Most common US HMG: M1917 or M2?

[Maj. Battaglia]

I was recently conducting research for a scenario I am creating and found some information that challenged my perceptions on the use of the M2HB 50 caliber HMG in US rifle battalions and companies. The research took me to a web site on the US 106th infantry division. The person maintaining the site was a machine gunner in a heavy weapons company. His account is well worth reading. US 106th Inf Div

What struck me was that he was used an M1917A1 water-cooled 30 cal HMG. I thought this was odd, as I understood that these were rarely used by the US in the ETO. I suspected that because the 106th was somewhat hastily organized and sent to a sector where the Allies felt it would be quiet, that they might have been equipped with some lower quality weapons. I decided to look further.

A week plus later after poring over many personal accounts, war photos, sites on WWII weapons, info on the composition of infantry units, and, finally, the CM discussion boards, I do not have a clear answer. However, it appears that the M1917 was more common than I had imagined and that perhaps it is underrepresented in CM scenarios. Here is what I found (ask me if you want specific links):

The M1917 was listed in infantry battalion TO&E until at least mid-1952. Dot mil sites and other US gov't sources assert it was the battalion-level HMG until the mid-50's. The M2 shows up only in non-rifle units (engineers, field artillery, regimental AT & cannon cos, etc.), except for two in the rifle battalion HQ co. The heavy weapons cos. had 8 M1917 and each rifle company had 2 M1919.

Most photos I found of MG's in the field show M1917s as infantry support, and M2s in the context of artillery defense (each FA bn had 21!). Almost all personal accounts support the M1917 as the HMG support for rifle battalions, although one vet from the 3rd inf div posted a comment on their site, in reference to a picture, saying he had never seen M1917 in action (he didn't say what subunit he was with-if he was FA or cannon co, e.g., then that would make sense). A search of the CM board yielded little: the difference was mentioned briefly in one of the MG effectiveness marathons but without substantiation (please PLEASE let's not discuss MG effectiveness here).

One interesting interview from the 1970s I read was with Gen. William DuPuy, who served in the 90th div. in ETO from D+2 to the end, including as a battalion commander beginning early December 1944. Shortly after he assumed command, he assigned M2s from "battalion trains" to his heavy weapons company and indicated that the battalion then had "eight heavy machine guns, six 50 caliber machine guns. . ." to support his maneuver companies.

Since the US forces were notorious scroungers and US field commanders had more lattitude to deviate from approved field structure, I am quite certain that M2s saw frontline service. But I am now doubting that they were more common than the M1917 (in rifle battalions) or that they were integral components of rifle & heavy weapons companies. Examples like DuPuy are surely not isolated, but it takes initiative at some level, and initiative was not always plentiful. And of course, when on the defense, the US would have more M2s that had caught up with the infantry.

What have others found, and what sources were relied on (particularly print sources)? I have had to rely solely on Internet sources since I am living abroad currently. Further, I am not confident that the TO&Es I referenced were in effect through the end of the war. The heavy weapons company one is TO&E 7-18, 15 July 1944, for example.

My curiosity aside, in game terms the main difference is the anti-armor capability of the M2. It is a serious threat to Axis light armor, whereas the M1917 is not. This makes an impact on the defensive strength of the US, and therefore the game. I am less concerned about aesthetics or the superior effectiveness of the M2 vs. infantry targets.

If, as it is beginning to appear to me, the M1917 was indeed the main HMG supporting infantry operations, it is not something that need be fixed by BTS (although allowing its use in 1945 could be something to change). Scenarios can be tweaked by the individual user if that is preferred, and in quick battles and DYO, one only need consider that the M1917 was more commonly the HMG supporting the frontline and stock US troops accordingly (that is, if historical accuracy is sought-buy the M2 if you want to kick some butt).

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>What struck me was that he was used and M1917A1 water-cooled 30 cal HMG. I thought this was odd, as I understood that these were rarely used by the US in the ETO<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I had been under the same impression for awhile. However, I have seen a fair number of photos showing the M1917 in use in ETO...even through 1945. I have no idea on actual numbers employed or how they compared to the M2. However the number of photos of have seen would seem to imply that it was in relatively common use.

Just a side note there was a water cooled version of the 50 caliber as well. In use in ETO during the war. Large looking beast.

[gunnergoz]

The reality is that both saw heavy use in the ETO. M1917's were plentiful as they'd been dropped from most TO&E's and could be scrounged up easily. M2's were frequently salvaged from downed aircraft and immobilized vehicles. Water-cooled .50's were usually associated with ground-moun AA use and were on the early version of the M-15 as well.

The main disadvantage to all of these weapons is their weight. Consequently, they might be more prevalent in units with enough vehicles to carry them about, i.e. armored infantry, cav, HQ's and artillery battalions (for ground defense). Of course, units used "liberated" or "misplaced" vehicles. I recall reading that dozens of jeeps disappeared every week in Paris. Not all of them went to the black market and many must have been taken back to front-line units by the furloughed GI's who "found" them. The rear-area "chairborne infantry" of the COM-Z were universally despised by front line GI's and taking their vehicles was considered a coup.

[s_e_avenger]

The M1917 also had a greater capacity for sustained fire between barrel changes, because of the cooling system.

I see a lot of pictures of the 1919 being hand carried in the "assault mode" with maybe 50 or so rounds in the belt.

The M2 was usually considered too cumbersome for regular infantry operations (except defensive ones)

[Viceroy]

I looked at Terry Gander's "Allied Infantry weapons of WW2". p115 &p125

"M1917 total production by the time the war ended 53,859." BTW 10,000 0f these were given to the Brits in 1940, who assigned them to Home Guard units.

"the M1917 ... was overwhelmed in numerical superiority by the Browning air-cooled variants."

"no fewer than 389,251 M1919A4 guns for flexible mountings" [were produced]

"by the end of the war no fewer than 1,451,842 M2 guns had been manufactured for land, sea and air applications. To these could be added a further 429,056 M2's specifically for ground applications."

These figures would seem to support the BTS approach that the M1917, though it saw a long and distinguished service, was less common than the M1919 and M2.

[Username]

Was the M1917 in production before the war started?

I have seen pics of these water cooled weapons in every theater and in Korea. The only bad thing about them was the weight.

If the air cooled version over-heated the barrel, then it was SOL since there wasnt a quick way to change barrels.

It should be interesting to see how the Maxims perform in CM2.

Lewis

[JasonC]

Well, for what they are worth here are my impressions and opinions on this subject. The basis is many official histories usually on a higher scale, but that mention the role of MGs in fights, and some lessons-learned documents, especially from Italy, that detail the sort of field modifications used in practice.

In general, the troops vastly preferred the M1919A4 air-cooled to either of the heavier guns. It was considered much handier, easier to carry and use. Compared to the 50 cal in particular, the much lighter ammo was also extremely important, as it allowed numerically much large total ammo loads for the same weight carried.

The army assigned many 50 cals to small subunits, and to every sort of vehicle imaginable, primary for its superior -air defense- abilities. At the time the formation types and the whole army structure were planned out, the prestige of the German "blitzkrieg" was at its height. And popular understanding of it included a large emphasis on the role of the air force in supporting the rapid ground attacks. Being able to deal with enemy air attack was a topic very much on the minds of US army planners.

The early US plans for the army involved levels of AA that are barely believable in restrospect. At one point, 400 AA battalions were planned for a 50 division army. As the air war was won, these ambitious to silly plans were scaled back, by a factor of two, then as much again. But I believe the abundant levels of 50 cals assigned down to small unit levels, largely reflect this earlier concern. Artillery batteries did not have lots of 50 cals to deal with enemy infantry or halftracks, but with Stukas - which never showed up for the party.

All the 50 cals being around, they were of course put to use in ground action. But when the infantry could help it or choose, they put the 50s on vehicles and carried air-cooled 30 cals instead, because they could carry so much more ammo for them and thus get more firing done. Nobody wanted to carry the heavy foot 50s, nor the ammo, and they pointed out the waste involved in the effort to their superiors. The same level of physical effort just brought more infantry firepower in lighter 30 cal form. When a vehicle motor was going to do all the work, there was no objection to the M2.

The water-cooled 30 cals, as I understand it, were meant to fufill the role of WW I MGs - denial of open areas on defense with industrial levels of ammo "thruput". As such, they were assigned to the -battalion- weapons company, rather than the -company- weapons platoon. That had been the level that had mattered in the previous war. A battalion in position with its water-cooled 30s amply supplied with ammo and dug in, could defy frontal attack by infantry, unless and until heavy weapons KO'ed the MGs. But they were not expected to be moved about as fast as the infantry moved.

I think the reason they were not as common or as liked was that the US infantry was usually attacking, not defending in position. The front often moved only a small amount each day, but it generally moved. Battalion level supported with mortar fire from a distance, but the rest of its weapons - 57mm ATG as well as the MG platoon - were mostly positional and defensive, and when they moved did so by vehicle. The troops preferred a gun they could easily carry, because infantry does not only go places trucks or jeeps can go.

In the Italy lessons reports, the things front line company and battalion commanders say are like this. Companies should bring only 2 mortars but bring more ammo for each of them, and leave the excess men on ammo detail to hump more forward. Bring all the 30 cal ammo you can carry, and enough air-cooled 30 cals to fire it all off. Bring the BARs and the zooks, and lots of grenades. Forget about anything heavier. Leave the 50s with the vehicles. Use the 57mm ATG men as extra riflemen. Leave the 81mm mortars someplace that can support, and move them up after each advance to a new position a ways back, trucking up their ammo.

The clear implication is that the limit the total unit faces in combat power it can carry is -weight-, and especially weight of the -ammo-. MGs that can fire 10 times the bullets before overheating are irrelevant when the lighter ones can fire everything you can hump, already. MGs that fire bullets that weigh several times as much each are wasteful compared to more bullets.

Extra tubes to fire off ammo faster are not needed very much - the thing is to have more bullets or shells to fire off, and enough tubes to push it through, and then to keep those tubes as light as possible in order to carry more ammo. In infantry fighting, the MGs and BARs do the ranged work, and grenades do the close work.

I think one should use the M1917s when you are depicting a -battalion- position on the -defense-. They belong in the same sorts of fights 57mm ATGs belong in. When attacking, neither the 50 cals nor the M1917s belong with the attacking force. Extra 1919 MMGs and zooks should be used instead. In CM terms, take the items with "medium" speed or better.

An attacking company may have 2-3 60mm mortars and up to 4 1919A4 MMGs and zooks (each). If you are editing the scenarios, use 2 60mm mortars and boost the ammo to maximum, around 50 rounds rather than 35. One might also boost the ammo per MMG to around 80 or 90.

The essential point to grok is that how fast the ammo load could be fired was often tactically less important than the total size of the load. And there were direct trade offs between weight of heavy weapons carried, and weight of the ammo load carried. Fewer and lighter weapons with more ammo each, is the formula the front line troops were continually harping on to the brass.

Some of that may reflect the conditions in Italy, with lots of steep hills to go up and down, including many places tactically critical where roads did not go. But the logic of it is pretty obvious. This does not mean the heavier types would not be used, just that they would be used in conditions where vehicles not men moved their ammo, and moved it to one spot then left them there, if possible. Which generally means defensive operations, or right along the roads - mounted on the vehicles themselves, or all of the above.

In the after action reports, one hears again and again about the intervention of an M2 in a battle. But it is overwhelmingly the M2 "on the jeep", or "on the truck", or "on the halftrack", or roof mounted on the AFVs.

One man's impressions, for what they are worth.

[Viceroy]

JasonC,

a very good post. Lots of good useful info.

A shame that not all your posts are of this quality.

[ 06-07-2001: Message edited by: Viceroy ]

[Maj. Battaglia]

Thanks to all who have responded so far. Good points all around. We may never have a full picture of HMG use due to the dynamic nature of the equipment frontline infantry carry. The fact that it depends on whether they are in a defensive or offensive posture (and then that can change quickly) only complicates things. I am hoping to figure out what a realistic US HMG mix is. When reading accounts and after action reports that aid in scenario design, there is not usually a detailed list of what support weapons were in the hands of the participants.

Infantry division TO&Es that I have seen put the M1917A1 only in the hands of the combat engineers (2 per platoon) and the infantry heavy weapons companies, eight to a company. (Cos. D, H, & M were heavy weapons--A,B,C,E,F,G,I,K,L were the rifle companies and (officially) had no HMGs, just two M1919A4 (or A6) each). These TO&Es are from 1944. A 1952 infantry battalion TO&E even showed 4 M1917A1 and 8 M2 per rifle battalion. Like I said earlier, TO&Es don't tell the whole story, but it is a start.

Looking at production figures as Viceroy has done is also one approach, but in some ways it is opening Pandora's Box. It is hard to trace what happened to each weapon, where they were sent (Russia, Free French, etc.), if they were mounted on vehicles, etc. Lewis also points out that the M1917A1 had been in production for some time before the war and asks whether the figure in Gander's book is war production or the number of pieces in inventory at the end of the war. But in any case, with eight M1917A1 per battalion, 24 per regt, and 90 per division (including 18 with the engineer battalion), less than 10,000 would have been needed to equip every infantry & armor division in the Army (a 6/45 armor division TO&E shows 129 in the inf. and eng. bns.). Even replacing every one TWICE due to losses would require less than 30,000. (Note: my 1944 inf. div. TO&E info does not include divisional stores, while I think the 1945 armor one does.)

According to the same 1944 TO&Es I have, there should be 156 M2s per infantry division. On the face of it it looks like the M2 would be more common. However, each infantry battalion would only be allotted 2, which resided in the battalion HQ. An infantry regiment had a total of 12, six from the infantry battalions and three each in the AT and Cannon companies. Of the 156, then, only 36 would be in the rifle regiments. The artillery brigade within the division held 89(!) of them, the engineer battalion had 12 (one per platoon and 3 in HQ) and the rest were scattered to other attached companies. The question is, how many filtered down to the rifle battalions/companies? Enough so that each rifle company could rely on one and a battalion six or more?

Jason C's point about employment of HMGs is worth noting-used in defense or attack overwatch from at least a couple hundred yards back.

Thank you for all your opinions and factoids.

Useful links at US Army Military History Institute: WWII Docs & 6/45 US Armor Div TO&E

[ 06-07-2001: Message edited by: Maj. Battaglia ]

[Viceroy]

Maj. Battaglia

I think you're right about Pandora's Box! For the sake of completeness I'll tell what he says about Lend-Lease quantities.

Gander says, there are no figures for Lend-lease M1917s.

M1919 LL he gives totals of 30,735.

M2 LL he says 15,083

But as you said, such figures do give as many questions as answers.

[JasonC]

I think the TOE given fits AA work as the original reason for the 50 cal assignments. I'll go through it and explain why I think that.

"each infantry battalion would only be allotted 2, which resided in the battalion HQ."

That would be the tactical operations center. Radio traffic in and out. Signals intel triangulates, so a possible air target. But not easy to do. Also far enough forward to be identified by ground observation, then targeted.

"three each in the AT and Cannon companies."

Cannon company - firing indirect. Radio traffic and flash-sound ranging for counterbattery. Another potential air target.

AT company - a bit less clear. But the blitzkrieg idea was though to involve armor attacks supported by airstrikes. The ATGs are obviously essential to stopping armor. So if the planes are trying to clear them and coordinate with the tanks closely in real time, then a potential air target. A bit paranoid, but my point is, they were.

"The artillery brigade within the division held 89(!) of them"

12 firing batteries (4 battalions) and five tactical HQs (4 battalions and one for the regiment), plus ammo dumps. When you think of it as ~4 50 cal for each possible tactical target, it doesn't seem like such overkill. As AA, that is.

You can also, incidentally, see the sort of logic that pushed them toward te ridiculously high number of planned AA battalions at one point. The number of points that -might- face air attack is huge.

Also, these units would see much of the radio traffic of the division, and also the obvious -located- points in the rear area for air to go after. Ammo dumps are another potential target for obvious reasons.

"the engineer battalion had 12 (one per platoon and 3 in HQ)"

Bridges. Obvious enough.

So, it seems to me quite clear the -TOE- role envisioned for 50 cals was close-in air defense of division positions, that might be particular targets for light bombers or fighter-bombers. While some would use them that way at first, everybody quickly found that the Luftwaffe was basically a no-show.

Then they have all these splendid 50s - but they are too darn heavy to lug around in the infantry, and there are no targets for them in the air above. So what happens to them?

I think what happens to them is everybody and his brother mounts one on a vehicle, "shotgun" style. For road column, at first it would be an air defense measure still. Drive across France, though, and you will wind up using them on any number of roadblocks and such.

After not very long, people are used to the idea of bringing up the "wagon" to hose down the injuns, whenever they get into trouble. I doubt they all stay in the artillery batteries, either. Some, certainly. Some probably come forward while some newly liberated wine goes to the rear.

Messy I know, and not the kind of precision answer you are after. I doubt there is a correct one. The lessons learned reports in Italy regularly speak of the assigned 50 cals, but if you look at the ammo being supplied and expended, it is tiny compared to the 30s. In the battle reports in France, you often hear about the intervention of 1-2 vehicle mounted 50 cals turning a firefight around.

I think their front line use was probably ad hoc. TOE or tactical-thought pressure to send them forward dismounted would be resisted for the weight and ammo reasons already mentioned and remain ineffective, as far as the leg infantry were concerned. TOE ideas of using them in the rear for air defense were outdated and irrelevant. They probably gravitated to the vehicles that could carry them around without putting anyone out, and that everyone had some access to, one way or another. Then they got used often, but ad hoc.

It is a messy reconstruction and involves plenty of supposition and guesswork. But it is the picture of their role I think is realistic and meets the various known facts about them. In CM terms, a company may have 0-3 jeep MGs, with 1-2 more common - that would be my guess.

[ 06-07-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Maj. Battaglia]

JasonC again makes a very good point when stressing the intended AA use for the M2. This is supported by an account I read where the veteran stated that international conventions at the time prohibited antipersonnel use of machine guns over 11 mm, except in self defense. Of course, I am sure these conventions were not observed by field commanders of either side, but the guys back in Washington drawing up the TO&Es would probably have them in mind. That would justify giving them to non-rifle, composite units of the division in need of AA. Secondarily, they could be used against light armor breakthrough or attacking personnel.

I'd be interested to see a training manual for the M2HB from the time to see what role is stressed.