Attrition and Maneuver- Apples and Oranges

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by CavScout:

The Japanese are not the only ones to have soldiers disagree with what was happening or had been ordered but continued to do their job. I fail to see how you can attribute this as some Japanese 'trait' other than some foolish racist idea.

Secondly, he planned the mission and it failed. The failure is his responsibility. It is much to easy to say, "I didn't want to do it... I was just following orders.."

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 02-23-2001).]

CavScout, let me spell it out clearly to you. This post of yours has nothing to do with the question you asked, which for convenience purposes is posted below.

Originally posted by CavScout:

Why would he plan something he thought had no chance? Midway was his baby.

I attempted to answer your question - because that was the 'kata' of the Japanese of thinking. Maybe. Another explanation. But you also answered it - he attempted the battle because he was a soldier, and soldiers obey orders. Most of the time. Regardless of whether they are Japanese.

Then you conveniently ignore the answer and accuse me of racism. This does not come as a surprise to me, since I am used to your inflammatory language, trolling attitude and your rather liberal attitude towards the truth. I had hoped that maybe that was a one-off, but apparently you can not sustain a discussion without either resorting to insults, jingoism, or plain untruths.

I am sure that if this discussion continues I will in no time be labelled a Nazi Worshipper and lots of other things by you. You have already started on racism.

Well then - to just make it clear: you have no clue what you are talking about. Japanese and Western soldiers in World War II had quite different attitudes to surrender, that much should be certain, and even be accepted by someone with the inability to reason you so consistently display. No racism at all. It is called cultural differences, and to deny them is just another form of racism.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Spook]

I would like to relate two intriguing comments from the review of Stennitt's "Day of Deceit":

"While battles raged in Europe, North Africa and China, opinion polls in the summer of 1940 indicated that most Americans did not want their country involved in another war. Disillusioned by the failure of their nation's idealistic commitment to 'make the world safe for democracy' in World War I, many Americans had chosen to retreat into isolationism rather than send their sons to face the horrors of combat. The isolationist lobby in America was loud and strong, demanding that President Franklin D. Roosevelt keep the United States out of any foreign wars."

"Yet, at that moment, Great Britain was standing alone against the Axis powers. Roosevelt and important members of his cabinet--displaying more vision and realism than most citizens--became convinced that a victorious Germany would threaten the national security of the United States. They believed Americans needed to become more involved."

"Given public sentiment at the time, the president believed that his countrymen would rally only to oppose an overt act of war on the United States. In order to achieve this, the president, in concert with his advisers, decided that the only means of accomplishing this was to provoke Japan."

Interesting. Though I pause to wonder why not a more concerted effort was applied to directly get Germany to commit more overt acts instead (like the sinking of the USS Reuben James), if war with Germany was the central goal all along instead of protection of US interests in the Pacific & East Asia. Regardless, this review does certainly provide grist for the controversy mill.

Another quote:

"One of the most shocking of McCollum's proposals, says the author, was Action D, the deployment of U.S. warships within or adjacent to Japanese territorial waters. During secret White House meetings, Roosevelt personally took charge of Action D, labeling the provocations 'pop-up' cruises. According to Stinnett, Roosevelt said, 'I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing. I don't mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six.' Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet, objected, saying, 'It is ill-advised and will result in war if we make this move.' "

"From March through July 1941, Stinnett writes, White House records show that FDR flouted international law and dispatched naval task groups into Japanese waters on three such cruises. One of the most provocative was a sortie into the Bungo Strait, southeast of Honshu, the principal access to Japan's Inland Sea."

Again, interesting. But does the book confirm these cruises, noted in the White House records, with US Navy logs from the ships performing the alleged saber-rattling cruises? Or was there also sufficient support for FDR in the US Navy Dept to keep these covered from Navy records?

Again, this book review is quite intriguing by itself, let alone reading Stennitt's book.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Then you conveniently ignore the answer and accuse me of racism. This does not come as a surprise to me, since I am used to your inflammatory language, trolling attitude and your rather liberal attitude towards the truth. I had hoped that maybe that was a one-off, but apparently you can not sustain a discussion without either resorting to insults, jingoism, or plain untruths.

I am sure that if this discussion continues I will in no time be labelled a Nazi Worshipper and lots of other things by you. You have already started on racism.

Let me see... you claimed to know why a Japanese Admrial did something in WWII based on the observations of a few Japanese co-workers, workers you never spoke to it seems. If that is not sterotyping... what is?

Well then - to just make it clear: you have no clue what you are talking about. Japanese and Western soldiers in World War II had quite different attitudes to surrender, that much should be certain, and even be accepted by someone with the inability to reason you so consistently display. No racism at all. It is called cultural differences, and to deny them is just another form of racism.

What does the differences in "surrender" have to do with the planning of Midway?

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 02-23-2001).]

[CavScout]

Spook interesting quotes but what do they mean? How does provoking a war with Japan help us fight against Germany?

It is not like the Japanese were fighting the British at the time, were they?

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Let me see... you claimed to know why a Japanese Admrial did something in WWII based on the observations of a few Japanese co-workers, workers you never spoke to it seems. If that is not sterotyping... what is?

Never talked to them - you are hilarious. I lived and worked with these people for two years.

I never claimed to 'know why', I offered an alternative explanation from your's that first seemed to be 'Yamamoto was an idiot', and now seems to be 'he did it because he was a soldier'. I did not even say that the explanation I offered was the one I believed in. Just food for thought.

Originally posted by CavScout:

What does the differences in "surrender" have to do with the planning of Midway?

You stated that pointing out cultural differences is akin to racism. This is one that actually existed.

Full of contradictions today, are we?

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 02-23-2001).]

[Peter White]

Originally posted by CavScout:

The Japanese are not the only ones to have soldiers disagree with what was happening or had been ordered but continued to do their job. I fail to see how you can attribute this as some Japanese 'trait' other than some foolish racist idea.

Secondly, he planned the mission and it failed. The failure is his responsibility. It is much to easy to say, "I didn't want to do it... I was just following orders.."

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 02-23-2001).]

Of course, it is not a uniquely Japanese to consider honor and duty over one's own personal judgement. It is a cultural trait known many places to varying degrees. The testimony only indicates that these particular values are common in Japan today; presumably they were in the past as well.

Midway was a pretty solid plan. It is only through great luck that the results were so very lopsided. If IJN had had the good luck, Midway would have been theirs and any significant US offensives would have been set back 12+ months.

At least Yamanto put together a plan that even with 20-20 hindsight had a reasonable chance of fulfilling its immediate goals. If were to "reroll the dice" on the exact same scenario, it could have been 3 US carriers on the bottom and the IJN celebrating. Not that that would have changed the eventual outcome of the war.

Changing subjects, personally, I consider the conspiracy theories to get Pearl Harbor bombed ludicrous. There were many suspicions of an upcoming Japanese offensives because the British and Dutch possessions were easy pickings. They needed the oil because of US sanctions. Going from the carrier fleet going into radio silence to an attack on Pearl Harbor is a big leap.

The real problem of intelligence is sifting through stacks of data to find useful information. With the benefit of hindsight, one can always dig up a few random scraps of data that give the right answer. Knowing which 99% of the data to ignore is easy after the fact. Tongue firmly in cheek, there are very few surprise historical events that could not be predicted in from reading the history books.

Furthermore the conspracy theorists do not answer the question of why FDR did not have his cake and eat it too. Running a few early morning airbase drills and repositioning a couple submarines, would have reduced the lopsidedness of the attack while still successfully embroiling us in a war.

[Ksak]

The sometimes inexplicable combat activities of the Japanese Navy in WW2 is a fascinating topic. After the smashing success of the initial air strike at Pearl Harbor the air commander did not order follow-up strikes nor did the main body move in to shell the docking facilities and keep the US Navy in San Diego for another year or so; nor did the fleet attempt to find the American carriers that were not docked at Pearl. Instead, they turned around and went home.

At Midway, which Peter White pointed out quite accurately could have easily gone the other way, the main body did not look for and pursue the American carriers to destroy them in a surface engagement. They turned around and went home.

At Guadalcanal, after soundly defeating an American cruiser fleet, they did not continue into the harbor to destroy the Marines supply transports. Guess where they went instead?

Yet later in the war, when it had to be obvious to every ensign that there was absolutely no chance of winning, the Japanese Navy threw massive fleets at overwhelming American power and this time did not disengage to destruction.

Do you also find the contrast between timidity with overwhelming strength and suicidal courage with inferior forces a strange mixture?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Ksak:

The sometimes inexplicable combat activities of the Japanese Navy in WW2 is a fascinating topic. After the smashing success of the initial air strike at Pearl Harbor the air commander did not order follow-up strikes nor did the main body move in to shell the docking facilities and keep the US Navy in San Diego for another year or so; nor did the fleet attempt to find the American carriers that were not docked at Pearl. Instead, they turned around and went home.

At Midway, which Peter White pointed out quite accurately could have easily gone the other way, the main body did not look for and pursue the American carriers to destroy them in a surface engagement. They turned around and went home.

At Guadalcanal, after soundly defeating an American cruiser fleet, they did not continue into the harbor to destroy the Marines supply transports. Guess where they went instead?

Yet later in the war, when it had to be obvious to every ensign that there was absolutely no chance of winning, the Japanese Navy threw massive fleets at overwhelming American power and this time did not disengage to destruction.

Do you also find the contrast between timidity with overwhelming strength and suicidal courage with inferior forces a strange mixture?

Was it courage or hopelessness? I would venture to say there is a large difference. Not to say the Japanese sailor/marine/soldier/airman was not brave - he certainly was - but their culture and way of thinking is so foreign to westerners that it is hard to properly ascribe to them the proper motives for their actions.

We call mid east terrorists "cowards" for blowing themselves up and taking "our boys" with them. Why do we think more highly of the Japanese for using the EXACT SAME TACTICS?

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

Never talked to them - you are hilarious. I lived and worked with these people for two years.

I never claimed to 'know why', I offered an alternative explanation from your's that first seemed to be 'Yamamoto was an idiot', and now seems to be 'he did it because he was a soldier'. I did not even say that the explanation I offered was the one I believed in. Just food for thought.

Let me see, you said, "I never talked to my Japanese colleagues about Yamamoto."

You "observed" traits from some co-workers and applied it to a race. Don't dance around it.

You stated that pointing out cultural differences is akin to racism. This is one that actually existed.

Full of contradictions today, are we?

Contridictions? I just question your irrelvent point.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Let me see, you said, "I never talked to my Japanese colleagues about Yamamoto."

You "observed" traits from some co-workers and applied it to a race. Don't dance around it.

Contridictions? I just question your irrelvent point.

Irrelevant to you, but we all know how you handle arguments that contradict a long cherished opinion of yours.

For the record, I also have a degree in Japanese studies, backed up by living there for two years.

I never applied my statement to race, but to culture. Again, a subtle difference that is obviously lost on you. So there is little point debating it with you, since you won't get it.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Spook]

Responding to Ksak's pondering of Japanese naval fleet actions:

The sometimes inexplicable combat activities of the Japanese Navy in WW2 is a fascinating topic. After the smashing success of the initial air strike at Pearl Harbor the air commander did not order follow-up strikes nor did the main body move in to shell the docking facilities and keep the US Navy in San Diego for another year or so; nor did the fleet attempt to find the American carriers that were not docked at Pearl. Instead, they turned around and went home.

Certainly, a follow-up raid onto Pearl to damage more effectively the dock facilities, fuel tanks, and sub pens had merit. But the Pearl raiding force was just that---a raiding force. Staying too long risked attack from US subs if not from the US carriers. Also, Japanese amphib operations were going in effect in Southeast Asia, Malaya, and the Philippines. The Japanese carriers might've been needed to support those on contingency if Allied resistance at those places was more effective. More closely, two of the carriers of the Pearl force were detailed over to help support the invasion of Wake Island.

At Midway, which Peter White pointed out quite accurately could have easily gone the other way, the main body did not look for and pursue the American carriers to destroy them in a surface engagement. They turned around and went home.

For a short time, Yamamoto did gamely try to pursue the US carrier groups. But with his task forces being relatively slower, and given that US planes could "reach" farther than guns on the open seas, the initiative in "setting up" engagements remained on the US side. And staying around near Midway carried several hazards. US subs were on hand, and reinforcing bombers could have shuttled from Hawaii to Midway. Yamamoto thus knew that he might be risking even worse losses for marginal gain.

At Guadalcanal, after soundly defeating an American cruiser fleet, they did not continue into the harbor to destroy the Marines supply transports. Guess where they went instead?

This does seem inexplicable, and was a major strategic error by the commander of the Japanese cruiser force. But the Japanese commander might've felt that remaining around too much longer might've risked US aerial attack of the Japanese cruisers in daylight, as the US carriers weren't "pegged" in location yet.

Besides, this wasn't the only Japanese naval foray into the Guadalcanal region, and one later naval raid did bombard Henderson Field with gunfire. That the Japanese forced repeat naval engagements certainly showed a willingness to try and hardly was "timid" behavior, but after Santa Cruz, Japanese naval air support came only from Rabaul and couldn't coordinate with the Japanese surface ships effectively. The Guadalcanal engagements cost 35 warships for each side.