry on with our munitions very low. I was preparing for an all-out last attack when their surrender offer came, it was a great surprise. In my heart, I was afraid that they would discover that our forces were much less than theirs and that was why I decided I must use all means to make them surrender without terms"

[JerseyJohn]

xwormwood

Great account. To me it's more a comndenation of the British Command structure than against Percival personally.

To me this statement tell most of the story:

Yama****a did not know that Percival's intelligence about the Japanese was so poor it could virtually be discounted."

Percival was almost certainly the wrong man for that assignment. Auchenleck, who prepared the defenses at El Alemain and stopped Rommel in his first effort to break through, would most likely have been better in this situation.

From Percival's view it must have been a daily shock treatment starting with the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse along with the quick loss of his air cover and the frustating defeat on the Malay Penninsula. He wasn't a great general, but I don't think he was one of the war's worst either. The entire campaign was a fiasco. What amazes me is the British General Staff should have had all these possiblities worked out not only before the campaign, but before the war itself!

[boninza]

weiter so, ich will unterhalten werden

[kenfedoroff]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

Great account. To me it's more a comndenation of the British Command structure than against Percival personally.

Piss-poor management in the corporate world results in the loss of jobs... It results in total defeat/death/capture in the military. ...Makes me greatful I never had to suffer the decisions of incompetent generals.

Who was the poor smuck who was in command of the French army during the German blitzkreig? I remember watching the History Channel and they stated he was in a castle somewhere issueing orders by motorcycle courier! He wasn't even hooked up to a radio! That may all be an exageration created for TV, though... not sure about that.

Thanks for the accounts on Percival... I forgot about that poor smuck.

Ken

[JerseyJohn]

kenfedoroff

Before I start let me say first I enjoy reading your posts an awful lot. Seeing these historical figures as "poor schmucks ..." etc. is the way I talk about these things conversationally and it helps bring things back into focus.

What you've read about Maurice Gamelin is true. By 1940 he was past the point of mandatory peacetime retirement so the French made him their commander in chief!

He did indeed command from a palace without a phone and without a radio. His reasoning was he should only command in the broadest possible sense, communicating on purely strategic issues with his Army Group commanders, Georges and Billotte. He felt they should in turn work out the details with their own Army commanders.

In 1942 or 43 he was arrested by the Vichy French who put him on trial for his defeat in 1940. He refused to offer a defense -- can't resist saying it must have been a habit by then -- and his countrymen had no idea what to do with him. So they gave him to the Germans who put him in Buchenwald. He was released by the Americans and died in 1958 in his mid-eighties.

Percival, I don't quite know what to make of. That entire campaign was botched for the Commonwealth on every level. The troops themselves, in Malaysia seem to have been spooked. The Japanese invantry moved on bicycles and when the tires blew they rode on the rims. Hearing them in the foliage somewhere British infantry thought the noise to be tanks and would abandon their prepared positions because they had no anti-tank weapons. Something so thoroughly botched can't all be the fault of a single individual.

The British General Staff, prior to the war, had proclaimed the Malay jungles inpassable to an army, exactly as the French had decided before the fact that German armor couldn't possibly move through the Ardennes.

[Liam]

Interesting information!!!!

I always heard the Japanese were fanatical and would outrun their supply giving their own Blitzkrieg style in the Pacific. It worked a long long longggggggggg way.... you'd have to say for the low cost of their own lives they conquored a Massive amount of Real Estate. Though I think a majority of that jungle was useless. Hardly like European Industrial Sectors. In the end they were stopped in the Coral Sea, no? That and the logistics of being spread out so far, and so thin. Much like the Germans themselves in Russia and leaving the Western Front open to the Allies.

I heard of a case too<if this is Karma> where a bunch of Japanese were eaten by Crocodiles during one of the Jungle Battles. I'm not sure the precise number but it was in the thousands... Very freakie deakie. the figure in my mind was something like 5,000 out of 6,000 men

[blackbellamy]

Concerning MacArthur, I believe his push for "returning" to the Philippines was a blunder resulting in unneeded casualties. We should have skipped the Philippines. Taking them back was not necessary towards forcing a Japanese surrender, and the only reason we invaded was because Mac made his stupid promise and didn't want to look like an idiot.

[Jim Boggs]

Originally posted by blackbellamy:

Concerning MacArthur, I believe his push for "returning" to the Philippines was a blunder resulting in unneeded casualties. We should have skipped the Philippines. Taking them back was not necessary towards forcing a Japanese surrender, and the only reason we invaded was because Mac made his stupid promise and didn't want to look like an idiot.

Actually Admiral Nimitz did advocate bypassing the Philippines in favor of landings on Formosa. At a high level meeting in Hawaii, (attended by Roosevelt, MacArthur, and Nimitz), to decide this very issue, accounts that I have read indicate that Roosevelt was inclined towards supporting the Formosa operation, but MacArthur's eloquence changed his mind.

I am sure that Jersey John will correct any mistakes in my recollection.

[Aztecace]

Originally posted by blackbellamy:

Concerning MacArthur, I believe his push for "returning" to the Philippines was a blunder resulting in unneeded casualties. We should have skipped the Philippines. Taking them back was not necessary towards forcing a Japanese surrender, and the only reason we invaded was because Mac made his stupid promise and didn't want to look like an idiot.

I am think the thousands of US prisoners of war that were freed with the taking of the Phillippines would not call it a blunder.

[JerseyJohn]

blackbellamy, Jim Boggs, Aztecace

I don't think hitting the Phillipines was a military blunder and Jim's interpretation of the Navy plan is exactly as I also see it. Naturally, whether Formosa would have been more suitable militarily will always be open to hypothetical discussion. But there was a much more important issue to be considered. The Phillipine Islands were a United States Protectorate mandated for independance when Japan invaded them.

We had no such committment to Formosa, which had been a Japanese possession since the late 19th Century.

MacArthur stated a very simple fact that nobody was able to argue with. Aside from the excellent point made by Aztecaceregariding both civilian and military prisoners being held there by the thousands, there was the inescapable fact that ALL Phillipinos, at that time, were American Citizens!

Military considerations aside, the United States had to make liberating the Phillipines a top priority. It was as though we were taking back one of the continental forty-eight.

And it had to be liberated at the earliest opportunity.

[ June 08, 2004, 04:25 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[kenfedoroff]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

...The Phillipine Islands were a United States Protectorate mandated for independance when Japan invaded them...

...Military considerations aside, the United States had to make liberating the Phillipines a top priority. It was as though we were taking back one of the continental forty-eight...

Good example/point JJ... many decisions forced on the Generals were made for political reasons, irregardless of whether or not that decision made good military/strategic sense.

I remember reading a story by a Japanese air ace where he claimed the Americans could have walked onto Iwo Jima unopposed at the time, but instead went for the Philipines. Of course, with 20/20 hindsight, it's easy to second guess decisions made under extreme pressure with limited Intel.

I went searching for my book by General Omar Bradley about his Army career, (another book apparently loaned out and never returned... *sigh*).

One of the more interesting parts of the book was dealing with incompetents during WW2. Bradley had to be ruthless in weeding out officers who just couldn't handle combat command (but who were good people that were able to function in other capacities out of combat).

I find this theme repeated by all sides (Axis and Allies)... that not all officers (of any rank) were suitable for combat command... and woe unto them that had to serve under them in combat.

It's interesting to read about it, but I'm most grateful I never had to live it.

Ken

[Red Fleet]

Hitler (who was not a general) did influence the high command in the first blitzkriegs. Many of the generals feared the trench war would repeat itself in the war. --> So in the beginning he encouraged his subordinate commanders to have new ideas.

Later in the war he meddled with everything and sent many many soldiers to their deaths for no gain. The stalingrad operation is only one of the good examples.

[David Brown]

Re: Japanese supply

The Japanese doctrine was for individual soldiers to concentrate on carrying ammunition and let the enemy supply everything else. The Japanese had, by far, the lowest supply needs of any army in the war - at least an order of magnitude smaller than the Americans. This gave the Japanese unparalled mobility in difficult terrain, such as jungles. In Burma, for example, the Japanse constantly outflanked the British by moving through jungle and took the supplies left behind when the British retreated. Once the British figured this out, however, this Japanese strength turned into a major liability. During the defence of the Admin Box near Arakan in 1944, the British stood firm even when surrounded. Resupplied by air the British held out so long that the attacking Japanese troops literally began to starve and were forced to retreat. The important point here is that the British (finally) figured out how to deal with the Japanese tactics. The Japanese, on the other hand, were unable to come up with a response to the changed British tactics.

(See "Last Stand!", by Bryan Perrett for its excellent discussion of the battle of the Admin Box.)