A CM "victory": What is it really trying to model?

[Lt Bull]

I thought I would start a new thread to address what I think are key issues that haven't been properly addressed in other related threads about VLs and victory determination in CM(+) (more recently in http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/016431.html)

Some interesting ideas on how VLs can be handled in CM+ have been thrown around in many other threads as well.

I think perhaps we could be jumping the gun here a bit by not relating it all back to a simple yet important preliminary fundamental question. All these ideas mean nothing (and are very difficult to evaluate) unless we can answer:

WHAT IS IT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO MODEL HERE?

Once we clearly define that in "real world" terms, only then should we start coming up with ideas and answering:

HOW CAN WE BEST MODEL THAT WITHIN CM+?

To begin with, we can consider the "scope and scale" of CM. In "real world" terms, a single CM scenario can currently model:

1) 0-120 minutes of WW2 combat.

2) a combat area ranging in size from 0.06 to 4.8 sq km.

3) force sizes ranging from single platoons/vehicles up to 5 German Rifle Bns or 3 US Rifle Bns + loads of support vehicles (not aware of exact figures, but its huge).

That's quite a range there.

Keeping that firmly in mind, I would hazard a guess that most people are thinking of ideas for battles in the size realm of a "typical" 1500pt 25-30 turn QB on a large map and ignoring the implications on larger sized batles for example. I haven't seen many people consider/discuss the +/- of any ideas when considering the whole "scope and scale" possible in CM.

This is why I think I don't believe a single "simple" answer to the "VL question" (without adequate reasoning) will adequately cover ALL situations and why I do believe it would be best to have a range of different ways to model a range of different battles and circumstances.

Back to the first question:

WHAT IS IT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO MODEL HERE?

Ultimately we are trying to model a way of deciding which player, if any, deserves to "win" a "battle". We won't be able to judge the ideas unless we can refer it back to what we hope it is we are trying to model in "real life".

Are all "real life" battles the same? Are the object of all meeting engagements, probes, attacks and assualts the same for both sides? No, so why should we think there might be a single simple solution for determining "victory" in all situations? A different kind of battle, a different set of victory conditions. Makes sense to me.

I would also point out that when considering the scale and scope of a "typical" QB ("realistically" 25-30 min of a reinforced company sized ME on 1.4 sqkm area with arbitrarily placed VL locations without any immediate strategic/tactical/"real life" significance), it will always be difficult to find a way in which "victory" can be determined. Can we really expect it to be clear cut? Thats why all this moaning about VLs in these battles and what should be done to "fix the VL problem" seems so trivial.

So what I would like to see is for discussion to go back several steps and for people to think more about what it is EXACTLY about a battle that we are trying to establish.

For me, orders are orders. CM has its own way of defining them and it automatically looks after itself. Follow them or fail. It's simple. I can accept the way CM clearly spells them out to me and all it's implications. Leave a VL undefended and you may lose it in the last turn. Tough s*#t! You let that happen. Perhaps you couldn't really have afforded to send your assets to go and fight elsewhere. If that is what is required to ensure you don't lose possesion of the VL, then so be it!

But whether they are "realistic" or not is another issue. If people aren't satisfied with following the orders currently unambigiously defined by CM as it stands, please be more specific on what your alternative suggestions are trying to model in "real life" and how your suggestion then does that. Be careful. A 30 turn 1500pt QB ME is not the be all and end all of definitive WW2 combat (I think they were actually an exception than than the rule).

I don't think these are very easy questions to answer.

Lt Bull

[Forever Babra]

WHAT IS IT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO MODEL HERE?

I would suggest a combination of factors:

- The achievement of local objectives.

- Denying local objectives to the enemy.

- Destruction of enemy forces.

- Conservation of friendly forces.

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Quo fas et gloria ducunt

Stereotypes

The Un-Rant

[crumply]

a good post. rt now it is modeling number of units killed x cost - losses + proximity to vl/100 squared, or something.

i can't imagine a wargame without vls--somedody should, and they should put it in CM2.

[Forever Babra]

It is all well and good to say "I want this" or "I want that", but how would you implement it?

If you accept as true the four elements of victory I posted above, then how will you reflect them in the game without the use of VLs?

If you don't accept them as true, what is your definition of victory and how would you model it?

[Lt Bull]

OK. A good start. These seem to be fundamental to all battles. We can consider each one of these factors as paramters within themselves which can be given "weight" depending on what kind of battle we are trying to simulate.

The last two factors:

- Destruction of enemy forces

- Conservation of friendly forces

are probably more easy to define/assess than the first two:

- The achievement of local objectives

- Denying local objectives to the enemy

I assume these are relating directly to "geographical" objectives.

In "real life", is possession of local objectives easy to define/identify? How is it done? What factors are considered? Is time a factor in it? Do both sides see it the same way?

We must not forget that if we are to develop a "realistic" model for defining victory parameters of a battle, those parameters must also make sense within the scope of the bigger picture of what might be happeneing (but is not dirtectly modelled in CM).

Lt Bull

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Lt Bull:

In "real life", is possession of local objectives easy to define/identify

I want to ponder that a while and answer later. My first instinct says "yes, it's easy to define," but on reflection I see problems.

[crumply]

i don't know enough about military doctrine to understand how they evaluate the success or failure on a tactical level.

probably loss of life and material would be analyzed differently by different sides.

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Lt Bull:

In "real life", is possession of local objectives easy to define/identify? How is it done? What factors are considered? Is time a factor in it? Do both sides see it the same way?

I see here the opportunity to blend our tactical game with operational considerations, and control of objectives can be instrumental in achieving this.

For example, tactically speaking, one building is much like another. A few yards won't make a difference operationally, and it's just as easy to set up a machine gun here as it is in that building across the street. Unless, of course, that building across the street happens to be the Barikady, or the Univermag Department Store. But generally speaking, in a purely tactical engagement, control of objectives should carry no weight. Control of space, however, should, since control of space would demonstrate which side dominated the field at the end of any engagement.

Now, most tactical engagements are unfortunately a part of some "big picture" operationally speaking. If there's an armoured brigade idling behind me (not part of the scenario), waiting for me to clear a route through that town so they can exploit, I'd better do it and do it on time or run the risk of throwing the whole timetable for the op out the window. In these cases, control of specific objectives is crucial for determining victory.

So how to define control? Remember hex-based games and those nasty "zones of control"? The same concept could apply here. Rather than a zone of control, however, I would call it a zone of influence: That space within which one can influence the actions of the enemy. Now, as can be readily imagined, a Tiger tank has a much greater zone of influence than a lone squad; and a battalion's worth of squads has a hell of a zone of influence. If I am a lone squad on a VL, and I see a battalion in front of me, that VL is most definitely not mine.

So I would define control as having A) a physical presence on the objective, and at the same time, not being within the zone of influence of enemy forces. To further refine it, I would amend to read: Not being within a "threatening" zone of influence of enemy units. To use the above example, if I am a lone squad on a VL and the only enemy that can threaten me is a sharpshooter, then I can say I control that VL.

The third, but most obvious, criteria for control of an objective is, of course, if it is behind your lines. But this is really an extension of B above; if it's far enough behind my lines, the enemy cannot influence it, except indirectly.

[Lt Bull]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

I want to ponder that a while and answer later.

Yeah, I often need to do that after reading some of the posts at this forum....hehe.

Conversely, we could also look at it another way: How is LACK of possession of local geographical objectives defined? What are features of this?

Lt Bull

[Lt Bull]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

So I would define control as having A) a physical presence on the objective, and at the same time, not being within the zone of influence of enemy forces. To further refine it, I would amend to read: Not being within a "threatening" zone of influence of enemy units. To use the above example, if I am a lone squad on a VL and the only enemy that can threaten me is a sharpshooter, then I can say I control that VL.

The third, but most obvious, criteria for control of an objective is, of course, if it is behind your lines. But this is really an extension of B above; if it's far enough behind my lines, the enemy cannot influence it, except indirectly.

A well thought out post FB. Nice use of the term "threatening zone of influence". Implies that an enemy at your door step gives you less control over the objective than an enemy in the next suburb. The third criteria is of course generally correct but not entirely. What of the case of say a parachute drop well behind enemy lines? (as in the case of say D-Day and Market Garden). Or even say Patton's 3rd Army breakout after Operation Cobra? Certain objectives were definitively held by forces well behind established front lines

I think at some stage, we also need to start addressing the issue of how "time" factors into victory determination and how it defines a battle.

When does the "test for control" in a "real life" battle start and end?

What determines "who is winning" a battle at any given point in time? (if at all such a judgement can be made).

At the scale of combat CM tries to simulate (especially QB level), what kind of things must happen for us to say that the battle has been won, lost or undecided? When do we decide if the battle has been won, lost or undecided? Does it matter what would've/could've happen if evaluation of the battle were to continue for a few more minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years etc? What does a few minutes of battle mean in the whole scheme of things?

Just a few more issues to consider when thinking about what we actually want CM+ victory determination to be modelling in "real life".

Lt Bull

[Guest Germanboy]

Majdalany, in 'Monte Cassino' defined modern wars as battles for the high ground. Once you have it, through your superior observation you own everything which is within:

a) the view of the objective

the range of your guns

I see CMBO battles as parts of these battles for the high ground or whatever tactical objective you care to think of.

The further you move down the tactical level, the more you have to break down the objective into manageable bits. As a Company CO you may not understand why the woods over there are so important that they warrant the death of half your men. But it may just be that they would either be an avenue for a counter-attack, or a place that has LOS to somewhere else outside your boundary area. For you it is just something you have to take. If you fail, it may affect the progress of your neighbouring units.

I think that there maybe a bit of a misunderstanding of the role and the scope of operational knowledge of junior COs. It would be nice if this could be addressed (with reference to WW II, not to current practice) by someone who knows better than I do.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Majdalany, in 'Monte Cassino' defined modern wars as battles for the high ground. Once you have it, through your superior observation you own everything which is within:

a) the view of the objective

the range of your guns

I see CMBO battles as parts of these battles for the high ground or whatever tactical objective you care to think of.

What if I want to design a scenario to capture a bridge? Scenario designers need that flexibility. Time is easy enough to factor in through the use of "X" number of game turns. Clearly, as in CMBO's current incarnation, if the objective is not taken before the clock runs out, victory suffers.

But being present on the bridge is not in itself control. I may own the bridge, but if I can't send vehicles across it because of an 88 Pillbox which still dominates it, then it is still under a significant zone of enemy influence.

On the other hand, if my objective is to get to the bridge and deny it to the enemy so that HE can't cross it, being present on it with even a very small force would boost the level of victory achieved.

What I think is needed is multiple level of victory definition which take into account operational considerations, or some sort of distinction between the tactical and strategic components of the game. If an attacking force suffers no losses, inflicts massive losses on the enemy, but doesn't achieve the operational objective, then, while they can be said to have won a tactical victory, they may have suffered a strategic defeat. Conversely, if losses are high but the objective is reached or held (Arnhem Bridge anyone?), then, though there may be a tactical defeat, a strategic and very important victory is still possible.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

But being present on the bridge is not in itself control. I may own the bridge, but if I can't send vehicles across it because of an 88 Pillbox which still dominates it, then it is still under a significant zone of enemy influence.

That is what I meant by breaking up the objectives the further down you get. And what Majdalany meant by battling for the high ground. The bridge itself is worthless, if you don't take the overlooking features in the landscape.

If I designed this scenario, taking and holding the bridge would be one Company's task. Clearing the area ahead could be another's. In designing a scenario, I would generally use reinforcements to simluate that, and give appropriate objective markers. E.g. one could be the bridge, the next one a small hill overlooking it (where the enemy may or may not have that 88 pillbox). At first you are then given a company (or somefink) to get to the bridge - once you are there you get reinforcements to take the hill. This kind of operational thinking has to be done by the scenario designer. In QBs it is really not possible to have this added level of complexity, I believe.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Forever Babra]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

If I designed this scenario, taking and holding the bridge would be one Company's task. Clearing the area ahead could be another's.

But what if all I want to design is the first portion? There can be an implication of other, bigger, things happening, but the scenario designer should not be obliged to model them. There may be operational considerations, but CMBO is still a tactical game.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Forever Babra:

But what if all I want to design is the first portion? There can be an implication of other, bigger, things happening, but the scenario designer should not be obliged to model them. There may be operational considerations, but CMBO is still a tactical game.

That's what I tried to say in my first post. If the scenario is designed in the way you describe, why bother complicating the victory conditions. It is not your job to clear the overlooking area. You have an objective (the bridge) and if you get it you did your job well, if you don't, the defender did the job well.

If you were expected to think - you would not be wearing two stripes

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

There are two different points being drilled here. I address the obvious issues in turn.

The scope of CM is not really the whole range it can show. Platoon fights are fun because they are fast, but CM is obviously not made for them. Much depends on purely random individual "rolls" at that scale. On the other end of the scale, regimental actions are not controllable in CM, as individual scenarios. They are "monster", and as unplayable as Campaign For North Africa. The real range scale for forces involved is a company team, including scratch or slightly depleted ones, to a battalion team, including reinforced ones with plenty of extras.

This is also the level of control or command that was actually used in WW for tactical combat. It was a rare fight in WW II, if an entire regiment was within sight of each other in the same battle. And isolated platoons seldom did things besides look for friendly forces, or hold this particular spot as part of a company-wide plan. In command terms, captains to lt. colonels are the people making these sorts of decisions, not generals or sergeants.

Second, the VCs of CM are not trying to do only one thing. And they don't. They are within the control of the scenario designer. The designer can vary the relative important of locations held, how many of those and how valuable, survival or destruction of enemy forces, exit through or away from or around the enemy, stopping him or not letting the enemy get away. The game gives the designer tools to do these things, but he must understand his tools to accomplish them.

Take the example someone gave about the bridge. "The bridge" is one item in the designer's mind perhaps, but he sees right away that control of the near bank helps but isn't control of the bridge. Control of both banks is more like control of the bridge, but it may be under fire. Control of the bridge exits and points that threaten them, is an addition to control of the bridge, but probably a relatively minor one compared to holding both ends.

No where is it written that you have to take one 300 pt flag and put it on top of the bridge, and expect CM's internal routines to "decide" what "control of it" means, and for those 300 pts to just coincidentally be the proper value of the spot. You can put a 100 point flag on the near side of the bridge, or two of them seperated right and left. You can put one 300 pt flag at the far end of the bridge. You can put 2 100 point flags at points further beyond that overlook the bridge. If you want to make the bridge more important and worth considerably higher losses, you can put 2 or 3 large flags very close to each other on the far bank of the bridge. You can make it worth a platoon or worth more than all the forces engaged combined.

Similarly, you can put just 1 100 point flag on some obvious but otherwise unimportant spot more or less in the middle of the map, and add no other VLs or exit VCs. Then the fight will be decided almost exclusively by which force destroys the other or more nearly so, with only a tiny weight given to "possession of the field" afterward, itself only included to help the AI orient itself and to reflect the combat outcome somewhat.

Designers need to use the tools they have, intelligently, and not expect the CM routines to do their own job. It is the scenario designer's job to decide what factors constitute tactical victory for the fight he is setting up. And to understand the CM VC system well enough to make it reflect those desired factors.

Last, there is one other point someone here is obviously trying to drill, about what constitutes the tactical control of a location. I will get to that. But first there is a distinction to be made. The proper role of any given VL, is the one the scenario designer intended to give it, not some fixed reality from WW II military considerations.

The designer may have wanted to measure acreage after 30 minutes to answer the question "who has the initiative on this part of the field?" Or he may have wanted to answer the question "who will have clear observation to the north for artillery FO work for the rest of the afternoon?" Or it may have been, "at this rate, will town A be cleared by the available attacking forces, before reserves arrive?"

There is not a "right" answer between these. The one the designer wants, is the right answer for his scenario. No where is it written that the answer will be the same for each fight by the same designer, or for each designer.

The point I think someone is trying to drill, however, is a frustration with gamey last minute flag grabbing, the alterative to which is a time-dependent award of VCs for objectives held. As in, hold a small flag and get 5 pts per minute you hold it or whatever. Then if you really take it, and hold it for a long enough period to show you are really "in possession", the ground can be considered as "seized" or "held". And if the flag is disputed or see-saws for most of the game, who controls it at the end is irrelevant - the points awarded to both sides will wash out. The thought is that no one really controls the VL in those situations.

In a WW II tactical sense, the reason particular spots of ground usually mattered was for observation and fire that could be delivered from that location. This required being on it safely, able to call for fire at least, and in most cases also required the ability to post a force there safely, sufficient both to hold it and to put out serious direct fire on more distant locations. As in, if the battalion can get onto the top of that ridge, its mortars can hit anything that moves in the valley beyond (observed indirect), and its MGs can rake the whole opposite slope (direct), and the enemy will have to pull out of the next valley or get cut up badly.

Does a single grab of such a flag at the end of a 30 minute period imply the level of control needed for that effect? No. Does a time varying VL do so? No, because it is generally immaterial whether someone holds it for 20 minutes as long as he eventually loses it and doesn't get it back. Would some complex formula for local combat power "projected" to the area of the flag reflect this level of control? No, because reserves or lack thereof may be more important to who keeps it than the forces present in the CM fight. As in, "Company A, get onto that ridge at all costs, Company B will relieve you on the summit and hold it against counterattacks."

The right way to reflect that level of control is to just have a "field" of VLs that "peaks" and the location in question. As in, 2x300 point flags along the line of the summit, and 4x100 point flags below them, 2 on either side of the summit, at distances from which fire could be directed onto the summit itself, ~100 yards or so.

In all that creates a 1000 point objective. Holding the whole summit and near side gives 80% of it vs. 20%, net 60%. The enemy having the opposite side and part of the summit, means it is disputed and neither side controls the place enough to use it for effective observation or fire. If that value is too high for the location, use 2x100 point flags along the summit line and 1 on each side in obvious useful location, e.g. cover ~80-100 yards below the crest.

The point is that designers need to make intelligent use of flags, that is all. The QB "problem" (if there is one) is simply that there isn't any designer - the VLs are being scattered over the field in near-random places and in near-random, but usually high, total value amounts. And in attacks and such, these flags are usually quite near the farthest places forward that the defender is allowed to set up.

What flags do in QBs can be quickly described, therefore. In meeting engagements they reflect local initiative and little else. As in, which side is more likely to have to react to the other's penetrations of the area. The total value of the VLs in meeting engagements is usually too high for small battles, and this encourages bloody-minded smashing of the opposing forces into each other. With larger battles (thus more points "in play" from destruction or loss of forces), the ~400-800 points involved aren't as silly.

In QB attacks, the VLs simply measure whether the attackers penetrated the defense at all. This disallows most defense in depth ideas on all but the largest maps - and large QB maps tend to be wide rather than deep, so often the same is true even on large maps. The defenders are practically on the objective. If the attackers "move" them (in football lineman's lingo), then they get VPs from flags.

I don't think there is anything wrong with CM flag-control mechanics, and there is nothing wrong with VCs in designed scenarios that designers can't fix by using the available tools intelligently. But the QB flags and overall layouts can be tweaked, IMO.

For one thing, the total value of the VLs assigned should have some maximum in relation of the point value of the fight. 800 pts of VLs in an 800 point meeting engagement makes no historical sense - life and death of force was always more important than that, in such even and chance encounters, which could rarely be expected to prove tactically decisive anyway, especially if much of the opposing force lived.

Half the point size of the battle is a better upper-bound for a meeting engagement, varying downward to one 100 point flag. Understand that causalty points tend to break evenly on both sides, and if there is any pronounced gain or loss from them, *net*, the side doing better in that respect has probably won the firefight in a pretty convincing fashion. E.g. 1000 pt battle, one side loses 20% the other 60%. That is a huge difference in losses, but only 400 points in a 1000 point fight, less than half.

With attacks, the QB problem is different. The problem there is that maps tend to be too shallow and to give the defender too little room to set up in, ahead of the flags. It makes sense in these types of fights, to give the attacker points for just generally getting "behind" or "through" the defenders, or forcing them to retreat a considerable distance. It doesn't make much sense to give point totals large compared to forces lost, just for moving the defender at all. With 150% odds, that should not be all that hard.

I think the way to address this is to reduce the size of "no man's land" (NML for short) at set up time, and give the defender more of the map to set up in. NML should be on the order of 250 yards for probes and only 100 yards in assaults, with attacks in between those two. Alternately, the defenders should have 1/2 the map to set up in, for a probe; 2/3rds for an attack; and more like 3/4 to 4/5 for an assault. And the flags should then be placed in a range from the middle of the map, to the last 1/4 - e.g. in the strip 200 - 400 yards from the defender's edge with an 800 yard map "depth".

This would require the attacker to truly get through the defenders to get location VPs. In probes he would only have to "get into" the defender's position, much as he does now in all three. But in the other types, he'd have to go "through", and with the assault battle type, he'd have the feeling of driving msot of the length of the map, through a defended zone.

Those are my VL comments and suggestions, for what they are worth.

[Forever Babra]

Excellent summation, Jason. I think I agree with you on every point except one:

I don't think there is anything wrong with CM flag-control mechanics, and there is nothing wrong with VCs in designed scenarios that designers can't fix by using the available tools intelligently.

Here's the rub. Suppose I am the defender in one of those wide-map, shallow depth defences you speak of (very common in CMBO). If I actually advance forward, I LOSE control of the victory locations. This is something that does need to be addressed, if nothing else. Fortunately, the determination routine for this probably already exists, being the same one used in ops to determine fronts. If the VL is still in one's "zone" when the battle is done, then it should belong to that player.

[Steve McClaire]

Good point about using victory flags in scenario design, Jason. I also agree that the victory flag locations for quick battles could use some tweaking.

As to the 'gamey' last turn victory flag grabbing, I think this could be less of a problem if you just play longer battles. Battles can still be ended early by a cease fire or surrender, but if you have plenty of turns it is more likely for the situation to 'stabilize' towards the end of the game, and help prevent last minute rushes. Historically speaking, I doubt most company / battalion sized actions were fought on such a tight schedule that the objective -had- to be secured in 20-30 minutes. Granted, I'm sure there were some where speed was important, but I don't think a 60 minute time limit is any less realistic for 90% of the battles. The actual fighting would probably take longer to develop, and some people might find that a little dull. But that's personal preference, I guess.

[This message has been edited by Steve McClaire (edited 03-03-2001).]

[Lt Bull]

Good to see some constructive posts. A comprehensive post Jason. Would like to add a few things.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

....the VCs of CM are not trying to do only one thing. And they don't. They are within the control of the scenario designer. The designer can vary the relative important of locations held, how many of those and how valuable, survival or destruction of enemy forces, exit through or away from or around the enemy, stopping him or not letting the enemy get away. The game gives the designer tools to do these things, but he must understand his tools to accomplish them.

Yes. This is why (and for other points you mention below) I think well thought out custom scenarios are much better than QBs if you are looking to play a game where the terrain layout and objectives makes more "realistic" military sense than the randomness of a QB. QBs can be fun, but they can be silly when you have randomly placed VLs in seemingly meaningless locations dictating the flow of the battle. This can lead to very "unorthodox" unit deployments and tactics. You probably have all seen it where a VL is in the middle of an open field and both sides know that any unit actually occupying the VL will get blasted in the open by units hidden away in cover. A weird standoff ensues and with time running out, the only hope of any player being able to hold the VL at games end is if they assault the VL in the last few turns. Do we blame the player(s) and label them "gamey" or the nature of the scenario for this "undesirable" situation? Would this situation have happened if points could be awarded for holding VLs prior to the end of the game? Or if there were NO VLs at all on the map?

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"Similarly, you can put just 1 100 point flag on some obvious but otherwise unimportant spot more or less in the middle of the map, and add no other VLs or exit VCs. Then the fight will be decided almost exclusively by which force destroys the other or more nearly so, with only a tiny weight given to "possession of the field" afterward, itself only included to help the AI orient itself and to reflect the combat outcome somewhat."

Reducing the victory point importance of VLs will also help in reducing the "stand off" situation I have described. But for this discussion, we shouldn't, at any stage, get a fixation on thinking that we are stuck with the way VLs have been defined currently in CM ..."all or nothing points for "control" of areas (always of the same area) determined solely at the end of the last turn"...we are trying to think of better ways to handle them. I wouldn't want to see peoples ideas stifled because they feel they must inherit CM's original "written in stone" VL model (and all the implications associated with it). It's an totally open discussion that has the benefit of our experiences playing CM custom scenarios/ operations and QBs (and any other sources of inspiration).

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"Designers need to use the tools they have, intelligently, and not expect the CM routines to do their own job. It is the scenario designer's job to decide what factors constitute tactical victory for the fight he is setting up. And to understand the CM VC system well enough to make it reflect those desired factors.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

The proper role of any given VL, is the one the scenario designer intended to give it, not some fixed reality from WW II military considerations.

I agree with the first part, but if you want a game to play out like a "realistic" battle (which seems to be what the majority of us all want), then the scenario design (and subsequent gameplay) had better taken into consideration what makes up a "realistic" battle.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

The designer may have wanted to measure acreage after 30 minutes to answer the question "who has the initiative on this part of the field?" Or he may have wanted to answer the question "who will have clear observation to the north for artillery FO work for the rest of the afternoon?" Or it may have been, "at this rate, will town A be cleared by the available attacking forces, before reserves arrive?"

There is not a "right" answer between these. The one the designer wants, is the right answer for his scenario. No where is it written that the answer will be the same for each fight by the same designer, or for each designer.

Absolutely. And what are the chances that a QB is going to result in a "realistic" battlefield situation like any of these? Slim. Hence, VL frustration/"gamey" tactics syndrome.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"The point I think someone is trying to drill, however, is a frustration with gamey last minute flag grabbing, the alterative to which is a time-dependent award of VCs for objectives held. As in, hold a small flag and get 5 pts per minute you hold it or whatever. Then if you really take it, and hold it for a long enough period to show you are really "in possession", the ground can be considered as "seized" or "held". And if the flag is disputed or see-saws for most of the game, who controls it at the end is irrelevant - the points awarded to both sides will wash out. The thought is that no one really controls the VL in those situations."

Certainly will result put a new spin on how QB would be played out.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

In a WW II tactical sense, the reason particular spots of ground usually mattered was for observation and fire that could be delivered from that location. This required being on it safely, able to call for fire at least, and in most cases also required the ability to post a force there safely, sufficient both to hold it and to put out serious direct fire on more distant locations........

Does a single grab of such a flag at the end of a 30 minute period imply the level of control needed for that effect? No.

No, but only if the designers intent was as you had described above. If the designers intent was just that eg. "No enemy sons-of-bitches anywhere near the VL, not even a filter-feeding goddam crew for that matter", then its OK (this is what CM asks of you EVERY TIME btw). Without any design intent as a reference (as in a QB), you can only assume that grabbing a flag in the last turn and altering it to affect the victory outcome was enough in itself to demonstrate the level of control, as seen and ruled by CM, was not sufficient to award victory points either way.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"Does a time varying VL do so? No, because it is generally immaterial whether someone holds it for 20 minutes as long as he eventually loses it and doesn't get it back."

Eventually? So what happens "now" is meaningless in relation to what happens "eventually"? So we shouldn't give credit to Col Frost's men at the Arnhem bridge for holding the bridge for 4 days (denying the Germans free access to send reinforcement down south to Nijmegen) because they EVENTUALLY had to surrender? Was what they did immaterial, irrelevant?

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"Would some complex formula for local combat power "projected" to the area of the flag reflect this level of control? No..."

Not necessarily, but would still make for an interesting battle.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"...., because reserves or lack thereof may be more important to who keeps it than the forces present in the CM fight. As in, "Company A, get onto that ridge at all costs, Company B will relieve you on the summit and hold it against counterattacks.""

Good point, but again, what's the design intent?

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"The right way to reflect that level of control is to just have a "field" of VLs that "peaks" and the location in question."

I think I understand what you are probably trying to achieve by this and I think it is a good concept, though it wouldn't necessarily have to be done as you described. At the moment, the "all or nothing" nature of CM VLs can lead to very abrupt and massive changes in victory point conditions in a very small amount of time with relatively few units involved. Not entirely bad, but has limiting implications. By splitting up the VL area into a number of smaller mini VLs with their VP value decreasing the further from the center, these large instantaneous "step changes" in victory levels by small units can be addressed. This like putting a "line of best fit" through a jagged line graph to make it more "natural".

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

The point is that designers need to make intelligent use of flags, that is all. The QB "problem" (if there is one) is simply that there isn't any designer - the VLs are being scattered over the field in near-random places and in near-random, but usually high, total value amounts. And in attacks and such, these flags are usually quite near the farthest places forward that the defender is allowed to set up.

See comments about QB above.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"What flags do in QBs can be quickly described, therefore. In meeting engagements they reflect local initiative and little else. As in, which side is more likely to have to react to the other's penetrations of the area. The total value of the VLs in meeting engagements is usually too high for small battles, and this encourages bloody-minded smashing of the opposing forces into each other. With larger battles (thus more points "in play" from destruction or loss of forces), the ~400-800 points involved aren't as silly."

Yes. I agree. Having a balance between force size and VL VP points is an important parameter that should be considered regardless.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"In QB attacks, the VLs simply measure whether the attackers penetrated the defense at all. This disallows most defense in depth ideas on all but the largest maps - and large QB maps tend to be wide rather than deep, so often the same is true even on large maps. The defenders are practically on the objective. If the attackers "move" them (in football lineman's lingo), then they get VPs from flags."

I agree that in QBs, it would be good to be able to also have the option of deeper maps rather than wider maps to allow defenders to defend further forward (rather than on) the VLs themselves. Again, it would result in a wider range battlefield situations.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"I don't think there is anything wrong with CM flag-control mechanics, and there is nothing wrong with VCs in designed scenarios that designers can't fix by using the available tools intelligently."

I would say the more tools available to the designer, the greater the range of "realistic" battlefield situations they will be able to create and the less we will have to make excuses for the shortcomings of the game.

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"But the QB flags and overall layouts can be tweaked, IMO."

I hope they will be more than tweaked.

I think we can agree that although the QBs in CM can be convenient and fun at times, they may be disappointing when we expect them to play out like a "realistic" battle would. I have much respect for the scenario designers out there that try to ensure that the battle will play out "realistically". I would really like to see what the scenario designers out there have to say about all this. I'm sure they would have some good ideas. What kind of limitations have you guys come across using the current CM scenario design tools?

It would be reasonable to say that the way CM currently handles VLs and victory point allocation in all battles can lead to a limited number of battlefield situations that wouldn't commonly be seen in "real life" (especially in QBs!!). Keep thinking about what "real life" battlefield situation(s) you would want to see in a CM+ custom scenario and QB and then think about how it can be implemented.

Lt. Bull

[Deathdealer]

I read your ideas about this 'new' way to calculate or consider the role of victory locations. Something came to me which might be of help to get more 'real' situations in QB but also to solve ending results ie. controlling VLs.

------------------

Aki

aka Deathdealer (the Blitz)

[Deathdealer]

I read your ideas about this 'new' way to calculate or consider the role of victory locations. Something came to me which might be of help to get more 'real' situations in QB but also to solve ending results ie. controlling VLs.

1. QB maps: let comp make the map without buildings. Then comp calculates 'good' points in the area considering height and visibility to other areas. Then depending on QB settings (town/village/rural etc.) comp builds up small/large area of village/town/farm and plants a big VL/several VLs in the center (depending on the size of battle) and then adds maybe 2-4 smaller VLs quite close to it (again depending on size of battle).

Now the bigger VLs should have larger area of 'importance' and need to be 'occupaid'. Smaller VLs have similar but smaller area around of them.

Depending on the size of battle comp should build up 1 to n places like this and 1 to n lonely VLs on 'important' places - cross roads, bridges, high ground (anything else?).

Of course here the n has to be small figure.

2. Control of VLs: in the end when situation is settled and comp calculates the results all units should have a 'value of control' which depends on the ammo and their value. The tank with no HE should have smaller value if opposing forces are inf and vice versa. Troops with little or no ammo should get value next to nothing. With inf the value should (may)be calculated with close assault values (40 m) as proposed in another group. All of these values should be considered as circles on the map except with special unit like bunkers which should have their value directed to their orientation.

Now the end results would be calculated on zones of control in contents of VLs. The VLs would be controlled by stronger forces of 'values'.

The real problem would probably be to QBs generation so the comp wouldn't have to place VL on every little hill on the map but with some kind of randomizing we could get far better QB maps than now.

Just a thought thou I'm not sure if this interests you...

------------------

Aki

aka Deathdealer (the Blitz)

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

OK, several points in reply to Lt. Bull, but first one to another fellow, who didn't like the fact that he had to leave men on objectives he had cleared. And another about the clock.

I don't think that is a problem, I think the CM way there is sound. There aren't fronts and lines at the scale of CM. There may be in one situation, but it is not in the least necessary. Many deployments are "all around", or meant to be able to turn and face any direction. Many places are bypassed, including some that may contain known or unknown enemies. And the flanks are in the air, with the forces present artificially restricted by the confines of the map and the length of the clock.

Players may correct assess the threat to their passed VL, and think "I know all his guys left are over there, so I can send everybody at them as long as I don't let them by". But this is the gamey side, not the need of the squad dropped on the VL.

Would a real commander know that he wasn't about to lose the VL to a small counterattack from off-map to his right flank? No. Did he have a tablet engraved by the Deity stating that only the forces he originally faced, and only in the positions he originally faced them, would bother him until the end of a period of exactly 40 minutes? No.

If you can get a squad back to the VL before the end, then you can get off easier with passed objectives than the real world commanders could. But why gamble on that? Drop a squad on the VL. That is more important than hunting down the last broken enemy squad to boost your "score".

Another fellow thinks the clock is unrealistic or at least that longer, 60 minute fights would be more so. I doubt it. For one thing, the infantry runs out of ammo long before then, in close fights. For another, the forces are again not restricted to those shown on the map, except for a limited time window. Beyond that time window, units will give up this area of the fight altogether and retreat, or throw in reserves to continue the battle.

What happens in overly long CM battles, is simply an unrealistic tactical "snowball" effect, whereby the side with the upper hand locally, progressively eliminates all opposition. But that is not how things really happened. The losing side escalated or cut bait and left. They did not hang around to die to the last man by slow and certain processes. What if the enemy got ammo resupply at the 35 minute mark, and your side didn't get it until the hour mark? Etc.

The point is simply that overly long periods, on smaller maps especially, simply give whoever has any local edge way too many cards, and above all way too much certainty about how the rest of the battle, or the rest of the day, will go. You cannot count on fighting only these fellas, and right here, over time scales that long.

Next to Lt. Bull's comments and questions. What problems have I encountered as a scenario designer, with the CM VC conditions?

1. I wanted to be able to provide exit VCs without telling the enemy player that was his opponent's mission. But "exit here" signs are not double-blind. They should be. If the other guy knows the enemy mission, the briefing will tell him ("Don't let him get through ya" or "the enemy will try to get out north"). There should not be any default knowledge of enemy exit VCs, their existence or direction.

Also, I would have liked exit locations set up in the map editor as "zones", but able to be smaller than whole map edges. Sometimes it is a matter of two roads that come from the same map edge but meet in the middle of the map, or the enemy has to be stopped from getting through "here" but on one side is not important (e.g. defender's sector is a corner, not the whole width).

2. The existing objective flags are too "lumpy", since the minimum size is 100 per location. This is OK is very large battles. In smaller ones, a 3:2 split in casualties inflicted can amount to only ~100 points. For such fights, I was forced to use small numbers of flags simply to keep the overall VPs from flags workable. But this eliminates the flexibility available from using several in a "field", or assigning multiple locations to secure e.g. a ridge or other line, rather than point, objective. I could have used 50 pt flags.

3. For exit VPs, "worth 2-3 times their purchase cost" and "other side gets points if they don't exit", is not precise enough information for designer's purposes. Exact ratios stated in the manual would have helped. In one case, I replayed a scenario with dual exit VCs 6 times to tweak the outcomes to "fair", because I didn't know the exact numbers. I realize *players* may not need this level of detail. But scenario designers do.

Not about VLs at all, but a designer's peeve, is I would like to be able to add sections of the map width and height, on either side, not just right and up. Why? Because I am often working to extend an existing map, e.g. to show adjacent locations. Similarly, I'd like to be able to crop the map from either side, not just right and up.

Another unrelated designer's peeve, is no added terrain types with linear obstacle types. Roads can be through woods, yes, but a hedge can't have brush up to the back side of it without a half-tile strip of open ground. This is more of a limitation than you might think. It means, e.g., that the immediate sides of walls are always open ground, etc.

he best way would be to have linear terrain types be "overlays" at the editor stage, with terrain underneath and roads, hedges, etc on top. Then one would not have to hunt through all the different fork-in-tall-pines tiles either. Below the editor level, the implimentation could be the same, with each tile containing normal terrain + line terrain, "calling" the right combo tile, but without the editor user ever having to see or pick among them. I can't imagine this being too hard to program in C or something, and it would save both BTS people and scenario editors a lot of tedious work.

Anyway, I am now rambling so I will stop - LOL.

[Mark IV]

I still think the easiest and least gamey approach to stopping the last minute flag rush is the randomly variable game length, by 3 or 4 turns. Since you never know which turn is actually the penultimate turn, the last minute squad-fragment rush either never happens, or can be dealt with. Worked great in SP and sounds easy to implement... compared to some of the other suggestions I've heard.

Re: defending bridges and other victory assessment issues, I don't think the length of time a defender occupies a VL in the context of a game is relevant. Since we are talking about 20-120 minutes of real time, the defense of a VL is sort of boolean- you either held it, or you didn't. A stubborn defense which is eventually forced off a VL has its own reward, in the number of casualties it inflicted in the process (counting directly toward victory assessment), and the time and resources it consumed of the attacker's clock and assets. But the VL itself has passed to enemy control within the specified time, so by definition the attacker has achieved that part of his mission, and should be credited for so doing.

If the goal of the scenario is to model a delaying action, this is simulated now with a succession of flags of increasing value leading to the defending map edge.

Otherwise, blocking a bridge or holding a pass has an intrinsic value that cannot be directly offset by a spirited, but ultimately unsuccessful, defense. In the context of a couple hours, tops, the Fuehrer isn't going to care if you held the bridge for an hour and a half; at the end of the day the Allies are pouring over the bridge and he's screwed again. If you whacked so many Allies in the process that their casualties offset the loss of the bridge VL, great; the more successful commander gets the win.

There were certainly objectives deemed valuable enough to expend a company or a battalion for. Those are the VLs, or benefits. The casualties incurred in the process (costs) are the mark of the commander's skill, and the modifier to the simple tally of controlled VLs at the end of the game.

The guy with the lower cost/benefit ratio (in the local, CM, tactical sense) is the winner.

[This message has been edited by Mark IV (edited 03-04-2001).]

[Steve McClaire]

Jason wrote:

What happens in overly long CM battles, is simply an unrealistic tactical "snowball" effect, whereby the side with the upper hand locally, progressively eliminates all opposition. But that is not how things really happened. The losing side escalated or cut bait and left. They did not hang around to die to the last man by slow and certain processes.

There's nothing in CMBO that forces the two players to play out the entire length of a battle. If a stalemate is setting in, they can decide on a cease fire. If it's time for the losing side to fall back, they can surrender, or even retreat off the map. The point being that the exact length of the battle is under the control of the players, rather than set by a unalterable clock that tends to force an unrealistic change in the battle during the last few turns. It's not the perfect solution, but it would help solve the last-second land grab.

As for realism -- arrival of other forces during 60 minutes as opposed to 30, ammo resupply, etc. By playing a battle in CMBO, you're already accepting the fact that the situation is 'isolated' for the time the battle takes place. It would take some fairly extensive research to convince me that resupply / reinforcement was so much more likely to occur within 60 minutes of the start of a battle, as opposed to 30 minutes, that it makes the 60 turn limit completely unrealistic. And even so, the turn limit could always be made 50 turns, or 40.

There should be an amount of time that is 'ample' for the battle to be fully decided in, without it being 'far too much'. And as I said, there's nothing that says the players must play out every turn until the clock runs out.

Question: Do you tend to find yourself playing more and more aggressively as the clock winds down? Is it because it's what you want to do, or because you have to grab the VCs before the last few turns expire? If you're being forced to rush, the 'game rules' are forcing you to. In some cases this may fit the scenario -- some objectives could be ruthlessly time dependent. But in most, I don't think a few minutes either way is going to make or break a RL victory.

Perhaps the suggestion by Mark IV, that the exact number of turns be 'slighty random' is a better solution. Or even have the option for the players to continue playing for an addition couple of turns if there are 'closely' contested victory flags. Either way, I think the issue of time should be more in the hands of the players, and less a set in stone limit.

[This message has been edited by Steve McClaire (edited 03-04-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

I agree the random end point is a fine idea.

Do I find aggressiveness increasing as the scenario ends - in long scenarios that is, and because the forces remaining drop like a rock. It is not a linear curve. As the active, unbroken units on one side drop off, the other side just goes hog wild and kills cowering sheep for the last 10 minutes. Which is about as realistic as a bucket of warm spit.

You say you can always just retreat off the map, but it simply isn't true. Only men in good order do so, and they are needed to protect those trying to rally, who are too dumb to run and will not even take a "withdrawn-run" order (unlike voluntary rout in certain other games).

In addition, reinforcement or release of reserves does not happen, and cease fires require agreement which there is generally no reason for the side with the upper hand locally, to give.

I find that realism in CM only exists if the game length is kept in a certain relationship with force sizes and map size, and definitely kept on the low side. Short CM fights are reasonably realistic in losses incurred and tactics employed, and do not become "winner take all, kill everybody" slaughters. Overly long ones stop being historical sims at all, and turn into last-man-standing first person shooters in an artificially confined "arena" (in time and space).

Armies protect their sub-elements. That is what layered sub-elements and nested, redundant structures are for - so that one formation can support another if it fails. If you take the CM scale failure times for a given unit size, and make games twice that long, you don't get realistic fighting but tiny unsupported forces fighting to the death on a deserted island.

In practice this means small games that are 20-25 minutes work, but 40 minutes on a small map is "gladiator". 30 minutes on a medium to large map works, but an hour is "gladiator". And I don't need a record of reinforcement times to know it. All I have to do is observe that some men survived WW II.